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PREFACE
Rural development experiences in Bangladesh and Pakistan
provide a major opportunity to examine the evolving interrelation-
ships between technical, economic, political, and social change.
Over the last quarter ofa century, these experiences have occurred
in the context of a series of national development plans and the
onset ofthe "green revolution." * These rural development efforts
have had mixed results. In recent years Pakistan's Punjab has
broken international agricultural records through very rapid rates
ofgrowth in wheat production. However, current social and politi-
cal trends in rural areas of Pakistan suggest considerable uncer-
tainty about future agricultural development and increased rural
conflict. To the east, the continuing touch-and-go struggle of the
Bengali people to increase rural welfare raises grave questions
about national economy viability in agriculture and reasonable
political stability.
These papers provide the first in-depth study of the problems
and processes ofrural development, up to 1972, in the two regions /
of the former nation of Pakistan. The analyses are set against the
backdrop ofhistorical change and the emergent social and political
structures. They are undertaken in widely varying resource con-
texts, from the irrigated and unirrigated regions oflow rainfall and
relatively low population density in Pakistan to the monsoon ag-
ricultural regions ofhigh rainfall and exceedingly high population
density in Bangladesh. They include details of significant
technological developments behind the green revolution in South
Asia. The papers aid the student ofdevelopment to gain insight into
how different sets of strategies are rooted in, and interact with,
* The term "green revolution" refers to the recent large-scale development of
high-yielding varieties of wheat, rice, and other grains, whose introduction into
developing countries has greatly increased crop yields and food production.
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historical, but changing, social structures. Attention is focused on
evaluating the results of successful strategies as well as on under-
standing unintended outcomes. In doing so, these papers provide
essential knowledge ofthe lessons ofpast economic developments
at a critical turning point in South Asian history. In accomplishing
these tasks they point to major rural development issues of the
1970s in these two large Asian nations and provide guidelines for
future planning.
Fundamental questions of economic and cultural change are
explored in these two important agricultural regions ofthe subcon-
tinent, which have shared a common colonial history and until
recently the same administrative and political structures. The
questions taken up in these studies include the extent to which
social structures are flexible and responsive to technical and.
economic changes, alternative roles for the civil bureaucracy in
rural development, the extent ofthe impact ofgovernment policies
and planning on rural development, the unexpected social effects
of private and governmental agricultural development achieve-
ments, the extent to which rural income disparities are increasing,
and the impact of original experiments in institutional change on
government programs.
Three general themes emerge: of agricultural stagnation and
geographically limited spurts ofgrowth in each nation; ofthe need
for political and administrative change to accompany social,
economic, and technological developments; and ofthe importance
ofthe interrelationships between social structures and the distribu-
tion of the benefits of technical and economic progress in rural
areas.
Most of the authors represented in this volume were active
participants in rural development programs in these nations in the
1960s. They have sought to analyze past developments, both as a
guide to future rural strategy in these nations and for the lessons
these experiences may provide for other developing nations. De-
spite notable successes, uncertainty is so great about the future
directions of these large rural areas of South Asia that questions
keep arising as to whether these national and rural social systems
will be able to change themselves rapidly enough in an evolution-
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ary manner, or whether economic and political events will occur so '
rapidly that revolutionary change will ensue.
.~ The following political events provide a time frame for the
analyses that follow. In August 1947, Pakistan attained indepen-
dence from Britain as a result of the partition of the subcontinent
with India. The new nation led by Governor General Mohammed
Ali Jinnah comprised the predominantly Muslim areas in Bengal
(East Pakistan) and all or parts of five regions in the northwestern
area of the subcontinent, the Punjab, North-West Frontier Pro-
vince, Kashmir, the Sind, and Baluchistan (West Pakistan). A dec-
ade later, in October 1958, after a series ofshort-lived governments,
the army in a bloodless coup installed General Ayub Khan as
president of Pakistan. Ayub Khan ruled for ten years until he
resigned under pressure in March 1969. General Yahya Khan,
commander-in-chief of the army, then became president and pre-
sided over elections in December 1970 that gave a sweeping vic-
tory to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League in East Pakistan
and a decisive victory to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Peoples' Party in
West Pakistan. A few months later, on March 26, 1971, as the result
of a constitutional crisis over the powers of the central and provin-
cial governments and a mass attack launched by the Pakistan Army
upon the Awami League, students, faculty, Hindus, and others in
East Pakistan, an independent Bangladesh was declared. Warfare
ensued between the Pakistan Army and the Mukhti Bahini gueril-
las. On December 3, 1971, the Indian government ordered her
troops to advance on Dacca, and on December 16, the Pakistan
Army in East Pakistan surrendered. Pakistan's disastrous losses led
to Bhutto's being sworn in as president ofwhat remained ofPakis-
tan (West Pakistan). On January 10,1972, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
returned in triumph to Dacca to become the first prime minister of
the nation of Bangladesh.
Four major needs led to this volume and the preceding re-
search workshop, which refined the analyses. The first was the
often-noted relative dearth ofscholarship available on Bangladesh
and Pakistan, particularly as compared with material on the more
accessible and popular areas of the subcontinent, such as India. A
few studies are available on the general economic and political
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development of Bangladesh and Pakistan, but relatively little
scholarly work treats rural development.
The second need was for more analysis of rural social and
economic change, in view of the dominance of rural people and of
agricultural production in national economic life. In 1965, more
than 57 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GOP) of East
Pakistan originated in agriculture. In West Pakistan where other
economic activities had grown more rapidly, agriculture remained
in 1965 by far the most important industry, originating more than 35
percent of the GOP. All manufacturing industries together origi-
nated less than 13 percent of West Pakistan's GOP in 1965.
The importance ofrural areas in these nations is shown also by
the proportion of population residing in them. The rural popula-
tion, which depends directly or indirectly almost entirely on ag- .
ricultural and associated rural economic activities, was estimated
for both "wings" ofPakistan at 85 percent ofthe total population in
1965.
The term "rural development" is used in this volume to en-
compass the whole range of technical, economic, political, and
social changes related to private and governmental efforts to in-
crease the well-being ofrural citizens. As agriculture is the domin-
ant economic activity in rural areas, a large share of the scholarly
work properly has focused on this sector, a distribution reflected in
this volume. Other fields of rural development include the whole
range ofthe technical and social sciences, especially such fields as
water technology, administration and government, political de-
velopment, and community social and cultural change.
The third need was professional: to integrate the research
results of different disciplines into a reasonably consistent under-
standing of Significant trends in rural development. As rural de-
velopment involves many interrelated economic and cultural
changes, the strengths of different professional tools and ap-
proaches can provide a more general analysis upon which we may
have greater confidence. The workShop was a first attempt to as-
semble a group of scholars representing an appropriate range of
social science diSCiplines to focus on problems of rural develop-
ment in Pakistan. The authors in this volume, although they some-
times come to different conclusions on major issues, are, to an
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extraordinary degree, in general agreement about the major
changes that are underway in rural areas of Pakistan and
Bangladesh.
A particular professional challenge was presented by the fact
that although the two areas were under one governmental and
administrative structure, two very different rural development out-
comes occurred due to large differences in the physical environ-
ments and cultural settings. The bringing together of the two ex-
periences in one volume thus provides a broader understanding of
rural development processes.
The fourth need relates to the timing ofthese papers. With the
resignation ofAyub Khan in 1969 many observers concluded that
an important phase in South Asian history had passed. It was an
appropriate time therefore to examine past successes and failures
with an eye to guides for future action. The authors represented in
the volume recognized they were writing at a watershed moment in
the history of South Asia.
One result of these papers is to underline a conclusion about
the process of economic change and rural development around
which there appears to be growing consensus and of which
Bangladesh and Pakistan today are outstanding examples, for if,
indeed, we were slow to grasp the by now obvious point these
studies highlight, the experience ofthese areas drives it home with
considerable force. They demonstrate most vividly that the process,
ofchange and development in the new states, with their traditional
social structures and pluralistic political cultures, is more likely to '
accentuate conflict than to moderate it. These papers emphasize.
the continual dilemmas, between the constraints of economic
choice and the demands ofpolitical management, and between the
decisions needed to stimulate economic growth and the accommo-
dations required to ensure distributive justice. At the national
level, the experience ofthese peoples in the 1960s suggests in this
latter connection that when the gap between growth and equity
widens-<>r is perceived to have widened beyond acceptable
levels-ensuing conflict may tragically vitiate the gains of de-
velopment itself. This, perhaps, is the central lesson of this de-
velopment experience to date.
The studies presented here are grouped under the geographic
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headings of Bangladesh and Pakistan. In doing so the quite differ-
ent cultural and resource conditions of the two regions are recog-
nized. The word Pakistan is employed for the western wing of the
former united nation to reflect current political boundaries, except
when the context of the discussion applies to the period August
1947-December 1971. During this time period Pakistan refers to
both wings. Bibliographical citations employ the national designa-
tion existing at the time of publication.
Most ofthe papers in this volume were delivered in draft form
at a graduate Research Workshop on Rural Development in Pakis-
tan, held at Michigan State University, June 21-July 28, 1971,
under the sponsorship of the Asian Studies Center. As it happened,
the workshop occurred three months after the military actions
began in March'1971 in East Pakistan. At times this led to a highly
charged atmosphere. However, the discussions, which examined
in depth certain ofthe fundamental issues in rural development in
both regions, served to illuminate to both Bengalis and Pakistanis
the interrelationships ofsocial and economic development, which
were minimally related to or influenced by the passions of the
moment. And although the printed word can convey only partially
the authors' sense ofurgency, no one present at the Michigan State
University workshop when the papers were first delivered and who
participated in the animated, but intensely serious, discussion that
they suscitated, can doubt the saliency ofthe underlying concerns
to which they were directed.
The editors express their appreciation for the contributions of
all the participants in the workship, including the twenty graduate
students, Bengali, Pakistani, and American, and especially to the
participating profeSSionals, only some ofwhom are represented in
this volume. Without the intense interchange, the revised papers
offered here would have been much wider off the mark.
Gratitude is expressed to the Ford Foundation for the financial
aid that made the workshop and the writing ofthis volume possible.
Additional support in the final editing of the manuscript was pro-
vided by the Title 211-d grant to the Department of Agricultural
Economics, Michigan State University, by the U.S. Agency for
International Development.
Particular thanks are expressed to Professor William T. Ross,
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director ofthe Asian Studies Center; to Professor Harry L. Case for
editorial advice; and also to the staff of the Asian Studies Center,
including particularly Dorothy Doane for administrative and gen-
eral support during the workshop. We have appreciated the cheer-
fully offered editorial aid ofAddiann Hinds and Nancy L. Stevens,
and secretarial services of Sylvia Anderson, Colleen M. Heron,
Diane Hutchinson, Julia McKay, Patti Stiiller, and Marilyn Wil-
cox. We appreciate also the careful and thorough work of Mrs.
Aileen Brothers who prepared the index.

PART I
RURAL
DEVELOPMENT
IN BANGLADESH

1
Rural Development
in Bangladesh:
An Introduction
Peter J. Bertocci
Emerging as an independent nation in December 1971,
Bangladesh presented a composite picture of all the extremes of
poverty and underdevelopment in the Third World. So stark ap-
peared the problems confronting the new state that some world
political leaders and not a few development speCialists predicted
Bangladesh would remain a perennially aid-dependent interna-
tional "basket case" for some time to come. The underlying con-
cerns that have buttressed this gloomy outlook are not difficult to
perceive. They lie in the country's iI].adeq~ely pro<!.t:~ti~_e.£()sys­
~~hel~&~~2'.i!.h~§.j!lQ~r.itedJfQJlt,th~systems ,ofagdCJII-
tural management and ruralp!1l:>liG,aclministrati9RQfpa§tcenturi~s,
"--]hngladeshri'7g~ilij;npeopleinhabit 55,000 square miles of
low-lying deltaic terrain, which is itself the product of one of the
world's greatest riverine systems. Its rice agriculture, supplemen-
ted over the past 150 years by jute as a major cash crop, is depen-
dently attuned to the late spring and early summer monsoon rains,
upon whose uncertain arrival and duration is based the productiv-
ity of these two growing seasons, responsible for 90 percent ofthe
rice output and nearly all that ofjute. The winter season, given the
lack of rain and effective irrigation technology, has not until re-
cently begun to figure importantly in the country's agricultural
production,l
Intense rural population densities, approaching 2,000 persons
per square mile ofcultivated area in some regions, have produced
great pressure on the land. Coupled with customs of inheritance
that stress individual ownership and equal division oflanded prop-
erty, demographic growth has contributed to postage-stamp farm
sizes, whose average in 1961 was scarcely more than three acres, a
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classically minifundist land tenure pattern further characterized by
high degrees of plot fragmentation. Technologically, farming in
Bangladesh corresponds to the widely accepted Shultzian dictum
concerning "traditional agriculture," in which "farmers have long
ago exhausted the productivity of the state of the arts at their
disposal" (Schultz 1965: 30). The tools of agriculture in Bangla-
desh, while admirably adapted by preindustrial standards to the
refinements of economic life on the Bengal Delta, can no longer
carry the day with respect to feeding an immense and rapidly mul-
tiplying population. Thus, while the country is everywhere quite
fertile and potentially waterable by the continuing benevolence of
the great rivers that traverse it, the vagaries of its monsoon climate
ensure that, witpout greater technological mastery of the environ-
ment, years ofbarely adequate crop production will continue to be
interspersed by those that bring the threat of hunger and the
menace of natural disaster. The peasants of Bangladesh are the
human actors in a traditional agricultural ecosystem that long ago
reached stasis in its capacity to produce.2
Systems of agriculture are, ofcourse, part and parcel oflarger
rural cultural systems and, in complex societies, subject to influ-
ence and often domination by the demands ofstate systems. In the
main, the collection of papers in this volume addresses itself to
some ofthe key elements ofboth cultural and state systems as they
have diachronically shaped the background ofBangladesh's "rural
development" to date. More speCifically, the stress in several ofthe
papers is on factors of economic policy-making and political ad-
ministration ofthe rural areas over a reasonably long period oftime.
Thus, this section begins with Calkins' discussion of the parallels
and continuities of both the Mogul and the British land revenue
administrations. Calkins shows the roots of rural Bengali cultural
models of land use and land control, which continue to influence
rural response to development efforts. Tepper analyzes the impact
of both British and Pakistani approaches to rural administration,
suggesting that here again the "cultural models" ofpolitical control
of the countryside, which the Bangladesh leaders have inherited,
will in all likelihood be adapted to the present-day requirements of
rural development. Elkinton's paper assesses the halting steps
toward agricultural development begun in East Bengal under
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Pakistani rule. These papers emphasize that the evolution ofrural
development in present-day Bangladesh has as its background
context the control of East Bengal by structures of state power
whose decision-making centers have been outside the region for
the better part of at least four centuries. Thus, policies affecting
East Bengal's agricultural development cannot be separated from
the fact that they were made, in different times facing different
needs, with reference to the requirements respectively of the
Mogul, British, and Pakistani state systems and the elites who
controlled them.
Two general themes emerge from among the many more spe-
cific ones raised in this collection of essays on Bangladesh. One
constant reverberation is that which underlines the relative lack of
decentralized, cohesive social organization in the countryside, a
point worth careful note when one considers the need for organiza-
tion in rural development. Paradoxically, however, the other theme
suggests that, despite this legacy of a comparatively autonomous
and inelaborate social structure in the rural areas, Bengali peasants
have been able to organize themselves or be organized in manners
signaling a quite positive response to opportunities for agricultural
progress. Thus, the reader will perceive a contrast between two
"traditions" in the rural political economy of Bangladesh: an indi-
genous organizational tradition of long standing, which has
reflected diffuse, dyadic, and relatively weak modes of social inte-
gration coupled with minimal, and usually negatively perceived,
extensions of state power to the rural areas (See Bertocci 1970:
105-137), and a more recent, partially imported modern tradition of
effective, centrally controlled management of agricultural innova-
tion.
Surely evocative ofthe firsttheme is the documentation ofthe
relative neglect, by no means benign, ofEast Bengal's rural hinter-
lands, coupled with a history of intense land competition dating
from at least the 1700s. Calkins' account of the Mogul and Brit-
ish revenue systems suggests that both tended to allow consider-
able economic and political power to devolve to the bottom levels
of complex and, over time, iricreasingly elaborate land taxation
hierarchies. Hence, he argues, East Bengal's land system has
tended for a long time to be quite competitive and unstable, a point
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later picked up in Bertocci's essay, which focuses in part on how
today's small-seale-farming Bengali peasantry, which inherits that
land system and the cultural models for economic action it pre-
sents, might react to the green revolution once it begins to take
widespread hold. Tepper's essay points to the paradox of an
"atomized" countryside whose social organization has long been
"segmented, diffuse, and in flux," yet overridden by the centralized
and highly structured British administrative system with its
"linch-pin" focus at the district level. This disjuncture was only
partly, and in the end ineffectively, resolved by Ayub Khan's de-
centralizing efforts, via the Basic Democracies scheme, to create a
power base among an emerging rural elite. Elkinton's contribution
again begins with the theme of neglect, this time with specific
reference to East Bengal's agriculture, to whose serious develop-
ment little attention was paid until the mid-1960s. The author
chronicles down to 1970 the fits and starts, and mixed achieve-
ments, of the reversal of this de-emphasis on agriculture. Thus,
major contributors to the current problems facing Bangladesh are
the cumulative social and economic impact disjointed systems of
land control and rural administration, combined with belated and
halting attacks upon agriculture's problems commencing only in
the 1960s.
Contrasting with this picture of disorganization and neglect as
painted by several ofthe essays is the second general theme, which
stresses remarkable achievement, especially organizationally, dur-
ing the latter half-decade of rural development in East Bengal's
"Pakistan period." This general theme suggests that Bengali far-
mers can and do respond to appropriately organized and compara-
tively well-managed efforts at agricultural and rural development.
The relative successes in this area, serving as counterpoints to
Bangladesh's dismal legacy of "rural development" efforts, point,
moreover, to possibly fruitful departures for the future. Stevens'
outline and evaluation ofthe development system ofthe Academy
for Rural Development at Comilla-the product of more than ten
years' concerted experiment-gives the essential background
necessary to the understanding of what appears to have been
adopted as one, perhaps the, path to integrated rural development
by Bangladesh's present Awami League regime. The basics ofthe
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Comilla cooperative system and its allied programs in trairiing,
irrigation, new seed diffusion, and education are described by
Stevens. Bertocci, in the first part ofhis essay, suggests some ofthe
ways in which the relative success ofthe Comilla strategy-as well
as some of its potential pitfalls-finds its nexus in the indigenous
social organization of the Comilla countryside. The ability of
small-scale farmers to benefit from the green revolution, at least as
diffused in the context of Comilla-generated programs, is dramati-
cally documented in the essay by Faidley and Esmay. Haq's more
technical paper outlines the successes that are possible, as well as
the problems yet to be overcome, in diffusing pump and tubewell
irrigation systems using the labor-intensive and cooperative or-
ganizational methods developed at Comilla. Together, then, these
papers center on the very specific and relatively successful devel-
opmental legacies that are likely to remain the backbone of
Bangladesh's approach to rural development in the 1970s.
As seen from the collective vantage point of these essays,
Bangladesh presents to the scholar and development practitioner
alike both paradox and contrast. The more dismal, larger, historical
picture, marked by a decline toward ecological disaster at the
village level and fuelled by the neglect, "atomization," and com-
petitively induced socioeconomic fragmentation over three suc-
cessive periods ofcolonial rule, is contrasted with the more hopeful
partial successes of comparatively recent years. At this political
turning point following the attainment ofindependence, it remains
to be seen to what extent Bangladesh and its people can build on
the potential its successes have unearthed so as to lay to rest the
legacies of its uncertain past.
PeterJ. Bertocci is an assistant professor ofAnthropology, Oakland
University, Rochester, Michigan. He is a social anthropologist with
an interest in the political and economic development ofthe South
Asia cultural area. His field research in Comilla in 1966-1967 led to
a Ph.D. in Anthropology from Michigan State University in 1970.
NOTES
1. The standard references on East Bengal's rural economy are Rashid
(1965), Ahmad (1968), and Ahmed (1965).
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2. For at least a partial picture ofthe ecological situation in Bangladesh,
the reader might consult Parrack (1969) for relevant comparative purposes.
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Stability and Change
in Landhold ing and Revenue
Systems in Bengal
Philip B. Calkins
Most writing about the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-
century Bengal rightly has been concerned with change over time.
Historical changes, however, can be of many types. Historians
often have divided their descriptions into categories, perhaps too
conveniently called social change, economic change, and cultural
change, but they have also suggested, partly in response to the
social scientists who are encroaching upon their world, that sig-
nificant historical changes need not be associated with processes of
modernization, even in periods described as modern. This paper is
a preliminary exploration ofone aspect ofthe subject ofchange and
stability in Bengal in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth
centuries.
Our view ofa society is determined to a considerable extent by
our understanding of the processes of change that are part of it.
Thus, ifwe attribute major changes in social or economic organiza-
tion to technological, ideological, or administrative innovation, we
imply not only a view ofhow change occurred at that time but also a
view ofhow change did or did not take place prior to the advent of
the innovation. In studying nineteenth- and twentieth-century
South Asia, it is a temptation to attribute changes to innovations
introduced by the British (or at least from the West), and in many
cases the attribution will be correct. Occasionally, however, it may
lead us to assume that society was more static than it actually was
prior to the establishment of British rule, and consequently it may
also obscure the fact that processes of change were operative dur-
ing the nineteenth, or even the twentieth centuries, which were
independent of, or only partially dependent upon, the existence of
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British rule and the introduction of aspects of Western culture.
Much attention has been given to the concept of moderniza-
tion and, more recently, to the ways in which "modem" factors have
been utilized in South Asia in what are termed traditional ways.
Both of these conceptual frameworks are useful for historians of
nineteenth- and twentieth-century South Asia, but they should not
be exclusively so, and should not draw attention away from other
possible explanations ofhistorical change that may be relevant for
both the British and pre-British periods. It is likely that some
aspects of British and pre-British Bengal were more similar than is
often supposed, and that the similarities do not necessarily suggest
that pre-British Bengal was on the verge of modernity but rather
that the effects ofsome British innovations were not as great as they
may appear to have been. The hypotheses upon which the argu-
ment depends are that pre-British society in Bengal was far from
static, and that many of the kinds of changes that took place in
pre-British times were similar to changes that occurred during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus, there were similar pat-
terns ofboth change and stability in British and pre-British Bengal.
Similarities between the Mogul
and British Land Revenue Systems
The subject ofBritish administration in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, and particularly of land revenue ad-
ministration, is one where both the innovative nature of British
institutions and the novelty of their effects may be subject to con-
siderable doubt. Although many historians have said that the
British administrative system of the early nineteenth century was
based largely upon that oftheir Mogul predecessors, still much has
been written to suggest that the British system was responsible for
major changes both in landholding patterns and in the revenue
system. In the case ofBengal, it cannot be doubted that the changes
in patterns oflandholding, employment, and economic investment
that followed the establishment of British supremacy were sig-
nificant, but it is also significant that these changes sometimes
followed patterns that were not new to Bengal. At most, some
changes in landholding patterns depended upon the imposition of
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extraordinary pressure from the top ofthe system, and, although the
British monopoly ofpower made it possible for them to apply more
pressure than had earlier rulers, a similar response to the applica-
tion of administrative pressure can be traced during the Mogul
period, and perhaps in pre-Mogul times as well. Other changes
may have occurred not so much in response to British activity as to
the fact that they were part of more or less regular cycles and
patterns oflandholding that existed at least during the seventeenth,
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.
Various arguments have been advanced concerning the in-
novative effects of the Permanent Settlement of Bengal by the
British in 1793. It has been said that the introduction ofthe institu-
tion of privately owned land, which was uncompromisingly en-
forced in law by the British, led to a vast turnover in land ownership
or control. Also, the people ofBengal are said to have been unaccus-
tomed to, and did not desire to be governed by, written regulations,
which tended to be more rigid in enforcement and less open to
alteration than was the earlier system ofcustomary understandings
between tenant and landholder. It has also been argued that the
Permanent Settlement gave an unfair advantage to the zamindar,
whose position was secure, while that of the cultivator became
more tenuous as pressure on the land increased and opportunities
for earning extra income in domestic industries declined. On the
other hand, we are told that many zamindars were unable to survive
the first few years of the Permanent Settlement, since they were
unable to make the change from collectors ofcustomary payments
to "punctual tax-gatherers" (Sinha 1967:102-104). The Permanent
Settlement was a failure, then, in the sense that it did not achieve
the goals intended for it, partly because of changes in circum-
stances that were not foreseen by those who planned it, and partly
because ofthe planners' lack ofdetailed information regarding land
tenures and land control.
This simplified view is not intended to summarize all that we
know about the Permanent Settlement, although it is clear that a
much better understanding of its effects should develop as more
detailed local studies are made. What is important here is that
parallels for most aspects of this explanation of the Permanent
Settlement can be found in the history of the administration of
"
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Bengal during the tenure of the Mogul dewan (finance minister)
and governor, Murshid Quli Khan, during the first quarter of the
eighteenth century. In addition, a comparison of the landholding
system in Bengal during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
with the system established by the Permanent Settlement suggests
thatthere were many similarities in the processes ofchange, as well
as in the basic structure ofthe landholding system, before and after
1793.
Although the circumstances that led to Murshid Quli Khan's
reform of the revenue system of Bengal were somewhat different
from those that led to the Permanent Settlement, many of the
methods he utilized and the results he obtained were quite similar.
Appointed dewan of Bengal shortly after 1700 by the Mogul em-
peror, Aurangzeb, with the hope that increased revenues could be
raised in that province to support Aurangzeb's war against the
Marathas in South India, Murshid Quli Khan rapidly became the
most important administrator in Bengal. Except for a period oftwo
years from 1708 to 1710, he retained his power until his death in
1727. First as dewan and later as nazim (governor), he carried out
the reforms that were to form the basis for revenue assessment and
administration until the British conquest after 1757.1
It is possible that Murshid Quli was thinking in terms of the
development of a semi-independent government in Bengal even
before Aurangzeb's death in 1707, and certainly by the time of the
death ofAurangzeb's successor, Bahadur Shah, in 1712, his policies
were oriented toward the achievement ofthat goal. Partly as a result
of this policy, and partly because he had been sent to Bengal
originally to bring about an increase in revenue collections, Mur-
shid Quli was anxious both to enhance his collections from the
zamindars, who controlled most of the land of Bengal, and also to
organize a secure and stable landholding system. In order to ac-
complish his goal, Murshid Quli followed a carrot-and-stick policy
with the zamindars. He encouraged efficiency in collection by
rewarding those zamindars who were able to deliver the increased
sums that he demanded, and by punishing those who were not. His
rewards often took the form ofopportunities for successful zamin-
dars to acquire the rights to more land, while his punishments
usually consisted either of physical harassment and sometimes
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imprisonment or else removal of a zamindar from his zamindari.
Although it is difficult to determine exactly the amount by which
Murshid Quli was able to increase collections, it is clear both that
they were increased, and that one result ofhis policy was to create a
number of very large zamindaris and generally to substitute a
landholding system that consisted of a relatively small number of
landholders who held relatively large areas ofland from the Mogul
government for an earlier system in which there had been a rela-
tively large number of smaller landholders.2
Both the intent and the effects of Murshid Quli Khan's policy
bear resemblances to the Permanent Settlement, which was estab-
lished by the British three-quarters of a century later. Although
there was no guarantee of permanent ownership of lands under
Murshid Quli's system, he did offer a reasonable degree ofsecurity,
government support, and official status to those zamindars who
established their ability to meet the revenue demand. In the case of
such enormous zamindaris as Burdwan and Rajshahi, the result
must have appeared to be quite permanent to the beneficiaries of
this policy. Similarly, for those zamindars who failed to meet the
revenue demand and who consequently lost part or all of their
zamindaris, the result was probably as unpalatable as it was for
those zamindars who suffered a similar fate after the Permanent
Settlement.
Like the Permanent Settlement also, the enhancement of the
revenue collections after 1700 was accomplished, at least in part,
not by increasing the official level of the revenue demand but
simply by insisting that the amounts already legally demanded
should be paid in full.3 Thus, while the argument that the British
upset the revenue system of Bengal by substituting a strictly en-
forced legal system for a customary system that was only loosely
enforced may have some validity, it must be modified by the pro-
viso that they were not the first administrators in Bengal to adopt
such a policy, and that the customary system that they upset was not
one that had been consistently in force during the previous century.
In the cases ofboth Murshid Quli Khan's policy and ofthe Perma-
nent Settlement, one effect ofthe demand that the revenue be paid
in full, and of the subsequent battles for control over the revenue
collections, was a large-scale turnover among the zamindars and
,-
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intennediate collectors. During Murshid Quli Khan's time, the
battle was waged, to some extent, under what must have been
novel conditions, since the tenns set by Murshid Quli Khan placed
an increased emphasis upon the ability ofthe participants to collect
revenue and to send it up the hierarchy ofthe revenue system. The
efficient administrator had an advantage, then, but since the use of
force by zamindars was by no means absent the advantage did not
always prove decisive. By the time of the Permanent Settlement,
custom may have changed enough for the preference for efficient
administrators to be more pronounced, but the evidence of com-
plaints lodged by zamindars at the time, and by historians since
then, suggests that the weight ofcustom was still heavily in favor of
zamindars who had held their lands for at least two or three genera-
tions.
The shift toward a preference for more efficient revenue ad-
ministrators can be seen more clearly in relation to another aspect
of both Murshid Quli Khan's revenue arrangements and those of
the Pennanent Settlement. In both cases, the ultimate effect was
not to establish the pennanent landholding rights of a relatively
small aristocracy exclusively; for, beneath the more visible surface
layer, which was occupied by the official landed proprietors, the
land continued to be divided among a large number of underten-
ants, who exercised the most effective control over the land and the
collection of the revenue.
Evidence provided by the "Risala-i Zira'at," a mid-eighteenth
century description ofthe pre-British land revenue system,4 and by
British observers (especially John Shore) suggests several general-
izations about the organization of the revenue system and the
behavior ofthose who participated in it. First, the system contained
large numbers and many levels ofintennediate revenue collectors.
In terms ofthe actual control that they had over the land during the
early eighteenth century, probably the most important group of
intermediate landholders and revenue collectors (Le., those who
had a right to a share of the produce of a plot of land, but were not
zamindars, ryots, nor landless laborers) were those who were inter-
posed between the village level and the pargana level. There is
little agreement among the sources as to the titles that were held by
tarafdar, ta'aluqdar, and mustajir or revenue farmer.s What is
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important for the argument, however, is their function rather than
their titles. Although there might be as many as ten levels of
intermediate holders between the village and the zamindar, it is
likely that the first level or two above the village were the most
important for controlling the land and the revenue collections. It is
very difficult to measure the effectiveness of the administrative
operations that were carried out by these intermediate holders of
revenue rights, but it is not difficult to see that a person who could
not make a circuit ofthe villages under his jurisdiction within a few
days would not be able to exercise a very direct control over them.
During good weather, this meant travel on foot or on horseback;
during the rainy season, it meant travel by boat in many parts of
Bengal. Thus it is reasonable to assume that the men who collected
revenue at the pargana level or below were the highest level of
officials or landholders who actually had a good idea of what was
the state of the land and of cultivation within their particular vil-
lages. Although the correlation should not be extended too far, it
would be reasonable to say that a revenue collector's knowledge of
the land was directly related to his distance from it. Consequently,
the zamindars who had the largest holdings were likely to have the
least information about the state of their lands. Murshid Quli
Khan's policy of encouraging the growth of large zamindars must
have intensified the problems caused by this situation, although his
support of relatively efficient collectors provided a partial remedy
during his own lifetime.
A second generalization is that both intermediate collectors
and officials who worked directly (as deputies) for zamindars were
inclined to defraud the zamindars when they could, and that the
opportunities for doing so were numerous. Both the "Risala-i
Zira'at" and Shore deal with the fraudulent practices of deputies,
moneylenders, and permanent intermediate collectors extensive-
ly, and both state that the advantages were often on the side ofthose
who were practicing the deception ("Risala-i Zira'at" 1760:fols.
5a-b, 12b, 14a; Shore 1788:56-59). The disadvantages ofthe zamin-
dars were largely due to their lack ofaccurate and detailed informa-
tion about the condition of the land and the amounts actually
collected from the villages. Village officials, lower-level inter-
mediate collectors, and the zamindars' own deputies, all could
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conspire to conceal such information.6 In addition, moneylenders
could sometimes increase the troubles of zamindars by deliber-
ately causing a decline in the revenue of particular parganas in
order to make the zamindar default in his payments to the govern-
ment, so that the zamindari rights to those parganas could be ac-
quired cheaply by auction ("Risala-i Zira'at" 1760:fols. 9b-l0a).
Finally, the sources indicate that intermediate collectors com-
peted with each other for revenue rights, and that zamindars com-
peted with zamindars. Again, deception was practiced often in
order to make a rival default in his revenue payments, so that his
revenue rights could be acquired either at auction or by appoint-
ment from the superior rightsholder.
The difficulties in acquiring accurate information about re-
venue assessment and collection, combined with other managerial
problems, were likely to cause trouble for many zamindars and
even for intermediate collectors. Although it is true that the posi-
tion ofmany ofthe zamindars grew worse after the British took over
the revenue administration, there is considerable evidence that
suggests that the change that occurred during the third quarter of
the century was one ofdegree rather than ofkind, and that the more
marked change that followed the Permanent Settlement was simi-
lar to that which followed Murshi Quli Khan's settlement.
The growth of a few large zamindaris during Murshid Quli
Khan's tenure ofoffice, as well as the well-known estimate that over
one-halfofthe cultivated land of Bengal had changed hands at the
sadr level (Le., from one zamindar to another) during the first three
quarters of the eighteenth century, suggest that it was not only
British innovation that caused the turnover.7 One important factor
was probably that the second, third, and fourth generations of
zamindars in large zamindaris might be less interested in adminis-
tration than their predecessors had been. Large zamindaris tended
to be built up by ambitious and capable men, and it would not be
surprising if some of their descendants, raised in luxury and
perhaps without the natural abilities oftheir unusual ancestors, did
not care to spend their time in the management of the zamindaris.
Several ofthe cases ofincompetent zamindars cited by Shore might
fall into this category, since these were zamindaris that had grown
important under Murshid Quli Khan and were thus in the second or
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third generation of their greatness during the 1770s and 1780s.
At least as important as the ability and determination of the
zamindars, intermediate collectors, and revenue farmers to retain
their lands, however, were the level ofthe revenue demand and the
extent to which superior collectors were able to force their subor-
dinates to meet that demand in full. Thus, when Murshid Quli
Khan increased the pressure for payment of the revenue demand
and later raised the demand as well, he increased pressure on the
landholders and their subordinates throughout the landholding
system in much the same way that the Permanent Settlement
increased the pressure at the end ofthe century. Landholders who
had been accustomed to escaping with only a partial payment ofthe
legal demand were suddenly asked to pay up in full, and many of
them were unable to do so. This.failure was due largely to the not
inconsiderable power ofthe local officials and small middlemen to
resist increases in the customary (as opposed to the legal) demand.
As suggested above, at every stage of the hierarchy of revenue
administration up to the zamindar, there were many ways in which
inferior collectors could conceal the true value ofthe land or ofthe
revenue collections from their superiors. It can be imagined, then,
that the weaker or less capable of the sadr landholders and inter-
mediate collectors would be unable to adjust to the changing condi-
tions. If they were working with a relatively small margin of profit
and were unable to effect changes in the customary rates ofcollec-
tion from the ryots and the customary rates of both legal payment
and graft that their inferiors in the system consumed, they would be
unable to increase their revenue payments to the desired extent.
Consequently, a cycle ofindebtedness would begin and eventually
they would lose their lands.
The above description of the pre-British revenue system of
Bengal suggests at least two important hypotheses. The first is that
the system tended to be quite competitive and consequently
somewhat unstable, especially during periods when pressure for
increased revenue was applied from above. The second is that
intermediate collectors enjoyed advantages because of their prox-
imity to the land, which made them more than a match for the
zamindars in many cases. Under normal conditions, both know-
ledge ofthe land and the power to increase collections tended to be
.J-
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concentrated toward the bottom ofthe administrative hierarchy. It
was a much simpler matter for the man who had the revenue rights
for a few villages to exert pressure upon those villages to increase
the amount of revenue collected than it was for a man who had a
large zamindari to extract a proportionate increase from his many
subordinates. The man at ground level had the advantage ofknow-
ingjust what the ryots were producing, and he was also able to tour
the villages so that both ryots and village officials would know that
he knew what they produced. The large zamindar could seldom
have such first-hand knowledge ofthe condition ofhis villages; he
had to depend upon the intermediate collectors, who had good
reason to conceal the truth from him, or upon officials who were
appointed to check on the activities of the middlemen and who
were consequently susceptible to bribes.
The advantages enjoyed by intermediate collectors, which
resulted in part from increased pressure on the revenue system,
suggest other comparisons between the events of Murshid Quli
Khan's times and those which followed the Permanent Settlement.
One result attributed to the Permanent Settlement is the develop-
ment of a large number of ta'aluqs, especially in Burdwan and
Murshidabad districts, when the increased pressure on the zamin-
dars (especially the zamindar of Burdwan) to pay their revenue in
full led them to let out their lands in what came to be known as
patni ta'aluqs on permanent leases. It was said that the zamindars
were unable to supervise collections within their zamindaris
closely enough to collect the full revenue demand, and con-
sequently let out the lands to ta'aluqdars who would have smaller
territories to manage and could therefore manage them better. The
parallel with the position of pre-British zamindars and their rela-
tionship to their intermediate collectors is obvious. An even more
exact comparison comes to light, however, ifwe look at the history
oflandholding arrangements in the pre-British period in the dis-
tricts most concerned. Ta'aluqs were especially common in Mur-
shidabad District in the pre-British period, and, although the evi-
dence for Burdwan is less substantial, the presence there of a
considerable numberofintermediate collectors cannot be doubted
(O'Malley 1914:158-159). We might then conclude that, although
the Permanent Settlement was a proximate cause of the develop-
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ment ofpatni ta'aluq s and was responsible for their particular legal
form, neither the functional phenomenon that they represented nor
the causal factor that inspired their creation was new to Bengal.
Changes in the Size of Zamindar Holdings
The above comparisons demonstrate some ofthe most obvious
similarities between the land revenue systems of Mogul and
British Bengal, and particularly between Murshid Quli Khan's
administrative arrangements and those of the Permanent Settle-
ment. No doubt a detailed examination of local systems would
reveal even more similarities. One conclusion we might reach is
that many of the goals of the two ruling groups and the methods
available for implementing them were similar. Perhaps more sig-
nificant, however, is the likelihood that the similarities between
the Mogul and British systems depended largely upon a continua-
tion of similar landholding patterns and styles of political and
administrative behavior from one period to the next. The parallel
cannot be extended too far; the fact that the Permanent Settlement
was permanent made some difference, although the ways in which
it differed from Murshid Quli Khan's settlement were less sig-
nificant during the first decades than they were later. Probably
more important than its permanence was the fact that the greater
concentrations of power that the British could muster limited the
extralegal or illegal options available to competitors within the
landholding system, and encouraged a shift toward the use of law
courts as dispute-settling mechanisms. However, the change may
not have been as great as many historians have thought.
Clearly, the distinction between a pre-British customary sys-
tem and a British system based upon well-defined and enforced
laws is often obscured when particular comparisons are made. The
distinction breaks down partly because the British system con-.
tinued to utilize much that was customary. More significant reasons
for its failure, in terms ofthe examples given above, are that either
the Mogul system could produce effects similar to those attributed
to the more legally oriented and better-enforced British system or
that some landholding patterns were relatively independent ofthe
actions ofeither the Mogul or the British rulers. Thus there appears
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to have been a considerable amount ofcontinuity in the landhold-
ing system in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and a strik-
ing element ofthat continuity was the existence ofmechanisms for
change that were part of the landholding system and that func-
tioned under both the Moguls and the British. These mechanisms
for change, as well as both the legal and customary aspects of the
relationships between participants in the landholding system, may
provide a fruitful area for future comparative studies, for they may
lead to a better comprehension ofboth political and social factors as
they pertain to the landholding system of Bengal.
One possibility is that a view of zamindaris in Bengal, as
subject to relatively regular cycles of rise and decline (increasing
and decreasing in size), may suggest explanations of both the ef-
fects of administrative action and the nongovernmental mecha-
nisms for change within the system. The simplest argument for the
existence of zamindari cycles is that zamindari families, like many
other families, may have had a tendency to lose either their interest
in or talent for administrative activity in the second or third genera-
tion after a zamindari had been built up by a particularly energetic
or fortunate individual.
Zamindaris were, of course, normally hereditary, but the ad-
vantages of hereditary status were limited. Examples can be cited
from many times and places, both in India and elsewhere, to de-
monstrate that hereditary title to land did not provide a permanent
guarantee ofownership or control. In Mogul India, armed rebellion
or failure to pay the revenue demand were considered to be legiti-
mate reasons for removing a zamindar. Normally, however, a pre-
judice in favor of the existing zamindars operated because it was
politically expedient to recognize existing titles and local political
structures, and because of the presumption that the zamindars'
knowledge of local conditions put them in a better position to run
their zamindaris than newcomers. Consequently, a good deal of
aberrant behavior was allowed before zamindars were removed.s
In periods that might be considered as times ofcrisis, however,
zamindars might be removed with much less compunction. Mur-
shid Quli Khan's tenure as dewan and governor was such a time, as
was the period when Mogul rule in Bengal was consolidated a
century earlier. The years immediately before and after the Perma-
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nent Settlement might be considered to be another, and although it
can be argued that the ultimate effect ofthe Permanent Settlement
was to prevent land from changing hands at the zamindari level, the
immediate effect was the reverse. Because ofthe increase ofeither
military or financial pressure on the landholders of Bengal, it is
likely that more land changed hands during these periods than at
other times, although the relative paucity of information about the
landholding situation during much of the seventeenth century
makes this conclusion tentative.
It is difficult to determine whether the apparent change in the
rate of turnover ofland rights (or at least ofzamindari rights) from
the late seventeenth to the early eighteenth century was due partly
to the introduction of new factors into the administrative or land-
holding system after 1700, or whether it simply resulted from an
intensification of competition in areas of conflict and among types
of functionaries similar to those of the seventeenth century. Cer-
tainly there was competition between zamindars for control of
territory before the eighteenth century, and that competition must
have been responsible for the turnover ofzamindari rights in many
cases.
The competition that could exist within a zamindari may, how-
ever, provide more significant comparisons for the seventeenth,
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. The eighteenth-century
evidence for this competition among intermediate collectors, and
between intermediate collectors and zamindars, is extensive. At
least some of this kind of competition existed prior to the
eighteenth century, however, for we have some evidence of the
acquisition ofparganas by particular zamindars.9 It is also clear that
competition existed between intermediate collectors in the
nineteenth century.
Thus it appears that while the eighteenth century included
two periods of unusually intense competition between landhold-
ers, which produced a marked turnover in landholding rights at the
sadr or zamindari level, large parts of the seventeenth and
nineteenth centuries were similar in that competition was less
intense and tended to produce a proportionately larger turnover of
landed rights below the zamindari level. During both the seven-
teenth and nineteenth centuries, zamindari assessments were rela-
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tively light, and so there was less pressure on the zamindars from
above.
Several questions are important for an understanding of how
the landholding system functioned throughout the three centuries,
and particularly in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Why
did the competition exist, and how intense was it? How did par-
ticipants compete with each other, and what factors determined
success in the competition? Finally, were there factors that tended
to maintain a balance within the system so that internal change
could continue without causing a change in the nature of the
system?
The competition within the landholding system of Bengal
depended upon the existence ofa reasonable number ofcompeti-
tors, a status hierarchy that was malleable enough to allow changes
ofposition, and the availability to participants ofmodes ofbehavior
that would result in changes in economic position and/or status
within the officially recognized landholding hierarchy. Although
competition is a feature ofmost land systems, some features ofthe
landholding system of Bengal created conditions that tended to
encourage certain forms of competition.
The land of the Bengal delta is utilized primarily for growing
rice, and much of it is, and has been, highly productive. Conse-
quently, not only can a relatively high population density be sup-
ported but relatively small areas can support large numbers of
people who do not cultivate the land. The relatively high concen-
tration of surplus produced in many areas of Bengal has tended to
create opportunities for dividing up the land revenue into shares,
both vertically (between superiors and inferiors) and horizontally
(between those of equal status in the revenue hierarchy). In addi-
tion, the fact that zamindaris in Bengal usually concentrated power
in one individual, or at most in one nuclear family, tended to make
them more vulnerable than those Rajput zamindaris ofNorth India,
which were based upon a clan system of landholding, since the
base of support tended to be narrower in Bengal.
Thus the number of participants with distinct, separate inter-
ests (not joined by clan or other strong ties) tended to be relatively
large, and tended to be stratified in an elaborate hierarchy of re-
venue collectors in areas where productivity was high. In addition,
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the hierarchy was often so flexible that two intermediate landhol-
ders might each be in an inferior relationship to the other with
respect to the rights for different plots ofland. Thus the system of
stratification was both complex and, at times, without clearly
defined levels for participants.
Since there were fewer large zamindaris during the seven-
teenth century, the hierarchies of intermediate landholders within
the greater number of smaller seventeenth-century zamindaris
were probably somewhat less elaborate than they were during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, the nature of the
relationship between land and crops, the fact that zamindars found
it difficult to increase revenue collection in the early eighteenth
century, and the few seventeenth-century references that we have,
all suggest that there were considerable numbers of intermediate
collectors in the seventeenth-century revenue system. A reason-
able hypothesis, then, would be that the seventeenth century fea-
tured a relatively greater amount of competition between partici-
pants within the landholding system, who were of equal or near-
equal status (particularly at the zamindari level). The history of
zamindaris such as that of Burdwan suggests, however, that com-
petition between inferiors and superiors was also important.10
Even for the eighteenth century, the details of conflicts be-
tween specific participants at the level of intermediate collectors
usually are not available, although the generalized descriptions
supplied in the "Risali-i Zira'at" and in British sources indicate that
such conflicts were common. As indicated above, several means of
acquiring increased wealth through additional revenue rights were
available to intermediate collectors, and, although more difficult, it
was also possible to effect a change in one's official status (from a
lower level of intermediate collector to a higher level, or from
intermediate collector to zamindar). During the eighteenth cen-
tury, however, it appears to have been more common for a zamindar
to acquire zamindari rights to additional lands than it was for an
intermediate collector to acquire zamindari rights.
We may conclude that, although eighteenth-century condi-
tions probably increased the amount of competition, it is evident
that conditions that would promote competition existed in the
seventeenth century as well. The fact that most of the competition
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took place at a level where its particulars were not recorded may be
especially important: this unrecorded competition was probably
responsible for the turnover of land rights at the highest or zamin-
dari level. The various devices for undermining the authority of a
zamindar, which are described in eighteenth-century sources,
could be utilized for years without any mention ofthem appearing
in the official records. Similarly, a zamindar could alienate revenue
rights to part ofhis land to intermediate collectors for good adminis-
trative reasons, without the fact being recorded in the kinds of
records that have survived. Only when things went wrong, and the
zamindar lost part or all of his revenue rights, might the fact be
recorded. In the seventeenth century, as in the nineteenth, there-
fore, we can expect to find both the alienation of zamindari rights
and competifion between intermediate collectors.
Again, the hypothesis suggests a comparison with the Perma-
nent Settlement and its effects. After the initial failures of some
zamindars to meet the revenue demand following the Permanent
Settlement, a situation developed that was more like the seven-
teenth than the eighteenth century. Under the Permanent Settle-
ment, the revenue demand ofthe zamindars was fixed, and so they
could take advantage of increases in the amount of revenue that
they could collect from cultivators and undertenants. Similarly,
although the revenue demand was not fixed legally in the seven-
teenth century, it appears that it was rarely enhanced, even though
inflation probably decreased the value ofthe rupee considerably.u
Therefore, seventeenth-century zamindars were also in a position
to profit from a widening disparity between the value ofwhat they
could collect and the value of what they had to pay.
Despite their increasingly favorable financial position, how-
ever, many nineteenth-century zamindars alienated the revenue
rights to parts oftheir zamindaris. Tous competition could continue
below the zamindari level (and, in some cases, continued also at the
zamindari level, despite the Permanent Settlement). Similarly,
seventeenth-century conditions appear to have been more condu-
cive to competition below the zamindari level, since zamindars
could alienate a substantial portion of their revenue rights without
endangering their positions, because of the relatively low level of
the revenue demand.
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In both the seventeenth- and nineteenth-century cases, there
appears to have been a tendency toward the proliferation of inter-
mediate landholders, probably for both administrative and political
reasons. Alienation ofa portion ofthe revenue rights was a custom-
ary and relatively easy way to get the revenue collected. It also
provided a means of supporting political followers in some cases.
Certainly, intermediate collectors were in a position where it often
would be advisable for them to support the zamindar from whom
they held their rights in the land, throughout the period under
discussion. In the seventeenth century, it was also often the case
that the intermediate collectors were of the same caste as the
zamindar, and that they or their ancestors had helped to settle the
land and to establish the zamindari.
The existence of the similarities and continuities in the re-
venue and landholding systems outlined above should not be taken
as an indication that nothing new happened in the nineteenth
century. Rather, my argument has been that many of the keys for
understanding the modern agrarian system ofBengal can be found
in earlier periods, even though the imposition ofthe British Raj and
exposure to economic and other pressures from the modern West
did affect agrarian relationships. Especially during the last thirty or
forty years of the nineteenth century, we can identify a number of
changes that appear to have set the scene for the present day.
Increases in population, moneylending activities, the growth of
cash crops, enhanced governmental control over local administra-
tion, and a growing sense ofcommunity on the part of the Muslim
ryots of East Bengal, all were important factors.
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it is likely
that, at least in some parts of Bengal, population pressure had
become great enough so that competition drove up the price ofland
rights. Thus, rights in the land became more difficult to obtain and
required a relatively larger capital investment. As a result, ryots and
intermediaries began to look more toward moneylending and
cash-crop farming as sources of additional income. Both of these
activities could be practiced with any amount of capital. This ex-
tension of economic activity produced new economic hierarchies,
parallel to and often interlocked with the landholding hierarchy.
Perhaps the most significant change in late nineteenth-century
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agrarian society was the growing awareness within Muslim and
lost-caste Hindu society of separate, collective identities. And of
course, at the very end of the century, the establishment of local
councils and the beginnings ofan electoral process pointed the way
toward a much greater development of Islamic identity in the
twentieth century. Thus it is likely that changes in the economic
sphere in the late nineteenth century tended to promote further the
development of class differentiation and group identification,
which was due primarily to Muslim revivalist movements and to
increased governmental activity at the local level.
By 1900, however, neither the development of class con-
sciousness among cultivators, nor the development ofIslamic iden-
tity among Muslim cultivators, had progressed very far. The
zamindari system still prevailed, and the traditional elements of
agrarian society continued to be of primary significance.
Philip B. Calkins is assistant professor of History at Duke Univer-
sity. He received his Ph.D. from the University ofChicago in 1971.
His research has been on Mogul history, with particular focus on
Bengal.
NOTES
1. For a general account of Murshid Quli Khan's career, see Karim
(1963:15-60).
2. Grant's account of the records for the Mogul revenue assessment of
Bengal up to 1728 indicates that it was only during the eighteenth century
that some zamindaris became so large that the assessment was organized
around them, rather than on the basis of territorial units that had been
defined by the Moguls (Grant 1917:176-191).
3. The figures that Shore gives for the annual revenue collections in
Bengal from 1700 to 1721 indicate that the collections did not surpass the
mid-seventeenth-century level of assessment until 1711, and that most of
Murshid Quli Khan's increase in the revenue collections had been effected
by that time (Shore 1788:539-540).
4. The author of this description of the pre-British administration and
revenue system in Bengal is unknown. The manuscript was written circa
1760, and it is clear that the author had had experience in the administra-
tive system he describes ("Risala-i Zira'at" 1760).
5. For example, see "Risala-i Zira'at" (1760:fol. 4b) and West Bengal
Government Archieves (1788:243-244).
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6. "Risala-i Zira'at" (1760:fols. 12b, 14a); Shore (1789:40-42); and
Glazier (1873 and 1876:20-21).
7. Hunter (1894:1, 35) and Sinha's statement (1967:104) that one-third to
one-half of the landed property of Bengal changed hands within twenty-
two years after the Permanent Settlement again suggest a parallel with the
first quarter of the eighteenth century.
8. Thus, many of the zamindars who resisted Mogul rule in the early
seventeenth century were allowed to retain their lands after they had
capitulated, and, although many zamindars who defaulted on their re-
venue payments a century later were imprisoned by Murshid Quli Khan,
many ofthem did not lose their zamindari rights, and were released by his
successor (Raychaudhuri 1969:63-69; Gladwin 1788:35-37, 74-75).
9. The growth ofthe zamindari ofBurdwan after 1660, for example, must
have been at the expense of other zamindars (ChatteIjee 1967:225-256).
10. The founder of the Burdwan raj did not hold the title of zamindar at
all, but rather was a local revenue official (ChatteIjee 1967:255-256).
11. Only one complete new revenue roll was drawn up in the seven-
teenth centUIy (Grant 1917:182). Also the nasaq form ofassessment, which
was used in Bengal, was at least semipermanent, the same assessment
figures being used year after year (Habib 1963:213-219). The increase in
the revenue assessment ofBengal was much less than the increase in most
provinces ofthe empire during the seventeenth century, and it is likely that
the value ofthe rupee declined sufficiently to offset any increase in taxation
(Calkins 1972:90-92, 316-322).
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The Administration of
Rural Reform: Structural Constraints
and Political Dilemmas
Elliot L. Tepper
The Muslim districts of Eastern Bengal have emerged once
again as a distinct and distinctive entity, bearing social and political
features marking them collectively as a "developing area" with its
own problems of political destiny and economic growth. These
problems are particularistic, and stem in large measure from events
peculiar to the region. Yet to the degree that other former colonies
are rural, agrarian, overpopulated, and poor, they will share some of
the dilemmas of development that beleaguer this troubled pro-
vince. Indeed, the former East Pakistan may provide a valuable
case study, for it combines these attributes to an extraordinary de-
gree. The present rulers of East Bengal, regardless of ideology or
intention, face a formidable set of constraints. They also inherit a
formidable set of problems, and dilemmas in meeting these prob-
lems. This chapter will consider some ofthe constraints, problems,
and dilemmas of rural development in East Bengal.1
Legacies of Colonialism and Neglect
The relative absence of institutionalized groups, and the
difficulty in creating them, is at the heart of the province's de-
velopment problems. Recent field research begins to indicate that
in an overwhelmingly rural province with a large, densely settled
population, the creation of such groups becomes a critical task for
any government seeking rural transformation. Even though my
comments here must be expressed very tentatively, this is an aspect
of the problem of rural development that seems both crucial and
virtually unexplored in a developmental context.
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The British Inheritance
Rural Development in Bangladesh
East Bengal is a rural hinterland. It is an overwhelmingly ag-
ricultural, nonurban area, which seems to have served as a
periphery for distant urban centers for almost all of its existence, or
at least since it stopped being a region of Buddhist educational
activity and became instead an agrarian outpost ofthe Muslim em-
pires. Even the urban center ofDacca lost its significance with the
advent ofBritish influence, and the corresponding decline ofDacca
muslin, and the growth ofCalcutta as the Bengali imperial capital.
When the British abandoned their attempts at direct rule in Bengal
and acquiesced instead to indirect rule (as did the Mogul emperors
before them),2 the contemporary fate of the rural regions became
set. The Permapent Settlement of 1793 turned over to a private
landlord class, a "landed gentry" in British eyes, much of the re-
sponsibility for governing eastern and northern Bengal. Thus vast,
inaccessible regions of the delta were confirmed, or perhaps re-
confirmed, as a colonial outpost, a hinterland serving the interests
of the expanding regional metropole of Calcutta and the more dis-
tant metropole overseas.
The hinterland status of the rural Muslim region led to its
perennial neglect, with deleterious long-term effects. As a hinter-
land, East Bengal underwent a prolonged period of what may be
called institutional atomization. The formal institutions ofgovern-
ment were kept to a minimum. The continued abdication to private
landlords ofrevenue collection duties led to a truncated form ofthe
usual British imperial control apparatus, the district collectorate.
Even by British standards, therefore, the "nerves of government"
were foreshortened. The ingenious mechanism of successive con-
querors, district administration, has passed on to the new states of
South Asia the very sinews, or infrastructure, of statehood. In East
Bengal, the formal infrastructure was kept to a minimum. The pri-
vate bureaucracy of the zamindars, a mystery never fully pene-
trated by the British, was an ad hoc arrangement that must have
varied from estate to estate and that ultimately therefore was a
dispersed and ephemeral form of organization. As a British report
once concluded, East Bengal was not so much badly administered,
it was underadministered. The region passed on to Pakistan a le-
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gacy of "administrative starvation" (Government of Bengal
1915:16).
Indigenous Rural Social Organization
THE COLONIAL IMPACT The "institutional atomization" car-
ried over to informal, or traditional, forms of political and social
control as well. The relative paucity of British institutional ar-
rangements was not compensated by a vigorous network of indi-
genous institutions. It is not simply that Metcalfe's famous "Village
Republics" failed to flourish in East Bengal,3 Rather, the Perma-
nent Settlement proved pernicious to autonomous, nongovern-
mental channels of decision-making and social control.
The de-institutionalization ofEast Bengal was documented by
British official reports, even as the process was occurring. A full
century ago the effects of the Permanent Settlement of 1793 were
being felt, as noted in the annual Bengal administration report of
1871.
... in the plains ofBengal ... these institutions seem to have
been very much weakened even anterior to British rule and in
the last one hundred years of British rule and the Zaminaree
theory ofproperty, they have almost disappeared. It cannot be
said that in more important provinces of this administration
there are absolutely no self-government institutions. Some
traces yet remain: some things are in some places regulated by
village Panchayats and by headmen, elders. But more and
more, the Zamindary agent supplants the old model and the
landlord takes the place ofindigenous self-rule. (Government
of Bengal 1873:44)
The same report comments on the weakness ofofficial institutions
as well, and tellingly summarizes the human and governmental
implications of peripheral status:
Many things done by tahsildars (village revenue officials and
bookkeepers) in other parts of India are not done at all and
many things we should know from them we do not
know.... it has happened that in the province we have held
the longest ... we have less knowledge ofor familiarity with
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the people than in any other province, that British authority is
less brought home to the people, that the rich are less re-
strained and the poor and weak less protected than elsewhere,
and that we have infinitely less knowledge of statistical, ag-
ricultural and other facts. (p. 44)
Contemporary scholarship bears out these earlier conclusions.
Recent field investigators reinforce the view that rural social and
political organization is segmented, diffuse, and in flux. The
"atomization" that seems to have occurred under the British colo-
nial regime and the Permanent Settlement was enhanced even
further by Partition turmoil, and the rather sudden removal of the
Permanent Settlement in 1950, due to the zamindari Abolition Act.4
While the old .zamindari social order produced a measure ofinstitu-
tional atrophy, it endured for an extended period, and led to its own
order of sorts, a prop for social relations that was dramatically re-
moved. As indicated earlier, that social order has not been given
adequate research-another by-product ofindirect rule and hinter-
land status within the British Empire in India. But since Indepen-
dence the rural scene has begun to receive attention. While the
picture is not yet clear, it seems likely that one fundamental answer
to the area's problems of rural development will ultimately lie in
discovering a means of bringing into existence some viable rural
organizations.
RURAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE The dominant fact of rural life
seems to be its dispersed, diffuse nature or, to continue a theme, its
atomization. Even geographically, high population density and del-
taic flooding have produced a scattered, rather than clustered or
nucleated, settlement pattern in much of East Pakistan (Rashid
1965: 355-357) and a social system has emerged that corresponds to
this "scattered" pattern. As Bertocci has shown in his pioneering
study (Bertocci 1970), while individuals apparently have a clear
perception ofwhat village (gram) is their own, that mental entity is
not a corporate unit territorially and may have little to do with the
externally recognized "village," which often was labeled and
placed on a map for revenue and administrative purposes by gov-
ernment officers.
The mental village entity of the rural Muslim offers no great
de---_.-----------~~-----
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locus ofidentity and cohesion to replace the physical village entity.
Traditional authority structures apparently have decayed. The
Muslim status-hierarchy never acquired the rigidity of the Hindu
caste system although it acquired castelike characteristics.s
However, despite a strong tendency for converts to continue
occupational group endogamy and for all groups to enforce com-
mensal practices, the classification system did not evolve into a true
counterpart to the fourfold division in Hinduism. The occupational
categories were never fully equivalent, nor were marriage prac-
tices followed rigidly. Moreover, mobility was apparently much
more fluid within Islam in East Bengal, despite the dynamism that
has been perceived within the Hindu caste system.6 Increasing
wealth and shifting fortunes ofthe Mogul empires merged with the
absence of enforced occupational heredity and an egalitarian
ethic to make the fourfold division unworkable within Islam. An
Urdu proverb illustrated the unworkability: "The first year we
were butchers, the next Sheikh; this year if prices fall we shall
become Syeds" (Karim 1956).
With the pseudocaste system declining in meaning, a class
system was elaborated. At first families simply were considered
either high born, sharif (or asraj), or low born, atraf. As the older
aristocracy lost power and influence and a Muslim middle class
emerged, the atraf bhalamanus 'atraf made a gentleman' ap-
peared. The 'lowest ofall class', the arzal, apparently is equivalent
to the lowest Hindu castes and retains the ritual and social opprob-
rium of those castes.
Presently the authority structure is confused. Vestiges of a
pseudocaste system still remain, but the quaSi-class system has
been found more useful by one investigator. 7 Another investigator
comments on the absence of a caste systemS and others find that
class, not caste, is a prominent feature (Rahim 1965), or find no
present trace of castes.9 And yet another finds a mixture of tradi-
tional and emerging elements competing for authority (Rashiduz-
zaman 1966:191-200). On balance, this last view seems likely to be
the most common rural phenomenon. Ascriptive authority has
been undermined, but not replaced. The hereditary charisma ofthe
erstwhile aristocracy retains vestiges of its former ability to com-
mand deference. This ability was originally gained by being a
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functionary in the Mogul apparat, a descendant of the Prophet, an
"original Muslim'{ rather than a Bengali convert, and/or hereditar-
ily wealthy. The coming ofthe British, which coincided with great
population increases and rapid expansion of Islam in East Bengal,
removed the first and much ofthe last element; inflation ofclaims in
the middle two drained them somewhat of authority-conferring
potency. Removal of the British and many Hindus at Partition
further shook the rural authority structure, and opened the way for
the present mingling ofold and new claimants to legitimate author-
ity. Traditional authority, new political authority, and wealth seem
to be the factors involved in the present makeup of rural social
organization.
Both religion and kinship patterns segment "village" life and
contribute to its.nonvillage characteristics, to the diffused nature of
rural existence. Islam, of course, does not rely on a centralized
hierarchy with parish-church affiliation at the bottom. Religious
leaders of varying degrees are numerous in East Bengal, but the
degree depends on religious training and local prestige rather than
hierarchical appointment. Mosques also abound but their location
depends upon the presence ofa wealthy patron, factional disputes
between patrons, or other local exigencies rather than on the exis-
tence of discrete and "deserving" villages, or of a diocese, areal
subdivision imposed by religious authorities. Many ceremonies
are celebrated together by traditionally defined social entities, but
this group ofcommon mosque attenders mayor may not be from a
single village grouping, and disputes over the location ofa celebra-
tion is a common cause of factional division. The tendency for
religious observance to segment rather than unifY village life is
reinforced by its dispersed and localized nature, which leads to an
intimate connection between religious celebration and local pri-
vate sponsorship. Sponsorship of religious activities is a prime
source of gaining and sustaining local-level prestige, but it is a
relatively costly undertaking. It naturally falls to traditional elites,
or would-be competitors with some wealth, to foster various cele-
brations, which leads just as naturally to extreme localization of
religious practices. Individual religious leaders may gain sufficient
following to become independent rather than institutional
_> .~ ...... 9)1 •
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charisma, and is therefore also a form oflocalization ofa nonvillage
religion. 10
VILLAGE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION Kinship practices be-
come important for present purposes in regard to the formation of
lineage patterns, which in tum affect the nature oflocal authority
structures in rural Bengal. Marriage ties, for example, have no regu-
larized function in enforcing either village endogamy or village
exogamy, unlike other areas ofthe subcontinent (Karve 1965). Mar-
riages in traditional Muslim Bengal may be either inside or outside
the village (Beech et al. 1966). Family patterns are predominently
nuclear, extended, and monogamous, rather than joint and
polygynous as might be found in an area where territorial and vil-
lage cohesion is given higher prominence.ll Yet it is the family that
provides a major organizational nucleus for political and social ac-
tion. In a land ofdispersed villages, there is no village headman, no
centralized village authority. There is, however, a hierarchy offam-
ily groupings and in the past this hierarchy has provided a form of
governing process, or at least adjudication of local disputes.
The peasant homestead (ban) is the locus of a patrilineal ex-
tended family divided into household units of usually nuclear, or,
not uncommonly, joint family structure (Rahim 1965:5). The avail-
able information suggests that in much of East Bengal, clusters of
homesteads are united loosely under the traditional leadership of
the locally more wealthy and influential men, variously known as
sardars or matabbars. These little homestead groupings-known
in the Comilla area, at least, as reyai or reai12----eonstitute indigen-
ous political units whose leaders act as a court of first resort in the
resolution of local conflicts. Often these homestead clusters are
socially recognized "local villages," even though they may not be
officially so recognized by official organs of local government. In
some areas of East Bengal, the sardars and matabbars of several
contiguous such homestead clusters form a kind of "council of el-
ders" for the whole area covered by the groupings they represent.
The functions of these leaders are related primarily to the settle-
ment of disputes and little else. Such a council of elders is largely
one of social control; "... its latent function is formally to channel
political relations between the prestigious sardars and groups they
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represent when these relations are thrown into open conflict," (Ber-
tocci 1970:3). The effect of this system is twofold. Local political
matters remain personalized but institutional, under the aegis of
traditional authority and wealth. And political authority, like the
village settlement pattern itself, tends to be dispersed.
This view oflocal political authority further reinforces the pic-
ture ofa diffuse pattern ofsocial interaction for much ofthe popula-
tion in East Bengal. Moreover like other aspects of rural life, the
reyai system apparently has undergone a decline. While one re-
searcher found and documented its activities (Bertocci 1970),
another researcher, in the same general geographical area (Comilla
Thana), found that "this traditional social organization has now a
nominal existence" (Rahim 1965:7). The diffuse, overlapping, and
battered rural institutions combined with the intricacies and com-
plex layering ofland tenure encouraged by the zamindari system,
and theall-pervasive problems ofpopulation density and food shor-
tages, help clarifY the nature ofthe problems ofrural development.
This is not to imply that individuals are normless, unguided by
social custom or economic constraint. The point is not that Eastern
Bengal exists habitually in a state ofanomie, but rather that it seems
to exist in a state ofunusual institutional fragmentation, that this is a
population that appears inherently little organized on a large scale
and lacking in extensive institutional foci of rural life.
Until much more is known about the process of community
formation, or until the process itselfproduces a "natural" change in
the existing situation, the formal institutions of rural government
retain a high, and perhaps a disproportional, degree of interest.
Even though originally imposed by an outside power, the present
apparatus is well entrenched. In the relative absence ofan alterna-
tive mechanism ofresponse and control, perhaps this is not surpris-
ing. As truncated as they are, the inherited modalities available for
rural development may now be considered a part ofthe local scene;
indeed, it is one more legacy of the colonial era that district ad-
ministration and a series of local councils seem now to be fully
"indigenous," They have acquired a legitimacy that is difficult to
ignore, a permanency that is one of the facts of rural life.
Although the history and substance ofboth these "indigenous"
legacies generally are known and understood, perhaps it would be
> .... ::a-a .. i •
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useful to review some oftheir characteristics salient for a discussion
of rural development.
The Government System
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION The district collectorate system
as originally evolved by Mogul and British practice was skillfully
designed to provide the basic framework for imperial occupation
and stable rule. After subdividing a region or an empire into pro-
vinces, the land was further subdivided into units, the districts.
Upon this bedrock the governance of the area rested. A corps of
specially trained officials, loyal to the central power and usually not
from the area, was placed in charge of a district. Each officer was
given nearly absolute authority. Within the guidelines of the cen-
ter, the district was ruled by a plenipotentiary, an agent of the
center expressing the sovereign's will throughout the periphery.
Frequent transfers, a well-organized central bureaucracy, and
well-trained district officers could maintain large areas with
minimum staff. The duties of revenue collection and maintenance
of law and order, the historic functions of the district official, re-
quired intimate knowledge of local affairs, and when well estab-
lished and running smoothly, this system facilitates an intensive
amount of information collection at the bottom, and relatively easy
control from the top. The mediator and linchpin was the district
officer, the focus of the expression of national intent and of the
capacity to act at the locallevel.13
East Pakistan inherited such a system, but one modified in
important ways. The districts established by Cornwallis at the end
ofthe eighteenth century, as part ofhis efforts to tighten British rule
in India, were designed, or forced, to take account ofthe situation in
rural Bengal at the time. This meant coming to terms with the large
zamindari estates that emerged into prominence in the period just
prior to British usurpation of the Mogul's position (Calkins 1970).
The result in East Bengal was fewer, and therefore larger, districts;
and as noted above, the collectorate was without the subordinate
revenue staff that elsewhere nurtured the viability of district ad-
ministration. The combination left this portion ofthe Bengal Presi-
dency with a firmly established but restricted collectorate. Crea-
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tion of a new subordinate post, the circle officer,I4 partially re-
medied the situation, but still left the Muslim districts as a holding
operation, a strong superstructure with weak underpinnings.
LOCAL COUNCILS In the absence or impairment of "tradi-
tional" forms of self-rule, the local government imposed (or "intro-
duced") within the formal political system takes on great sig-
nificance. Local government in Bengal has been, from its inception,
closely bound to rural administration. The closeness of the link
varied over time.
The first local councils were groups oflocal notables, entirely
appointed (nominated) by the district officer, to perform unpleasant
tasks ofcivil government. The chaukidari panchayats established
in 1870 (Village Chaukidari Act, Act VI ofl870, Bengal Code) were
created to assess and collect taxes to support the village watchmen;
the district road committees established a year later (District Road
Committees Act, Act of 1871, Bengal Code) were created to assess
and collect taxes to improve the district roads. A person appointed
to the chaukidari panchayats could be fined 50 rupees for refusing
to serve. The district road committees were chaired by the district
officer. The identity with rural administration was nearly absolute.
Attempts to divorce local government from rural administra-
tion were affected and ultimately hampered by administrative im-
peratives. In 1882, Governor-General Lord Ripon issued an impor-
tant statement on rural self-government.Is The rationale and fate of
the resolution have been almost paradigmatic.
Ripon wanted a network oflocal councils, with the most impor-
tant council to be at the subdivisional (subdistrict) level, or even
lower at the thana level; the district was considered too large for
effective councils. Membership was to be at least three-fourths
elected, and the chairman was to be elected as well. The councils
were to be training grounds in citizenship, rather than immediate
improvements on the efficiency of rural administration. But even
for Ripon, the long-range goal was to facilitate the functioning of
the rural bureaucracy, by creating quasi-autonomous local organi-
zations to absorb some duties of government:
The task of administration is yearly becoming more oner-
ous.... The cry is everywhere for increased establishments.
•
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The universal complaint in all depamnents is that of over-
work. Under these circumstances it becomes imperatively
necessary to look around for some means of relief; and the
Governor-General in Council has no hesitation in stating his
conviction, that the only reasonable plan open to the govern-
ment is to induce the people themselves to undertake, as far as
may be, the management oftheir own affairs; and to develop,
or create if need be, a capacity for self-help in respect of all
matters that have not, for imperial reasons, to be retained in
the hands of the representatives of Government. (Govern-
ment of India 1882: Paragraph 6)
Ripon's councils were never established. Although a bill to imple-
ment the resolution was introduced into the Bengal Council,16 the
act that emerged (Government of Bengal 1885) was substantially
altered, with effects that remain visible and relevant to contempor-
ary East Pakistan. The act established a potentially powerful coun-
cil at the district level, a powerless coordinating council called a
union committee in any village or group of villages. Only the dis-
trict board was made mandatory. The local boards and union com-
mittees were discretionary. Indeed, the act permitted ample scope
for use ofdiscretionary powers by the district officer, who could and
did fail to establish lower councils, continue to appoint members to
the councils, and maintain personal control ofthe district board by
assuming its chairmanship. When the president of Pakistan at a
much later date sought to initiate an extensive but controlled sys-
tem of local government, he could draw upon well-established
local precedent.
There is, however, an alternative precedent, based upon more
recent experience prior to Partition. During the dyarchy period, the
two decades between 1920-1940, local councils were reinvigo-
rated. The reforms instituted by the 1919 Village Self-Government
Act (Government of Bengal 1919) gave local councils deep roots in
the countryside. It is likely that the interwar experience remains as
a standard of legitimacy for rural self-government, just as par-
liamentary democracy, a concept firmly instilled during the same
period, remained a standard for the national political arena.
In more detail, the precedent consists of an active district
1
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council, with an elected nonofficial as chairman, a weak inter-
mediate council at the subdivision level, and a universally estab-
lished, popularly elected union council.17 The councils were based
on a franchise restricted by a land-owning qualification, and suf-
fered perennial limitations due to lack of funds. In addition, they
are far from the original concept promoted just prior to the reforms,
which, as did Ripon, held that the union and not the district coun-
cils should be "the real working bodies," and that c~eatinga strong
district council "started local self-government at the wrong end
(Government of Bengal 1915:123). These councils too were in-
tended to take power away from the district, and vest it in much
lower union, thana, and subdivisional councils. But while these
hopes were again frustrated, the district councils displayed a capa-
city for leadership despite limited authority and funds-and the
absence of the district officer as chairman. The councils, particu-
larly the district councils, came into their own during the dyarchy
reforms, an example that has not been forgotten.
Moreover, the dyarchy councils apparently were received
with enthusiasm by the voting population, perhaps due in part to
the absence of alternative channels of expression. Seats on all the
councils at all levels were hotly contested, and turnout was consis-
tently high. Rural Bengal demonstrated a taste and facility for poli-
tical activity, when given an opportunity. Other observers since
have shared N.C. Roy's observation atthe time: "The interest ofthe
people in local elections has turned out to be immense. The Ben-
galees are now impregnated with politics" (Roy 1936:25).
Problems of Rural Development
After Independence, Pakistan remained domestically a
quasi-colonial state. Quite apart from external relations, the coun-
try's leadership pursued an evolutionary course at home, introduc-
ing piecemeal changes without radical rejection of the past. The
predominant tendency was to adapt rather than destroy the basic
structures ofstatehood inherited from the colonial period. The pre-
sent leadership in Bangladesh encounters problems created by the
provinces' hinterland legacies. If the future leadership seeks to
improve the countryside, and involve it in the process ofemerging
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nationhood, it will need to devise responses to some hard-core
problems of rural development. Some closely interrelated prob-
lems may be capsulized rather briefly.
Introductory Comments
The absence of organized, broad-based rural groups is a pri-
mary stumbling block for any efforts at local reform. While this
phenomenon is difficult to adequately conceptualize or document,
it apparently underlies much of the usual neglect and governmen-
tal helplessness in the countryside. Some suggested reasons for
rural social disorganization, or compartmentalization, have been
alluded to earlier. Whether correct or not, in a formal sense there is
a marked absence of institutional foci in rural East Bengal, and a
long history of failed attempts to create new ones. This problem
faces all governments with limited resources and a large rural
population: how can the governors reach and affect the governed;
how can the ruled make their will and needs known to the rulers?
In a situation of a near vacuum institutionally, in terms of govern-
ment or indigenous instruments of aggregational expression, the
universal problem is rendered particularly acute.
The bureaucratization of reform efforts, and the cost of
bureaucratization, is another problem inherent in rural develop-
ment efforts. Although there have been some notable private en-
deavors aimed at rural uplift- "rural reconstruction"-these ad
hoc schemes faded quickly. Given the nature of rural existence,
only programs with government support, and built into the gov-
ernment's district machinery, can hope for sustained success. Rural
development, as an effort by government, warrants a detailed
examination, since its potential and limitations are so crucial to
such a large proportion of the population.
Rural development may be viewed as compensation for the
pattern of entrenched but circumscribed administration found in
East Pakistan. No government as yet has chosen to destroy the
reliable prop of statehood perfected over centuries of changing
forms of governance. Rural development is a means of tinkering
with that system, an attempt to ameliorate its defects, to augment its
effectiveness. Governments in South Asia increasingly have be-
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come concerned with the well-being ofthe governed. In the age of
nationalism since the tum of the century, and in the period since
Independence in 1947, that concern has come increasingly to the
fore. While there is clearly a limit to what government action alone
may achieve in the South Asian setting, there also is clearly a per-
ceived obligation for governments to assume a great role in instigat-
ing change. In Bangladesh the role of government is especially
critical because of the negative effect the Permanent Settlement
had on indigenous rural institutions. Where government is likely to
be most active, where population pressure is densest and the need
for change the greatest, the institutions of government have been
weakest. The various strands of rural development found in
Bangladesh have their counterparts throughout South Asia. But in
East Pakistan, rural development by governmental reform played
an especially crucial function in expanding the potential for suc-
cessful economic and social transformation.
Agricultural reorganization in the context of Bangladesh is a
form of rural development. Not only does it cater to the greatest
source ofmanpower and potential productivity, but it is an attempt
by government to amplify its restricted mofussil operation; it is an
attempt by government to escape the strictures of the Permanent
Settlement and affect the social and economic milieu in which
almost the entire population of rural Bengal lives. The Agriculture
Department and other agencies of the imperial and postimperial
systems is an additional segment of rural administration, with im-
portant implications for local reform.
Agricultu,ral Department Problems
The troubled existence ofthe Agriculture Department is there-
fore instructive. For much of its history, it had suffered from the
general weakness of rural administration in Bengal: repeatedly, it
was shown to be among the most understaffed in British South Asia;
its effective penetration remained restricted to district levels at
best. This is a by-product ofthe neglect ofrural Bengal, reinforced
by the Permanent Settlement and by the lack of trained Muslim
personnel. But the Agriculture Department in East Pakistan met
also with another legacy from the Cornwallis era and the colonial
period. District administration, stretching back in time perhaps as
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far as Akbar, was the linchpin for government operations. The
bureaucratic apparatus, centering on the person of the district offi-
cer, seemed ill-suited to comfortably accommodate parallel lines of
authority in the form ofthe regular civil service (the district officer)
and the separate nation-building agencies (the district agriculture
officer). It seemed equally ill-suited to accommodate parallel con-
ceptions of government services: the generalist approach, em-
bodied in the Indian Civil Service and its lineal successor, the Civil
Service ofPakistan, versus the technical approach, embodied in the
Agriculture Department. The clash of structural and conceptual
approaches resulted in highly skilled generalists and technicians
segmenting their valuable and scarce resources into an uneasy,
rigid compartmentalization; both remained restricted in impact by
the intrabureaucratic tensions and by the unshakably district-level
orientation of rural administration.
Governments from Akbar through Ayub had centered their
rural government at the district level and in the district collectorate.
The result for nation-building agencies such as the Agriculture
Department was tension, insecurity, and limitation of effective-
ness. In East Pakistan, the problem as usual was compounded. The
occasionally promising results of some government agriculture
programs served as poignant indicators of the potential rewards if
the structural bottleneck could be eliminated. That bottleneck cen-
ters in the district. Rural development in Bangladesh, in the form of
the regular district administrative apparatus, retains the historical
legacy of being bereft of an intensive network below the district
(due to the service provided by zamindars, in lieu ofa collectorate
staff) and of being internally divided within the collectorate by
competing parallel hierarchies and concepts oforganizational pro-
cedure.
Cooperative Organization Efforts
Cooperative societies were an early and important attempt to
resolve the difficulties embedded in orthodox rural administration.
Although sponsored by the "nation-building" technical staffs,
cooperatives were considered a separate component of rural de-
velopment. They were attempts to create at or near the village level
numerous small groups capable of absorbing the expertise and
1
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financial resources that the government allotted to agriculture.
Cooperatives contain attractive attributes. They aggregate produc-
ers in the villages and focus on credit absorption and generation.
They, thus, in the East Pakistan context, provided the manifest
function ofpermitting the district-level nation-building agencies to
enhance their effectiveness below the district, in a manner criti-
cally affecting the agriculture conditions ofthe area. They aimed to
provide the latent and reinforcing function of inducing a social as
well as economic renovation ofthe village through the alteration of
outlook and temperament produced by individuals joining to-
gether for mutual self-improvement. Hence, since their introduc-
tion to South Asia in 1904, cooperatives, as an appendage of gov-
ernment operations and as initiators of would-be social move-
ments, have been the objects ofsustained official and private hopes.
In practice, the cooperative societies movement repeatedly
has fallen short of the hopes it engenders. The effects in part have
been organizational. Staffing and financial shortages normal to
agencies dealing with the large populations found in rural South
Asia are habitually compounded, typically enough, by the addi-
tional administrative weakness in rural Bengal under the British,
and by the lack ofMuslim personnel in the cooperative department
opting for Pakistan at the time ofPartition. In part the defects have
been conceptual, as seen in the continued debate in the former East
Pakistan over whether cooperatives should be village or union
based, single or multipurpose in function.
The Cooperatives Department encountered an additional prob-
lem in encouraging a social movement through bureaucratic
means. There is inherent tension in the competing goals of a
performance-oriented bureaucracy and a voluntaristic-oriented so-
cial welfare philosphy. Social movements are neither inherently
orderly, nor subject to easy inducement upon official directives.
The Weberian-rational bureaucratic model, in its South Asian in-
carnation, has shown itself in the Cooperatives Department to be
statistics conscious; the tension repeatedly, perhaps inevitably, has
been resolved in favor ofa strong paper superstructure and a weak
organizational base. Bureaucratic pressure to produce visible re-
sults, combined with relatively limited departmental funds and a
capital-starved agrarian economy, leads to the subversion of the
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social welfare motives, and of the cooperative structure itself, in
favor ofephemeral organizations confined to the absorption ofun-
redeemable credit. The manifest and latent attributes of coopera-
tives continue to call forth extensive effort and high aspirations.
The clash of concepts, norms, and procedures in an economy of
intense scarcity and want continues to inhibit the cooperative
societies movement.
Rural Reconstruction and Uplift
"Rural reconstruction," or "rural uplift" combines agricultural
reform and a proselytizing spirit into an emotive broad-based appeal
for total rural change. It has been expressed in a number of guises,
in an honorable tradition including Tagore and Gandhi, Brayne and
Hatch, the Bengal Department of Rural Reconstruction, Village-
AID, and even the Agricultural Development Corporation. The
purpose underlying this component of rural development is to
move outside the normal channels of rural administration and
create the conditions for a penetrating pervasive change in the
moral and human climate ofthe rural population. All the projects of
"uplift" or community development seek to reorient government
actions, to break down (or sidestep) compartmentalization.Re-
peatedly, the answer to the bureaucratic bottleneck has been seen
as the creation of an ad hoc bureaucratic entity with the alleged
authority to coordinate the activities ofthe orthodox administration.
In addition, there typically is an attempt to create a new cadre of
officials below the district level, charged with the specific task of
combining government services and making them available to the
rural populace. The urge to jump the boundaries of regular ad-
ministration and to provide to villagers a "friend, philosopher, and
guide" runs deep within the tradition of rural reconstruction.
In its most familiar forms, rural reconstruction seems now to
have run its course. The impulse that guides it remains. Indeed, the
desire to renovate the countryside, to bypass routine channels, to
alter the spirit and enlist the enthusiasm of the village population
undergirds much ofthe broader process of rural development. But
the efficiency of a "super agency," whether as a corporation, de-
partment, or series of coordinating committees, has been brought
decisively into question. The concept of a change agent, a jack-of-
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all-trades, a catalyst, has been brought to the verge of disrepute.
Extraordinary bureaucratic entities with diffuse idealistic philoso-
phies repeatedly encounter ordinary bureaucratic entities with
well-defined notions of orderly procedures, and mundane preoc-
cupation with self-preservation and measurable results. The
difficulties ofthe Cooperatives Department, noted above, were mag-
nified in rural reconstruction agencies such as Village-AID to the
exact degree that they claimed superiority of authority over the
regular administration, and laid emphasis upon a revitalization and
"movement" philosophy. The internal tension in norms and proce-
dures between the civil service and nation-building agencies
prompted, but did not readily permit, a third set ofcompeting con-
cepts and approaches. The civil service, in the form of the district
collectorate in rural areas, will not easily yield its traditional claims
to penultimate authority within its jurisdiction; development bloc
areas and development officers were a direct challenge to that au-
thority. The nation-building agencies, particularly the crucial Ag-
riculture Department in Pakistan, would not easily concede that
the technical expertise they possessed could be bettered by simple
techniques and emotive appeals for voluntary participation in rural
uplift; the multipurpose village-level workers, with their rudimen-
tary training and determined search for "felt-needs," constituted an
affront to the authority and principles of the nation-building de-
partments. In the face ofthese and many other problems, itwas the
regular administration that prevailed. As a separate approach to
rural local reform, community development, in its East Pakistani
variant as rural reconstruction, seems to have ended. The Village-
AID program was its last pure manifestation.
Ayub's Reforms and the Dilemmas
of Rural Development
Ayub Khan introduced reforms that directly affected the pro-
cess ofrural development. His reforms were surprisingly evolution-
ary in some ways, and sharp departures from past policies in other
ways. There is no need to review here the familiar background and
outline of Basic Democracies, nor is space available for a detailed
analysis of Ayub Khan's reforms in operation. However, there are
several features ofhis system that may be given briefly, before the
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old era fades from memory and the new hardens into permanence.
The New Local Government System
Ayub returned to the predyarchy period for the philosophy and
form of his local government system. Basic Democracies was not
sui generis, but showed unmistakable resemblance to the type of
local government established during the earliest, most paternalis-
tic, period of British experimentation. Under Basic Democracies,
the district council remained preeminent; the intermediate council
(the thana council) initially had little purpose to fulfill; the lower
councils remained restricted by lack offunds. Most noticeably, the
councils were tied closely to district administration: originally,
membership even on the union councils could be filled by ap-
pointment; the thana and district councils were at least halfofficials
(government officers); and both higher councils were chaired by
representatives of the collectorate. The district officer regained de
jure control of the district council, in clear contrast to the dyarchy
reforms that remained in effect for a full half century prior to Basic
Democracies. In 1962, Ayub would have agreed with a British
report from the prenationalist period: "We deem it essential that
the [local self-government] movement should be completely under
the eye and hand of the district authorities" (Great Britain
1909:240).
Basic Democracies sacrificed participation in favor of coordi-
nation of scarce resources. If a choice had to be made between
democracy and (economic) development, as Ayub apparently
thought, then economic development clearly came first. The struc-
ture ofthe thana and district councils was designed to facilitate the
coordinated use ofthe government's human and material resources
by bringing together elected representatives and members of the
nation-building departments under the guidance of district offi-
cials. This can be viewed as a way to resolve some ofthe dilemmas
and problems of rural development. It makes "development" the
duty ofregular government agencies and local councils, rather than
of a special ad hoc cadre as in the unfortunate earlier experiments
just before and after Partition, thus reducing the opposition, or
reluctance, ofthe rural bureaucracy. It also potentially reduced the
structural and methodological tensions between the collectorate
d
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generalist and nation-building specialist (and competition be-
tween the departments as well). The council system was the first to
actually implement in a pragmatic fashion a direct attack on the
problems offragmentation and coordination. Opponents can argue
the cost was too high; Ayub could argue that the system combined
democracy and development,1s But if there was an imbalance, the
choice was deliberate.
Basic Democracies inaugurated the first significant shift away
from overcentralization at the district level. Perhaps to everyone's
surprise (except the head of the Academy for Rural Develop-
ment-see note 18), the thana council emerged as a major compo-
nent of Basic Democracies, and thus as a major new feature ofEast
Pakistan's development efforts. The precedent had been decidedly
negative; the-subdivisional council established in 1885 and main-
tained in 1919 had been feeble. There was little reason to suspect
that the first council at the lower, thana, level would differ. Yet due
to the Rural Public Works Program, increasing funds and
decision-making were siphoned downward from the district to the
thana councils.
In the first year of the provincial works program, the district
councils were allocated 50 percent of the total funds, deliberately
shorting the lower councils in the fear that they would be unable to
properly absorb large sums of money. Thereafter, however, the
percentage allotted to the thana councils steadily increased, from a
TABLE 1. Rank Order of Works Program
Allocations to Basic Democracies Councils, 1962-1967
Thana Councils
District Councils
Union Councils
Municipal and Town
Councils
Experimental Projects
Five-Year Average
1962-1967 (%)
37.7
26.4
21.0
2.6
2.1
1966/67 (%)
58.1
15.0
13.0
6.0
4.3
SOURCE: Adapted from Thomas (1968:86). Based on official annual report figures.
The Administration of Rural Reform 49
b
low of6.5 percent in 1962/63 to a high of 58. 1 percent in 1966/67
(Table 1). The final average for the five-year period, ranked in order
of total allocations, shows the dramatic reversal of a well-
entrenched tradition; the figures from 1966/67, the most recent
year available, underscore the five-year trend.
Despite regular recommendations to the contrary, the district
has remained the primary focus ofrural politics and administration
in Bengal since at least the early British period, when Lord
Cornwallis tightened the reigns of company rule. Even the Basic
Democracies Order left district authority more or less intact. As the
figures indicate, the thana indeed came into its own under the
works program. The potential for facilitating development that is
built into the thana council has been tested and found reasonably
effective. A critic of the Rural Public Works Program complained
that this was "merely a devolution of authority from the District
Magistrate to the Circle Officer, who is the kingpin of the Thana
administration" (Sobhan 1968: 152). If completely true, this would
have been a fulfillment ofa long-sought goal. "Merely" decentraliz-
ing government from 17 districts to 413 thanas would have marked
a breakthrough in the long search for governmental effectiveness.
The decentralization was by no means complete but to some de-
gree the ruler and ruled in East Pakistan were brought into more
intimate contact. For that period, enhanced interaction between
government and citizen resulted in a major "rural reconstruction"
effort.
Political Results of the Reforms
Basic Democracies shifted power to a rural elite, away from
urban centers. The most unique, nonevolutionary aspect of Basic
Democracies was the use of local councils to alter the basic for-
mulae by which the state was governed. Ayub used the Basic
Democrats as an electoral college to choose the head of state and
the national and provincial assemblies. This had the effect of politi-
cally decapitating the urban centers and institutionalizing rural
notables as important actors in the national arena. Perhaps this too
is a throwback, in intent, if not form, to the paternalistic days of
British rule. Ayub succeeded, through a locally novel device, in
achieving what Cornwallis sought and failed to achieve: creation of
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a relatively stable and politically pliant landed gentry. The novelty
of the device, and the resurgent potency of urban elites, will cer-
tainly end the electoral functions of local government, and return
the rural councils to matters of merely local concern.
Dilemmas for the Future
Ifthe new leaders ofBangladesh seek continuity with the past,
rural administration and local government probably will sink com-
fortably into familiar patterns, and the evolutionary tinkering will
resume. The dilemmas that will reappear have been built into the
discussion above, and can be recapitulated briefly.
Development-or-democracy very possibly will seem again to
be a valid dichotomy as it apparently was for the Ayub regime.
Unimpaired centralization ofauthority remains the hallmark ofthe
district collectorate; even further centralization of control can be
urged, to ensure efficiency rather than fragmentation in use of re-
sources. (This argument holds for all development-first theories,
regardless oforganizational form.) Yet there seems to be little need
for such pessimism. The performance of local councils during the
interwar period indicates that the simple expansion of popular de-
mand and popular authority enhances, to a degree, the normal op-
erations of government agencies. The interwar councils had lim-
ited funds and limited franchise, yet dramatically expanded
their scope.
A second dilemma relates also to the structure of district ad-
ministration. The historic "pull to the district"-eentralization of
activities at the district level-has only recently and tentatively
been broken. The thana council became, perhaps briefly and unex-
pectedly, crucial to Basic Democracies as a development mecha-
nism. Authority and funds were devolved to collectorate and line
agency personnel, and to elected repre~sentatives. Abolition of
Basic Democracies could lead to abolition of the thana council, at
least as an operative council; the legacy of earlier precedents and
the attraction upward to the districts likely will prove stronger than
potential benefits of decentralization.
Only a very conscious effort will prevent the resurgence ofthe
district to full authority and prestige, to the detriment ofthe efficacy
of government capacity, and of local influence as well. Yet the full
a
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thrust ofboth rural administration and local government has been
to move the locus of activities closer to the rural populace, below
the district. It is a token of the "administrative starvation" of East
Bengal that the government's network of services remains primar-
ily clustered in a handful ofdistrict headquarters. Equally, it is the
outpost nature ofthe region that consistently has thwarted efforts to
make local government "start from the bottom up, rather than the
top down"; paternalism and the appeal of stability have out-
weighed the desire for extensive local involvement. If future re-
gimes gamble on enhanced local participation through reasonably
powerful local councils, then the gamble should be extended one
step further: devolution of real authority from district to thana
councils. No other single step, within the existing framework,
would do more to stimulate effective enhanced demand on the
government for resources, and the reciprocal rapid expansion ofthe
rural bureaucracy to meet the demand. The logic of evolutionary
tinkering, if that is the course ofthe postconflict leadership, points
to a popularly elected, tax-supported council at the thana level in
East Bengal.
A third dilemma ofrural development departs from the nature
ofdistrict administration. Rather, the issue relates to the role ofthe
rural population in shaping the politcal destiny ofthe country after
the end of military rule in Pakistan. The electoral role of local
councillors will disappear, regardless ofthe form that local councils
may assume. Whatever the corrupting effect ofthe electoral college
on individuals, local councils, and the party parliamentary system,
it did have the effect of giving unprecedented importance to the
rural sectors of the country. When the electoral college lapses, will
the rural stake in the national arena lapse as well? The dilemma in
this case arises due to the absence ofviable village-based structures
in East Bengal. Without such party structures, the return of party
politics and of nonnational rural councils can mean the loss of a
rural voice in the formation of the revamped polity. Can urban-
based politics accord a significant, participatory role for the non-
urban population, to replace the faulty, unacceptable mechanism of
Basic Democracies?
If local councils are given a new life, the ready political re-
sponse historically associated with rural electoral politics may pro-
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vide the base for the emergence of viable party activities beyond
the moffusil rural towns. This could have a salutary effect on
stimulating a responsive local bureaucracy (unless it reacts nega-
tively, a form ofpassive resistance) and give organizational strength
to rurally based political party leaders. But this would first entail a
gratuitous and strong commitment by urban-based political party
leaders.
Summary and Conclusion
Rural development is a process of government, rather than a
program or agency. It is an attempt to restructure the government's
relationship with its nonurban population. The need to rely on
government to take action combined with the need to adapt exist-
ing governmental moffusil institutions leads to thorny problems of
rural development. In the absence of private organizational capa-
city for innovation and change, all rural development becomes
"governmentized," assumed as a duty ofthe government; this leads
to reliance on the district gridwork to implement rural change. Yet
attempts to alter the rural apparatus has both historically and re-
cently proven difficult. The perceived necessity for unrestricted
authority in the collectorate causes fragmentation and tension for
even the line agencies, the nation-building departments, as the
separate but parallel hierarchies conflict philosophically and
methodologically-a problem that is greatly accentuated for addi-
tional ad hoc "reconstruction" agencies inserted into the district
apparatus.
Centralization, as well as fragmentation, is inherent in district
organization, and therefore in local tradition as well. Rural de-
velopment requires reform of the government machinery, and a
vigorous local government. The frequently made observation re-
quires, it is further said, decentralization from the collectorate, and
a system oflocal government with power close to the"grass roots";
yet reform efforts within the government, and by the government,
seem always to end with reinforced potency at the district level.
There is an inexorable "pull to the district" that makes deviation not
only in a sense "illegitimate" as noted earlier, but also ineffectual.
There may yet emerge significantly altered conditions in rural
Bangladesh. The basic"givens" ofrural life suggested in the open-
-
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ing paragraphs may change; the demands of independence could
be a crucible that reformulates the social and political institutions
of rural life, and of the government as well. But if not, the future
must evolve from the givens ofthe past. Then the potential for rural
development will tum upon two central problems. To what degree
will any government sacrifice the sinews of stable rule, the balky
but reliable district apparatus, for the sake ofrural decentralization
and democratic participation at the local level? Without reforms,
the capacity for responsive and responsible rural government will
remain circumscribed; with reforms, the leadership may perceive
its own security, and the skeleton ofan uncertain state, in jeopardy.
Related to this, but more broadly, is the problem of develop-
ment and participation. While the rural citizenry remains unor-
ganized and poor, what can be done to keep the nonurban sector of
the population from fading once again into political and economic
obscurity? Under either a closed or open political system, the most
serious problems of rural development still remain the problems
stemming from neglect and unimportance. In the third and fourth
decades since Partition, and in the initial years ofliberation, a cent-
ral problem of rural development will be to prevent the virtual
reversion of 85 percent of the population to an ignored hinterland
status.
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NOTES
1. This analysis is partly based on Tepper (1966).
2. The impact ofMogul administrative practice in Bengal is somewhat
controversial, but it seems clear that the Todar Mall's measurement and
assessment reforms were never fully implemented in the eastern districts.
For a recent and concise statement of Mogul organization in Bengal, see
Calkins (1970:794-500). He notes, inter alia, "The political structure in
Bengal was somewhat peculiar, however, because almost all the land was
controlled at the local level by indigenous landholders, who were called
zamindars. These zamindars played an unusually important role as re-
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venue collectors and keepers ofthe peace. Over time a group oflarger and
stronger zamindars began to emerge to take over more of the respon-
sibilities of government." See also the volume edited by Frykenberg
(1969).
3. Indeed there is reason to doubt that such village republics
flourished anywhere in the subcontinent: "... Metcalfe wrote hopefully of
the 'little republics' which he had found flourishing in the country between
Agra and Delhi, in the twilight between the Moghal and the British ad-
ministrations, assuming them to be a general phenomenon. In fact in that
region, they had been born (or re-born) of the necessity for a defense
organization against raiders from the neighboring desert. They were
confined to quite a small area. In the north especially, panchayats tended to
be based on caste and religion and rarely covered the whole community."
(Hicks 1961:46)
4. More techI].ically, the East Bengal Code, State Acquisition and Ten-
ancy Act, Act 28, 1950, East Pakistan. The words "East Pakistan" were
substituted by a general-ordinance in 1960.
5. Perhaps this can be explained historically. The province was the last
stronghold of Buddhism in India; the Hindu revival was slow to advance,
and was influenced in the reconversion process by Tantric practices
(Beech et al. 1966:7). The personalistic and less-Brahminic version ofHin-
duism was thus not entrenched at the time of the Muslim conquest (circa
1200). On the other hand, at least 70 percent ofthe Muslims in Bengal were
converts from Hinduism, many lived in areas where Hinduism remained
strong (Hindus until very recently formed over 18 percent of the East
Pakistan population), and most still live in areas where Hindus dominate
socially and economically.
6. For a discussion of the dynamic aspects within village-level caste
systems, see Srinivas (1962).
7. F. R. Khan (1962:226) noted a "caste-spirit" and "Muslim caste-like
groups" in the village he studied, but ranked these groups into a simple
high-born and low-born hierarchy:
A. High Muslim: Khan (Pathan) or Khandkar
B. Low Muslim: 1. Shek 4. Kulu
2. Shikdar 5. Nikuri
3. Mondol 6. Bediya
8. The absence ofcaste is attributed to "the absence ofsuperior middle
tenure holders (a class which generally patronized and helped in the set-
tlement ofthese groups), the predominance of Muslims and the proximity
of the town which has most of the service needed by the villagers." This
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comment implies that caste is considered by the author to be a Hindu
phenomenon exclusively (Qadir 1960:56).
9. A class system is found based on wealth. A local saying is quoted that
reflects the new situation: "Nowadays if one's economic situation is good,
one's family status is also good" (Bertocci 1970:26-27).
10. Reference here, of course, is only to Islamic practice. Hindu prac-
tices in a "quasi village environment" are even less well documented. All
comments about local-level religious organization in East Pakistan are
tentatively made and open to dispute and revision when further informa-
tion becomes available; few areas ofresearch are so fruitful or so ignored.
Comments here are based upon the village studies listed above, particu-
larly Bertocci (1970), plus Zaidi (1961 and 1963).
n. The critical difference between extended and joint families in re-
gard to land is that while members ofextended families may own contigu-
ous property, joint families share ownership of property. In Muslim prac-
tice as manifested in East Bengal, primogeniture and Hindu influence
combine to provide joint ownership between father and eldest son as long
as the father lives, and perhaps joint ownership among brothers for a short
time after the father dies, but then property reverts to nuclear family own-
ership (Beech et al. 1966:4-7). It is interesting to note that in the
Dhanishwar study there was strong support for the joint family as an ideal
but also wide recognition of its defects (Qadir 1960:100-109). The author
concludes, "In spite of all the honest support for the system, it is ap-
prehended that its foundation is becoming weaker due to the changing
value judgment as a result of the present educational system.... Many
respondents blamed wives of the brothers for causing break [sic] in the
joint family system." East Pakistan still has more joint families than West
Pakistan, but this probably is due partially to the Hindu minority in East
Pakistan.
12. Bertocci (1970:8) writes that the word is probably Arabic in origin
from the root meaning "proteges", those who are under the protective
domain of others. This might indicate that the reyai system is Muslim in
origin, and an alternative to the Hindu caste panchayat. Rahim (1965:5)
suggests that the reyai might once have included kin groups only.
13. The literature on "district administration" is rather extensive. The
overall pattern ofBritish imperial control is given by Tinker (1966). One of
the most detailed examinations ofthe collectorate is given by Khera (1964).
Of the work focusing specifically on East Pakistan, see Hoque (1970),
which is part of the continuing examination of administrative patterns by
the National Institute ofPublic Administration in Dacca. See also Muhith
(1967, 1968).
...
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14. The "circle" referred to a circle (grouping) of unions, the lowest
administrative subdivision. The post was created out of awareness, from
firsthand knowledge, ofEast Bengal's administrative weakness, which re-
sulted from the first Partition in 1904 (Government ofBengal 1915; Anisuz-
zaman 1963).
15. The Resolution on Local Self-Government of 1882. The resolution
first appeared in Government ofIndia (1882).
16. The contents and an analysis of the bill are provided in the Bengal
District Administration Committee Report (Government of Bengal
1915:81-82).
17. Apart from official reports, which are somewhat inaccessible, there is
surprisingly little information about this important phase of local govern-
ment in Eastern Bengal. The authoritative general source ofinformation is
Roy (1936).
18. Union councils, after a short time, were completely elected on the
basis ofuniversal suffrage; the elected chairmen ofthe unions sat as mem-
bers ofthe thana council, which in tum chose the elected representatives of
the district councils. Indeed, the first suggestion for the "coordination,
councils" apparently did not come from Ayub, but from Akhter Hameed
Khan, the man most prominently associated with rural development in
East Pakistan (Mohsen 1963:87).
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Comilla Rural Development
Programs to 1971
Robert D. Stevens
... The crucial feature of traditional agriculture is
the low rate of return to investment in agricultural
factors of the type that farmers have been using for
generations. ... In order to transform this type of
agriculture a more profitable set offactors will have
to be developed and supplied. To develop and to sup-
ply such factors and to learn how to use them
efficiently is a matter of investment-investment in
both human and material capital. (Schultz 1964:8)
Introduction and Background
This paper focuses on the nature and status in 1971 ofsix major
rural development programs originating at the Academy for Rural
Development in Comilla, Bangladesh. Due to their importance in
the progress of work at Comilla, more detailed analysis has been
presented of the Agricultural Cooperatives Federation and the
Thana Training and Development Center Program. Four other
programs are examined briefly: the Rural Public Works Program,
the Thana Irrigation Program, the Women's Program and Family
Planning, and the Rural Education Program.
A consensus among economists is that the social and economic
transformation of low-income developing societies is dependent
upon the continuous flow into agriculture ofinvestments in modem
technology with high economic returns. Less emphaSized in the
literature about economic growth from traditional agriculture are
the associated institutional changes required in this transformation.
The elaboration ofa large number of new or modified institutions
accompanies rapid economic growth or may be induced by
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East Pakistan's Agricultural
Planning and Development, 1955 -1969:
Its Legacy for Bangladesh
Charles M. Elkinton
From Benign Neglect to Top Priority
Pakistan's three successive five-year development plans, cov-
ering the period 1"956 to 1970, exhibited rapidly improved planning
capability. A long-term perspective plan covering twenty years to
1985 provided a useful broad framework within which to construct
successive five-year plans. This impressive overall planning effort
benefited from a decade-and-a-half of competent assistance from
the Harvard Advisory Group (HAG) and a rapid increase in the
number and the competence of indigenous planning personnel.
The place and need for annual development plans were finally rec-
ognized during the third plan period. East Pakistan first produced
annual plans for FY(Fiscal Year) 1968 and FY 1969.
During the 1950s, including the First Plan period, East Pakis-
tan played a relatively minor role in the planning process and was
accorded a relatively minor share ofdevelopment resources. This is
indicated by the increased flow of public sector development ex-
penditures to East Pakistan from about 20 percent of the national
total for the First Plan to some 38 percent for the Second Plan and
about 50 percent of the Third Plan allocations.
The total public sector development allocations to East Pakis-
tan accorded to the agricultural sector for each of the first three
five-year plans and the share ofthe total are shown on the following
page.
The determination of sectorial allocation of development re-
sourceS is eternally a knotty problem for any developing country
because it usually involves sociopolitical issues and complicated
sector analysis. At the margin of development investments, what
choice ofadoitional inputs at a given level would produce a higher
- --
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TABLE 1. Development Allocations to the Agricultural
Sector in the First Three Plans (millions of rupees)
Five-Year Plan Total Allocated to Agr. %
Allocation Agriculture of Total
First Plan (1956-1960) 1,231.1 228.6 19.0
Second Plan (1961-1965) 5,550.5 966.6 17.0
Third Plan (1966-1970) 14,390.0 2,124.0 14.8
61
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SOURCES: Data for First and Second Plans are from GOEP (1966), Table 16.3. Data
for Third Plan are from Government of Pakistan (1966).
net social per capita product? Family planning? Additional fer-
tilizer? A new jute factory? Or another addition ofkilowatts ofelec-
trical power?
East Pakistan's rural sector accounted for some 95 percent of
the population and about 95 percent ofthe value ofexports includ-
ing raw and processed agricultural products, which also provided
about 70 percent of the annual gross domestic product (GDP). In
view of this relative importance, it is not surprising that there al-
ways has existed a high correlation between the year to year annual
movement ofthe GDP and the annual index ofagricultural produc-
tion. Until FY 1967/68 the government of Pakistan assumed a rela-
tively relaxed posture vis-a-vis agriculture; a sort ofbenign neglect
prevailed. One important reason for this was the easy availability of
food grain and vegetable oil imports from the United States Public
Law 480 (PL480) program. These import purchases were made
with rupees and most of the funds generated were in tum made
available to finance economic development projects. Thus, it is not
surprising that development planning officials, indigenous and ex-
patriate alike, did not undertake comparative cost and advantage
studies ofPakistan's agricultural resources and crops and were rela-
tively unconcerned about the lack ofagricultural production prog-
ress in both the East and West wings. There was, however, some
concern about the social and political consequences, especially in
East Pakistan, that might be generated by increasing rural un-
employment and deepening poverty, and this concern led to the
introduction of a massive rural works program to offer seasonal
employment and to develop sorely needed rural infrastructure.
rl
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The United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) made available to East Pakistan for rural works, between
1968 and 1969, 104.3 crore of rupees; 86.7 crore as grants and 17.6
crore as rupee loans on favorable repayment terms. At the official
exchange rate of 4.76 rupees to $1.00, 104.3 crore is equal to $210
million.
The relatively relaxed attitude of Pakistani planners toward
agricultural development came to an abrupt end in 1967. In that
year U.S. food grains (wheat most notably) were in short supply
relative to domestic and foreign sales commitments. Pakistan offi-
cially was notified that the United States could not supply the re-
quested quantities and that a significant part of the tonnage to be
made available would have to be corn and corn sorghum. Pathans of
the North-West Frontier Province ofWest Pakistan did not objectto
corn since it has been a traditional part of their diet. East Bengalis,
on the other hand, viewed corn a~d sorghum as completely foreign
and distasteful foods.
A reassessment of Pakistan's minimum food grain needs led
the government ofPakistan to commit about $75 million equivalent
to world market food grain suppliers to fill the country's deficit.
Having approved these commercial imports, the president ofPakis-
tan promptly called a meeting of provincial governors, ministers,
and top economic planning officials. At this and succeeding ses-
sions, it was agreed that Pakistan could no longer afford to depend
on the United States for food grain supplies on concessional sales
terms to supply the country's deficits. The president requested his
officers to prepare, on a crash basis, plans for increasing Pakistan's
wheat and rice production to the self-sufficiency level in the shor-
test time and by 1970, if possible. The initial plans provided for
rapid introduction of the short-stemmed high-yielding varieties of
wheat from Mexico and rice from the International Rice Research
Institute (IRRI). Also, provision was made for a sharp increase in
fertilizer supplies through expanded imports and, in the longer
term, expanded indigenous production.
West Pakistan had renowned success in the use and rapid
adoption ofMexican wheat and IRRI rice, together with expanded
use ofother necessary inputs and grain support prices. Food grain
self-sufficiency was achieved by the end of 1969. Food grain pro-
duction increased in tonnage from a 6.5 million average between
----: - d
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1961 and 1965 to 9.4 and 9.8 million tons in FY 1968 and FY 1969
respectively.
East Pakistan's plans for quickly achieving self-sufficiency in
rice production relied heavily on rapid and successful adoption of
IRRI No.8 and No.5 (otherwise designated as IR-8 and IR-5),
which had proven to be highly successful in West Pakistan and
parts of India. In addition, plans were drafted and steps taken to
expand fertilizer imports and production and to increase low-lift
pump irrigation for the boro rice crop, including IRRI No.8. Unfor-
tunately, IRRI Nos. 8 and 5 had certain limitations. The East Pakis-
tan climate, plant diseases, and limited supply ofcontrolled irriga-
tion proved less than optimum for these imported varieties. Thus,
the East Pakistan food grain deficit continued at over 1 million tons
in 1969, and 1.5 million tons in 1970 (Table 2).
Agricultural Sector Plan-A New Initiative
In light ofthe worsening food-grain-supply situation, the East
Pakistan Planning and Development Department, in cooperation
with other concerned agencies, in 1968, undertook the preparation
of a thorough agricultural sector development plan. Although this
TABLE 2. East Pakistan Food Grain Imports
and Average Minimum Price of Rice
1960-1964
(Annual Ave.)
1964/65
1965/66
1966/67
1967/68*
1968/69
1969170
Food Grain Imports
(000 tons)
662
735
875
1,076
644
1,029
1,500
Average Annual Minimum
Provincial Retail Rice Prices
(rupees per maund)
25.1
25.0
29.7
38.8
34.6
38.6
N.A.
>
SOURCE: Government of East Pakistan Food Department.
*1968 was a record-breaking crop year with a reported crop of 11 million tons.
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plan had shortcomings, it was by far the most analytical and defini-
tive agricultural development plan ever produced in East Pakistan.
The United States Agency for International Development Mission
in Dacca concurred in most of the problem assessments and in
general with the quantified and costed actions recommended.
However, the mission felt that the plans had used population
growth estimates that were too low and rice production estimates
that were on the high side. Thus, rice production targets were too
low to fill prospective requirements.
An elaborate study with recommendations for nationalizing
the jute industry from production to marketing and exports was also
made by the Government of East Pakistan (GOEP) Planning and
Development Department. This study noted that jute production
had remained almost static and that East Pakistan's dominant posi-
tion in world raw jute trade had declined sharply during the past
two decades.
Two other important agriculture subsectors that were given
relatively less analysis and program attention were fisheries and
tea. Expansion offish production could make a significant contribu-
tion to increasing East Pakistan's protein consumption. The
Fisheries Department with expatriate help identified the major
technical, institutional, and resource constraints to expanded out-
put, but these findings and recommendations remained, for the
most part, unimplemented.
Expanding tea consumption outstripped production so that net
tea imports came to prevail. Political as well as economic factors
were alleged to be major constraints on expanded output. Both tea
and jute policies and development plans were of special interest
and were subject to some degree of control by the central govern-
ment, and thus East Pakistan's ability to plan and program produc-
tion, marketing, and export improvements was abridged.
Input Shortfalls
East Pakistan's annual plans for FYs 1969 and 1970 proposed to
achieve agricultural production goals by sharply increasing the
supply of important input factors, including high-yield varieties of
grain and jute and continued input subsidies to assure farmers a
favorable cost-return ratio. The 1970 plan also noted the increasing
« • +
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constraints on development resources and thus the necessity of
using the following criteria for project selection: preference for
projects in the penultimate stage, quick-yielding projects, aided
projects, agricultural supply industries (such as fertilizer produc-
tion), family planning, and malaria eradication.
The FY 1970 plan projected a 12.8 percent increase in rice
production and calculated the quantity ofinputs together with their
response coefficients, which would give incremental outputs to
achieve the targeted rice outputs. The same general planning pro-
cess was used as was used in preparing the FY 1969 production
goals. The official input-output records for the crop ofyear 1968/69
showed an average or better than average crop year with respect to
the influence of climatic factors. Thus it is of interest to note FY
1969 production experience relative to planned output targets for
that year (Table 3).
TABLE 3. Targets and Realized Production
and Inputs, FY 1969 Plan
Plan
Production Production
Targets Realized Difference
Rice (millions oftons) 11.50 11.10 -0040
Jute (millions of bales) 7.00 5.80 -1.20
Sugarcane (millions of tons) 8.00 7.00 -1.00
Tea (millions oflbs.) 68.00 62.00 -6.00
Potato (millions of tons) 0.75 0.75
Oil Seeds (millions of tons) 0.18 0.20 +0.20
Plan Input Inputs
Targets Realized Difference
Fertilizer (tons) 375,000 278,000 -97,000
Low-lift Pumps
(acres irrigated) 698,000 515,000 -183,000
Plant Protection (acres) 993,000 800,000 -193,000
SOURCES: GOEP 1969a and 1970b. Rice and jute production data from Government
of East Pakistan FY 1969 official production report.
d
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The shortfall of almost 100,000 tons of fertilizer, 183,000 acres of
low-lift pump irrigation, 193,000 acres of plant protection lacking,
plus an informally reported shortfall in acres ofIRRI rice, account
for most of the deficit in crop output.
Further, there is strong evidence that the official estimates of
the 1965 to 1969 rice crop were on the high side by an annual
average ofabout three-fourths ofa million tons. These errors led, in
tum, to underestimates of grain import needs and to inflated grain
prices (See Table 2). The sources and magnitude ofthese errors as
well as corrective action is discussed in a later section.
Required Improvements in Planning,
Statistical Methods, and Finance
In 1969, the government ofPakistan decided that the country's
economic planning operations could henceforth be performed
adequately without further expatriate, that is, Harvard Advisory
Group, assistance. This judgment seemed quite reasonable to me
as it related to the central government's Planning Commission,
which had developed an impressive indigenous planning compe-
tence.
On the other hand, the East Pakistan Planning and Develop-
ment Department, which had a few well-trained economic plan-
ners, was still seriously deficient in trained manpower relative to
the momentous tasks ahead. Concerned East Pakistani officials
voiced the opinion that the elimination ofexpatriate planning assis-
tance to the East Pakistan Planning and Development Department
was premature. However, the central government's decision on
this matter prevailed. Had this decision continued in force, it
would have then been urgent to expand assistance to East Pakistan
in the training abroad ofeconomists who had promise ofbecoming
competent development planners and program evaluators. After
Independence, however, several highly trained Bengali develop-
ment economists, who had previously been associated with the
Institute for Development Economics in Karachi and who had fled
the country during 1971, returned to take up posts in the new
Bangladesh government's· planning commission. Moreover, other
foreign-trained development specialists in institutions outside of
Dacca have been offered positions in various sections of the plan-
_..............
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ning apparatus. Thus, central planning in Bangladesh seems as
well served by competent professionals as is possible at the mo-
ment. The need for training more specialists to serve at the various
district levels, as well as in development institutions such as the
Academy for Rural Development at Comilla, will continue.
Adequate and reliable statistics available on a timely basis are
a sine qua non for effective and efficient development planning.
East Pakistan, starting from an almost unbelievably low base, made
considerable progress in developing useful series of technical and
economic data. The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Census, under an AID financed agreement, made available to East
Pakistan some twenty man-years of advisory service for the de-
velopment ofstatistical institutions, capabilities, and a useful series
of economic data. This input together with a participant training
program helped East Pakistan to make a useful start in the de-
velopment of this critical capability and service. However, only a
relatively modest beginning was made in this important field in
East Pakistan while the developed countries have undergone tre-
mendous technological advance in data collection and processing.
The US-AID mission to East Pakistan unfortunately found it neces-
sary to close out the statistics project in 1969. The action was taken
in part because it was clear that progress in strengthening statistical
institutions and services was slowing down as a result of tightness
ofoverall development funds and also because ofthe relatively low
priority accorded statistical services by controlling officials of the
East Pakistan government. I believe that the government of
Bangladesh should ask a team ofable but disinterested outsiders to
reevaluate the country's existing statistical institutions, organiza-
tions, trained manpower, and methods and to make recommenda-
tions for further development and growth of this basic service.
Within the constraints of the limited number of trained plan-
ning officers and insufficient high quality and timely socioeconom-
ic statistical series, the Development Planning Department staff
and cooperators from other nation-building departments and a few
expatriates surprisingly produced two impressive annual plans and
a few good sector and subsector studies. With increased resources
and related improvement noted above, East Pakistan's planning
was in a position to achieve excellence"... we presently lack in
statistical information on perhaps one-half of the economy.... In
d
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all probability it is likely that our lack of knowledge impedes our
ability to devise suitable programmes to stimulate development in
this half of the economy" (Rabbani 1968).
Among the more serious statistical def1ciences have been
faulty methods for making annual estimates of rice production.
Since the annual value of rice output accounts for more than one-
third ofthe gross domestic product, progress made to improve these
estimates will be reviewed in the next section.
Rice Production·Estimates
Past failures in agricultural planning, food grain import decisions,
and in restraining rice inflation have resulted in part from large
annual errors in rice production estimates. East Pakistani agricul-
tural production data from 1947 to 1965 were based on a system of
"subjective" estimates. From 1965 onward, the same method was
employed on all crops except for the aman and aus rice crops and
jute. Since 1965, annual estimates ofthese crops have been in trans-
ition to an "objective" method of crop estimation and reporting
(Larson 1969).
TABLE 4. Official Reported Rice Production
1947-1969 (millions of tons)
Aus Aman Bora Total
"Subjective" Sample Estimates
1947/48 to 1960 ave. 1.7 5.4
1960/61 to 1964/65 ave. 2.4 6.8
1965/66 2.9 6.8
1966/67 2.7 5.9
1967/68 3.1 6.8
1968/69 2.7 6.9
"Objective" Sample Estimates-Aus and Aman
1965/66 2.9 5.9
1966/67 2.7 5.7
1967/68 3.1 6.3
1968/69 2.7 5.7
0.3 7.4
0.5 9.7
0.6 10.3
0.8 9.4
1.1 11.0
1.6 11.2
0.6 9.4
0.8 9.2
1.1 10.5
1.6 10.0
SOURCES: "Subjective" Sample Estimates are from Government of Pakistan 1969.
"Objective" Sample Estimates are from Larson 1969.
. ~ -
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The subjective method was based on annual reports ofacreage
and yield changes by the extension field staff of the directorate of
agriculture. As a starting point, this method used the 1944-1945
census of Bengal for benchmark crop acreages and a rather vague
so-called normal yield. These were "opinion-type" estimates and
were not based on any probability sample of farms or field plots.
The "objective" crop acreage yield survey was based on the
annual collection of acreage information from a probability area
sample of about 5,000 area segments or cluster ofplots-each five
acres in size. Crop-cutting experiments to obtain yields were car-
ried out annually on a subsample of some 2,700 aman plots, 2,000
aus plots, and 1,700 jute plots (Table 4). Sampling errors for esti-
mates at the provincial level were estimated to be about 1.0 to 1.5
percent for yields, 2.0 to 2.5 percent for acreage, and 2.5 to 3.0
percent for production (Larson 1969).
Because the growing ofboro crop rice was spotty and irregular
over the countryside, the general purpose sample survey was not
applicable. Thus, for this crop, the traditional "subjective" crop-
reporting system still continued.
Financial Constraints
Agriculture accounted for about 20 percent of East Pakistan's
Second Plan development expenditures and, aside from rural
works, this figure declined to 12.4 percent oftotal outlay during the
first three years ofthe Third Plan (Table 5). If rural works expendi-
TABLE 5. Average Annual Development Expenditures
for Second Plan Period and First Three Years
of Third Plan Period (in crares of rupees)
Infrastructure
Social Services
Food and Agriculture
Industry
Total Annual Average
Second Plan
40.8
25.2
18.9
9.6
94.5
Third Plan
83.4
34.9
33.8
28.1
180.2
>
SOURCES: Data for the Second Plan are from Government of East Pakistan 1965.
Data for the Third Plan are from Government of Pakistan, "Consortium Memoran-
dum."
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tures are added in, the agricultural share increases to 18.5 percent.1
In addition to the direct fund outlays to agriculture, there were
expenditures on infrastructure, industry, and social services, which
benefited farmers and thus would have contributed to agricultural
development.
The question as to whether agriculture's share of total de-
velopment funds was "fair" or "adequate" is difficult to assess in
general terms. There are related but unanswered questions as to
opportunity costs and prospective net returns from alternative in-
vestments in a meaningful time frame. However, Government of
East Pakistan officials declared, "In keeping with the revised Third
Plan Strategy, topmost priority has been accorded to the agricul-
tural development program which includes the attainment of self-
sufficiency in food grains and expansion ofjute, tea, sugar cane, oil
seeds and other crops" (GOEP 1969c).
Given the highest development priority for agriculture in gen-
eral and food grains most explicitly, the question arises as to
whether all possible policy, financial, institutional, and program
measures were adopted that would achieve the stated self-
sufficiency goal. A selected few of the more important existing
deficiencies for policy and program are discussed in later sections of
this chapter. Thus, reference will be made here only to financial
constraints.
Floods destroy up to 5 to 10 percent ofEast Bengal's rice crop
on an average of about every third year. The feasibility of limited
but significant projects to partially correct this problem was deter-
mined, but rupee and foreign exchange resources were not ade-
quate to carry on all feasible projects.
Rural works for the development of sorely needed rural infra-
structure and relief of rural unemployment only received an aver-
age annual input of 15.8 crores during the four years from 1966 to
1969. East Pakistani officials and expatriates alike who had been
closely associated with this program agreed that 25 to 30 crore of
rupees could be effectively employed annually on this program,
especially since the Thana Irrigation Program had been added to
other rural works. Further, I personally urged the government of
Pakistan (GOP) and GOEP officials, in FYs 1967, 1968, and 1969, to
speed up the process of alloting funds to the rural works program.
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The program was seasonal, mostly carried out between mid-
November and the end of March; funds in hand were required
several months in advance of initiating projects in order that com-
mitments could be made for labor and materials. Bureaucratic red
tape and perhaps some disinterested officials regularly held up the
allotment of funds and thus delayed the start-up date of the annual
works program, a malpractice that should be corrected if the pro-
gram is to continue as part of Bangladesh's overall agricultural de-
velopment strategy.
These few examples plus other related considerations point up
the problems faced by the East Pakistan government because ofthe
limitations imposed on it due to lack ofcontrol overthe preparation
and approval of periodic development plans and the allotment of
funds for achieving development plan goals. Even though now an
independent Bangladesh will have complete autonomy in these
matters, it will still have to face up to major issues relating to in-
creasing public revenue and stimulating private savings and in-
vestments. Reduction of the high cost of government revenue col-
lections and positive measures to encourage private savings should
be given priority consideration.
One further important consideration relating to the financial
problem was the two-decade average annual transfer from East to
West Pakistan, of an equivalent of some $50 to $100 million of
financial resources, foreign exchange and rupees combined, as a
Pakistani economist's study and a balance of payments study by a
competent American economist convincingly document.2 East
Pakistan received an estimated one-third of all Pakistan foreign
assistance since 1953 and this has totaled some $1.2 to $1.5 billion.
It is likely that over two decades East Pakistan transferred financial
resources to the West roughly equal to all foreign assistance it re-
ceived. As the events of 1971 showed, this was a serious economic
matter for East Pakistan and a complicated political problem that
contributed to the dissolution of the nation.
Rural Works and Inflation
The rural works program was started province-wide in FY
1963, and an annual average of 15 crore rupees were allocated to
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this program between FYs 1963 and 1969. The question of the
inflationary impact of the program was frequently raised. An
analysis ofthe price and living-cost effects ofthe works program is
lacking, but some of the related magnitudes suggest that the price
impact was not great and that the additional rupee supply was
sorely needed. East Pakistan's money supply, currency plus de-
mand deposits, was only 14.0 percent ofthe gross domestic product
between 1963 and 1968. The comparable West Pakistan figure for
the same period was 26 percent. The works input amounted to
about 5 percent of the money supply between FY 1963 and 1968,
but these funds were dispersed widely in an undermonetized
countryside. East Pakistan's per capita income averaged 293
rupees and, assuming an average ofsix persons per family, reflected
an annual average family income of some 1,800 rupees. The aver-
age annual works input per family was about 14 rupees; average
annual wholesale prices increased 3.5 percent per year and con-
sumer prices about 3.9 percent between FYs 1963 and 1968.
The rupee inputs for rural works were generated by imports of
PL 480 food grain and vegetable oil. From 5 to 10 percent of East
Pakistan's grain supplies and about 25 percent ofoil supplies were
imported. Rice demand had a price elasticity of-0.5 and the income
elasticity was probably somewhat above 1.0; thus, the increased
grain supplies offset in large measure the rice price effects of in-
creased income.
Finally, recognition was given in the East Pakistan Annual
Plan of FY 1968 to the need for monetary expansion to stimulate
domestic development; an unprecedented Rs. 75 crore (about 30
percent) expansion of commercial bank credit was indicated as
necessary to achieve the investment goal in 1968/69.
Priority AgriculturalPrograms, FYs 1972 through 1975
The Setting
Increased food production should share with population con-
trol the highest priority in Bangladesh's development plans. As
previously noted, food production in the former Pakistan province
during the three planning periods from FYs 1956 to 1969 has not
kept up with population growth. Failure to close the food grain gap
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in the near future will widen the underconsumption gap or alterna-
tively will necessitate large and continuous annual imports from
abroad, which in tum will deprive the economy of foreign ex-
change sorely needed for import of industry production goods and
needed consumer commodities.
Agricultural programs must be concerned initially with short-
term measures, that is, things to be done that can influence greater
production in the immediate future. The major constraints to early
achievement offood grain self-sufficiency are obviously population
growth and the physical difficulties of Bangladesh's geography.
Other constraints are also important. Chief among these are: (1)
uncertainty in obtaining the finances for importing an adequate
supply of inputs on a timely basis; (2) an inadequate number of
trained personnel to assist farmers with efficient use of modern
inputs; (3) frequent recurrence offloods and other natural disasters,
which regularly cause a 5 to 10 percent loss of food grain; (4) an
underdeveloped and inadequate agricultural credit system; (5) an
inadequate extension and research service; (6) completely in-
adequate marketing institutions and facilities; (7) lack ofhydrologi-
cal information about the country's surface water and groundwater;
and (8) inadequate or weak management and operation on the part
of most development agencies. Factors favorable for short-run ag-
ricultural growth are: (1) favorable economic incentives; (2) input
subsidies and a large flow of rupees to the rural sector, which re-
duce the urgency for major improvement in agricultural credit in
the short run; and (3) present planning-policy emphasis on agricul-
ture. Finally, Bangladesh normally has a suitable climate for year-
round production, good rice soils, and undeveloped water re-
sources, giving the province natural advantages in rice production.
Technical Inputs
FERTILIZER East Bengali farmers annually increased their
use of fertilizer by an average of 23 percent during the year 1965
through 1968. This increase took place despite serious floods dur-
ing the period. Unfortunately, in FY 1969, fertilizer nutrient use
only reached 108,000 tons, a mere 10 percent above FY 1968. In the
annual plan, the GOEP projected for FY 1970 an increase of25,000
nutrient tons; equivalent to a 23 percent advance. This annual rate
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of increase seems reasonable if supplies are available and if dis-
tribution facilities are improved. East Pakistan had two urea plants
in 1970 with a combined capacity of about 190,000 nutrient tons,
and two triple phosphate units with a capacity of 70,000 tons. If
these can resume near-capacity production in the near future, the
prospect is that Bangladesh may produce enough fertilizer (except
potash) to satisfy a demand increasing by 20 percent per year in FYs
1972 and 1973.
After FY 1973 there is a promising prospect that IRRI high-
yielding rice seed, especially adapted to East Bengali conditions,
will be generally available for use on the aman crop and possibly
the boro crop. Rapid introduction of high-yielding varieties after
FY 1973 would, ofcourse, require sharply increased fertilizer use.
Bangladesh eitheI must bring another fertilizer plant on production
stream in FY 1974 or prepare to again import annually increasing
amounts of fertilizer thereafter. Construction of another large
natural gas urea plant should be started as soon as possible.
The East Pakistan Agricultural Development Corporation
(ADC) was responsible for fertilizer distribution, moving fertilizers
from import points and internal factories to interior depots, usually
to thana centers. From these points (413 thanas), sales to farmers
were handled by local distributors; there were some 18,000 local
sellers reported in 1969. This system appears to have functioned
reasonably well in increasing fertilizer nutrient use by farmers
from an average of 4.3 thousand tons annually between 1955 and
1959 to an annual average of 75,600 tons from 1965 to 1969.
However, there were unsolved problems, as is indicated by
the wide differerence in fertilizer sales and use between districts.
In FY 1968, a good crop year, five districts, with 21 percent of the
cropped area ofthe province, purchased (and presumably used) 50
percent ofall fertilizer distributed. The six lowest districts with 36
percent of the crop area took only 14 percent of the fertilizer. Six
other districts, having 43 percent of crops, took 36 percent of the
fertilizer supply. The lowest six districts in fertilizer use had fewer
local fertilizer sellers than did the higher-use districts.3 They also
have fewer access roads and year-round waterways than do the
higher-use districts. These and any other contributing reasons for
the low fertilizer intake should be fully investigated by the
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Bangladesh government with a view to taking needed action to
remove the more serious constraints.
Finally the anticipated increase in availability and use of
high-yielding seeds from FY 1973 onward will make necessary a
sharp increase in fertilizer availability and use. In view ofthe prob-
lems ofdistribution discussed above, there would have been some
doubt as to the East Pakistan ADC's capacity to service adequately
the enlarged distribution role. Before the crisis of1971, the GOEP
had invited province-wide private distributors of petroleum prod-
ucts to consider also taking on fertilizer distribution and sales.
Prior to the outbreak ofthe crisis, an agreement between the GOEP
and private companies had not been reached. Fertilizer production
and imports were both within the public sector in East Pakistan and
there was a subsidy ofsome 50 percent on fertilizer sales to fanners.
Private companies with potential capability to handle fertilizer
production indicated that the GOEP proposition was unattractive
because of the large prevailing public sector role in fertilizer pro-
duction, import, and sale. In view of this, the Bangladesh govern-
ment might well plan for the future transference of all phases of
fertilizer production, import, and distribution to the private sector.
There is a precedent for this move in West Pakistan, which be-
nefited greatly by moving these important functions to the private
sector.
PLANT PROTECTION The urgency in developing plant pro-
tection capabilities lies in assuring the import of an adequate sup-
ply ofpesticides on a timely basis. Import requirements during FY
1969, FY 1970, and FY 1971 cost annually about $4.5 million and an
annual average need of$6 million for the period FY 1970 through
FY 1975 was anticipated.
Plant protection application to crops in the past has been car-
ried out by the GOP (10 spray planes), by the GOEP (2,148 field
sprayers), and increasingly by private farmers with pesticides and
spray equipment supplied by the Department ofAgriculture. This
system was much less efficient than the ADC fertilizer program and
is not likely to be adequate for the present needs ofthe Bangladesh
fanner. Further, it was highly subsidized and it may be hoped this
cost to the previous government could be discontinued or sharply
reduced over the new country's first planning period.
L[.'
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Information on import requirements, ofboth kind and quanti-
ty, of stocks on hand, and on area distribution are quite unreliable.
Proper projection and accounting procedures were greatly lacking
in East Pakistan and a complete reorganization ofthe plant protec-
tion division is required for Bangladesh. Stocks normally are
moved out from the provincial and district areas to thana storage
where accounting becomes difficult because of the number of
thanas (413) and the level ofstaffin charge. Surveys should be made
on stocks on hand to determine amounts and quality. Also, a pes-
ticide standardization committee should decide the actual mate-
rials that are required for importation.
The commendable GOEP targets were: (1) to take over aerial
spraying from the GOP in order to ensure more timely and ade-
quate coverage; (2) intensify extension-service training of farmers
in the identification of need and proper use of pesticides; and (3)
transfer responsibility for imports, distribution, and use of pes-
ticides to the private sector during the Fourth Plan period. Unfor-
tunately private companies in East Pakistan appeared less in-
terested than those in the West in assuming responsibility for pes-
ticides and in fertilizer distribution. The GOEP had expressed a
desire for expatriate assistance in effecting these changes, and the
new Bangladesh government may wish to request similar assis-
tance.
SEEDS Improved high-yielding seeds are of paramount im-
portance to countries seeking an accelerated agricultural growth
rate because of their high payoff record in terms of increased pro-
ductivity and expanded output. Recognizing this, the GOEP in
1967 declared a "Grow More Food" policy and had high hopes of
achieving a technological breakthrough in rice output by achieving
widespread and rapid adoption of International Rice Research In-
stitute varieties. In FY 1967 the GOEP imported 500 maunds of
IRRI seed No.8 and experimented with this quantity on 2,000 acres
(GOEP 1967a:13). This test revealed that IR-8 generally produced
good results under controlled irrigation and optimum utilization of
other essential inputs.
On the basis ofthe 1967 experience, the GOEP made available
69,500 maunds of IR-8 seed to apply to 240,000 carefully selected
irrigated acres ofthe boro and early aus crop ofFY 1968. An assess-
. -
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ment of this crop in mid-season revealed some of the problems
associated with the IR-8 crop:
Although early plantings, particularly those without
adequate applications of fertilizer, suffered some set-backs
due to cold spell and crop disease, on the whole the perfor-
mance has been satisfactory. However, it may be pointed out
that utmost efforts are to be made to evolve new paddy va-
rieties to suit the different local conditions and such efforts
will not be confined only to selected irrigated areas. (GOEP
196&:13)
Thus, it was discovered that this imported seed, even under
carefully controlled production conditions, was subject to photo-
sensitive limitations and disease vulnerability in the East Bengal
environment. The decision to press on with the development of
modified and new varieties tailored to the local environmental
conditions was indeed wise. In the meantime, while new varieties
were being evolved, it was decided to encourage continued expan-
sion of the acreage in IR-8 and IR-5 on controlled-irrigation lands.
This was done in the belief that these varieties would, on the aver-
age, at least double and maybe triple the per-acre yields as com-
pared with local boro varieties.
As ofthe 1969 crop year, low-lift pump irrigation was practiced
on 420,000 acres, and other mechanical irrigation, mostly
tubewells, may have raised the acreage total to about 550,000 acres.
Traditional hand-irrigation methods were used on more than 1
million acres. Accordingly, the planning target for IRRI varieties
was raised to over a half-million acres in FY 1969 and about 700,000
acres in FY 1970. How nearly these targets were approached is not
yet known but the reported acreage of the boro crop in 1969 was
480,000 acres larger than in 1968 and 525,000 acres above 1967.4
The reported average yield in 1969 rose by two maunds per acre
over the previous year. The expanded boro acreage reflected ex-
panded availability of irrigation, which also influenced yields. Be-
fore the advent of IRRI varieties, the yield of the boro crop had
been increasing steadily for several years and reached 16.3 maunds
per acre in 1967. In 1968 and 1969 the average per-acre yields rose
to 19.8 maunds and 21.8 maunds respectively. lIthe half-million-
22 ilb 2£jl£i£2LLJ.
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acre IR-8 target for 1969 had been actually realized, it could have,
with a favorable season, accounted for a large part ofthe increase in
average yield and also much of the half-million-ton increase in
output. Unfortunately the acreage and yield of the aus crop de-
clined so that the aus crop decreased almost 400,000 tons; the aman
crop officially was reported almost 100,000 tons over 1968 and the
1969 total rice crop was reported to be 170,000 tons above 1968.5
The preliminary record of experience with IR-8 and IR-5 in
use on the boro and aus crops suggests that it has made a useful
contribution to boro output under controlled irrigation and near
optimum use ofassociated inputs. Having at hand no better alterna-
tives, the GOEP properly took the risk ofencouraging these strains.
On the other hand, these imported varieties still appear vulnerable
to a cool and low-photo-index winter as well as to East Bengal's
virile plant disease strains. Accordingly, it is highly desirable and
urgent that progress made in 1970, when IR-20 was successfully
grown on some 200,000 acres, be continued in seeking to modify
imported strains and in developing other new, high-yielding va-
rieties for each of Bangladesh's three rice crops.
Indeed, the GOEP had recognized these needs and in 1969
USAID brought to Dacca a seed improvement adviser who had
experienced outstanding success in improved seed development
in other countries. Early in 1970 he elaborated a comprehensive
plan for new seed distribution to Bengali farmers, aiming at
maximum use ofADC facilities, including twenty-two seed multi-
plication farms and several thousand registered seed growers. The
plan envisioned usage of the already existent Agricultural De-
velopment Estate program, involving the formation of coopera-
tives, the supply ofcredit, and the development of a marketing sys-
tem. It was thought that the development ofan effective seed grow-
ers' association would be ideally feasible in connection with a
program under way for the multiplication ofIRRI No. 532-E-576,
that is, IR-20, which had been planted over 500 acres in 1969 to
provide seed for further testing and increase during the 1970 aman
season.6
IRRIGATION Because ofthe frequency and destructiveness of
monsoon floods (major damage every third year and less destruc-
tion about every other year), the GOEP was appropriately giving
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major emphasis to dry-season winter-crop irrigation. In FY 1969
mechanical irrigation was used on about 420,000 acres and indi-
genous irrigation on about 1 million acres. During FY 1969 some
11,000 pumps were in use and the target for FY 1970 was 19,000
pumps, which would irrigate almost 1 million acres (GOEP 1969a
and 1970b). This area plus the area irrigated by Water and Power
Development Authority (WAPDA) tubewells and local irrigation
methods were planned to bring the total irrigated area to about 2.1
million acres, approximately 9 percent ofthe total crop acres ofEast
Pakistan. Actually, there was a shortfall in pumps and tubewells in
use and the mechanically irrigated area probably fell far short of 1
million acres.
There were two limitations to the success of this ambitious
program: the first, a shortage of trained people to keep the pumps
running; and the second, a question as to the adequacy of surface
water in some areas to match the irrigation necessitated by draught.
A visiting International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) team (FY 1970) expressed concern about surface water
availability, and, because of this concern, the team remained non-
committal about providing financing for an additional 18,000 pumps
requested by the GOEP. The problem oftrained mechanics is dis-
cussed in the extension section of a report on this strategy.
The GOEP arranged through several aid donors for the impor-
tation of low-lift pumps sufficient to raise the total supply to the
24,000-pump level. Unfortunately, these engine and pump combi-
nations came from several West and East European aid donor coun-
tries, and thus parts would not have been interchangeable and
maintenance problems would have been difficult.
The Thana Irrigation Program (TIP) was started experimen-
tally in t~n thanas in FY 1967, and, from the good results ofthis trial,
it was decided in FY 1968 to embark on a province-wide thana
irrigation program as a part of the rural works program. This pro-
gram not only had the overriding merit of expanding total crop
acres, but also would thoroughly involve local people directly in
the planning and execution of the program.
The GOEP hoped to reach the target of4 million acres as soon
as pOSSible, but uncertainties about the supply of winter surface
water and the amount, location, and quality ofgroundwater would
80 Rural Development in Bangladesh
have to be removed. Studies and investigations of these water
supplies will require several years. West Pakistan investigated,
with United States Geodetic Survey (USGS) help, the groundwater
ofthe Indus Plain for almost ten years before embarking on a com-
prehensive tubewell program.7
Newly independent Bangladesh will have to solve otherprob-
lems in this area. As irrigation programs expand, required funds
from the public sector may rise. Once again economic development
priorities must be evaluated. If water supplies prove to be ade-
quate, the TIP perhaps should be deemed equally as important as
fertilizer, quality seeds, thermal power or other infrastructure, or a
new industry plant. A further persistent problem is the matter of
operation and maintenance ofengine and pump equipment and the
procurement of spare parts. Training assistance ofthis type should
be provided in greater quantity.
Economic Incentives
East Bengali farmers, including the great majority who are
illiterate, have long since demonstrated that they shift the use of
their resources in response to changes in price/cost relationships.8
Thus, positive economic incentives must be given the highest
priority in the effort to induce farmers to undertake the technologi-
cal breakthrough, which is in progress and which must be acceler-
ated. The GOEP recognized the importance of incentives as indi-
cated by large subsidies on fertilizer, irrigation, plant protection,
and improved seeds, as has the government of Bangladesh. Fer-
tilizer and low-lift pump irrigation were formerly subsidized about
50 percent; improved seeds about 20 percent; plant protection,
flood protection, and large-scale WAPDA irrigation projects at 100
percent. Before the emergence ofBangladesh, the USAID mission
shared the view of the GOEP that these subsidies should be con-
tinued well into the Fourth Plan period and then be gradually
reduced as production approaches the target level and as a modem
credit system is organized, adequately financed, and readily avail-
able to serve the needs of farmers.9 Support for this general ap-
proach may well continue, should the new government in Dacca
wish to adopt it.
-
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In addition to subsidies, and ofequal or greater importance, is
the current and prospective ratio of rice prices to the prices of
commodities other than food. The prospect for Bangladesh over the
next three to five years is that this favorable price ratio for farmers
will continue because ofthe deficit food grain position, which still
hovers between 2 to 3 million tons of shortfall in rice production
each year.
A multiple correlation analysis measuring the movement of
retail rice prices as related to changes in the per capita availability
of food grains indicates that a 10 percent change in food grain
availability per capita would cause a 20 percent change in price at
the retail level (HAG 1970). It appears to the writer that a rice price
support program will not be necessary nor appropriate as long as
Bangladesh is a deficit rice area relying on imports to supply up to
10 percent of the annual supply. On the other hand, it would be
prudent to prepare a standby price support system in the event
relative price changes do jeopardize achievement of agricultural
objectives. In the past, annual smuggling of rice to India also
tended to inflate East Pakistani rice prices, and this problem con-
tinues for Bangladesh. The GOEP established a compulsory rice
purchase plan within five miles of the border to inhibit smuggling
and to acquire a portion of the rice supplies needed for the ration
shops, which operated to assure low-income groups a supply of
food grains at below cost, a form of consumer's subsidy (GOEP
1964, 1965, 1966, 1967b, 1968b). During FY 1969, the government
paid between Rs. 27 and 28 to these areas and sold through the
ration shops at Rs. 29 +. Also rice was purchased at the regular
market price throughout the province to supplement the border
purchases made for the ration shops. These purchases only
amounted to an annual average of39,000 tons during the year from
1960 to 1968.10
The high price of rice makes it essential that there be a jute
price support program to stimulate production, with a view to
stabilizing international prices and retaining foreign markets. The
GOEP program for jute price stabilization during the year 1968 and
1969 appears to have succeeded in eliminating the wide seasonal
fluctuations that had prevailed in previous years. But a significant
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increase in output would also depend on making available sub-
sidized inputs and extension advisory services, just as has been
done for rice. The 5 percent rise in the wholesale price ofrice in the
years just prior to the crisis of 1971 is clear evidence of the impor-
tance of food grain shortages resulting from excessive summer
Hoods and limited imports,l1 even under normal conditions.
Virtually all the farmers were exempt from the agriculture in-
come tax. Land taxes were fairly nominal at an average ofRs. 5.90
per acre, including land revenue, development and relief tax, edu-
cation taxes, and Basic Democracies assessment. Thus the tax pay-
ments by farmers were mostly in the form of excise taxes on com-
modity purchases, and various fees and stamp taxes. Ithad been the
intention of the GOEP not to increase taxes on agriculture while
the "Grow More· Food" campaign was in force. Thus it is obvious
that taxes were not a disincentive to changing technology in ag-
riculture. On the other hand, the GOEP planners hoped that an
agricultural green revolution would create taxable income, and it
would be reasonable for their successors in Bangladesh to expect
the same.
Agricultural Credit
Agricultural credit in East Pakistan mainly included taccavi
loans, Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) and Agricultural
Development Corporation supervised loans, and private money-
lenders-the latter furnishing 90 percent of the rural credit at an-
nual interest rates of 50 percent to 100 percent.12 To expect gov-
ernment or commercial credit agencies to service East Pakistan's
small annual operating loans to over 6.2 million farmers on 6 to 7
percent interest is unrealistic. Therefore, before any farmer credit
program can be workable in Bangladesh, 12 percent to 15 percent
interest, or a combination of interest and service charges as is done
in some developed countries, must be accepted. It is too large a
program for the government to provide this credit, and commercial
banks will become involved only on a remunerative basis. Super-
vised credit with a large percent being offered in kind could
perhaps be best to assure proper credit use. Private sector banks
should be approached to plan and cost out a project of this size.
ADB-ADC experiences in this field were not successful because of
t9
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poor servicing by the loaning agencies. A profit motive is appar-
ently necessary to make this type of operation successful.
The GOEP planned in 1970 to provide Rs. 100 crore for assis-
tance to the rural economy to finance agricultural modernization
(GOEP 1970b). This input was to include Rs. 80 crore of institu-
tional credit and subsidies for inputs plus Rs. 40 crore for rural
works. The Rural Works Program fell far short of the Rs. 40 crore
contemplated in the early plans for FY 1970. Thus, the total rupee
inputs probably fell somewhat short ofRs. 100 crore. If the Rs. 100
crore level had been realized, it would have amounted to almost 10
percent of the gross value at factor cost of total agricultural output.
Only 25 percent of the Rs. 100 crore input would have created
farmer indebtedness. This is a favorable factor for rapid accelera-
tion offarmer adoption ofnew technology, especially fertilizer and
irrigation, during an initial period, for example, three or four years. _
On the other hand, this sytem of financing agricultural growth is a
major drain on government financial resources, and thus the
Bangladesh government must reorganize and modernize farm cre-
dit institutions in order that an effective credit system can replace
subsidies as early as possible.
The need for accomplishing this has already been recognized
by the GOEP authorities who expressed a strong interest in intro-
ducing an agricultural credit guarantee fund concept in East Pakis-
tan to assist farmers in their purchase of low-lift pumps and
tubewell equipment, and perhaps later on to cover fertilizer pur-
chases. The AID Provincial Office worked closely with local bank
officials and the GOEP Planning and Development Department to
adopt this scheme to meet East Pakistan's tradition-bound and in-
adequate agricultural credit system. It is especially promising as a
technique ofgetting private bank resources involved in the agricul-
ture credit program. If adopted by the new government, this re-
vised credit system should be put in full operation as soon as possi-
ble, in order to meet the needs that will arise from the contemplated
use of greater quantities of fertilizer, pumps, and improved seeds
and pesticides, and also to permit some reduction in inputs sub-
sidies.
Perhaps the most promising long-run contribution to a solution
of the farm credit problems is the organization and method of the
s
84 Rural Development in Bangladesh
Academy for Rural Development at Comilla. The credit coopera-
tives in this system encourage and put much emphasis on farmers'
savings as an integral part ofthe credit program. As the farms prog-
ressively modernize, this approach should contribute greatly to
expanded rural credit. While this basic organization is being set up
in additional thanas, it will, ofcourse, be necessary to proceed with
improvement of the other farm credit institutions and resources
noted above.
Agricultural Research
East Pakistan's agricultural research facilities and capacity
were described in 1969 by the leader ofa USAID-financed Agricul-
tural ResearcnReview Team as virtually nonexistent (Parker et al.
1968). The new capital uprooted the traditional agricultural re-
search facilities and it may not have been possible for these
facilities to be replaced and made fully functional before the end of
the then-scheduled Fourth Plan period. This project was in opera-
tion and stafftraining underway but more funds would have to have
been provided for an earlier and a more adequate program. The
limited research personnel in the Ministry ofAgriculture had been
undertaking nominal adaptive trials ofseeds with alternative prac-
tices. The Ford Foundation-assisted Rice Research Station was
constructed and functioning by FY 1970, and it has already made a
solid contribution to the development of IR-20 and other new
strains.
East Pakistan Agriculture University at Mymensingh had a
group of some seventy newly trained young agriculture scientists,
who were expected to begin to produce meaningful research
within the next three to five years had they been given the neces-
sary rupee funds for research, additional research facilities, and the
technical guidance ofsenior expatriate research advisors, including
several resident senior advisors and short-term visiting advisors, as
needed. A USAID contract with a Georgia University consortium
to provide this assistance was postponed in 1971 by East Pakistani
hostilities.
This foreign input is also required to engender the psychology
ofsuccess. It has been wisely said that"enthusiasm is often under-
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rated in agricultural development. As happened in West Pakistan,
one major accomplishment touches off others within a research
service. Years of little or no progress have weighed heavily on the
whole agricultural research establishment of East Pakistan. One
breakthrough, one success would lead to others, and the research
service would begin to contribute the way it should" (Hill and
Borlaug 1968).
From the above, it is obvious that Bangladesh's agricultural
production progress during the next five years will have to rely to
some extent on basic research done in areas with a somewhat com-
parable climate and ecology, such as the Philippines or other
Southeast Asian countries. In addition to this, ofcourse, the adap-
tive trials involving domestic and imported seed together with vary-
ing quantities and varieties of fertilizer, insecticides, and other
inputs will be useful-in fact, essential. Presumably the Ford
Foundation will continue its support ofrice research and the intro-
duction of IRRI varieties.
A relatively modest USAID input of rupees for initiating spe-
cific projects at the Agriculture University is desirable. This would
be only supplementary to rupees for research, which must be made
available by the Bangladesh government. The USAID contribution
would be essentially for demonstration purposes. The develop-
ment of basic and applied research at the university is essential,
partly because ofthe long delay in the development ofthe research
facilities of the Pakistan Ministry of Agriculture. Plant scientists
agree that "no country should undertake wide scale introduction of
high yield expatriate seed without having available adequate
facilities and a substantial corps of plant breeding and related sci-
ence personnel with the capability to keep up with production
problems which multiply on a geometric basis as new and high
yield varieties are introduced."13 Thus, East Pakistan would have
been introducing the IRRI varieties at great risk if the Ford Foun-
dation had not provided the minimum necessary research facilities
and personnel.
Evidence of this is the limited area and seasonable periods
where and when IR-8 and IR-5 may be grown. While under certain
conditions these varieties produce yields comparable with those
achieved in West Pakistan, the scope for these varieties actually has
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proven less than optimum. These varieties have not been as disease
and insect resistant as are local varieties. During the monsoon, IR-5
and to a certain extent IR-8 are photoperiod sensitive and must be
sown late in winter as they are not cold resistant. Varieties now on
test show much improvement in disease and insect resistance and
in not being strongly photoperiod sensitive in this area. It will,
however, be two to three years before enough seed is available,
even though these varieties proved successful in province-wide
trials.
Agricultural Extension and Training
The FY 1969 USAID-provided Extension Review Team con-
cluded in part that the GOEP Extension Service was badly or-
ganized, inadequately trained, and underfinanced. The team made
specific recommendations for correcting each of the major defi-
ciencies. The GOEP showed a strong initial interest in the recom-
mendations ofthe team, and in FY 1970 had the report under study
in preparation for interagency discussions intended to arrive at
agreement on the recommendations and preparation of plans for
implementation. It appeared to the visiting mission that even ifthe
government accepted and implemented the team's report, the ef-
fect of these improvements would not have been reflected in pro-
duction much before 1975. This is because basic institutional
changes and enlarged budgets for this kind ofservice came to frui-
tion slowly in East Pakistan. For Bangladesh, an effort must be
made to expand and accelerate the training ofkey advisory person-
nel to develop a capability to install, service, and maintain irriga-
tion facilities, and to advise farmers on the efficient use ofirrigation
water. The urgency ofadditional training is indicated by the sharp
increase in the available supply and planned expansion of the use
of low-lift pumps.
Facilities for pump operator training were available at
twenty-five zonal workshops over the former Pakistani province.
Sixteen zonal shops had facilities for mechanic training, and some
6,000 pump operators and approximately 200 mechanics were
trained in FY 1969. To operate the 19,000 pumps that were con-
templated for FY 1970, an additional trained corps of 12,000
operators and 600 mechanics was going to be needed. Also re-
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quired was a corresponding increase in trained personnel who
could guide farmers in the proper use of irrigation water. Official
reports on the extent to which these inputs were realized in FY
1970 are not available as of this writing, but informal reports indi-
cate that there may have' been a significant shortfall in pumps used
and an even greater deficit in the training of personnel. In 1968,
fourteen training courses were held at twelve locations, and 309
trainees participated. Two USAID advisers, one irrigation and one
extension specialist, assisted in the organization and carrying out of
these training activities, together with the preparation of instruc-
tional materials. A second adviser on irrigation methods reported
for duty in December 1968. The emphasis has been on the training
of instructors, with a goal of accelerating the training program in
keeping with the expansion in pumps and mechanically irrigated
areas.
Flood Control
East Bengal's periodic Hoods, cyclones, and droughts cause
tremendous economic loss. A recent instance was the November
1970 tidal bore that wracked vast but still uncounted havoc on
human and animal life, crops, and property. The excessive summer
Hoods of 1969 destroyed an estimated 600,000 bales of jute and a
substantial acreage of aus crop rice.
The boro or "winter" rice crop is free ofHoods but is necessar-
ily based on irrigation, the increase ofwhich is retarded by mechan-
ical problems and potentially by limited surface water and
groundwater resources during the winter months. This crop
reached 2 million acres and may eventually reach 4 million acres
out of Bangladesh's 22 million acres of crop land.
Thus increased Hood protection for the aus and aman crop is
considered to be essential. Expatriate hydrologists have stated that
comprehensive water resource management in East Bengal would
require cooperative efforts among the riparian countries of the
Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna rivers. Since there are no feasi-
ble reservoir sites in the country, except Karnaphuli, regulation of
the rivers would require major water storage structures near the
headwaters of the river systems. The international agreements
necessary to create comprehensive river management appear to be
I
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possible only in the indefinite future (International Engineering
Company 1964).
About 2.5 million acres were receiving flood protection and
GOEP studies indicated that it was technically and economically
feasible to extend flood protection to some 5 million acres by 1980.
After the 1968 flood, the GOEP prepared and sumitted plans for an
annual outlay of Rs. UO crore for fifteen years. This plan was de-
signed to protect 16.8 million acres, of which 13.9 are cropped.
There is serious question as to whether the East Pakistan Water and
Power Development Authority could, even with optimum foreign
assistance, have managed a program of the magnitude proposed.
On the other hand, increased flood protection is ofsuch paramount
importance that Bangladesh and aid donors should undertake as
much of the proposed activity as is technically and economically
feasible.
Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development
The activities ofthe (now Bangladesh) Academy for Rural De-
velopment at Comilla, discussed in more detail elsewhere in this
volume, made a valuable contribution to rural development in a
generally traditional countryside. So successful was the "Comilla
Approach" regarded that in FY 1969 a formal proposal was made to
extend the academy's projects ofcomprehensive rural organization
and development to all 413 thanas ofEast Pakistan, and the GOEP
in 1969 set up a high level interagency committee to consider this.
Unfortunately the proposal came at a time of increased budgetary
constraint and interagency jealousies, which combined to delay
approval ofthis important proposal. However, the writer notes with
approval that the "Comilla Approach" seems likely to be given high
priority in the rural development strategy of Bangladesh as it
evolves during the 1970s.
Conclusions
The policy ofthe government ofEast Pakistan, restated period-
ically during the 1967-1970 period, was to ashieve self-sufficiency
in the production of food grains, to expand'jute production and
exports, and to increase the output ofoil seed and other crops that
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would upgrade the diets of East Pakistani consumers.14 Studies
made ofvarious aspects ofthe agricultural sector indicate that East
Bengal has soil, water, and climatic resources sufficient to attain the
stated objectives even for a substantially increased population.
Also the studies indicate that rice and jute, as well as some other
important crops, have a comparative advantage, especially on farms
that have adopted the new high-yielding seed technology.
With some additional numbers of adequately trained person-
nel, including expatriate services and a substantial upgrading of
statistical services, the Bangladesh development planning estab-
lishment should be capable of producing first-rate periodic plans.
As soon as possible, annual estimates of rice crops should all be
based on an "objective" probability sample.
A shortage ofpublic financial resources for development was a
chronic and critical problem for East Pakistan. Private savings and
investment have continued at a distressingly low level, that is,
some 10 to 12 percent of the provincial annual product. This is
about one-halfthe rate that has been realized in West Pakistan. One
important consideration related to this problem has been the aver-
age annual transfer from East Pakistan to the western wing of mil-
lions ofdollars offinancial resources, foreign exchange, and rupees,
as competent economists convincingly demonstrated. East Paki-
stan received an estimated one-third of all Pakistan foreign assis-
tance since 1953; this totaled some $1.2 to 1.5 billion. Indications
are that East Pakistan transferred financial resources to the West
over two decades roughly equal to all foreign assistance received
by East Pakistan.
Although the problem of disparity in allocation of domestic
and foreign-supplied resources between the two wings ofPakistan
has now disappeared, it is nonetheless important for Bangladesh to
raise far more public revenue from its economy than was ever done
while East Bengal was part of a united Pakistan. An obvious start
should be made by cost-reducing measures in the revenue collec-
tion sector. Also, there appear to be promising opportunities for
inducing a substantial increase in private savings and investments.
Proposals in this area are beyond the scope of this paper, yet the
topic is most important to the future development of the
Bangladesh economy, including the agricultural sector.
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Bangladesh inherits most ofthe development-oriented institu-
tions needed to administer development programs and projects.
However, most of them have a history of being limited by weak
management systems and in some cases archaic practices, for
example, accounting methods and personnel policies. Most of the
government agencies had able men at the top, some are outstand-
ing, butthe top layer was always far too thin, a problem that is likely
to continue in the short run. Expatriate assistance to help in the
revision and modernization of management and in the training of
personnel appears to be the most promising course ofdevelopment
action. A major program of upgrading agricultural research and
training extension personnel for field service to promote modem
agricultural technology must be given high priority.
Economic in'centives for farmers appeared to be adequate in
1971. Improved seed and fertilizer prospects seem to be generally
favorable for the near future, but the potential deficits that now
threaten Bangladesh could slow down development unless rapid
efforts are made to expand in this whole area. Irrigation develop-
ment was off to a good start under the aegis ofTIP, and targets can
be reached with adequate further training ofpersonnel and confir-
mation that the winter water supply will be available and adequate.
The development of agricultural credit facilities and the en-
trance of private bank resources plus expansion of the Comilla
Farmer Credit Cooperatives appear to be the most promising solu-
tions to the farmer credit problem.
Periodic flood damage to Bangladesh's crops is of such a mag-
nitude that if not dealt with it may jeopardize achievement of ag-
ricultural production goals. Only 2.5 million acres ofland achieved
protection but it may be feasible to double the protected area over a
five-year period. This would involve a series of limited area pro-
jects and would not include comprehensive river management
based on headquarters reservoir construction.
Finally, with respect to agricultural development institutions,
the Comilla comprehensive rural organization approach to moder-
nizing all aspects of farm production and rural life appears most
promising, and it is urged that Bangladesh make available the pol-
icy determination and financial resources to introduce this proven
system to all its thanas.
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Charles M. Elkington was director of Agriculture in the USAID
mission, Dacca, 1967-1970. He received his Ph.D. in Agricultural
Economics in 1947 from the University of Wisconsin, and in addi-
tion to being a faculty member ofWashington State and Iowa State
universities, he served in many U.S. government roles overseas.
He was with the USAID mission in Pakistan from 1961 until his
retirement in 1971.
NOTES
1. Rural works accounts for 11.2 crore out ofthe 33.8 crore total for food
and agriculture.
2. Mahbub-ul-Haq (1963:100) and John H. Power (1963:205). Roger
Norton notes that during 1967/68 East Pakistan's estimated import ofship-
ping and military services, plus its export of capital to the West Wing,
amounted to Rs. 2005 million (1969:5, 23).
3. The lowest fertilizer-using districts were Jessore, Pubna, Sylhet,
Khulna, Barisal, and Faridput. The high-use districts were Chittagong,
Hilltracts, Bogra, Comilla, and Dacca.
4. During FY 1971, less than 3 percent ofEast Pakistan's total cropped
area-under 600,000 acres-were under new varieties. [Ed. note]
5. The more reliable "objective" estimates of FY 1968 and 1969 rice
production show a 1969 decline of600,000 tons in the aman crop, as well as
a 400,000-ton decrease in the aus crop. A half-million ton decrease in the
1969 crop, below 1968, appears consistent with rising rice prices and larger
import needs.
6. For more detail on IR-20 in 1970, see Rochin (1971). Despite pro-
duction setbacks due to the civil war and its aftermath, the new govern-
ment in Dacca is highly attuned to the role that new varieties, along with
increased efficiency in their dissemination, must play in the country's ago'
ricultural development. Accordingly, its first annual development plan,
launched in July 1972, envisioned bringing 3.5 million acres under produc-
tion with the new high-yielding varieties. The "Comilla Approach" to "in-
tegrated rural development" appears to have taken precedence over the
former ADC-oriented approach, discussed above as a major strategy in the
diffusion of agricultural innovations, including the new varieties. Eighty-
three thanas were covered by the Comilla program in 1972173, and, via
gradual rephasing and cumulative addition of new acres, coverage of 410
thanas is targeted for the end of 1977 (Bangladesh Embassy 1972). [Ed.
note]
7. Even after the effects ofthe civil war, Bangladesh was able to irrigate
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a little over 1 million acres during 1971/72, or about 5 percent ofits total
cropped area. The Thana Irrigation Program, pioneered at Comilla, played
a key role in this effort. [Ed. note]
8. GOEP 1969b: section on farmers' supply response to relative
change in prices of raw jute and aus crop rice.
9. Rabbani, in a paper on "An Approach to the Fourth Plan Formula-
tion in Pakistan," said, "Another important policy area will be the level of
subsidy on agricultural inputs during the Fourth Plan and the timing of its
gradual reduction" (1968:11).
10. Government of Pakistan (1969:128) and unpublished reports of the
Government of East Pakistan.
11. As indicated in his preliminary discussion of the approach to the
Fourth Plan, Ghulam Rabbani, chief economist, Planning Department,
Government ofEast Pakistan, attached importance to rice price policy. He
stressed the need to.study the effects ofrice pricing on key output variables
in formulation ofpolicy during the plan (1968:11; Appendix, p. 8).
12. Taccavi loans are administered by the Agriculture Department.
These loans are, in part, ofa "relief' nature, i.e., they are provided to assist
farmers who have suffered losses from floods or other disasters with purch-
ases of inputs, food, etc. The repayment rate on these loans is low and
begins late.
13. This was recently emphasized by the research team visiting Pakis-
tan in 1968 and has been documented and emphasized by Dr. Borlaug and
other plant scientists.
14. As indicated in the annual development plans for FY 1969170, this
government also gave high priority status to the Family Planning Program
and its objectives.
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economic change (Hayami and Ruttan 1971). These nonmarginal
economic changes are in the public, quasi-public, and private sec-
tors.
After 1947 with the withdrawal ofthe British, a major change in
the role ofgovernmental systems occurred on the South Asian sub-
continent, which sought to shift primary emphasis from law and
order, and tax collecting to developmental activities. How to mod-
ify or create more effective governmental and other institutions at
the local level for more rapid economic and social development
was a task facing the two wings ofPakistan and the academy in the
late 1950s.
An exceedingly complex set of questions are involved in de-
termining how to go about changing institutional arrangements so
as to aid in acc~leratingfarmers'investments in modem technology
in the varied cultural, economic, and technical environments in
different parts ofthe low-income world. One extreme strategy is to
attempt to assure that highly productive agricultural technology is
available in the society and then encourage private entrepreneurs
to come forward and make the investments that will result in accel-
erated growth. Another extreme strategy is based on the assump-
tion that government has the most knowledge about new agricul-
tural technology and therefore knows best how to and is most able
to rapidly develop agriculture. This approach often has included
the unproved assumption oflarge economics ofsize in agriculture
and has involved the complete reorganization of rural society into
large collective or communal farms, such as in the well-known
cases of the USSR, Yugoslavia, the People's Republic of China.
Both these extreme strategies have had serious shortcomings from
an economic as well as other points of view. In contrast, the well-
documented, less-extreme national strategies for accelerating ag-
ricultural growth in small farm agriculture in Japan (Johnston 1966;
Ohkawa et al. 1970), Taiwan (Hough and Ness 1968; Shen 1970),
and earlier in Denmark (Skrubbeltrang 1953) have had considera-
ble success. Currently in the developing nations, a number ofcare-
fully worked-out approaches and experiments are underway, at-
tempting to accelerate the economic and social transformation of
rural society without the mistakes of attempting to directly trans-
plant foreign models. The rural development programs developed
at the Pakistan (now Bangladesh) Academy for Rural Development
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are one set of these experiments. The Swedish aid work at the
Chilalo Agricultural Project in Ethiopia is another (Nekby 1971). A
different approach was followed in the Puebla Project in a rainfed
area of Mexico (Myren 1970).·
The Environment of the Comilla Rural Development
Programs
The physical environment of the academy is presented in de-
tail in a number of studies (including Muyeed 1969), as well as in
many academy research publications. A salient feature ofthe envi-
ronment is the owner-operated rice farm with an average landhold-
ing of1.46 acres. The overwhelmingly dominant rice crop is grown
in all three seasons, aus, aman, and boro, under a tropical monsoon
climate with an extensive summer rainy season involving flooding
of much of the land and a rainless winter season. Rice occupies
about 90 percent of the cropped acreage. The average cropping
intensity was 1.6 in 1968.
The social environment and background of the activities at
Comilla have been documented and described in many academy
publications and have been summarized as well (Raper 1970; Ste-
vens 1972; Asian Studies Center 1974). In brief, rural development
programs in Comilla were developed by a new type of rural train-
ing institution, the Academy for Rural Development, charged with
providing members of the government administration with im-
proved knowledge about how to increase the rate of social and
economic development in rural areas. When the academy began in
1959, its staff consisted often professionals, only two ofwhom had
Ph.D. degrees. the expertise of this faculty was primarily in the
social sciences, education, psychology, sociology, economics, and
political science.
Methods Used in Developing Programs
Bold experimental and pilot fieldwork were fundamental to
the wide-ranging impact of the programs discussed below. Pilot
activities were conducted by the Academy for Rural Development
in one thana (county) containing 107 square miles and, in 1961,
217,297 people. These rural development programs were strate-
gies for the involvement of the people of the area. They were de-
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signed to provide a way in which fanners and others could gain
increasing access to meaningful economic, political, and social ac-
tivities. The activities have been the result ofcareful experimenta-
tion in the local cultural environment. Continuing research and
evaluation of programs have been reported in academy publica-
tions.
These development programs, it should be stressed, were lim-
ited largely to improved organizational activities focused on sup-
plying more profitable new technology to fanners, including the
provision of training to insure the required investment in human
capital for productive use of the new technology. In this process,
academy personnel undertook a great deal oflocal testing ofcrops
and fann equipment. The academy was not aSSigned the task of
developing new·and more profitable agricultural technologies, al-
though at least one important technological change was pioneered
by the academy-the hand-digging of tubewelIs.
The methods used in the rural development programs de-
veloped out of a need of the academy at its establishment in 1959.
In an early statement, Akhter Hameed Khan, the first director ofthe
academy and dominant figure in the development of the programs
at Comilla, said:
Our training activities have been fonnulated around these
rules: that training should be supported by research; that
training should be supported by experimental efforts to test
theories and find workable procedures.... When we began
work, the first serious problem was that the instructors had no
experience in rural development. Whatever knowledge they
had was of an academic nature. The instructor in rural busi-
ness management had only the experience ofhaving managed
to get himself out of the village! Our ignorance could not be
removed by reading books. The number ofsurveys ofthis part
of the world is very small and most of these are about India.
But even these only described things as they exist. We were
here to try to discover things as they should be and then plan
the training accordingly. (Khan 1963:1)
In 1960, experimental and pilot activities were facilitated when
Comilla Thana was designated as a development laboratory in
I
.,.
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which programs and administrative experiments could be underta-
ken by the academy. Although villagers were the primary target
group ofthe experimental programs, some urban citizens in the city
of Comilla were benefited, particularly by the cooperative credit
activities.1
With respect to the overall goals of the rural development
programs, Dr. Khan's view in 1963 was:
What we are trying to evolve here is a pattern for the future
administration ofEast Pakistan at the Thana level. This is our
primary aim. Weare not engaged in a little experiment. It is by
no means an academic exercise or Simply a research project. It
is an attempt to find out what can be done to bring about the
soundest and quickest economic and social development all
over East Pakistan. (Khan 1963: 12)
This approach led to the elaboration of various experiments
and pilot programs, six ofwhich are examined below. The relation-
ship between the pilot programs at Comilla and the resulting
province-wide programs are taken up in appropriate places later in
the paper.
Com illa-Type Agricultural Cooperatives
Beginning with experimental activity in 1959, a new system of
cooperatives was developed in Comilla Thana to take the place of
the largely defunct union cooperatives. This section focuses on
evaluation of the Comilla agricultural cooperatives after ten years
of development, by analyzing the economic effect of the coopera-
tives on farmers, examining the financial condition of the agricul-
tural cooperative federation, and by assessing the social impact of
the cooperatives. More detail is provided about this program as it
was the first one established and it helped set the pattern for sub-
sequent programs of heavy involvement of village people as-
sociated with appropriate training.
Approach and Organizational Growth
Central to the success ofthe cooperative program was the gen-
eral methodological approach used.
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From August, 1959, the Academy has been closely ob-
serving the working of plans and programs in the 80-square
mile Comilla Thana V-AID area. We have attended regularly
the fortnightly conferences ofthe V-AID workers and listened
attentively to their views and the view ofthe officers. We have
also invited selected groups of successful farmers, teachers,
office bearers of the cooperatives, artisans and others. We
have made case studies of all these groups and carefully re-
corded their opinions and suggestions and published these in
the shape of small monographs.
The Academy has taken this area as a laboratory for social
and economic research and experiments because we believe
that such experiments and researches are necessary in order
to put substance into our training programs and make them
realistic. It is also the best use of the talents of the team of
experts at the Academy....
We think that we are now in a position to initiate an exper-
iment in agricultural and economic development which may
be very significant. Briefly the chief objective of this experi-
ment would be to promote the formation ofsmall cooperative
groups of farmers who would adopt improved methods, im-
plements and machines. A small gr~up cooperative would
aim to become self-sustained. The members would learn to
save and collect their own capital and invest it in better farm-
ing. (A New Rural Cooperative System for Camilla Thana
1961:64)
From this approach, a cooperative system was developed con-
sisting of small village credit cooperatives run by villagers, and a
central cooperative at the thana level, which was responsible for
promoting new agricultural technology and providing the neces-
sary agricultural supplies, extension training, credit, and the super-
vision of record keeping. The requirement that a village select
three individuals who were to be their own cooperative leaders and
who would receive training at the academy made unnecessary the
injection ofoutsiders into the village cooperative scene. As a result
of this approach, the Comilla cooperatives have been based upon
natural social groupings (Bertocci 1970).
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From early experimental work with village cooperatives in
1959 (Rahim 1961; Stevens 1967a), the number of cooperatives
grew among farmers and other groups. By June 1969, there were
301 village agricultural cooperatives and a central agricultural
cooperative federation in Comilla Thana (Table 1). Membership in
this federation included 11,673 villagers, or an average of37 mem-
bers per society. The average loan issued was $53 while savings
and shares equaled about $30 in an area where per capita incomes
were estimated at $100. Even more rapid development of village
cooperatives occurred in three other thanas, each a great distance
from Comilla, and in the seven additional thanas ofComilla District
(Table 1). In view of the dismal history and the great difficulties
faced by cooperatives in developing societies, the record ofgrowth
and performance of the voluntary cooperatives in Comilla Thana
over an eleven-year period was an incredible achievement.
The program content of the cooperatives is focused on the
provision of loans and agricultural inputs to farmers. The loans
provide the primary source of income for both the central agricul-
tural cooperative federation and its associated village primary
TABLE 1. Status of Comilla-Type
Agricultural Cooperatives, 1970
Agricultural
Cooperatives
System
Average Average Average
Number of Number of Shares and
Cooperative Cooperative SaVings
Societies Members per Member
per Thana per Thana
Average
Loan
Issued per
Member
Overdue
Loans over
Total Loans
(0/0)
bE
Comilia Thana 301 11,673 $28.98 $52.71 2.0 more
1960/61-1968/69 than 1 year
Three External 229 5,873 10.34 57.75 4.4 (2.5
Thanas more than
1963/64-1968/69 1 year)
Seven Comilla 196 5,620 19.53 54.60 9.5
District Thanas
1965-Nov. 1970
SOURCE: A New Rural Cooperative System for Comilla Thana (1970:18) and Khan
1971.
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cooperatives. In 1968/69,60 percent ofthese loans were for two- or
three-years' duration (A New Rural Cooperative System for Com-
illa Thana (1970:27).
The new technology content of the cooperative programs has
been a fundamental element of success. The major technologies
provided by the cooperative organization include: (1) The intro-
duction and operation oflow-lift water pumps beginning in 1959 (A
New Rural Cooperative System for Comilla Thana 1961; Mohsen
1969). (2) The pilot development of low-cost hand-dug six-inch
tubewells begun in 1962, including necessary operational supervi-
sion, maintenance, repair, and parts supply. (This development of
intermediate technology in Bangladesh is the most outstanding
original technical contribution of the Comilla programs and is
examined by Haq in chapter 7.) (3) Pilot and adaptive research
beginning in 1960 on the use offour-wheel, 35-horsepower tractors
for rice and other crops. In ten years a great deal ofexperience had
been gained with these tractors, but it is fair to say that, although
6,154 acres were cultivated by seventeen tractors by 1969, a solu-
tion has not yet been found to the economic operation ofthis size of
tractor in agriculture in the Comilla area (Faidley 1973). (4) Adap-
tive research and testing ofnew crop varieties and animals with the
assistance ofJapanese, Danish, and United States technicians. In
1966, the first IRRI varieties ofrice available for use in East Pakis-
tan were tested and promoted (Bari 1969; Kazi 1969). (5) Adaptive
research, supply and promotion of agricultural inputs including
particularly chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and improved seeds.
(6) A number of storage and processing activities employing new
technology, especially cold storage plants, dairy processing, and
rice milling. Although the academy as a social science institution
was lacking in technological expertise, it succeeded in obtaining,
through foreign assistance and Pakistan government agencies, ac-
cess to technically competent individuals.
The academy's need for outside technical knowledge points to
an important weakness in its original concept. The experience of
the work at the academy shows that social scientists working in
rural areas ofdeveloping nations are at a great disadvantage ifthey
lack effective access to high quality agricultural and other technical
knowledge. An institution of this nature either requires a few
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highly competent individuals trained in fields of agricultural
technology or a workable way to gain regular access to such persons
located in other agencies.
Economic Impact on Farmers
The economic effect of agricultural cooperatives on farmers is
. difficult to measure because of the joint relationships between the
credit and the other activities for the supply of modem inputs to
agriculture. Although the results presented below are not all due to
cooperative activity, there is little doubt that a major share of the
economic impact is due to this work. The impact is measured by the
extent offarmer coverage and the effect on production and income.
Some concluding comments focus on employment, income dis-
tribution, and land tenure issues.
When examining the ecoriomic impact ofthe cooperative pro-
gram for farmers, it is useful to distinguish cooperative members
from others. In Comilla Thana, in 1968/69,37 percent ofthe farmers
were cooperative members. An average of 22 percent were mem-
bers after five years ofcooperative activity in seven other thanas of
Comilla District (Khan 1971).
Due to the lack of farm management studies in the Comilla
area, economic benefits can only be measured indirectly in terms of
changes in inputs and yields. For winter rice, Faidley and Esmay
concluded that within five years almost all farmers, both coopera-
tive members and other villagers, had adopted high-yielding
winter rice varieties, which on the average more than doubled rice
yields for both groups (see chapter 6). The growth of purchased
inputs was significant for winter rice. In 1966, cooperative mem-
bers used commercial fertilizers at the rate ofabout $4·per acre on
unimproved rice varieties; in 1970, with almost 100 percent use of
improved rice varieties, commercial fertilizer increased to more
than $16 per acre among cooperative members (chapter 6, Table 8).
It is particularly significant that nonmembers ofcooperatives were
able to purchase and apply almost the same amount ofcommercial
fertilizer per acre for this crop. Thus, in spite of the fact that
cooperative membership was limited to less than 40 percent ofthe
farmers, other farmers were able to obtain large quantities of fer-
104 Rural Development in Bangladesh
tilizer and seed directly or indirectly from the cooperatives.
Other evidence of economic gains by cooperative farmers
based on unpublished data gathered by Rahim show that, by 1969,
a control group of farmers outside Comilla Thana had increased
yields by only 10 percent as compared with 98 percent for Comilla
cooperative farmers. An estimate of net family assets showed an
increase of 19 percent for the control group as compared to an
increase of 61 percent among Comilla cooperative members
(Thomas 1971a).
An estimate of direct benefits of cooperative credit was ob-
tained by assuming conservatively that one-quarter of an average
farmer's debt was shifted from a 60 percent interest rate to the
effective interest rate of 17.4 percent possible through coopera-
tives. Such a chahge increases annual net income by some thirteen
dollars (Stevens 1967b). For farmers with per capita annual in-
comes of one hundred dollars this is an appreciable gain.
In conclusion, there is little doubt that in Comilla Thana the
small village cooperatives and their thana-level cooperative federa-
tion had considerable economic impact on a majority ofvillagers by
increasing their income. The two groups least benefited were the
very small farmer, the approximately 20 percent of the village
families with less than one acre of land, and the landless laborers
representing some 19 percent of the families.
The Economic Stability of the Cooperative Federation
By 1970, after ten years ofdevelopment, the Comilla coopera-
tive system had demonstrated its administrative and financial sta-
bility. In this section, credit arrangements are outlined followed by
analysis of financial progress and problems.
In the noninflationary environment ofthe 1960s in East Pakis-
tan, loans were obtained by the members of the village coopera-
tives at an interest rate of 10 percent plus a service charge of 5
percent per annum. Of the 10 percent interest, 2 percent was paid
back to the village cooperative society to build its own fund, 4.5
percent was paid to the financing bank as interest and 1 percent was
paid to the village cooperative manager as his commission. The
thana-level association retained 2.5 percent to meet its own costs.
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The 5 percent service charge was used for salaries of the vil-
lage accountants, who maintained the accounts of the primary
societies, and to provide traveling allowances to the village
cooperative managers, the village model farmers, and the chairmen
of the primary societies, as well as to members of the managing
committee of the central association. An allowance to the thana
officers for teaching classes also was paid from the service charge.
The amount of the loans to a village cooperative was depen-
dent upon the sum ofits savings and shares. In the 1968/69 account-
ing period, savings and shares amounted to 35 percent ofthe loans.
Shares purchased by farmers obtained a 5 percent dividend in
1968/69. A fixed 4 percent interest was paid on cooperative mem-
bers' savings accounts.
Central to any successful credit cooperative is loan repayment
experience. Comilla-type cooperatives have had manageable
amounts ofoverdue loans and bad debts (Table 1). Although further
effort is required to reduce overdue loans, other data on the rapid
growth of membership, savings accumulated by members, loans
issued and realized all point to financial and organizational health.
Financial success is indicated by continuing asset growth. The
profit and loss statement for 1968/69 showed a net loss of about 1
percent on the total income of the agricultural cooperative federa-
tion. The expenditures in this account include about 5 percent of
the total income for agricultural extension activities. An important
question is whether the cooperatives should have to carry the
whole of this technical education cost (A New Rural Cooperative
System for Comilla Thana, 1970).
From the point of view of the national treasury, the Comilla
cooperative system was an immense step forward. Loans of the
taccavi type through the old union multipurpose cooperative
societies, which had been mostly captured by local notables, had
annual loan repayment rates of only about 40 percent. No other
formal organizations have been able to reach large numbers of
small farmers with significant amounts of credit in rural areas of
Bangladesh.
Strong evidence that the Comilla cooperative system held
further promise came from the approval, in the fall of 1970, of the
Integrated Rural Development Program by the central government
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of Pakistan. Administered by the Department of Agriculture, this
program was to establish an agricultural cooperative federation and
village cooperatives on the Comilla model in all 413 thanas within a
nine-year period. This program has been given high priority by the
Bangladesh government and is currently (January 1975) being im-
plemented with a target coverage of413 thanas by 1977.
The magnitude of the projected investment per thana was
$21,000 in annual recurring administrative and training costs, in-
cluding $15,430 for training and extension and $5,570 for salaries,
as well as an annual disbursement ofloan funds to each thana of
$210,000 for five years. Complete repayment of the loan fund was
planned for twenty-five years. The single capital grant for build-
ings, transport, and office equipment was $42,000 per thana (Gov-
ernment of Pakistan 1970).
Social Impact
Social impacts of the cooperatives, although difficult to docu-
ment precisely, appear in a number ofways. In many villages, the
cooperatives are still too young (three to five years) to have had a
major influence on the social system. However, in a number of
instances, the village cooperative manager has been asked to par-
ticipate with traditional leaders in settling disputes.2 A further de-
velopment reported by one instructor is that when villagers want to
get things done, they now go to the village cooperative manager
rather than to the traditional leaders or the elected union council-
lor.3 There is little question about the impact ofthe cooperatives on
the agricultural information system. Research in the thana shows
that village cooperative members adopt new practices earlier and
have higher proportions of adoption in all time periods (Rahim
1963, 1965, 1968).
With respect to educational impact, the weekly training of
model farmers from the village cooperatives at the thana headquar-
ters is a major educational input. This training is reinforced by
subsequent discussion in the villages, often aided by written lesson
material. The cooperatives also have supported literacy classes for
men, women, and children.
The impact of cooperative activities has been positive on
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employment rates. Most of the changes in agriculture have been
employment creating, particularly the major increase in winter
crop acreage due to irrigation. The cost and returns studies provide
estimates ofadditional labor used with the new high-yielding var-
ieties (Rahman 1967). It is recognized that there has been some
displacement of hand irrigation by low-lift pumps and of animal
plowing by tractor cultivation, but the net effect on employment of
these two changes appears to have been positive.
With respect to the impact of cooperative activities on values,
Schuman, in a pioneering social-psychological study, found that
Comilla cooperative farmers had a statistically reliable increased·
belief that their own efforts can overcome obstacles and realize
goals, as compared with control groups in other parts ofEast Pakis-
tan (Schuman 1967).
The impact of the Comilla activities on government and poli-
tics should be considered together. The strong impact of Comilla
on certain government programs such as rural works and irrigation
is discussed below. Despite this, however, Governor Monem Khan
continued to take a negative view ofthe academy and its activities
during the mid-sixties.
Thana Training and Development Center
Introduction and Problem Situation
Just as the returns to investment on a farm are dependent upon
the level ofmanagement performance, at the thana or county level,
the quality of government program operations and management
greatly influences the return to government programs. Involved
here are issues of institutional or nonmarginal change in an ad-
ministrative system. The return to program investment is depen-
dent both on the productivity of the specific project activities and
on the rate of adoption.
The changed concepts and institutional arrangements for local
government organization embodied in the Thana Training and
Development Center program represented equally fundamental
departures from past operating procedures as did the new coopera-
tive system. Together these programs were the progenitors ofother
108 Rural Development in Bangladesh
programs, including the four programs analyzed in the latter part of
this paper.
This analysis is focused on factors affecting the rate ofadoption
of programs at the thana level. Stich factors include: confusion and
conflict among programs; lack ofnecessary coordination, especially
in ensuring availability ofrequired program supplies; also"... part
of the trouble was that the nation-building departmental officers
were not yet ready to plan with the local people and to report to
them directly" (Mohsen 1963); and, departmental officers were not
able to gain needed participation by villagers in programs.
Government program performance at the thana level in East
Pakistan was generally poor in 1959, consisting of independent
departmental activities (Agriculture, Cooperatives, Water, etc.),
which in a larger number ofcases provided low or negative returns.
In the early exploratory analysis ofproblems in the thana, the Com-
illa academy concluded that a solution to these problems required
three kinds ofcoordination: coordination ofdifferent departmental
programs at the thana level; coordination of departmental efforts
with those of the next lowest level ofgovernment, the unions; and
coordination between the different unions (Mohsen 1963:12).
At about the time the academy was undertaking its exploratory
analysis, the Ayub Khan government of Pakistan established the
five-tiered Basic Democracies system of government in October
1959. From the point of view of improved governmental manage-
ment at the local level, the five-tiered Basic Democracies system
was a significant departure from the past history of governmental
organization in which the lowest effective governmental unit had
been the district, with an average population in East Pakistan of
more than two million. The new system added two lower levels of
government: the thana and union levels. A union council was
elected at the lowest level. A union in 1961 had an average popula-
tion of 12,544 in East Pakistan. The new system also established a
thana council at the next level above the unions and below the
district. Thana council membership comprised the elected chair-
man of each union council, plus government officials (25 percent)
and appointed members (25 percent). (For more details, see chap-
ter 3.)
Since in the previous government organization, the district
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level, particularly in the person of the deputy commissioner, re-
tained most ofthe decision-making power and control offunds and
personnel, the question was posed as to what powers and activities
were appropriate for the new lower levels of government. As it
turned out, the Rural Works Program became one major area of
successful activity ofthe thana and union councils with 71 percent
of the works program allocations going to these levels of govern-
ment in 1966/67 (Pakistan Academy for Rural Development 1968).
The works program demonstrated that certain kinds of activities,
such as road building and water-control earthworks, could be effec-
tively carried out by these new lower levels of government.
Experimental Pilot Activities in Rural Government
In spite of the success of the public works program, there re-
mained many questions about how to improve the management of
government programs at the thana level. The history of the
academy's experimental activities for the development of im-
proved rural administration is contained in six annual reports (An-
nual Report 1963-1969).
Experimental activity for the development of improved rural
government began in 1960. These activities by the academy faculty
led to a 1963 proposal for the establishment of an experimental
Thana Training and Development Center. In 1964, the concept
was accepted and funds were allocated for province-wide elabora-
tion in all the nonurban thanas of East Pakistan (Annual Report
1964). By 1970, most thanas in the province were using develop-
ment centers similar to that piloted at Comilla.
The concept of the Thana Training and Development Center
includes the following major objectives (see also Figure 1):
(1) one physical location at the thana level for all major
nation-building department offices
(2) a small adjacent adaptive research and experimental farm
(3) housing for government officers sufficiently attractive to
encourage them to stay in the thana for many years
(4) physical facilities for adult- and farmer-training classes-
the training center
~THANA TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER
Justice and Revenue Thana Council (Includes 12-18 Unions) Thana Central Cooperative
Thana The Circle Officer, the General Administrativ.e Officer Association
Magistrate of the Thana. A typical Thana Council included 24 Project Di rector
members (l2 Union Council Chairmen and 12 appointed Managing Committee
Members).
Functions Functions: Program coordination of Nation Building Functions
Law and Order Departments and Quasi-governmental agencies. Agricultu ral Inputs
Revenue Thana Program decision making: (Rural Works, Thana Credit
Irrigation Prag ram, etc.) Agricultu ral Ma rketi ng
Agricultu ral and
I rrigation Machinery
Non-Agricu Itu ral Cooperatives
TRAINING ACTIVITIES AND ADAPTIVE RESEARCH
I::::::::::-- --....::::::
I unionll IUnion II I Union Council II I, unionll II Union ICouncil Council (Includes 12-15Villaqes) Council Council
Villages of the Thana (365)
301 Village Cooperatives of the Thana (1970) (Direct Communication to the Thana Central Cooperative)
Figure 1. The Thana Training and Development Center System, Camilla, East Pakistan, 1970.
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(5) Enough land for additional activities as needed such as
warehouses, machinery repair shops, a bank, and so forth
(6) an effectively functioning thana council, including elected
representatives from the unions and representatives of the
nation-building departments
(7) a central cooperative association to serve farmers.
The first five physical objectives were relatively easy to ac-
complish once decisions were made to allocate the needed works
program funds to purchase and build. The more difficult task of
establishing an effectively functioning thana council and a sound
agricultural cooperative organization has required years of experi-
mental and pilot activity.
A particularly difficult continuing challenge in Comilla Thana
has been the achievement ofeffective cooperation in developmen-
tal programs between the administrative and elected members of
the thana council under the leadership of the general administra-
tive officer of the thana-the circle officer. A second challenge has
been to activate the training component ofthe center. Examination
of five changes made in Comilla through June 1969 provide evi-
dence of progress.
First, as a result of the pilot experiences in Comilla Thana,
greatly increased allocation offunds was made to the thana councils
for the Rural Works program and the Thana Irrigation Program.
These programs represent a major increase in thana council func-
tions.
Second, although the Basic Democracies order for the first
time required departmental officers to report their activities to the
thana council, as well as through the usual departmental routes to
their superiors, the establishment of this important new relation-
ship between government officers and the representative thana
council did not develop easily. In Comilla, through hard work, a
certain amount ofincreased communication was achieved between
the two groups, but the Tenth Annual Report of the academy con-
cludes that attendance in the thana council by these officers leaves
much to be desired, and that up to June 1969 the circle officer had
no administrative control over departmental officers in the thana
(Khan and Hussain 1963:15). Mohsen commented, "Activating the
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departmental officers seemed to be more difficult than mobilizing
the people"(Mohsen 1963:18).
Third, the success ofthe thana council in providing a forum for
effective coordination of the programs in the different unions be-
came very clear in the development of rural works program plans.
Instead of receiving comprehensive plans drawn up in district or
higher offices that had little possibility of implementation and no
genuine support from local leaders, the new approach started the
planning processJor works programs from the village level. Final-
ly, after many meetings including appropriate departmental offi-
cers and other technical experts, a thana rural works plan was ap-
proved with implementation steps included-implementation
steps that could be carried out. Preventive health and crop- and
animal-disease plans were developed in a similar manner. In this
way, the required coordination ofactivities in different unions was
achieved.
Fourth, successful operation of the thana training center was
achieved through a wide variety oftraining classes and activities for
many categories of the rural population, including women, union
council members, farmers, bricklayers, religious leaders, and so
forth. In 1968/69 in Comilla, forty-nine training programs were
organized with an attendance of 2,226 persons. In many of these
programs, departmental officers assumed new roles as teachers,
thereby increasing contact with rural people and their practical
problems.
Fifth, considerable experimentation continued in Comilla on
appropriate administrative relationships among the three major
parts of the Thana Development and Training Center (Figure 1).
By 1970, in Comilla and other areas, the circle officer apparently
had been accepted at least in principle as the chief administrative
officer in the thana.4 However, recent actions of certain depart-
ments and officials counter to this administrative model indicate
continuing problems (Thomas 1971; Khan 1971).
Evaluation
How may the increased economic and social returns to the use
of government funds as a result of improved organization and in-
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stitutional relationships be evaluated? In Comilla Thana, as in most
areas, a number ofmajor variables changed along with changes in
government organization. The joint products are difficult to sepa-
rate. Little data on governmental performance levels are available
and experimental controls are not possible. The following judg-
ments are, therefore, made.
From an economic point of view, the returns obtained from
both the Rural Public Works Program and the Thana Irrigation
Program were dependent upon the Thana Development and Train-
ing Center's organization and concepts. Without the center and its
training activities, these programs would have either failed com-
pletely or would have provided much lower returns.
In social terms, the most important result has been the new and
improved relations between government officers and villagers.
"Undoubtedly, the most wholesome influence is that of the new
relationship between officers and villagers .... There is guidance
and supervision without undue subordination. There is trust aris-
ing from mutual knowledge They have now a realistic view of
government and its agencies but as human agencies with lim-
ited resource, established for their benefit, and solicitous of their
loyalty" (Khan and Hussain 1963:15).
Subsequent support of the Comilla rural development model
by the World Bank in its East Pakistan Action Program provided
additional evidence of the economic and social soundness of the
Thana Training and Development Center's organizational system
(Thomas 1971a).
Rural Public Works Program
As the personnel of the Academy for Rural Development in-
teracted with other government officials in the thana and the vil-
lages, the academy staffbecame more directly aware ofthe extent of
annual crop damage caused by floods. In particular, flooding af-
fected the ability offarmers to repay cooperative credit. Raper indi-
cated that in one area south of Comilla town, for five years in suc-
cession prior to 1961, the spring rice crop had been severely dam-
aged and the late summer rice crop often had to be transplanted two
or three times before the seedlings could keep ahead of the rising
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flood waters (Raper 1970:107). There was continual pressure to do
something about the flooding.
In 1961, Richard B. Gilbert of the Harvard Advisory Group
asked the director ofthe academy ifhe could organize public works
programs in the villages to increase employment and income, using
wheat as part payment for wages under the PL 480 program. Dis-
cussion in the thana council in October 1961 ended with approval
of a proposal for a thana-wide pilot public works program. As a
result, twenty-one schemes for irrigation and drainage and three
schemes for flood control were submitted by eleven union councils
early in 1962. By the end of the year, 35 miles of canals had been
cleared and 14.5 miles of embankments and roads had been con-
structed to help control floods. This included the construction of
two water regulators and twenty-three culverts.
The success ofthis pilot program led the Department ofBasic
Democracies and Local Government to authorize funds for a pro-
gram to be carried out in many parts of East Pakistan in 1962/63.
The Comilla academy participated in the training of government
officials for the expanded operation. A Manual for Rural Public
Works was written, which explained the procedures used in the
rural works program. Evaluations of works program activity were
also undertaken (Pakistan Academy for Rural Development 1963a,
1965; Sultan 1966)
The works program was increasingly supported by the gov-
ernment in East Pakistan. Its success led to a rural works program in
West Pakistan as well. Thomas provided a summary ofRural Public
Works Program accomplishments in East Pakistan for the years
1962-1968 as follows: Roads, hard-surfaced and dirt, new, 21,895
miles; repaired, 118,371 miles; Embankments, new, 3,743 miles;
repaired, 7,595 miles; Drainage and irrigation canals, new, 9,031
miles; repaired, 9,966 miles; Community buildings including
schools, 9,584. This activity is estimated to have created a total of
173 million man-days of employment or 40 million annually. The
total works program allocations for the period were 196 million
dollars. Thomas concludes that the rural works program was re-
markably successful in providing a major increase in infrastructure
facilities in rural areas. In benefit-cost terms he estimated a 57
percent return to funds invested in the program (Thomas 1968,
1971b).
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Thana Irrigation Program
In spite ofheavy rains and floods during the summer, water is
short for crops in the dry winter season in which less than two
inches of rain falls per month from November to February. Hence,
irrigation is necessary for most crops during this season. The initial
approach to winter irrigation involved use of the accumulated
water in ponds and rivers through low-lift mechanical pumps. It
was soon recognized, however, that available surface water in
many areas was used up quickly during the dry season. Experimen-
tal activity in the use of tubewells was therefore undertaken.
The early experience with these activities is reported in a
number ofpublications (Rahim 1961; Pakistan Academy for Rural
Development 1963b; Rahman 1964). Data on the growth of irriga-
tion activities and the problems faced are documented in the an-
nual reports ofthe academy and by Raper. Basic problems in these
programs relate to reducing the costs of the tubewells, assuring the
continuous operation and repair of the tubewell pumps and en-
gines, and assuring payment for the wells. The cooperative system
analyzed earlier provided a solution to these managerial problems.
The experiments and pilot operations at Comilla led to deci-
sions in 1968 to launch the province-wide Thana Irrigation Pro-
gram. The target of the first year, 1968/69, was to distribute and
operate 11,500 low-lift water pumps for irrigation, and for the East
Pakistan Agricultural Development Corporation to sink 700 tube-
wells of 6-inch diameter. The evaluation report states that 10,852
low-lift pumps were used in the 1968/69 season and 638 tubewells
were sunk, ofwhich nearly 200 went into operation during the year
(Mohsen 1969:21).
By the end of 1970/71, the Thana Irrigation Program had
placed 26,000 operating pumps in the field capable ofirrigating 1.3
million acres. Due to the thana-level organization and training ap-
proach used, farmers were persuaded to pay part of the irrigation
cost. The magnitude of this organizational success based on the
Comilla experience is better gauged by the fact that the East Pakis-
tan Water and Power Development Authority in twenty years had
only been able to irrigate 94,563 acres at immense cost, and that
after a nine-year effort the Agricultural Development Corporation
had only fielded 3,900 pumps (Thomas 1971a). Subsequently the
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Bangladesh government has allocated major additional resources
to the Thana Irrigation Program.
Women's Program and Family Planning
One cause of our misery and poverty is that we keep our
womenfolk at home guarded over constantly. We keep them
indoors, We have almost imprisoned them. We do not educate
them, and because they are confined, they cannot educate
themselves; so they are nearly all illiterate. They are timid.
And so long as the women are uneducated, development can
hardly be expected in our country. (Khan 1963a:2)
Following this philosophy, the academy developed a Wo-
men's Program,.whose basic aims have been well summarized:
The women's program is intended to bring women out from
the physical and psychological seclusion that has withheld
their productive energies from the mainstream of develop-
ment. They are to learn how to get about independently and
with dignity, how to earn small sums of money through a
variety of economic activities convenient to their household
obligations, and how to enrich the health and social life of
their families. (Luykx 1970:363)
In attempting to provide more opportunities for women,
exploratory conversations between village men and women and
academy staffresulted in the decision to develop a series oftraining
programs for women at the academy. These commenced in 1962
and have continued to date. Training classes have included such
subjects as child care, maternity diseases, family planning, literacy,
sewing, spinning, poultry raising, gardening, sanitation, first aid,
and silk-screen printing. More specialized training programs were
also developed for midwives. Economic activities of the program
for women commenced with the provision of hand-spinning
machines in 1963. Other economic activities have included sewing
and weaving, poultry raising, and the use ofwheat in diets, which
led to training in family nutrition. In the 1968/69 year, thirteen
different training groups involved 304 women in classes ofseven to
fifty days (Annual Report 1970; Ahmed 1969). In 1969, women's
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programs patterned after those at Comilla were introduced by the
Agricultural Development Corporation in three experimental farm
project areas in different parts of East Pakistan.
In association with the women's program, an experimental
family planning activity was undertaken in 1962, with support from
the Provincial Department of Health. This pilot, rural family-
planning program had three parts: action, promotion, and research.
The research was partly supported by the Population Council and
included technical assistance by a number ofoverseas researchers.
Valuable lessons were learned from the villagers' responses to dif-
ferent approaches used in providing both materials for family plan-
ning and in teaching the use of family-planning devices. These
research results were of particular value in a Muslim rural society
where there was considerable uncertainty about the acceptability
offamily planning. Effective promotional techniques developed at
the academy involved the creation ofsongs about family planning,
which were sung in local markets and on government radio (Raper
1970:172-185; Annual Report 1970:85-88; Mannan 1968).
Action elements of the program were integrated with the na-
tional family-planning scheme in 1965, under the administrative
control of the thana family-planning officer. Research and experi-
mental program activities have continued with a view to using the
family-planning activities in Comilla Thana as models for the rest
of the province (Raper 1970:183-185).
Rural Education Experiments
In 1959, the academy estimated that only one-fifth ofthe popu-
lation over five years of age in Comilla Thana was literate. The
academy undertook four experiments in education beginning in
1961. They were: (1) the introduction of a "rural bias" (farm-life-
related education) in the rural schools through a pilot school pro-
ject; (2) the establishment of "feeder schools" in villages with
cooperative societies (these were one-teacher village schools for
small children and adult illiterates); (3) the training of village
women to teach adult literacy classes in the villages and to teach
small children in government primary schools; and (4) the school-
plant improvement project.
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In 1969, the status ofthese programs was as follows. The pilot
school project had evolved into a youth club program in all the
sixty-nine primary schools in the thana, with a membership in
1968/69 of5,720 students. Teachers, however, were reported to be
reluctant to participate in the youth club programs without addi-
tional pay. The feeder school program had become an imam (reli-
gious leader) teacher program. The imams were given training in
literacy methods at the academy. In 1968/69 they taught 136 classes
to 4,227 students, and operated literacy classes for 2,875 adults.
The women's program included sixty-eight female literacy
classes in which 2,375 women were enrolled. School-plant im-
provement became part ofthe Rural Public Works Program in 1964.
Under this program, a large number of classrooms were built and
repaired in Comilla Thana (Annual Report 1970:75-81; Muyeed
1966; Bhuiyan 1968).
As of 1971, the experiments in rural education in Comilla
Thana had had some success and were continuing. However, the
Department of Education and other units of government had not
yet seen fit to adopt these activities as models for broader programs.
Whether this was due to the limited success ofthese experiments or
to a lack ofunderstanding of their usefulness is not clear.
Conclusions and Generalizations
A majority of rural citizens have benefited through increased
income from the academy's experimental and pilot activities at
Comilla. Also through the Thana Training and Development
Center under the Basic Democracies sytem of elections, and the
agricultural cooperatives, villagers increased their political and so-
cial involvement in planning and local decision-making. As a re-
sult, economic and social benefits of the Comilla programs have
been widespread.
The generalizations about the experience at Comilla that fol-
low are in three parts- those concerning experimental programs
generally, those focused on agricultural cooperatives, and those
related to the development of rural government.
The literature on economic growth from traditional agriculture
has placed little emphasis on the associated institutional changes
required in the agricultural transformation. A large number ofnew
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or modified institutions are essential for rapid economic growth.
These nonmarginal economic changes occur in the public, quasi-
public, and private sectors. In Pakistan, a major change required of
the main governing system was a shift in focus from law-and-order
and tax-collecting activities to developmental activities.
In this chapter, six major programs of the Academy for Rural
Development in Comilla were examined. The promising women's
program and rural education experiments were presented briefly.
Up to 1971, they had had only limited national impact. The Thana
Irrigation Program and the Rural Public Works Program were also
discussed only briefly, as there is a considerable literature available
about these nationally adopted programs. Major focus in the chap-
ter was placed upon the new type of agricultural cooperatives and
the improvement of rural government through the Thana Training
and Development Center. Conclusions about the possible useful-
ness of these three experiences for other nations follow.
Camilla Experimental Development Programs
The following points about the work at Comilla in developing
programs appear fundamental to their success.
1. A large number of exceedingly valuable pilot and experi-
mental activities in rural development were conducted in
Comilla at relatively small cost to the treasury.
2. An experimental, open-minded approach, involving a great
deal of interaction with rural people, was essential to the
programs' success.
3. A wide range ofsubject matter activities, including agricul-
ture, education, roads, women's programs, and health were
undertaken because ofthe interrelations between these ac-
tivities and the reinforcement ofprograms that result in the
minds of rural citizens.
4. As successful experiments moved to the pilot stage, the
target agency for the operation of the wider program was
kept in mind and was brought into the planning and opera-
tions as soon as possible.
5. The evaluation function was essential to document change,
and to aid in reviewing the effectiveness of programs.
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The New Type ofAgricultural Cooperatives
Beginning with experimental pilot activities in 1959, a new
type of village agricultural cooperative was developed in Camilla
Thana. By 1971, 301 agricultural cooperatives were registered in
the thana with 11,673 members. Loans overdue more than a year
among this group were at a 2 percent level. Expansion of this
cooperative system into ten other thanas resulted in a total of2,360
village cooperative societies with a total membership of68,632 by
1971.
Evaluation of the effects of these cooperatives in Camilla
Thana indicate they have had major economic impact. A number of
studies show rapid increase in input use, in the planting of high-
yielding varieties, and in rice production. Between 1964 and 1969,
one comparative study contrasts an estimated 10 percent increase
in rice yields in an adjacent thana, where cooperatives have only
recently been organized, against a 98 percent increase in rice yield
in Camilla Thana. In 1970, in Camilla Thana where per capita
incomes were in the $100 range, the central agricultural coopera-
tive federation and its village cooperative societies operated a
credit program with an average loan of $53 per member with per
member shares and savings equal to $29. This cooperative system
was finanCially stable with steady annual increases in loaning activ-
ity. Additional evidence of the promise of the system came from
approval in the fall of 1970 for the expansion of these types of
cooperatives to all 411 thanas ofEast Pakistan. Additional impact of
the cooperatives in the social and political areas has also been
shown.
The following points are of particular importance in consider-
ing the development of this type of village cooperative system.
1. The Camilla experience has demonstrated that small farm-
ers in low-income nations can be organized voluntarily
into effective village cooperatives. This system, therefore,
represents a viable rural institutional system for serving
small farmers.
2. This cooperative approach includes: small primary units of
up to sixty members based upon preexisting social groups, a
cost ofcredit to farmers approaching 15 percent, and a pos-
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sible requirement, particularly in the early stages, ofpartial
monopolies in the supply ofnew inputs to defray the appre-
ciable costs of serving small farmers.
3. Integral to the system is the self-selection of the leaders of
the primary cooperatives coupled with their continuous
training in cooperative management and new agricultural
technology.
4. The combination within the cooperative of agricultural ex-
tension activities and the provision ofcredit is productive.
Through local communication channels, the agricultural
knowledge extended through the cooperative passes to all
members of the village; hence, the national treasury may
appropriately pay some ofthe costs ofextension carried out
by the cooperatives.
5. Vital to success ofthe system is the continuous access ofthe
central cooperative organization to new, high-return, ag-
ricultural technology.
Improving Rural Government-The Training and
Development Center
Early activity by the academy focused on improving local gov-
ernment performance. The result was the acceptance by the East
Pakistan government in 1964 of the thana training and develop-
ment center concept for the 413 thanas in East Pakistan. The physi-
cal facilities for those centers had been completed in most thanas
by 1970.
Continuous effort by the academy has been focused on the
more difficult task of greatly improving the performance of gov-
ernment officials at the thana level. Major successes were achieved
in pilot activities that developed the thana-level Rural Public
Works Program and the Thana Irrigation Program. The models
developed at Comilla were the basis for province-wide expansion
of these programs, recognized nationally and abroad as significant
contributions to rural development in Bangladesh. Without the
changed concepts of rural government that they embodied and the
kind oforganization for local development that they demonstrated,
these activities would either have been impossible or of much
lower productivity. The World Bank in its East Pakistan Action
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Program of 1970 supported this rural development model for local
administration.
The following points about the approaches and programs ofthe
Comilla Rural Training and Development Center appear impor-
tant.
1. Rural areas require a training and development center at a
central physical site that includes all the agencies needed
by rural people. The center should be as close as possible to
a heavily frequented market. In connection with the estab-
lishment of such a center, care is required that these ser-
vices of the lowest levels of government be located so that
most rural citizens may conveniently conduct their busi-
ness in a round trip by local transportation during one day.
2. Rural government should focus on activities that affect most
rural residents directly and that require joint action. To as-
sure effective action, responsibility for development ac-
tivities such as roads, water control, schools, and health
should be clearly separated from other rural government
functions such as law and order and taxation. In the Comilla
experience, rural government was not effective in agricul-
ture and other specialized sectors that involved only a por-
tion of the population directly. Responsibility for these
specialized development activities should be clear; they
appear to require specialized organizations such as the ag-
ricultural cooperatives or other special cooperatives.
3. A training center should be an integral part ofrural govern-
ment. All significant institutional and program changes re-
quire certain amounts of training for different groups: far-
mers, women, government officials, and so forth. Also, the
experience of having officers from the agriculture depart-
ment and other agencies take on the new role ofteachers of
rural citizens has proved to be ofconsiderable value to both
groups, particularly in increasing communication and un-
derstanding.
4. Ofparticular value was the regular bringing together in the
thana council of representatives of government agencies
and valid representatives of rural people for discussions of
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plans and action programs. In this way, villagers gained
much increased involvement in local government
decision-making. Improved program performance resulted,
as representatives ofgovernment agencies have the techni-
cal expertise and control ofthe allocation ofmajor funds and
supplies and rural leaders were able to obtain decisions
from communities and mobilize people to participate in
development projects.
5. Of fundamental importance in developing successful pilot
programs is the early participation ofagencies for which the
pilot program may become a model. Joint planning and
operation of pilot programs with target agencies should be
undertaken to as great an extent as possible so that the pro-
gram, if successful, may more easily become adopted as the
agency's own.
Robert D. Stevens served as an adviser to the Academy for Rural
Development at Comilla as a member of the Michigan State Uni-
versity Pakistan Project. He received his Ph.D. degree in Agricul-
tural Economics from Cornell University in 1959, and has con-
ducted research in a number ofnations in Asia and Latin America.
He is currently associate professor of Agricultural Economics at
Michigan State University.
NOTES
1. See particularly pages on the Special Cooperative Societies Federa-
tion in Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, A New Rural Coopera-
tive System for Camilla Thana, 1961, and Annual Reports for the years
1962-1970.
2. Personal communication with Peter Bertocci.
3. Personal communcation with Anwarul Hoque, instructor, Bangla-
desh Academy for Rural Development.
4. Personal communication with R. R. Faruqee, C.S.P.
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Introduction and Use
of Improved Rice Varieties:
Who Benefits?
LeVern Faidley and Merle L. Esmay
Introduction
There is lack of agreement as to who benefits from the im-
proved crop varieties and modern farming practices introduced by
the green revolution. This chapter presents an analysis ofthe effect
the green revolution has had on the farmers of Comilla Thana in
Bangladesh, where since 1960 an experimental laboratory has been
developed for the testing of rural development programs by the
Academy for Rural Development. As this rural development con-
cept is to be replicated throughout Bangladesh, this analysis pro-
vides some indication ofthe probable results and benefits through-
out the country.
Farm Size and Subsistence Incomes in Camilla Thana
Comilla Thana in 1969 contained 51,560 acres of agricultural
land and had a population of approximately 200,000 people, an
average density of 2,500 people per square mile. In 1969 there
were approximately 31,000 families living in the villages of the
thana. About 15 percent ofthe families were landless and about 70
percent owned less than 2 acres (Table 1). The mean landholding
per rural family was 1.46 acres. In almost all cases, landholdings
consisted of fragmented, widely scattered plots, ranging in size
from 0.10 acres to 0040 acres with a negligible number of plots
larger than 1 acre.
Muyeed's data on income levels of the families living in the
agricultural villages, as appraised by the families themselves, show
that 44 percent of the families considered themselves as living at
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TABLE 1. Landholdings of Agricultural Families
Landholdings
no cultivable land
0.01- 0.8 acres
0.81- 2.0 acres
2.01- 4.0 acres
4.01- 6.0 acres
over 6.0 acres
% of Families
15
26
28
18
8
5
SOURCE: Muyeed (1969).
less than a subsistence level of income, while 27 percent consi-
dered themselves at a subsistence level (Table 2). Table 1 indi-
cated that 41 percent ofthe people had less than 0.80 acres or were
landless, while 28 percent ofthe people had from 0.8 to 2.0 acres.
Ifit is assumed that there is a correspondence between landholding
size and income levels, then the landless and those families with
less than 0.80 acres (41 percent) probably had incomes below the
subsistence level, while those with 0.81 to 2.0 acres (28 percent)
would appear to have had incomes approximately at the subsis-
tence level. Families with more than 2.0 acres would then make up
the majority ofpersons with incomes above the subsistence level.
Membership in Comilla Cooperatives
The Academy for Rural Development introduced the coopera-
tive scheme into Comilla Thana in 1960. Primary cooperative
TABLE 2. Income Levels of Agricultural Families
Income Levels
Income below subsistence level
Income at subsistence level
Income above subsistence level
Income at higher level
SOURCE: Muyeed (1969).
% ofFamilies
44
27
22
7
<0
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societies were formed in the agricultural villages and a central
cooperative was established to provide the primary cooperatives
with (1) banking and supervised credit; (2) agricultural extension
and training; (3) agricultural inputs, including mechanical power;
(4) water development, irrigation, and rural electrification; and (5)
processing and marketing facilities.
Rapid growth of the primary cooperative societies resulted in
members owning 51 percent ofall land in the thana in 1969 (Table
3).
Over 37 percent of the families in the thana belonged to
cooperatives in 1969. Although no direct evidence is available to
indicate a causal relationship, accelerated cooperative growth took
place in the three years from 1967 to 1969, at the time improved rice
varieties were being adopted.
The largest single category of cooperative members (43 per-
cent) were farmers with landholdings from one to two acres (Table
4). Offarmers with this size oflandholding, 68 percent belonged to
cooperatives. Most cooperative members owned the medium and
larg~r landholdings in the area. Families with more than one acre
TABLE 3. Growth of Cooperative Membership
and Land Ownership in Comilla Thana
Item 1964165 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69
Number of agricul- 152 158 225 251 301
tural coops
Number ofcoop 4,910 5,161 8,462 11,518 11,673
members
Percent of families 15.7 16.5 27 36.7 37.3
who are coop
members
Land owned by coop 10,100 11,700 19,150 26,050 26,410
members (acres)
Percent of total land 19.6 22.7 37.2 50.5 51.2
owned by coop
members
SOURCE: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (1970).
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TABLE 4. Distribution of Total Population
and Cooperative Membership by Farm Size
Farm Size
in Acres
% ofTotal Rural % ofCooperative % of Rural Popu-
Population Members lation Who Are
Coop Members
nil 15.3 2 5
.01-1 30.5 12 15
1.01-2 24.2 43 68
2.01-3 14.4 18 47
3.01-5 10.6 16 56
over 5 5.0 8 60
SOURCE: Akhter (1969).
made up 86 percent of the cooperative membership while only 55
percent of the total rural population owned one acre or more. The
landless and near landless (those with less than one acre) made up
over 45 percent ofthe total population; however, they represented
only 14 percent of the cooperative membership.
There are several reasons that may explain why the landless
h'nd near landless families did not belong to the cooperatives. First,Y Comilla cooperative societies required that members make regular
cash and in-kind savings deposits, which many families with low
incomes would find difficult to do. Second, the loan policy of the
cooperative generally excluded persons with less than one acre
from taking its loans, and thus, the small landholders and low-
income families could not easily benefit from cooperative member-
ship. Fortunately, as is shown later, this did not prevent some of
these persons from benefiting from the agricultural transformation
that has taken place in Comilla Thana.
Irrigation-A Strategy for Agricultural Development
Under conditions of traditional agriculture and unpredictable
weather, the high uncertainty involved in growing crops during
both the aus and the aman seasons has often meant that investments
made in these crops were lost. The academy therefore judged that
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the greatest return from investment could be realized during the
dry winter season when the loss due to weather would be minimal.
However, crops grown during this season required irrigation. Since
winter irrigation was very limited in the thana before 1960 because
manual irrigation methods were primarily employed, a mecha-
nized irrigation scheme was proposed. This scheme involved using
low-lift water pumps from perennial water sources and deep
tubewells to tap the groundwater sources.
Since 1965, mechanized irrigation has expanded greatly and
replaced much of the manual irrigation (Table 5).
The irrigation program was administered through the Central
Cooperative Association, which was responsible for the installation
and maintenance of the tubewells and pumps. The wells and
pumps were only located in villages where there were cooperatives
and then only when these cooperatives made a request and paid a
rental fee in advance. This rental fee was a flat rate per pump or
tubewell and was independent ofthe acreage irrigated. The village
cooperatives were responsible for digging and maintaining chan-
nels for the distribution ofthe irrigation water, as well as for setting
TABLE 5. Winter Crop Coverage (in acres)
under Different Irrigation Methods
Irrigation Method 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Tubewell 1018 1127 2412 3891 6201
Power Pump 129 170 727 1227 2324
Total Mechanized 1147 1297 3139 5118 8525
Manual" 6024 5493 3967 2186 1430
Natural b 1290 870 874 1324 853
Total Traditional 7314 6363 4841 3510 2283
SOURCE: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (1965-1970).
"Manual irrigation refers to water moved by hand without the aid ofany mechanical
devices. .
b Natural irrigation refers to low-lying areas' where sufficient standing water is re-
tained to grow a crop without irrigation.
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up a procedure for sharing the irrigation water among the people
who were to use it. Although the pumps were rented to the village
cooperative societies, use of the water was not limited to coopera-
tive members. Often persons who were not members, but who had
land within the area that could be irrigated, purchased irrigation
water from the cooperative societies, usually at a price somewhat
higher than that paid by cooperative members. This has permitted
persons who were not cooperative members to participate in winter
cropping and derive benefits from it.
The Impact of Improved Varieties
With this background information concerning the organization
for agricultural development, the effect of the introduction of im-
proved rice varieties will be considered. Since improved rice var-
ieties have, at this writing, mainly been designed for use on irri-
gated land during the dry winter season, this discussion is limited
to the introduction of improved varieties during this season. First,
the effect ofcooperative membership on the adoption and yield of
improved varieties and the use of recommended practices will be
discussed, followed by analysis of the effect of farm size on the
growing of improved varieties.
Rate ofAdoption
Improved rice varieties for the winter cropping season were
first introduced for general use by farmers in Comilla Thana in
1965. Cooperative members were the first to adopt improved va-
rieties ofrice and their rate ofadoption was rapid, from 7 percent to
98 percent in only five years (Table 6). However, the rate ofadop-
tion by persons who were not cooperative members was even more
TABLE 6. Rate (%) of Adoption ofImproved Varieties
Coop Members
Nonmembers
1966
7
1967
31
1
1969
87
66
1970
98
98
SOURCE: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (1965-1970).
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remarkable-increasing from 1 percent to 98 percent in only four
years. The lag in adoption by persons not in the cooperative can
probably be attributed to the assumed high risk of growing im-
proved varieties during their initial introduction. However, once a
third of the cooperative members demonstrated that the varieties
could be successfully grown, and that there were large economic
benefits to be derived from them, adoption by almost everyone
quickly followed. Until 1970 only three types ofnew varieties were
grown: IR-8, Pajam, and Taipei-l77. In 1970, however, the East
Pakistan Rice Research Institute made available several additional
improved varieties, which were used by some of the cooperative
members. The nonmembers, however, chose to grow only the
three original improved varieties.
Yield
Yields from improved varieties were two to three times larger
than for nonimproved varieties each year. There was also a steady
annual increase in yields for the improved varieties. The coopera-
tive members were continually able to obtain higher yields for both
improved and nonimproved rice varieties. It is important to note,
however, that although the yield for improved varieties was con-
tinually larger for cooperative members than nonmembers, the
TABLE 7. Yield of Improved and Nonimproved Rice
(in maunds)
1966 1967 1969 1970
Improved rice:
Coop members 35.09 43.49 44.02 48.14
Nonmembers 33.20" 40.36 44.76
Nonimproved rice:
Coop members 16.94 18.00 19.25 16.56"
Nonmembers 11.74 15.21 15.74 25.16"
SOURCE: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (1965-1970).
NOTE: 1 maund = 82.29 pounds.
a These values were derived from survey data containing less than four observations.
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magnitude of the difference between their yields decreased from
24 percent in 1967 to 7 percent in 1970 (Table 7). In 1966 and 1967,
with most persons growing nonimproved rice varieties, coopera-
tive members growing these varieties had 30 percent and 16 per-
cent greater yields, respectively, than nonmembers. In 1970, with
almost everyone growing improved varieties, cooperative mem-
bers had only a 7 percent greater yield than nonmembers growing
these varieties. Thus, it appears that the improved varieties contri-
buted to an equalization of yields between cooperative members
and nonmembers. The effects of cooperative membership on
yields, therefore, were actually less with the improved varieties
than they were with the nonimproved varieties.
Method of Sowing
The use of improved varieties has brought many changes in
almost all farming operations. In 1966, 62 percent of the coopera-
tive members and 40 percent of the noncooperative rice growers
broadcast their rice. Twenty-seven percent of the coop members
and 58 percent ofthe nonmembers random transplanted their rice.
Only 11 percent of the cooperative members and 1 percent of the
nonmembers transplanted their rice in lines, which was the im-
proved planting method. In 1970,99 percent of both cooperative
members and nonmembers used line transplanting. Line trans-
planting requires about twenty man-days per acre compared to
eighteen man-days per acre for random transplanting and two
man-days per acre for broadcasting. Thus, the use of improved
varieties significantly increased the labor requirement for sowing.
Line transplanting is important in growing improved varieties
since it makes cultivation and plant protection operations easier.
Weeding
Weeding is the second farming operation that has changed
greatly with the introduction of improved varieties. In 1966, 60
percent of the cooperative members and 82 percent of the non-
members did no weeding in growing the winter crop. In 1970 all of
the cooperative members and all but 1 percent ofthe nonmembers
used some type ofweeding. Of those weeding in 1970, 70 percent
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of the cooperative members and 53 percent of the nonmembers
used both hand and machine weeding while 29 percent of the
cooperative members and 45 percent ofthe nonmembers used only
hand weeding. Machine weeding refers to a small, one-row
weeder, which is pushed by hand between the rows of rice in the
paddy field. In hand weeding in 1966, both cooperative members
and nonmembers weeded the crop an average of 1.25 times. In
1970 they weeded the crop an average of over 2.2 times. Those
weeding both by machine and by hand weeded over 3.7 times. This
indicates a significant increase in the labor used to produce the
improved varieties compared with the indigenous varieties.
Land Preparation and Threshing
The number of times a field is tilled before planting has also
increased with the introduction of improved varieties, although
this increase is not as significant as the increase in the number of
weedings. In 1966 coop members tilled their fields with bullocks
for the winter crop an average of 4.07 times, while nonmembers
tilled an average of3.5 times. In 1970 both members and nonmem-
bers tilled an average ofslightly over 4.75 times. Since it requires a
bullock pair about two days to till one acre each time, the total time
required for land preparation per acre has increased from 8.0 to 9.5
days for coop members and from 7.0 days to 9.5 days for noncoop
members.
The threshing of improved varieties has also increased labor
requirements. In 1967 about 4.5 man-days per acre were needed for
nonimproved varieties, while about 9.0 man-days per acre were
needed for improved varieties (Hoque 1970).
Use of Fertilizer
Thus far, this discussion has dealt mainly with the change in
the use of nonpurchased inputs with the introduction of improved
varieties. There also have been major changes in the use of pur-
chased inputs, such as fertilizer and insecticides.
Usually twice as much fertilizer was used to grow improved
rice varieties than to grow nonimproved varieties (Table 8). Also,
total investments in fertilizer by cooperative members have been
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TABLE 8. Value (in rupees) of Fertilizer Used per Acre,
1966-1970
1966 1967 1969 1970
Rslacre % Rslacre % Rslacre % Rslacre %
1mproved Rice
Coop Member
Cow Dung
Commercial
Total
35.80
47.40
83.20
43
57
19.30
59.89
79.19
24
76
32.20
94.04
126.24
24
76
31.20
78.61
109.81
29
71
Noncoop Member
Cow Dung
Commercial
Total
17.05 3 33
34.32 3 67
51.37 3
31.40 32
68.32 68
99.72
37.80 34
73.22 66
111.02
23.10 3 43
30.23 3 57
53.33 3
26.50 35
49.27 65
75.77
37
63
50 17.70
50 30.32
48.02
20.40
20.87
41.27Total
Nonimproved rice:
Coop Member
Cow Dung
Commercial
Noncoop Member
Cow Dung 11.70
Commercial 9.26
Total 20.96
56 13.00
44 14.81
27.81
47
53
10.45 53
9.08 47
19.53
22.203 28
56.95 3 72
79.15 3
SOURCE: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (1965-1970).
NOTE: $1 U.S. = Rs. 4.76.
3 These values were derived from survey data containing less than four observations.
significantly larger than those by nonmembers when growing im-
proved varieties. Cooperative members used about three-quarters
of their total fertilizer investment on commercial fertilizer, while
nonmembers used only two-thirds of their total fertilizer invest-
ment on commercial fertilizer. Cow dung is usually available from a
farmer's own animals at no cash cost, while commercial fertilizers
(oil cake, urea, potash, and phosphate) require cash expenditures.
Cooperative members thus made both proportionately larger cash
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investments as well as larger total investments for fertilizer than
nonmembers.
Increased diversification has occurred in the types offertilizer
used. For example, in 1966,7 percent of the coop members and 54
percent of the nonmembers used no fertilizer at all, with only 15
perc~nt of the coop members and 6 percent of the nonmembers
using both cow dung and all four of the commercial fertilizers. In
1970 everyone used some type of fertilizer. Seventy-nine percent
of the coop members and 74 percent of the nonmembers used all
five types of fertilizer.
Use of Insecticides
The use of insecticides has increased significantly since the
introduction of improved varieties. In 1966, 53 percent ofthe coop
members and 85 percent of the nonmembers did not have a pest
attack and did not apply an insecticide. Of the cooperative mem-
bers who did have a pest attack, 20 percent sprayed before the
attack, 7 percent after the attack, and 17 percent both before and
after the attack. Three percent did not spray. In 1970 only 1 percent
ofthe coop members and 2 percent ofthe nonmembers did not have
a pest attack and did not spray. Twenty-five percent of the coop
members and 12 percent of the nonmembers sprayed but did not
have an attack. Thus, in 1970 only 26 percent of the coop members
and 14 percent of the nonmembers were free of a pest attack. Of
those who did have an attack, 37 percent ofthe coop members and
38 percent of the nonmembers sprayed after the attack. Twenty-
seven percent ofthe coop members and 37 percent ofthe nonmem-
bers sprayed both before and after the attack.
The average number oftimes the fields were sprayed has also
increased. Between 1966 and 1969, the number increased from 1.5
to 2.75 applications per crop for those who sprayed after the attack;
it increased from 1.2 to 1.9 applications for those who sprayed be-
fore the attack; and it increased from 2.25 to 3.25 applications per
crop for those who sprayed both before and after a pest attack.
Farm Size and the Improved Varieties
In examining the relation between farm size and the use of
improved varieties, data is available for both cooperative members
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and nonmembers (Table 9). Ideally, if benefits from growing the
new varieties were to be obtained equally by persons from all farm
sizes, the distribution of farmers in each size growing winter crops
would be the same as the distribution offarm sizes. For example, in
1966,43 percent ofthe cooperative members had a farm size offrom
one to two acres while only 36 percent grew winter crops, instead of
43 percent. Similarly for nonmembers, values under heading 5
would equal that under heading 4 ifbenefits were equal. It must be
emphasized that the estimates ofTable 9 are only approximate, but
they do give at least some indication of the trends in the use of
winter cropping by farmers.
On closer examination of these data it would appear that for
cooperative members, farm size had a fairly negligible effect on
who is able to grow a crop. Thus, the cooperative was fairly success-
ful in distributing the benefits of winter irrigation among all of its
members regardless of farm size. Even the landless and near-
landless cooperative members are represented in winter irrigation
in about the same proportion as they were represented in the total
cooperative membership.
Unfortunately, this is not the case for nonmembers. While over
65 percent of the nonmembers had less than one acre of land or
were landless, no more than 31 percent of the nonmembers, who
own farms ofthis size, were able to utilize irrigation water to grow a
winter crop in anyone year. It is important to note, however, that
this percentage was increasing each year. The farmers who seemed
to benefit the most were those having from one to five acres in that
more than the proportionate share of these farmers were able to
grow winter rice crops. Actually, it is the one- to two-acre farmers
who seem to have used winter crops in a higher proportion in
comparison with their number than farmers in any other category.
Table 10 shows the relation between size of farm and the per-
centage of farmers' land that is winter cropped. First, the small
farmers, both coop members and nonmembers, irrigated a larger
proportion of their farmland than larger farmers. The absolute ac-
reage under cultivation, however, increased with increasing farm
size. Second, cooperative members had a much larger proportion of
their farmland under winter irrigation than nonmembers. Also,
cooperative members with small landholdings ofless than one acre
TABLE 9. Distribution by Farm Size of the Number of Farmers Growing Winter Crops
Cooperative Members Nonmembers
--
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% Coop members Of members growing % nonmembers Of nonmembers
Farm size with given winter crop, % with with given growing winter crop, %
(acres) farm size given farm size farm size with given farm size
1966 1967 1969 1970 1966 1967 1969 1970
nil 2 - - 3 2 24 - 2 7 4
0-1 12 22 11 11 18 41 16 23 22 27
1-2 43 36 33 41 32 13 41 42 32 22
2-3 18 19 29 11 11 12 30 20 15 26
3-5 16 19 18 24 19 7 13 10 24 15
over 5 8 3 8 8 18 3 3 2 2 5
SOURCE: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (1965-1970).
NOTE: All columns do not total 100 percent because individual percentages were rounded off.
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TABLE 10. Percent of Land Owned
by the Farmer That Is Winter Cropped
Farm Size Coop Member Nonmember
(acres)
1966 1967 1969 1970 1966 1967 1969 1970
0-1 80 60 195" 208" 58 77
1-2 53 50 77 79 53 55
2-3 46 56 75 66 23 59
3-4 25 65 66 70 38 23
4-5 22 51 47 9 25 66
Over 5 48 60 56 25
Average 44 53 68 67 9 42 53
SOURCE: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (1965-1970).
"Numbers larger than 100 result from these farmers renting land in addi-
tion to the land they owned.
had a definite advantage over nonmembers with this same land-
holding in their ability to rent land and thus increase their culti-
vated acreages.
In only one year (1970) was there a significant relationship
between farm size and yield (Table 11). Even then, it was the
farmers with one to four acres whose yields seemed to be lower
than the others. It is evident from this table that the small landhold-
er with less than one acre could effectively compete in the produc-
tion of improved varieties with those with larger landholdings.
Although evidence is inconclusive, it does appear that larger land-
holders, those with over four acres did, on the average, have some-
what higher yields than persons with smaller landholdings. How-
ever, this does not appear to be cause for concern since persons
with all sizes of landholdings adopted the improved varieties at
about the same rate. Thus, farmers of no single landholding size
derived benefits from the improved varieties at the exclusion ofthe
others.
Conclusions
1. Cooperative members come mainly from farms larger than
one acre.
------
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TABLE 11. Average Yield ofImproved Varieties
for Different Farm Sizes (in maunds per acre)
Farm Size Coop Member Nonmember
(acres)
1966 1967 1969 1970 1966 1967 1969 1970
nil 44.62a 59.00a 50.57 45.16
0-1 39.14a 32.41" 39.92 48.40 34.63 41.23
1-2 25.85a 48.72 43.06 45.42 37.27 43.90
2-3 44.13a 34.43 45.28 43.61 46.92 45.61
3-4 31.48a 56.19 45.06 45.72 42.09 39.51
4-5 31.75a 49.37 52.51 33.20a 49.67a 54.70
over 5 34.93 45.30 53.58 50.66
Level of
Signifi- .79 .255 .563 .01 .172 .059
cance
SOURCE: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (1965-1970).
NOTE: 1 maund = 82.29 pounds.
aThese values were derived from survey data containing less than four
observations.
2. Mechanized methods of lifting water have almost com-
pletely replaced manual methods in Comilla Thana.
3. Since the operation oftubewells and pumps is controlled by
cooperative members, they are able to derive greater benefits from
the irrigation program and thus greater benefits from the improved
varieties than nonmembers. The only way in which nonmembers
can obtain water from mechanized irrigation is through purchase
from the primary cooperatives. Cooperative members have been
able to irrigate a larger proportion of their farmland than nonmem-
bers.
4. The rate of adoption of improved rice varieties during the
winter-cropping season was very fast, requiring only five years for
cooperative members to reach almost complete adoption and four
years for nonmembers. The faster rate for nonmembers can be at-
tributed to the achievements demonstrated by cooperative mem-
bers.
5. Use of improved rice was limited to three varieties through
--- -------------------------------'
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1969. In 1970, however, additional improved varieties were intro-
duced and used by cooperative members.
6. Yields for improved varieties were from two to three times
larger than those oflocal varieties.
7. Cooperative members have continually obtained higher
yields and invested more in the factors of production than non-
members. The yield differences between cooperative members
and nonmembers, however, have been less with improved va-
rieties than they were with nonimproved varieties. Thus, the im-
proved varieties have tended to lessen the unequal distribution of
benefits of winter irrigation between cooperative members and
nonmembers.
8. Introduction of improved varieties has led to an increase in
the use ofboth traditional and nontraditional production inputs for
both cooperative members and nonmembers.
9. Farmers appeared to adopt improved varieties at about the
same rate, regardless offarm size. Cooperative members, however,
adopted before nonmembers.
10. Nonmembers with less than 1.0 acre and the landless are
the only groups who have consistently been represented in winter
irrigation in a smaller proportion than they are in the total popula-
tion.
11. Small farmers appear to be able to grow improved varieties
as successfully as large farmers.
LeVern Faidley received his Ph.D. in Agricultural Engineering
in 1974 from Michigan State University. He conducted research on
the mechanization of rice cultivation in Bangladesh from 1969 to
1970.
Merle L. Esmay is professor of Agricultural Engineering at Michi-
gan State University. He received his Ph.D. in Agricultural En-
gineering from Iowa State University in 1951. He has conducted
research and been an adviser on many international development
missions since 1962.
Research for this paper was done with the cooperation and assis-
tance of the Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development and
Introduction and Use of Improved Rice Varieties 145
-
financed by a grant from the Midwest Universities Consortium for
International Activities.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Akhter, Farkunda
1969. Characteristics of the Members of Camilla Cooperatives. Sur-
vey and Research Bulletin No. 10. Camilla: Pakistan Academy
for Rural Development.
Hoque, Anwarul
1970. "Cost and Returns from Winter Crops." Unpublished Manu-
script. Camilla: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development.
Muyeed, Abdul
1969. "Strategies Involved in a Development System of Planned So-
cial Change in Rural East Pakistan." Ph.D. dissertation, Michi-
gan State University.
Pakistan Academy for Rural Development
1967. Eighth Annual Report for June 1966-May 1967. Camilla:
Pakistan Academy for Rural Development.
1970. Tenth Annual Report for July 1968-June 1969. Camilla: Paki-
stan Academy for Rural Development.
1965-1970. Winter Crop Cutting Surveys, Camilla Kotwali Thana.
Camilla: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development.
"
II
7
Experience with Low-Cost
Tubewell Irrigation
Khondaker Azharul Haq
Before the introduction of mechanized irrigation, agriculture
in Bangladesh had been perennially dependent on the monsoon
and subservient to its vagaries. Both the monsoon crops, aus and
aman, have always been subject to damage by drought and flood-
ing, the extent of the harm done depending on the duration and
intensity of the wet and dry periods. It was realized that the prob-
lem ofdrought, at least, could be solved by the artificial application
ofwater, even ifthere were few measures that could be taken in the
near future to control flooding.
Because it was felt that the rapidly needed gains in agricultural
production might best be made during the winter (boro) season,
normally the period of lowest production during the year, in 1959
the Academy for Rural Development at Comilla initiated pilot
projects to provide farmers with irrigation facilities for winter crop-
ping. These projects gradually expanded, utilizing variously and
with different rates ofsuccess, gravity flow systems, low-lift pumps,
and "low-cost" tubewells. By 1970, tubewell irrigation accounted
for the overwhelming majority of Comilla Thana's irrigated ac-
reage. So successful was this mode of irrigation that in 1968 the
government ofEast Pakistan agreed to start a province-wide Thana
Irrigation Program, based on the Comilla model of organization of
irrigation. This step was regarded as a most important one toward
increasing agricultural production. This chapter analyzes various
problems related to the installation, repair, and maintenance of
tubewells, discusses the types of economic benefits derived from
their use, and summarizes recommendations for the improvement
of tubewell performance and efficiency.
In contrast to the monsoon season, which usually extends from
the middle ofMay to the middle ofSeptember and receives most of
-
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the 80-inch yearly rainfall, the period from October to May is quite
dry with very little precipitation. This dry season has the maximum
sunshine, with average maximum and minimum temperatures of
90°F and 57°F, and is considered most favorable for crop produc-
tion. But very few crops can be grown without irrigation, and thus
the most productive period of the year has remained largely un-
utilized. As a first step toward supplying water, power pumps were
introduced in the cooperatives of the Comilla Kotwali Thana,
situated on both sides of the Gumti River. In 1971, eight coopera-
tive groups irrigated 274 acres with power pumps (PARD 1961:49).
This irrigated area produced 6,000 maunds (494,000 lbs.) ofpaddy.
The yield was 22 maunds per acre (1,810 lbs. per acre) as compared
to 14 to 16 maunds per acre for the monsoon rice crops. By 1964, the
area under irrigation and the total winter paddy production had
increased more than three times. At a larger stage, introduction of
dwarf "miracle" rice varieties, which could be favorably grown
during the dry season with a yield more than three times that of
local varieties, generated a tremendous additional demand for irri-
gation among the cooperative farmers of the thana.
Experience with Hand-Dug Tubewell Irrigation
Surface water resources ofthe thana were not sufficient, how-
ever, to meet the ever-increasing demand for water. The Gumti is
the only river in the thana with some potential for surface water
development, but its flow is as low as 300-400 cubic feet per sec-
ond during the driest periods. It was estimated that with almost full
utilization ofsurface water, only 7 percent ofthe 51,000 acres ofthe
thana's cultivable land can be supplied with water from surface
sources. Although the low-lift pump power in the thana provided
great stimulation to production and income in the villages where
they were used, the major limitations to their use were water shor-
tages and organizational problems. In 1962, after three years of
experience with low-lift pumps, it was concluded that surface
water resources in Comilla Kotwali Thana were insufficient for
wide-spread irrigation. The only alternative was the installation of
tubewells to supplement surface water. To meet the needs of the
entire thana, a comprehensive tubewell irrigation plan was de-
veloped. The first experimentaI6"-diameter wells were installed in
..,.
E,.
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1963, and the experience gained during these first years contri-
buted to the rapid expansion of mechanized irrigation (PARD
1966). With the introduction ofnew crops and rice varieties and the
diversification ofthe cropping patterns in Comilla Thana, the utili-
zation of irrigation has increased greatly (Table 1 and Figure 1).
Tubewells have irrigated larger areas than surface-water
pumps of the same capacity. Average irrigation coverage of about
fifty acres per well was achieved by 1966/67. Both the tubewells
and surface pumps had rated output capacities of 2 cubic feet per
second (cusec).
A general complaint about the Comilla tubewells is that the
area irrigated per cusec is low. This is based on the assumption that
the discharge {fom the well is 2 cubic feet per second. Although
theoretically correct, in practice there are complications. First, the
maximum efficiency of a pump coupled with a diesel engine is 70
percent compared to 90 percent when coupled with an electric
motor. Other technical factors such as aqUifer characteristics, the
design of the well screen, well development procedure, and the
quality of well construction and installation also affect the yield.
TABLE 1. Irrigation and the Use of Pumps
and Tubewells in Comilla Kotwali Thana
1964165 1965166 1966167 1967168 1968169
No. of Pumps Used 3 4 17 37 67
No. of Tubewells 34 25 46 91 126
Used
Area Irrigated by 128.75 178.28 726.49 1292.02 2323.14
Low-lift Pumps
(acres)
Area Irrigated by 1006.08 1127.25 2350.43 3891.54 6204.08
Tubewells (acres)
Total Area Irrigated 1134.83 1305.53 3076.92 5183.56 8527.22
(acres)
Acres Irrigated per 42.92 44.57 42.73 34.92 34.67
Low-lift Pump
Acres Irrigated per 29.59 45.05 51.09 42.75 49.23
Tubewell
SOURCE: PARD 197Gb.
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The average measured discharge from the wells is 1.2 to 1.3 cusecs;
thus, each cusec irrigates between 35 and 40 acres. With more effort
and research, the output of the Comilla 2-cusec tubewells can be
increased to 1.7 cusecs. This will increase the area irrigated and
reduce the per acre cost of irrigation.
One dimension of the situation is that the demand for
tubewells accelerated at such a pace that it was not possible to
satisfy all demands with the limited number ofdrilling rigs. Due to
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this, and because of a lack of additional technically qualified
people, it was not possible to significantly improve the yield from
the wells already dug. However, the average area covered per well
has increased greatly from eighteen acres in 1963 to forty-nine
acres in 1969 (PARD 1970b:61).
A look at the process of hand digging tubewells will clarify
some ofthese technical issues. Tubewells in Comilla are installed
by the manually operated cable-tool method. The only criticism has
been that it is a very slow method, taking from six to eight weeks to
install a well with an average depth of300 feet. However, there may
be some advantages to this time period since it is utilized in two
ways. First, local people work with the technical crew and sub-
sequently the best local people are hired. After further training,
they are place'd in charge of drilling with a new drilling rig. If a
vacancy does not exist in Comilla Project, they are sent to help
other organizations. Second, during this period, discussions are
held with farmers to arrange for water distribution and use. Addi-
tional factors that have favored the adoption of this method are:
1. The cost of the drilling rig is very low compared to the
power rig. Most of the components of the rig can be manufac-
tured locally, an encouragement to local industries.
2. The rig can be dismantled and manually transported. Many
areas in rural East Bengal are not accessible by roads, especially
in the monsoon season.
3. Technicians are in a better position to analyze the well log.
The bailer has a function similar to the soil auger; therefore, the
soil samples brought back by the bailer are true representatives
of the depth as well as the sequence of occurrence in the soil
profile. This is not possible with either the water jet of the
hydraulic rotary method of drilling.
4. It is possible to have a uniform gravel envelope around the
wells because the outer casing runs throughout the length ofthe
bore hole and, after lowering the well components, it is pulled
out.
5. The method is labor intensive, and ten rigs, on an average,
employ 60,000 man-days oflabor a year.
6. A well constructed by this method is less costly. A hand-dug
well having a depth of250 feet costs Rs. 27,000, as compared to
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the Rs. 49,000 cost ofthe water jet method. One basic idea behind
the hand digging of wells was that the next generation of wells
could thus be installed by the respective cooperative societies in
the Comilla cooperative system.
The expected life ofa hand-dug well is ten years. When their
useful life is over, components of the well can easily be pulled out
ofthe ground and most ofthe well components can be reused. Only
about Rs. 10,000 is required for reinstallation of such a well. The
Comilla cooperatives have reached the stage in which the village
societies are psychologically prepared to seriously consider paying
for the investment required for reinstallation.
The discharge of a well normally decreases every year. This
decrease in yield is primarily due to incrustation ofthe well-screen,
although there are some instances ofaquifer depletion. The aquifer
in the Comilla area is composed mostly of fine to medium sand.
Though some of this finer sand is removed in the well-develop-
ment process, some does make its way through the gravels and
sticks to the outside of the well screen. Chemicals from the
groundwater tend to cement this material. Over a period of time it
thus forms an impermeable layer, preventing water from entering
the well. This situation can be improved by research on the "rede-
velopment" of old wells through chemical treatment and by using
compressed air and surge-blocks. Ifpreventive maintenance is car-
ried out at regular intervals, well life can be extended beyond the
expected ten years.
Another potential of these wells is their use as drainage wells
to remove excess water from fields during the monsoon season. The
well tops are situated, on an average, ten feet below the ground
surface. Water flowing into the wells is absorbed by the aquifer.
Experiments in other parts of the world have shown that by this
process, 1.5 to 2.0 cusecs can be absorbed by an aquifer, depellding
on local geologic and hydrologic conditions. If this is possible in
Bangladesh, a new chapter in monsoon agriculture will open.
Repair and Maintenance Issues
The greatest problem faced so far has been the adequate repair
and maintenance ofthe wells. The standard ofmaintenance on the
I
)
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well, its components, and the prime-mover is much below desired
levels, and in most cases maintenance costs are excessive. Yearly
repair and maintenance of the engine and pump alone costs about
25 percent ofthe purchase price, as compared to the 5 to 7 percent
estimated by the manufacturers. The following factors have contri-
buted to make this problem chronic.
1. When this project was started in Comilla, there was practi-
cally no available skill and experience in East Pakistan in this
particular field of engineering. Therefore, the staff learned
through the process of trial and error.
2. No systematic procedure was followed in the daily,
periodic, and preventive maintenance of the engine and pump
until 1970. No maintenance was done on the wells.
3. Spare parts were not readily available as most ofthe engines
were imported. The parts neither arrived in time nor met the
demand. The need for available parts was filled by locally made
imitations. These were of poor quality, but as expensive as im-
ported parts. In some cases, an engine overhauled with imitated
parts at a cost ofRs. 1200 lasted only a few days.
4. Diversification of engines has added to the existing prob-
lems. At least five makes of engines from many nations are in-
stalled on existing wells.
Types of Economic Benefits
Three types of economic benefits have resulted from using
tubewells: (1) major increase in winter dry season cropped acreage,
(2) benefits in higher yields for the spring and fall crops, due to
supplemental irrigation at the beginning and end of the rainy sea-
son, and (3) an incentive to shift to higher-yielding varieties,
brought on by the availability of winter irrigation.
The area under winter crops increased rapidly with the intro-
duction ofmechanized irrigation (Table 1 and Figure 1). In the year
1968/69, the area covered reached a total of8,527 acres, constitut-
ing about 25 percent of the total cultivable land of the thana.
Seventy-five percent of this area was covered by tubewells and 25
percent by low-lift pumps. Further increase in winter crop area will
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depend entirely on tubewell irrigation, since the meager surface
water resources have been utilized.
Though these wells are primarily constructed for irrigating the
winter crops, their use in supplementing natural precipitation in
the aus and aman seasons adds benefits. Both aus and aman crops
are subject to drought. In aus it occurs mostly during the early stage,
and in aman during the flowering and seed formation stage. Water
shortage during the latter period may result in total or partial crop
failure. There has been (as ofthis writing) no detailed study, but it
has been estimated that the yields ofboth aus and aman crops can
be increased by 15 to 20 percent with irrigation at the required
period. The yield of boro (winter) paddy showed an increasing
trend also, from 21 maunds per acre in 1965 to 40 maunds in 1969
(Safiullah 1969:8).
With the introduction of new varieties and diversification of
cropping patterns, the ratio between acreage under improved va-
rieties and total acreage has increased (Table 2). For example, in
1967/68, of5,184 acres of irrigated land, 1,027 acres were planted
TABLE 2. Irrigation of Different Crops
and Rice Varieties, Comilla Kotwali Thana (acres)
CROPS 1967168 1968/69
Tubewell Pump Total Tubewell Pump Total
IR-8 1361.09 578.24 1939.33 3123.48 1180.00 4303.48
Taipei-l77 1726.92 261.41 1988.33 1878.00 311.00 2189.00
Pajam 390.00 59.00 449.00
China-I 40.00 40.00
Local Boro 264.49 94.22 358.71 335.50 386.00 721.50
Broadcast
Shaitta 343.19 324.80 667.99 106.60 325.24 431.84
Potato 153.58 4.08 157.66 311.50 44.00 355.50
Watermelon 20.53 3.31 23.84 18.00 18.90 36.90
Vegetable 21.80 25.96 47.76
SOURCE: PARD 1970b.
I
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with local varieties (Local Boro and Shaitta). In the following year,
total irrigated acreage had increased to about 8,527 while the acre-
age under local varieties had increased to only 1,153. During this
two-year period, the percentage ofacreage under local varieties to
total irrigated acreage had declined from about 20 percent to about
14 percent.
Summary and Conclusions
The installation oftubewells for winter cropping has increased
income and employment in Comilla Thana. The net return for irri-
gated crops has amounted to as much as Rs. 1000 per acre for some
farmers who invested Rs. 300 per acre. Winter cropping provides
employment for'a considerable part of the agricultural labor force,
who would otherwise be unemployed.
Though the tubewell irrigation program in Comilla was quite a
success, there are some areas in which improvements can be made:
1. Every tubewell is constructed with the same specification
of well-screen and pumping set. Since the composition of the
aquifer varies from place to place and since all wells do not yield
the same amount ofwater, the capital cost per cusec yield ofthe
well becomes quite high for low-yielding wells. To avoid this,
after conducting pumping tests, the wells should be supplied
with engines and pumps of the requisite horsepower.
2. High repair and maintenance costs should be reduced. This
can be achieved by continuously training operators and
mechanics, and by carrying out periodic and preventive mainte-
nance as recommended by the engine and pump manufacturers.
3. Well development is not carried out currently on the Com-
illa wells. As a result, yield and the life span of each well is
reduced. For better effiCiency and performance, proper testing
and development should be carried out.
4. Greater attention to the water distribution system is re-
quired for increased efficiency. Before installing a well, the area
commanded should be surveyed in order to have a proper layout
of the water distribution system. Some land leveling should be
done if necessary to maintain the proper slope, eliminating un-
necessary ponding of water observed in some channels.
5. More wells should be supplied with electricity to reduce
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fixed and operating costs and to permit increased hours ofopera-
tion and coverage.
6. An intensive study of the groundwater resources of the
thana should be carried out to determine the potential ground-
water reserves.
7. Greater efforts should be made to convince the cooperatives
to purchase wells, considering the huge benefits they derive
from them. In this way, the capital ofthe central cooperative may
be released for other uses.
8. Efforts should be made to manufacture diesel engines lo-
cally. The complicated high-speed diesel engines should be re-
placed by relatively simple low-speed diesel engines.
9. Chemical analysis of the groundwater is not now being
done, but it is an extremely important means ofdetermining the
type of incrustation that blocks well-screens. If this information
were available, it would be possible to apply the correct chemical
in the well maintenance and redevelopment process.
10. The locally manufactured well-screens provide a favorable
surface for the seating of incrusting material and bacteria. The
quality of these screens should be improved to eliminate this
unfavorable characteristic.
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Social Organization
and Agricultural Development
in Bangladesh
Peter J. Bertocci
Introduction
This paper examines what little is known about rural social
organization in Bangladesh, with special reference to the new na-
tion's experience with agricultural development efforts under
Pakistan rule. It is a baseline study, since the events subsequent to
March 1971, leading to the eventual independence ofBangladesh,
constitute a watershed and a cutoff point in the history of East
Bengal's agricultural development. The relationship between so-
cial organization and rural development as it has evolved in the past
will be analyzed with emphasis on problem areas and the implica-
tions for possible strategies for future agricultural growth.
The subject matter is organized into three related albeit
somewhat disparate parts. The first examines briefly the ecological
base ofrural social organization in East Bengal, and attempts some
tentative, hypothetical generalizations regarding the parts of the
province about which most is known. The second describes the
role rural social groupings have played in the organization of past
developmental efforts and the part they might play in the future.
The third section continues in this comparative vein by centering
attention on the known results of efforts to implement the green
revolution in East Pakistan prior to 1971, and their implications for
future diffusion of the new varieties in varied parts of the new
nation. A broad and hopefully provocative sweep is made rather
than a pinpoint analysis of detail since, because the development
scene in Bangladesh is still fluid, it seems most fruitful to focus on
the general import ofpast lessons as a guide in making plans for the
future.
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The Ecological Base
It is a truism to say that the whole of East Bengal is charac-
terized by a low-lying deltaic plain and a monsoon climate to which
exceedingly dense populations have historically adapted via the
medium ofa preindustrial technology. But agriculture in the prov-
ince is influenced by regional and microregional differences in soil
type, rainfall, and other hydrological conditions that result in cor-
responding variations in the types, quantity, and quality of crops
grown (see, e.g., Rashid 1967:260-286). It follows that form and
variation in rural social organization throughout the province ought
similarly to occur in a manner related to settlement patterns and
population densities as they are alternately conditioned in each
type of agricultural environment.
The major distinctions between East Bengal's agriculture and
rural social organization are generally related to the delta's major
ecological zones: the moribund, mature, and active delta areas, as
well as those parts of the province that are marginal to the current
courses of the great river systems (for a detailed discussion see
Nicholas 1962; with reference to East Bengal, Bertocci 1970a). But
unfortunately there is to date no universally accepted schematiza-
tion of East Bengal's agricultural zones. Even more sadly, we pos-
sess even less knowledge of regional variations in rural social
organization; in this respect, Bangladesh is one of South Asia's
least-studied culture areas.
Nonetheless, from sources ofaggregate demographic data and
general descriptions of settlement patterns, we are able to
hypothesize tentatively regarding the outlines of regional differ-
ences. Such a hypothetical attempt is made in Table 1.
The most obvious differences among the various regions of
Bangladesh are in their respective population densities, at least as
best as these can be known from 1961 census data. Although the
province contains population agglomerations that stagger the im-
aginations of demographers, the observed regional variations in
population concentration, which correspond broadly with the del-
taic ecological zones, figure importantly in differences in social
organization. Population densities affect settlement patterns. Thus,
at the microregionallevel in particular, the degee to which den-
sities affect tendencies toward nucleation or dispersal in settlement
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TABLE 1. Population Densities and Settlement Patterns
in East Bengal's Regions, 1961
Region/Delta ArealDivision
"North Bengal" (northwest
region)/Marginal; moribund/
Rajshahi
"South Bengal" (southwest
and south central regions)
/Moribund in north; mature;
active in South/Khulna
"Central Bengal" (and north
central districts) /Marginal in
north; active elsewhere/
Dacca
Northeast and southeast
districts/Active except
in Sylhet, parts of
Chittagong/Chittagong C
Pop. Density per
Sq. Mi. of
Cultivated Area a
1,080
1,230
1,570
2,000
Predominant
Pattern of
Settlement b
Generally dispersed,
but an observed
tendency to form
"line villages"
along roads; more
nucleation than
elsewhere
Generally dispersed, to
the extreme in South
Barisal; some "line
villages" along em-
bankments and roads
Generally dispersed
throughout; high
mound building seen in
parts of Mymensingh
Generally dispersed,
absence of nucleation;
low population in
Sylhet, which is in a
marginal zone
All-Bangladesh population 1,350
density
a Adapted from Rashid 1967, Table 96.
b Summarized from Ahmad 1956.
C Chittagong Hill Tracts excluded.
patterns has implications for the character of integration and social
solidarity ofpeasant communities in different parts ofthe province.
This will be evident, for example, in the discussion about the most
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heavily populated southeastern districts of East Bengal. Secondly,
however, population densities and their variations affect the de-
gree ofland pressure in different parts ofthe province and, thus, the
size ofholdings; the latter is crucially relevant to understanding the
economic class and social power structures ofpeasant communities
in diverse areas. The discussion of rural class differences on a re-
gional basis, relevant to the diffusion of the green revolution as
noted below, will make this reasonably clear. Thus, in an otherwise
remarkably similar rural scene observable everywhere in East
Bengal, population densities, in addition to local topographical and
climatological nuances, require crucial distinction in social
analysis.
But the Bengal Delta is, nonetheless, notable for its relative
homogeneity in overall appearance. Everywhere in East Bengal
the abiding impression is one ofan amorphous countryside, whose
seemingly shapeless character allows the casual observer no easy
guide to the differentiation ofone village community from another.
It is this very homogeneity which, in the absence of detailed field
studies for most of the province, tempts one toward the tentative
extrapolation ofpossible uniformities in structure and organization
on the basis of existing, admittedly minimal, data.
Organization and Development in the Southeastern
Districts: Evidence from Camilla
As earlier noted, East Bengal is one of the most understudied
parts of South Asia, at least by sociologists and anthropologists.
What we do possess in the way of detailed field studies of rural
communities comes largely from Comilla District (Bertocci 19700,
1970b; Glasse 1965; Qadir 1960; Zaidi 1970). In addition to pub-
lished research available in Owen (1962) and Islam (1974), some
unpublished material on Dacca District can be found. Smith's
"culture-at-a-distance" report (1946) on an area in Sylhet District is
the only other easily available account of another part of the pro-
vince.
In this section is a brief review of the major features of rural
social organization in the former Comilla District, particularly in
Comilla, and the development efforts of the Comilla academy and
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its allied institutions. Some hypotheses as to the generalizability of
these findings for the rest of East Pakistan are also offered.
Community organization in Comilla Thana displays the follow-
ing general features:
1. As elsewhere in the province, the area has a great density of
population-about 2,000 persons per square mile of cultivated
area. Its people live in scattered settlements and the nucleation of
dwelling in any marked degree is absent.
2. There are several important referents for the term gram or
"village"-the mauza (revenue unit) and the "census village"
among them-but the term also implies"natural" social groupings
of family homesteads (bari). These are commonly referred to as
"local villages" and as such designate socially defined com-
munities. In Comilla Thana the socially defined village is surpris-
ingly small considering the great size of the area's population.
According to what may be calculated from the Comilla Academy
for Rural Development Research Section's Coordinated List of
Villages for Comilla Kotwali Thana (1963), there were at that time
some 463 "local villages" in the thana. These communities aver-
aged about 340 persons in population size, living in an average of
between eight and ten homesteads. The mean area occupied by
such groupings, including cultivation land, was approximately 135
acres.
3. The smallness of "local villages" seems to be determined
by the fact that they consist in the main of clusters of peasant
homesteads lying in relative proximity to one another. Although
kinship plays a role in uniting these entities, the daily contact over
time resultant from this geographical proximity seems to be the
dominant factor in uniting member homesteads and lineages.
4. Political and social leadership in "local villages" centers on
the economically dominant lineages and their most prominent
members. These dominant lineages tend to organize what exists in
the way of collective activities, be these religious or secular, and
most commonly certain oftheir members are the sardars or matab-
bars ("village leaders") who exercise political leadership. But a
great degree ofcentralization in village affairs is lacking; indeed, its
opposite is more nearly the rule.
5. Territorially and demographically small in size, the Comilla
'.
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"local village" is capable oflocalized identifications, which in some
contexts are quite strong. Even where the "local village" encom-
passes a greater than average population and area, such as, for
example, that studied by Ellickson (1972) with over 1,000 inhabi-
tants and an area ofaround 600 acres, neighborhood (para) organi-
zation is quite strong as a centrifugal force. And in the small "local
villages" more typical of the thana, where rivalry has long been a
feature of the relations between resident dominant lineages, one
may describe the community as "vertically segmented," the al-
Iegiants to one or the other lineage-or its sardar/matabbar or
other factional leader-constituting which is called in the local
dialect his reyai, literally, his "group ofproteges."
6. But this "intensive" character ofvillage and intravillage or-
ganization at on~ level is counterbalanced at another by the fact of
"extensiveness" in political organization, on the one hand, and in
individual and group relations on the other hand. Thus, for exam-
ple, each ofthe sardars in any given village is likely to be a member
of a multivillage "council of elders"-known as samaj-whose
main function has historically been the settling ofdisputes in any of
the villages under its "jurisdiction." This multivillage political in-
stitution supercedes the "local village" in public affairs and in so
doing involves individual villagers in a formal institutional struc-
ture that counteracts the more inward-oriented tendencies of the
villager's immediate smaller community.l Ninety percent of vil-
lagers' kinship ties in the villages I have studied were extended
outside their grams in a gradually expanding pattern throughout
the thana (107 square miles) and beyond its borders. People as
often as not attended mosques and other religious meetings outside
their local villages and their economic dealings-moneylending
and labor exchange, for example-often took them far afield. In
general, then, the "extensive" character of both group and indi-
vidual activities beyond the immediate "village level" seems to be
a dominant feature of the thana's social organization, contrasting
with another salient characteristic, that of localized "intensive-
ness" at the "village" and intravillage levels of interaction.
The degree to which this general pattern of"intensive" versus
"extensive" group organization prevails elsewhere in East Bengal
cannot be fully known, given the paucity offield studies. Certainly
Social Organization and Agricultural Development 163
the work of Glasse (1965) from the Matlab Bazar area ofnortheast-
ern Comilla District suggests that Comilla Thana is not wholly
unique in this regard. Smith (1946:592) discusses a part of Sylhet
District in which a "seven-village unit which functions as an
economic and social entity" seems representative of that area, al-
though the data she presents suggest differences in detail from that
found in Comilla Thana. Indeed, given the broad homogeneity of
the Bengal Delta, particularly that of its most populous districts,
one is tempted to think this overall pattern oforganization, despite
local differences in specific form, is markedly similar. Existing
studies ought to provide hypotheses for further research through-
out the province.
If it is true that large parts of the East Bengali countryside
consist organizationally ofsmall groupings that overlap territorially
and structurally into larger ones, what strategy, then, is relevant for
the social organization of rural development? How should local,
indigenous social forms mesh with organizations evolved by gov-
ernment to produce growth and innovation in agriculture? We do
have evidence of the results of past attempts to organize develop-
ment, and in examining these we can at least partially evaluate
success or failure with reference to the way they were linked to
traditional rural organization.
The union level ofdevelopmental organization has, ofcourse,
been one of the administrative tools in this respect in the recent
past. Under Ayub Khan's Basic Democracies, the union council,
composed of a number of representatives from various electoral
wards, was the lowest tier ofadministration. It was also, through its
supposed linkage to governmental nation-building departments,
the local-level primary unit of focus for development efforts (for a
briefdescription see Ziring 1966 and Rahman 1962:10-15). But the
union, while doubtless important as a political unit whose antece-
dents go back for a century, is not coterminous with indigenous
social groupings. Indeed, in drawing up its overall external bounda-
ries, as well as its internal electoral wards, inevitably little refer-
ence was, or probably could be, made to the "local village." Thus,
the "rice-roots" level of local government lumped many "natural"
groupings together, on the one hand, and on the other served in
many instances to cross-section them representationally.
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While the imposition of this administrative institution over
existing social groupings was no doubt unavoidable, it may well be
that such an arrangement brought in its train some inherent, if
perhaps unforeseen, difficulties in organizing development efforts.
Unfortunately, few studies examine in detail the role of the union
council in fusing rural administration with development efforts, the
major exceptions being the good, if conflicting, assessments made
respectively by Thomas (1968) and Sobhan (1968) on the Rural
Public Works Program. Otherwise, the evidence for the early years
of Basic Democracies is at best mixed regarding judgments on the
union's effectiveness as an organizational tool for rural develop-
ment (see Rahman 1962:68-72 and 1963:37-41).
The one case that indicated the union was seriously tried in
agricultural development efforts is that of the USAID-sponsored
"Program Building" project in Mymensingh District. In essence,
the Program Building procedure was five-fold. ~t consisted (1) of
the establishment of training schools for the district's agricultural
workers who (2) would join with local people in union-level sur-
veys to determine the exact nature oflocal agricultural problems;
(3) of a union agricultural committee, composed of farmers plus
agricultural officers and (4) ofadditional subcommittees whose re-
spective charges were related to various specific aspects ofagricul-
tural development; and (5) ofannual repeats ofthe original survey,
made to assess the degree and rate of progress in development
(Stevens 1967:19-23).
While noting that some initial short-run success was made in
organizing farmers at the union level for development, Stevens
suggests that in the longer run several limitations became apparent.
First, there was the danger of co-optation of development efforts,
and hence results, as all activities were channeled through the
more prosperous farmers through the union council. Indeed, it has
been widely observed that in East Pakistan under Ayub Khan the
union councils were in many cases the domains of the "surplus
farmers." This seemed to be the case in the union that encompassed
the villages I studied in 1966-1967, and Sobhan (1968:73-100)
utilizes survey data to arrive at an adamant generalization for the
former province as a whole in this respect. Given the widespread
attacks on Basic Democrats in 1969 and the end ofthe "Ayub Khan
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era," one is tempted to accept the truth of rural economic elite
dominance of local councils. Thus, while a laudable attempt, Pro-
gram Building as an effort to organize development at the union
level of political administration seemed likely to founder on the
rocks of the rural class system of East Bengal in that it risked con-
centrating the benefits of development in the hands of the wealth-
ier farmers, thus enhancing the distrust of the poorer peasants
who in the main were more numerous. Moreover, the inability of
the Program Building approach to cope with the perennial problem
of rural credit (Stevens 1967:24) is perhaps indicative of this
difficulty posed by the rural class structure.
The question of inequality of access to, and benefits from, de-
velopmental efforts organized at the union level was compounded
by the fact that, compared to local village groupings in which most
farmers feel immediately at home, the union, as an arbitrary
agglomeration of these smaller units, contained elements of an in-
herent organizational unwieldiness. It was no doubt a positive aim
ofthe Program Building approach to "break down the village walls
of cliquishness," as Ben Ferguson, the project's mentor, put it (as
quoted in Stevens 1967:20). But offsetting this goal was the likeli-
hood that the approach reached local, intensively organized village
groupings only indirectly at best and this through the medium ofa
territorially extensive class system. Thus, its long-run effectiveness
seems likely to have been seriously hindered (see the discussion by
Stevens 1967:24ff.).
This analysis andjudgment as to the outcome ofthe one known
attempt to organize development at the union level suggests real
shortcomings with the union council as the territorial basis oflocal
level administration, and in newly independent Bangladesh it may
not so remain. But whatever the initiating unit will be for rural
development at the local level in East Bengal, the shortcomings of
operating with agglomerations oflocal villages, given the character
of indigenous social organization outlined above, ought to be con-
sidered.
The Comilla experiment is instructive as an alternative ap-
proach. It is not necessary to recapitulate the main features of the
Comilla program here, as Stevens' paper in this volume refers to it
in ample detail and the interested reader may further consult the
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definitive summary provided by Raper (1970). However, the man-
ner in which the "Comilla model of development" fits into the
thana's traditional social organization and its relationship to the
latter should be emphasized as an underlying (and unsung) factor
in the project's relative success.
The Comilla cooperative project has from its inception taken
the "primary village community" as its grass-roots organizational
focus. Indeed, it seems fair to say that most development activities
in Comilla Kotwali Thana have in effect bypassed the union level of
political and administrative organization, with the single important
exception of the Rural Public Works Program. Most cooperative
societies in Comilla Thana would appear to be coterminous with
the area's many "local villages." And where in the larger-sized
villages cooperative societies are formed, it is common for such
communities to have more than one cooperative, each of these
established in parts ofthe village where neighborhood loyalties, as
against those felt toward the larger collectivity, are strong. In a
word, Comilla cooperatives tend to overlap with the project area's
"natural" social groupings.
But the problems ofexcessive localism this fact might engen-
der are offset by the direct linkage ofthe cooperative societies to the
Central Cooperative Association, which provides supervisory,
banking, credit, and training functions. Thus, the Central Coopera-
tive Association, in effect, coordinates development activities by
linking activities geared to rural uplift to one "central place" at the
thana level ofthe old administrative system.2 At the same time, the
association, by reaching directly into the socially "intensive" local
villages and their subunit, serves to unite the otherwise "amor-
phous" Comilla countryside's myriad social groupings into a ter-
ritorially broad-based developmental scheme.
In this respect, the Comilla experiment can be seen as an at-
tempt to pour new wine into old bottles. It focuses on traditional
social groupings in the project area, but aims at bringing into being
new social roles and new leadership groups consonant with "mod-
ernization" in agriculture as well as other spheres ofrural life. It has
the strategic advantage of building on indigenous forms of rural
social organization, working with groupings familiar to the peasant,
and does not attempt to create wholly new (and uncomfortable)
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entities. It brings development to the demographically over-
whelmed and socially fragmented countryside, which the union
councils, functioning above the "village level," have not been able
to do.
This does not mean, however, that the Comilla "system" has
been unencumbered with the problems of differences in wealth
and power, which troubled the Program Building approach. The
manifestations of these kinds of difficulties at Comilla will be dis-
cussed in some detail below, but suffice it to say here that attempt-
ing to pour new wine into old bottles has obvious disadvantages.
Efforts to reorient the old order to the new tasks and roles required
by rural development find their first resistances in the structure of
the old order itself. Opposition to the cooperative experiment,
grafted as it has been onto the traditional community structure,
came precisely from those who perceived they might lose in the
new change (traditional village leaders, religious influentials, and
moneylenders who gained most from the indigenous system of
rural credit.) But once early opposition was overcome in many
cooperative societies and the advantages of cooperation, tied to
access to irrigation facilities and new seed varieties, became
widely perceived (see chapter 6), the danger has arisen that the
benefits of development might here also be co-opted by the tradi-
tionally dominant elements in the "local villages." The advantage
in the Com illa system ofrural development organization in combat-
ing this tendancy has been the fact that supervision at the thana
level-reaching down into the rice-roots communities individu-
ally-has helped control the undermining of the cooperative sys-
tem.
The basic problem discussed here has been, however, that of
finding appropriate organizational techniques for diffusing the in-
novations associated with agricultural development to the myriad
overlapping communities that proliferate in the East Bengali coun-
tryside. The Comilla model ofdevelopment has aimed at reaching
local people in the social groupings where they are most "at home,"
while at the same time centralizing a coordinated and complex
diffusion ofnew ideas and technology at a higher level ofadminis-
tration. To the extent that the social organization ofComilla Thana
represents much of what is found elsewhere in Bangladesh-a
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likelihood that can only be substantiated by further research-
thana-level centralization of development efforts directed at local
communities is possibly the most fruitful strategy for the future.
The Extensions of the "Local Village":
Their Relevance for Development
Above, and in more detail elsewhere (Bertocci 1970a, and
1970b), I have tried to show the way in which small, "intensive"
village groupings and their subunits in Comilla Thana merge "ex-
tensively" into larger groupings across the countryside. One key
nexus of rural social groupings, which provides further organizing
focus to the "local village" andsamaj groupings, is the local market
area. In Comilla Thana, much ofthe social, as well as economic, life
of local villagers takes place in and around small, nearby hats or
rural markets, which number well over twenty in the rural areas of
the thana.3 These markets constitute "central places" for the vil-
lages that surround them and it is possible to estimate that each
currently active market in rural Comilla Thana (comprising approxi-
mately 100 square miles) covers a "hinterland" ofbetween three to
five square miles. In the village area I studied, there was a local
market that served as an economic and social "central place" for
some fifteen to twenty mauzas and "local villages," as well as three
samaj groupings surrounding it. Its ten permanent shops were lo-
cally owned and/or rented and nearly all the sellers and buyers who
frequented its biweekly meetings were from the same fifteen to
twenty mauzas. As it happened in this instance, the union council
headquarters for the area were located in the market, as was a
primary school. The market was a recreational area for many villa-
gers and it was the place for religious meetings ofan ad hoc sort that
attracted large numbers of the faithful. The market's total hinter-
land was approximately four square miles in area and encompassed
a population of some 6,000 people. In addition to the informal ties
and social contacts implied by the above description, 40 percent of
some 441 marriage ties I was able to record, covering three genera-
tions, crisscrossed the market area (see also Islam 1974:78-79).
Thus, in addition to the formal "intensive" and "extensive" social
groupings that give shape to the Comilla countryside, the market
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area provides a "central place" around which many crucial rural
activities are focused.
There is, moreover, empirical evidence that the Comilla
Thana area is not unique in this regard. The Bengal District Gazet-
teers for 1910 (Allen: 1912) lists 343 hats and larger markets for the
district as a whole, which in 1901 covered 2,777 square miles and
had a population ofnearly 3 million living in 8,695 mauzas and no
doubt many more "local villages." Thus, at that time each market in
Dacca District covered an average area ofabout nine square miles
and served an average population ofperhaps 8,600 located in some
twenty-five mauzas. Patel (1963) reports for Rajshahi District in
North Bengal the existence of 408 rural markets and from data on
that district's area and population in 1961 one can calculate a stan-
dard marketing area ofabout nine square miles and a population of
nearly 7,000. The average distance between markets in Rajshahi is
between five and ten miles, but often smaller distances prevail.
Thus, evidence from two other districts suggests that a common
pattern of market area focus to rural people's activities may be
found in further research, besides that which seems to prevail in
Comilla Thana alone.
It is possible, then, that throughout Bangladesh the rural mar-
keting community provides the mechanism for "integrating myriad
peasant communities into [a] single social system...," an observa-
tion Skinner makes in his study ofmarketing and social structure in
rural China (1964:3). Skinner further points out that Communist
attempts to modernize rural China had to come to terms with the
existence of these natural social units (1965:382-399). First the
cooperatives, then ultimately the communes themselves, had to be
scaled to the size of these traditional units oforganization. "By the
winter of 1960-61, Communist planners and cadremen alike had
gained new respect for the enduring significance of natural social
systems, and were seeking ways to use traditional solidarities for
their own organizational ends" (Skinner 1965:396).
What organizational ends in rural development might the mar-
ket area in Bangladesh serve in the future? Clearly, given the in-
adequacies of the union as a supravillage developmental unit, the
same would apply to market areas in most respects, despite the
latter's seemingly more tightly knit social fabric. But one area in
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which the social ties ofthe market area might serve developmental
goals is that ofland consolidation. It is well known that East Bengal
exhibits a classically minifundist profile in land tenure, individual
farms split up into many small plots. Should it prove necessary, for
example, to consolidate landholdings as a prerequisite for in-
creased agricultural productivity, the market area might constitute
an appropriate and socially acceptable unit within which to
agglomerate small, fragmented holdings. The individual holdings
ofmost farmers most often contain plot fragments lying outside the
boundaries of their "local villages," either in neighboring samaj
villages or in the market area at large. Thus a multivillage, samaj, or
market-area unit might be adopted as the consolidation unit for a
moderate scheme falling short of nationalization and communiza-
tion of land. (Even should the latter occur, the market area as a
likely unit might well be considered, ifthe Chinese experience is at
all relevant here.) Given the fact that social organizational units in
rural Bangladesh overlap in increasingly wider circles-this to an
extent not readily found in other peasant societies-awareness of
their territorially extensive character ought to guide both research
and strategy for development in the future.
Rural Class Structure and the Green Revolution
New, high-yielding varieties of rice adaptable to the winter
growing season have been in use in East Pakistan since 1966. The
beginnings oftubewell and other irrigation schemes also date from
about this period and therefore the introduction of the new va-
rieties, in particular IR-8, complemented efforts to utilize the po-
tential ofthe dry and normally minimally productive boro or winter
season. Varieties capable ofsustaining high yields during the mon-
soon period, when the aus (summer) and aman (autumn) seasonal
cropping takes place, have only been widely tested in 1970. This
experimentation, primarily with IR-20 during the aman season,
aims at finding a variety of the new rice that will be productive
under East Bengal's particular monsoon agricultural conditions.
Despite these hopeful beginnings, the spread of irrigation and the
diffusion of new crop varieties in the former East Pakistan gener-
ally lagged behind that achieved in West Pakistan.
The paper by Faidley and Esmay in this volume (chapter 6)
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summarizes some of the recent results of the green revolution in
Comilla Thana, where, under the aegis ofthe cooperative program,
concentrated efforts to induce widespread adoption ofthe new va-
rieties have taken place. Their findings allow several important ob-
servations. Firstly, Faidley and Esmay have usefully shown once
again that smallness of holdings is not necessarily an impediment
to either the adoption ofor benefit from mechanized irrigation and
the new rice varieties. There appears to be growing agreement on
this point and the study under discussion drives one more nail into
the coffin ofthe rationale behind the"elite farmer strategy" for the
diffusion of the green revolution, which has assumed a higher de-
gree of entrepreneurship among large farmers and that the
economies of scale possible on larger farms are necessary for a
quick growth in overall production. Secondly, however, the study
also points out the need for a well-developed institutional struc-
ture, which, at least at the outset, controls the diffusion of the new
technology, especially assuming the provision ofcredit and inputs
at reasonable prices. In this case, that institutional structure has
been the Comilla cooperative system.
One is tempted to draw a third conclusion from these findings.
Given the appropriate institutional structure, many of the initial
problems, not merely of adoption but also of distribution of bene-
fits, ofthe new technology are perhaps more easily avoidable under
conditions of comparatively egalitarian land tenure. It is well
known that in East Bengal the average size of holdings is around
three acres. The Hindu landlord exodus in 1947, followed by the
East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1950, allowed
lands formerly concentrated in large scale zamindari holdings to
devolve in large measure to the tillers (see Ahmed and Timmons
1971 for a discussion of land reforms in the former East Pakistan).
From the fact that great concentration of holdings is absent in East
Bengal's land relations, one is tempted to hope that the major social
and political impediments to fairly equal distribution of the green
revolution's benefits will be minimized. (For a discussion of the
opposite kind of situation, see chapters 13, 15, 17.)
Certainly the fact that in Comilla thana land is widely distri-
buted among holders, albeit in exceedingly small farm sizes, is
related to the success of the project thus far in disseminating the
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new varieties and technology fairly widely.4 In this respect, Com-
illa is generally representative oftenurial conditions present in the
most populous southeastern and central districts of East Bengal.
Thus, the spread ofthe Comilla program to these areas, as has now
been decided upon by the Bangladesh government, ought to
achieve similar results, assuming the same levels of institutionali-
zation of the cooperative program.
Land tenure conditions by themselves, however, obviously do
not guarantee success, either at Comilla or elsewhere. The Comilla
cooperative system, built laboriously over ten years of effort, has
provided by example one mode of institutional organization that is
so crucial to the process ofdiffusion. The Comilla system furnishes
rural credit, it centralizes the diffusion ofirrigation techniques and
the new seed varieties and supervises the activities necessary to
the spread of the green revolution in the thana. Adoption of the
same kind of strategy in other areas of Bangladesh appears now to
have been chosen as the handmaiden to the spread of the new
technology. At the same time, however, the Comilla system has
been no more successful than many other developmental schemes
in solving the problem ofthe landless. Faidley and Esmay (chapter
6) note that a goodly proportion of the land poor and landless seem
unable to benefit from joining cooperative societies organized
along Comilla lines. One wonders, indeed, if at Comilla the gap
between the one- and two-acre farmers will, ifnot increase, come to
be stabilized over time, in a way which the rural proletariat com-
prised of 15 percent of the thana's farm population will remain
such.
Moreover, there is a continuing problem related to the
dynamics oflandownership and land transfer in the thana. Small-
ness of holdings does not prevent the emergence of a rural class
system based, at least in part, on possession or control of land. I
have tried to show elsewhere (Bertocci 1972) that difference in
class, status, and power in Comilla villages are largely correlated
with variation in farm size, according to whether one is a "surplus,"
"subsistence," or land poor or landless farmer.
The rural class stratification of Comilla Thana is admittedly
embryonic in that it is in large measure incomparable with the more
elaborate and "closed" class and caste systems found elsewhere on
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the subcontinent. Possession of better than the mean amount of
farmland has allowed, both historically and presently, the rela-
tively more prosperous "surplus" farmers to emerge as dominant
figures in their local villages. The "dominant lineages" can be said
to be part ofthis rural class, for under the conditions of"traditional"
agriculture in a monsoon environment, possession ofmore than the
average amount of land usually has meant the production of
sufficient grain surplus as to allow investment of the latter in
economically and politically profitable activities. Crucial to this
process is the lending out ofland, grain, or money made possible by
the possession or control of better-than-average holdings. In par-
ticular, given the absence in the thana of large-scale outright ten-
ancy in the form of land rent and sharecropping, the usufructuary
mortgage has been an important means of land transfer to the
surplus farmers (see A. A. Khan 1968 for a discussion ofrural credit
in Comilla Thana). But at the same time, since land pressure is so
great, it is difficult for a surplus farm family to retain possession of
land gained. This also relates in part to a system ofpartible inheri-
tance, which mitigates against joint ownership of family land and
thus weakens the ability of a family to prevent loss of its holdings
over time. The result is, as some have calculated, a three-
generational rise and fall of surplus farm families. And the local
status and power systems generally correlate with this pattern of
dynamics. Thus, rural social stratification in Comilla Thana-and
one may hypothetically posit the same for the most populous other
districts on ecological grounds-appears flexible and fluid in its
"circulation of elites" over time and space.
The dynamics ofsocial stratification in Comilla villages is thus
related to land pressure and competition for landownership, fueled
in turn by the scarcity of rural credit. The Comilla cooperative
system has in particular aimed at replacing the indigenous system
of moneylending through provision of credit to farmers at lower
rates than the traditional system of agricultural finance with all its
risks has allowed. And the cooperative project has registered suc-
cess over time in its efforts. But it is appropriate to wonder whether
the historically endemic competition for land still constitutes a
threat to egalitarian distribution of benefits of the new technology
thus far observed in the thana's cooperatives. It seems that the
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demonstrated advantages of the new varieties have reinforced al-
ready high land values. Faidley and Esmay observe that farmers
with even the smallest holdings have begun, with presumably the
advantage ofcooperative credit, to seek expansion oftheir holdings
by renting land. It also appears likely that farmers holding land in
mortgage will be even more reluctant than under the traditional
system to seek repayment of loans.5 Finally, it also may be that
those farmers who in the past have rented out their land or given it
to sharecroppers now will be increasingly reluctant to do so as
higher profits from augmented yields make it more worthwhile to
keep one's land and ifnecessary to work it with hired labor. Under-
lying these concerns is the fact that in an area with population
densities of 2,000 and more per square mile, there is limited land
available and the new varieties plus irrigation have made land all
the more valuable. We may see at Comilla a sharpening ofconflict
over land possession, which may have as an added long-term result
certain tendencies toward social polarization. The latter is already a
distinct possibility between cooperative members and nonmem-
bers. It remains to be seen whether within individual cooperative
societies themselves this occurs between the smaller and larger
landholders.
Regional Variations in Land Tenure
and the Strategy of Diffusion
The diffusion of the new technology in Comilla Thana has,
thus far at least, resulted in the drastic maldistribution of benefits
reported for other areas where the green revolution has been in
progress. And East Bengal's most populous southeastern and cen- ,
tral districts might well have the same experience, at least in the
short run, given a Comilla-like institutional strategy ofdiffusion, for
these districts display tenurial conditions similar to those ofCom-
ilia Thana.
But regional variations in land control and social structure,
those related to differences in ecology, do exist despite the wide-
spread existence ofsmall holdings and the lack oflarge-scale own-
ership throughout the province. The Agricultural Census ofPakis-
tan (Government ofPakistan 1960), Table 3, allows the calculation
Social Organization and Agricultural Development 175
that 51 percent of all farms in Bangladesh even today consist of
holdings ranging from zero to 2.4 acres in size. These collectively
amount to only 16 percent of the total cultivated area, however. If
one includes farms of up to 4.9 acres in size, it may be said that in
1960 some 77 percent ofthe farms occupied 43 percent of the total
cultivated area. Thus, land ownership in Bangladesh, while small
scale and comparatively egalitarian, is by no means absolutely so.
Tables 2 and 3 in this chapter allow a brief glimpse into re-
gional variations in land tenure for 1960. They compare gross areas,
the divisions, which, as suggested in Table 1, broadly correspond to
the different ecological zones ofthe Bengal Delta. In particular, the
comparison between "North Bengal" or Rajshahi Division with the
rest of the province is rather striking. Table 2 compares the land-
ownership data of each division as percentage categories of the
whole province. Its major finding is that tenancy, particularly
sharecropping, is considerably higher in North Bengal than in the
rest ofthe province. In 1960, North Bengal contained 51 percent of
all the fully tenant (no ownership) farms in Bangladesh. Forty-four
percent ofthe province's sharecroppers were in Rajshahi Division,
which accounted for 37 percent of the total sharecropped area.
Table 3 presents comparative data for 1960 on land tenure in
each division. Again, the same kinds ofvariation in landownership
and tenancy are observable. In general, the size of holdings for all
farms shifts from larger to smaller as one goes from northwest to
southeast. The number ofowner farms correspondingly varies from
51 percent in the northwest to 74 percent in the southeast. Share-
cropping and other forms oftenancy are again shown to be higher in
North Bengal and it can be assumed that these figures underesti-
mate the overall as well as the comparative situations even for 1960.
There is no reason to believe, in the absence of more recent data,
that these tenurial conditions have changed from this general direc-
tion of subprovincial variance.
It may be argued that these differences, in a part of the world
where the average farm size is little more than three acres, do not
mean much and that they pale in significance beside the great
concentrations of ownership in the Punjab, for example. But the
smallness of farm size is no barrier to inegalitarian land relations.
Indeed, Mukherjee's recently republished economic study of six
rTABLE 2. Regional Differences in Land Tenure, 1960-1961
%of'
%of % of Owner- %of Sharecropped %of %of
% of Rural Owner cum-Tenant Tenant Cultivated Share- Landless % of Rice
Division Population a Farmsb Farmsb Farmsb Areac croppersd Laborersd Productione
Rajshahi 24 21 30 51 37 44 23 22
Khulna 20 19 21 15 27 19 23 23
Dacca 30 28 32 24 24 18 30 29
Chittagong
(excluding
Hill Tracts) 26 32 17 10 12 19 24 26
TOTALS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
a Government of Pakistan 1961, part 2, Table 2.
b Government of Pakistan 1960, Table 5.
C Government of Pakistan 1960, Table 9.
d Government of Pakistan 1961, part 5, Table 51.
e Government of Pakistan 1962, chapter 3, Table 1.
TABLE 3. Land Tenure Differences by Division, 1960-1961
Mean Farm Size per Cultivated AreaC
Owner-cum-
Owner Tenant Tenant Share- Owner-cum-
Farms a Farms a Farms a croppersb Owner Tenant Tenant
Division (%) (%) (%) (%) Farms Farms Farms
Rajshahi 51 46 3 7 3.7 4.2 2.6
Khulna 59 40 1 4 2.9 4.9 2.8
Dacca 58 41 1 2 2.3 3.2 1.6
Chittagong
(excluding
Hill Tracts) 74 25 1 2 2.0 2.9 1.8
AVERAGE 61 38 2 4 2.7 3.8 2.2
a Government of Pakistan 1960, Table 2.
b Government of Pakistan 1961, part 5, Table 51.
C Government of Pakistan 1960, Table 2.
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Bogra District villages in the North Bengal region shows this area to
have displayed marked disparities in land ownership in 1946,
which situation probably still obtains in goodly measure (Mukher-
jee 1971). Moreover, Nicholas' (1962) comparison between diffe-
rent ecological zones in deltaic West Bengal (India) shows the con-
trast in social structures and land relations reported to be consider-
able. The absolute dominance ofthe small landlord over his tenants
in the moribund delta of West Bengal varies only in quantity of
power when measured by the standard of the big landlord ofWest
Punjab or Sind; qualitatively, one doubts from the tenant's point of
view that there is much difference. There is, moreover, reason to
believe that this applies to the same region ofEast Bengal as well.
What imRlications, then, does this variation in land tenure in
Bangladesh's regions have for a long-run strategy for the green
revolution? Several are obvious.
1. Unless concerted efforts are made in North Bengal to assure
diffusion of the new technology to the tenants and sharecroppers,
the tendencies already apparent in areas of inegalitarian landown-
ership elsewhere are likely to reproduce themselves. This is all
the more possible given the weakness ofEast Pakistan's land laws
regarding tenancy, which the new state will inherit. Ahmed and
Timmons note:
It is, in fact, a glaring defect of the present [East Bengal State
Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1950] ... that the bargadars
[sharecroppers] are for all practical purposes considered as
the equivalent of landless laborers and therefore can be
ejected at will. (1971:58)
At the present time, the main season during which the new va-
rieties have been successful is the (boro) winter season. But in
1968, as one representative recent year, Rajshahi and Khulna divi-
sions respectively produced only 6 and 4 percent ofthat year's total
provincial boro crop, at which time only 7 percent ofRajshahi'sand
4 percent of Khulna's cropped area was under boro cultivation
(Government ofPakistan 1969). This suggests that as tubewell irri-
gation spreads to the northwest land will increase in value, and it is
entirely pOSSible that eviction of tenants will take place. It is, of
course, also possible that landlords in North Bengal and its south-
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ern neighboring districts may find it equally profitable to continue
utilizing tenant services as before, particularly in the absence of
mechanization. But this will depend upon the relative factor costs
of sharecropper versus wage labor (as provided by the landless),
and if the latter proves less expensive under conditions of excess
labor supply, the likelihood of large-scale tenant eviction seems
more imminent. This would affect a large number offarmers, for, as
Table 3 indicates, 37 percent of all farms in Bangladesh are of the
owner-cum-tenant variety and this figure rises to nearly 50 percent
in North Benga. Thus, many farms are dependent on some form of
tenancy for their total cultivated acreage. Massive evictions would,
then, not merely affect those who are tenants outright, but also the
much larger number of "partial" tenants so prevalent throughout
the province and thus bring on considerable social and economic
polarization.
2. If, however, sharecroppers and tenants are not evicted, they
still may not equally benefit from the green revolution, despite the
fact that the Comilla experience shows relative neutrality to scale
in the short run. As Ashraf (1971) has shown for West Pakistan,
payment of rent in cash or kind takes profits from increased yields
away from those who must rely on others for their cultivation land.
Although they may benefit in some measure from improved var-
ieties, their overall condition may well remain unchanged. As a
pessimist might put it, their poverty merely moves to another level.
The usual mode of payment for sharecroppers is in kind to the
amount of half the crop. At the time of Partition, a widespread
peasant movement in East Bengal called for "tin bhag" or "three
division," that is, two-thirds ofthe crop to the cultivator, the rest to
the landlord. One wonders whether or not the green revolution
might not, at least in North Bengal, usher in a replay ofthe Tebhaga
Movement of 1946. ,
Thus, all regions of the province reflect the dependence in
varying degrees offarmers on rented and sharecropped land. When
considering the "subsistence" farmer, this fact ought to be remem-
bered, for, as Ahmed and Timmons (1971) suggest, the land laws of
East Pakistan did not really protect the rights ofeither the renter or
the sharecropper. Moreover, the "legislation placed great powers
in the hands of revenue [and other] officials, thus increasing the
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charges of petty tyranny." Neither the land laws nor the actual
practices of revenue and court officials in the former East Pakistan
protected the rights of either owner or tenant in full measure, as
anyone acquainted with Bengali peasant litigations knows. And in
the continuing struggle over land possession, possibly enhanced
by the demonstrated profitability of mechanized irrigation and the
new rice varieties, little stands in the way, under current condi-
tions, ofpolarization ifthose who have traditionally rented out land
decide to evict their tenants.
As of this writing, Bangladesh has undertaken to develop as
rapidly and effectively in agricultural production as it can-and
rightly so. This brief summary has attempted to describe the social
organization of the countryside, with which the new government
must now deal in the effort to achieve increased agricultural pro-
duction. There are, as to be expected, weaknesses and pitfalls
awaiting the developers who now confront the old order; but, with
skillful research and planning, the countryside may reveal concrete
advantages as well.
NOTES
1. The two small villages I studied in 1966-1967 were part of a samaj
grouping that covered eight mauzas, an area of over one square mile (640
acres), and encompassed a total population ofabout 1,800. At that time the
samaj consisted of fourteen sardars, each representing intravillage group-
ings known as reyai (Bertocci 1970a :20).
2. One might, of course, argue that the centralization functions now
carried out at the thana level in Comilla could equally be done in each
union. However, the costs involved in setting up all the features of the
thana training center in each union would be in all likelihood prohibitive.
They are, as the thana-level experience at Comilla shows, unnecessary as
well.
3. I am grateful to Dr. Nicolaas Luykx, director of the Food Institute of
the East-West Center, Honolulu, and a former Michigan State University
Adviser at Comilla, for providing me with a list of Comilia Thana markets
from his own research notes. He lists some thirty-nine markets, both rural
and urban, in the thana, not all ofwhich were currently active at the time of
his research.
4. The average size of holding in Comilla Thana is about 1.5 acres.
Nearly 70 percent of all landholding families have two acres or less and
-
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over 80 percent of them report their incomes as being at the subsistence
level only or below it. See chapter 6, Tables 1 and 2.
5. In his discussion of the traditional system of rural credit in Comilla
Thana, A. A. Khan notes:
Since the agriculturalist lenders enjoy the annual output of[the] land
as interest [on] their money, they do not bother about the realization
of debt. They rather like to continue [sic] their possession [of] such
mortgaged land by not realizing debt. (1968:25)
How much less inclined will mortgage holders be to relinquish control
over valuable land under the new productivity conditions of the green
revolution?
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RURAL
DEVELOPMENT IN
PAKISTAN

-9
Themes in Economic Growth
and Social Change in Rural
Pakistan: An Introduction
Robert D. Stevens
Rural development in the late sixties in Pakistan (formerly
West Pakistan)l has been hailed as an outstanding example ofeffec-
tive government planning combined with vibrant private entre-
preneurship. Contrary to the expectations of many at the time of
Independence in 1947, Pakistan had apparently achieved an
economic breakthrough, ending the vicious cycle of centuries-old
stagnation and poverty. But, ironically, as international recognition
of these accomplishments grew, civil disturbances occurred in
1969 that not only brought down the government that had been
heralded as the initiator of the nation's economic growth, but also
led to the traumatic crises of civil war, division, and new political
leaders who veered sharply away from previous policies.
These economic and social developments raise questions in a
nation still largely rural. For example, a major puzzle is, To what
extent were the developments in the economic and political areas
independent ofeach other or, What were the significant social and
economic interrelationships influencing the outcome? In order to
shed light on these and many other questions, the chapters that
follow provide detail of significant social and economic develop-
ments in rural areas of Pakistan. They also offer alternative theses
about the amount ofsocial and economic change that has occurred
and analyses of the effects of these types of changes on political
change.
Pakistan covers an area of310,OOO square miles. This nation of
an estimated 62 million persons in 1971 is composed of four major
language and cultural groups in distinct geographic regions: the
large irrigated plains of the Punjab containing more than half the
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population; the mountainous regions of the North-West Frontier
Province where the Pushto-speaking people reside; the flat, partly
irrigated desert of the Sind; and mountainous, sparsely populated
Baluchistan. In terms of both area and value, wheat is by far the
most dominant crop in the nation. Rice, sugarcane, and cotton are
other major crops. Except for the rain-fed northern highlands and
mountainous areas, the production of a large proportion of the
major crops is dependent upon the vast irrigation systems of the
Indus river basin, which water three-quarters ofthe cultivated area.
In the following pages, a brief background to the political and
economic development of Pakistan is offered to place the indi-
vidual chapters in perspective. In a subsequent section, themes
and controversies that emerge in the contributions of the several
authors are highlighted. On some issues, there is general consensus
among writers with different disciplinary backgrounds; while on
other topics sharply divergent views are held, based to some extent
on alternative hypotheses about the nature of the economic and
social change occurring in Pakistan.
Brief Background on Political and Economic
Development
In the light of economic and political development theory,
Pakistan over the last two decades presents a disappointment to
some and a paradox to others. It was once thought that success in
economic development-that is, growth in national income-was
the key to social and political progress and stability. No better
example of the validity of this belief, at least in the eyes of some
observers, was to be found than in the Pakistan ofthe mid-sixties in
the heyday of the Ayub Khan era. The Pakistan of that period
seemed to provide living proof that, given the "right" policies,
economic development with "stability" was possible for an exceed-
ingly poor country. As Gustav Papanek put it in his summary ofthe
achievements of the former Pakistan that contained both east and
west wings, the country had confounded the prophets of gloom.
By the middle 1960s the rate of economic growth was more
than double the rate of population growth; investment was
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approaching a healthy 20 percent, and savings exceeded 10
percent ofdomestic resources. Prices were stable, foreign ex-
change earnings were increasing at 7.5 percent a year, and
foreign resources were being used with increasing effective-
ness. Pakistan was widely regarded as one of the half dozen
countries in the world with the greatest promise of steady
development. In the face of its pitiful resource and capital
endowment at independence, and in comparison with other
countries, Pakistan's performance was outstanding. (Papanek
1967:2)
The Pakistan of that period achieved an annual rate of economic
growth of6.2 percent between 1959 and 1965, as against 2.6 percent
I throughout the 1950s.
Industrial development was the star performer ofthe Pakistani
economy from 1950 onward with five-year average rates of growth
of between 12 and 34 percent in West Pakistan.2 Agriculture, the
"sick child" of the 1950s with an annual 1.8 percent growth rate,3
was regenerated with remarkable vitality after 1959. In West Paki-
stan, the growth rate from 1961 to 1971 reached 5.6 percent annu-
ally (Gill 1973:38), an extraordinary performance. There can be no
denying Pakistan's economic achievements, at least by conven-
tional measures.
During this period of economic florescence, there was fre-
quent applause by some Western observers for Pakistan's "political
stability." To them, Ayub Khan, hailed by some as the "DeGaulle of
Asia," had erected a system of political management that was suc-
ceeding in maximizing economic growth while containing those
elements in the country's political structure that threatened con-
tinually to disrupt the "progress" toward a strong and viable
nation-state. Other analysts, however, noted underlying, and in-
creasingly active, sources of instability in Pakistan. A rereading of
their writings of the mid-sixties reveals a chronicle of the succes-
sive challenges to Ayub's political system (see, for example, Ahmad
1967:150-182; Sayeed 1967a, 1967b, 1968; Sobhan 1968). Regional
disparities in the benefits of growth were creating increasing dis-
content. Disquiet was evident in urban areas, where perceived
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relative deprivation was producing an inchoate, but mountingly
effective resistance. Finally, the country's intelligentsia, inspired
by the vision ofpolitical modernity, displayed growing restiveness
in the grip of the autocratic preSidential system.
Thus, while for some the Ayub Khan era was proofofthe close
interrelationship between political stability and economic growth,
for others the evidence was more mixed. While few denied Paki-
stan's impressive growth rates, attention was drawn by the cautious
pessimists to what can in retrospect perhaps be perceived as the
"gathering storm."
The failure in 1969 of Ayub Khan's political system disap-
pointed those to whom it had promised much in the way ofvindica-
tion of traditional theories of national development. At best, it
seemed a paradox that despite economic success, political stability
could not be registered. Some see Ayub's fall as evidence that a
paternalistic leader, surrounded by a traditionalistic elite, is not
capable ofmobilizing a disparate national population to the task of
achieving national unity (see, for example, Ziring 1970). For others,
Pakistan's experience provides sad evidence of the difficulty
inherent in the attempts of a highly pluralistic political culture to
realize the value consensus upon which political development
must be based (Wheeler 1970). And, in contrast to these views,
left-oriented analysts have, not surprisingly, seen the events of
1968 and 1969 as the natural outcome ofcapitalist development-
concentration of wealth, the polarization of social classes, the
growth ofclass consciousness, and the beginning stages of revolu-
tion, which may eventually envelop the whole ofthe subcontinent
(see, for example, Ali 1970). Whatever grains of truth may be found
in these analyses, it will probably be some time before we are able
to assess fully the Ayub Khan period in Pakistan and the meaning of
Ayub's fall. But these recent attempts to do so have at least one
virtue that will inform future efforts. They raise serious questions
about the thesis that economic growth alone is sufficient for na-
tional well-being. Pakistan's recent history teaches us that
economic growth and political stability are not necessarily natural
correlates.
The sweeping success in West Pakistan's fall elections of 1970
of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Peoples' Party, which was based on a re-
formist platform, was in part a political expression of some of the
.-
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recurring themes in the following chapters. Forexample, Bhutto's
announcement in March 1972 ofa land reform to involve over one
million acres was a political expression of concern with the great
inequality in income. The crisis and abrupt change in politics in
Pakistan may be signs of a crisis of social and economic develop-
ment policy that result from a certain line of development. While
neither inevitable nor necessarily unique, the experience may well
hold important lessons for students ofeconomic and social change.
Major Themes and Controversies in
Rural Development
Five major themes and controversies stand out in the following
chapters on rural economic growth and social change in Pakistan:
(1) agricultural stagnation and growth, including explanations of
growth and identification of the beneficiaries of growth; (2) the
regional effects of agricultural growth; (3) the nature of the chang-
ing relationships in the political and social sphere associated with
economic and technical changes in rural areas; (4) impending
crises and possible outcomes in rural development; and (5) impli-
cations for the role of government and political institutions in the
solution ofrural problems. Each ot these themes is now considered
in turn.
Dimensions ofagricultural stagnation and growth in particular
areas ofPakistan are woven into parts ofmost chapters, but the four
chapters by Raulet, Gotsch (chapter 17), Burki, and Rochin focus
most directly on these issues. In chapter 10, Raulet examines major
factors shaping the rural economy in the colonial period of
present-day Pakistan. He points to the stagnation of agriculture in
the unstable conditions of the subcontinent during the eighteenth
century. In the following century, agricultural expansion occurred
because ofcolonial actions that greatly strengthened law and order
and also improved transportation. Of particular importance were
the fifty years of major canal irrigation projects that began in the
1880s. Thus, at Independence, Pakistan inherited one ofthe largest
gravity irrigation systems in the world. In spite of this, as a result of
the slowing down in the expansion of irrigated areas in the 1930s,
per capita crop output appears to have begun to decline in the two
decades prior to Independence. This trend continued after Inde-
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pendence. In the 1950s, agriculture in Pakistan grew at less than 2
percent per annum. Coupled with a population growth estimated at
2.3 percent per annum, food production per capita continued its
gradual decline, and food imports had to be increased.
Gotsch, in chapter 17, provides details of the extraordinarily
rapid agricultural growth ofthe 1960s, in which crop production is
estimated to have increased at a rate approaching 6 percent annu-
ally. Burki (chapter 15) adds depth to our understanding of these
developments in the early 1960s by pointing out that these in-
creases were due primarily to greatly increased use of tubewell
water and fertilizer. The high-yielding wheat and rice varieties did
not become widely available in Pakistan until 1967. There is a
general consensus in the chapters that follow about the outline
presented here'of agricultural stagnation and subsequent growth.
The authors focus the greater part of their writing on explana-
tions of the dramatic acceleration in agricultural production in the
1960s. Parts ofthe analysis in Gotsch's two chapters provide details
of such direct causes as the greater availability of agricultural in-
puts, including seed, fertilizer, and water. Using a linear program-
ming model, Gotsch demonstrates that on a typical 12.5-acre farm
using tubewell water and advanced rice, maize, and wheat
technology the index of cropping intensity could profitably in-
crease from 110 to 152 with an associated 85-percent increase in net
revenue (chapter 13). Rochin also shows the impact of the new
inputs on production in the rain-fed district of Hazara where the
dwarf wheats have doubled yields per acre (chapter 14). As little
had been known about the performance ofthe new dwarf varieties
in nonirrigated farming areas this research result is of particular
interest.
A more general interdisciplinary explanation for the stagnation
of agriculture in the 1950s and its acceleration in the 1960s was
sought by Burki. While granting the increased input flows in the
latter decade, he pursues the thesis that government decision-
making had a major influence on agricultural growth and asks the
underlying questions as to why decisions in Pakistan's political
economy were made that first caused agricultural stagnation and
then acceleration. More specifically, why were the flows ofagricul-
tural inputs accelerated in the 1960s? Burki advances two hypoth-
eses: (1) that the interests of the politically dominant landed aris-
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tocracy in the 1950s resulted in little attention to increased agricul-
tural productivity; and (2) that the rise of the new middle-class
capitalist farmers in the 1960s, resulting at least partly from the
Ayub Khan land reforms of 1958, influenced government policy
and the civil service to shift to activities that supported increased
productivity in agriculture.
The authors are in substantial agreement that the major bene-
ficiaries of the green revolution in Pakistan have been the medium
(50 to 100 acres) and large farmers. However, during this revolutio-
nary change, a large proportion of farmers in all size categories
appear to have obtained some absolute increase in production
through the widespread adoption of the high-yielding rice and
wheat seeds as shown in the details ofRochin's study and Gotsch's
chapter 13. In this chapter, Gotsch also indicates the speCial condi-
tions under which the relative position of small farmers might im-
prove. However, in spite of the widespread adoption of the new
varieties, rural income disparities have increased considerably.
Thus, the outstanding achievement ofrapid growth in agricultural
production has brought with it unanticipated consequences for so-
cial and political structures in rural areas, an issue elaborated on by
a number of the authors.
Although the second major theme of increasing regional in-
come disparities during the 1960s may appear on hindsight to be
obvious, the one-unit government in West Pakistan until the late
1960s and the dominance of Punjab Province in the economy
tended to obscure regional problems. The extent of increased re-
gional disparities is documented by Alavi (chapter 16) and Gotsch
(chapter 13) and commented on by Hasan (chapter 12). The data
show strong relative gains by the Punjab generally and by particu-
lar districts in the Punjab.
More diverse views show forth on the third major theme-the
changing relationships between rural Pakistan's political and social
structures and economic and technological changes. The authors
address themselves to various parts of these relationships using
different professional tools. Perpsective is provided by Raulet's
historical approach in which he points to major factors shaping the
rural economy during the two centuries ofthe colonial period. The
significant changes include much improved rural security, greatly
increased transportation, and immense expansion of irrigated
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areas. This history illustrates the now classic Schultzian model of
expansion of agriculture under virtually stagnant technology
(Schultz 1964). During these decades, the social system, in spite of
such internal changes as the expulsion of the rural moneylender,
appears to have maintained mechanisms, such as tenancy and cre-
dit, for extracting most of the additional income from peasant farm-
ers. Hence farmers' levels ofliving in 1947 appear not to have been
much higher than a century earlier.
The premise that representative local government is a precon-
dition to genuine rural development is employed by Ahmad (chap-
ter 11). His research thus focuses sharply on the development of
rural self-government in Pakistan as he traces the limited colonial
effort toward local self-government and examines the reasons for
the continuing weakness of local democracy after two decades of
independence. In particular, he finds an inherent contradiction in
charging the civil service bureaucracy with the task ofencouraging
local democracy, for this in turn would reduce the power of the
bureaucracy. This contradiction, he suggests, has caused rural local
government to remain an adjunct ofcentral administration. Perhaps
the most critical factors considered by Ahmad for the development
oflocal self-government are those that show the weakness ofdemo-
cratic values in rural society in Pakistan. In conclusion Ahmad asks
whether the civil service can change its role in Pakistan so as to
limit its actions in order to assure the free operation of local gov-
ernment. If not, he sees the bureaucracy continuing the strategy of
struggling against elected representatives to retain power in rural
areas.
Burki, from experience within the Civil Service of Pakistan,
takes the view that the rural bureaucracy is sufficiently responsive
to changes in the rural power structure, and, in particular, that it is
not wed to anyone group such as the landed aristocracy. Thus, he
judges it will align itself with new political groups as they emerge
in rural areas, such as the new middle class farmers. However we
evaluate these different conclusions about the role of the civil
bureaucracy past and future, there is little doubt that the actions of
this group will greatly influence future events in rural areas
whether in an evolutionary manner or toward more violent
changes.
The fourth major theme, on future trends in rural development
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in Pakistan, arose from evidence of increasing tension in rural
areas. One way ofposing the question is to ask: To what extent will
changes in rural social and political structures be required by con-
tinued rapid growth in agriculture associated with further widen-
ing of income disparities? Gotsch and Burki, who address them-
selves most directly to this question, come to different conclusions,
the former more pessimistic. Gotsch foresees the new class of pro-
gressive larger farmers with increasing political influence pressur-
ing for continued high agricultural price supports and low taxes
while opposing increased public control over water resources and
mechanization. The result of this package of policies will be to
increase income disparities and further exacerbate rising rural
unemployment. Gotsch is not optimistic that in the near future
Pakistani society will easily develop the reformist instruments ne-
cessary to cope with these contradictions. In contrast, Burki sees evi-
dence from the rise ofthe middle-class farmer, helped by the Basic
Democracies electoral process and the associated political adjust-
ments, that the social system is sufficiently elastic to accommodate
to changing conditions. He, however, does foresee increased rates
ofpolitical conflict with the emergence ofnew political groups and
changes in economic and social structures.
The fifth major theme relates to the implications of these
analyses for the role of government and political institutions in
Pakistan. On this theme, the professionally disparate scholars in
this volume seem in general accord. In all cases, a strong govern-
ment role appears to be assumed or to be required, implicitly in the
case ofBurki, more specifically by other authors. Gotsch and Hasan
point to the particular economic roles required ofgovernment, such
as adjusting domestic agricultural product and input prices so as to
be more in line with international prices. Both emphasize the need
to increase taxes on agriculture, especially in view of the windfall
gains from the new seeds obtained by larger farmers. A related
needed policy change involves the reduction of subsidies on ag-
ricultural inputs, including particularly mechanical inputs, fer-
tilizer, and pesticides. While documenting the increased regional
income disparities resulting from the green revolution in Pakistan,
a phenomenon observed worldwide, Hasan, Gotsch, and Alavi par-
ticularly ask government to undertake actions that will modifY or
compensate for this trend.
d
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With respect to the role ofgovernment in support ofthe small
farmer, four policy thrusts stand out in these analyses. First, Rochin
has shown how the success ofthe new wheats among barani farm-
ers has encouraged these farmers to expect government to pro-
vide more income-increasing technology. Second, Hasan and
Gotsch mention the possibility that small farmers might obtain
more land through land redistribution. Lack of emphasis on this
possibility was probably due to pessimism at the time of writing
about the political realities of such a reform being carried out or
having significant impact. Third, the ominous problem ofimmense
rural unemployment is discussed by Hasan and is stressed by
Gotsch. Hasan calls for specific government policies that would
influence the rate and kinds oftechnological change in agriculture
so as to prevent rapid decreases in agricultural employment. The
final policy thrust relates to the bureaucracy's role in, aiding self-
government among the predominantly small-farmer populations of
rural areas. Ahmad advises that the withdrawal of the bureaucracy
from rural politics would greatly aid self-government, while
Gotsch, following similar thinking, calls more specifically for the
development of farmer-dominated grass-roots organizations.
In the 1960s, Pakistan commenced an immense rural agri-
cultural transformation that will continue throughout this century.
The impact ofeconomic and technical changes on rural society has
hardly begun. Effective, farseeing technical and social science re-
search could have a major productive impact on Pakistan by help-
ing to guide the nation more smoothly through the pressures and
contradictions of rapid social, technical, and economic changes in
rural areas. The costs ofinappropriate and bad policies can be great,
especially for the poorer half of the population.
NOTES
The author appreciates Peter Bertocci's aid in developing parts ofthis
chapter.
1. Throughout this volume the designation Pakistan, unless otherwise
indicated, is used to identify the area ofland formerly called West Pakistan
in the larger Pakistan of the years 1947-1971.
2. For additional data, see Papanek (1967:20, 318).
3. Derived from Papanek (1967:317).
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The Historical Context
of Pakistan's Rural Economy
Harry M. Raulet
Over the years, beginning well back in the nineteenth century,
there has been an interest in accounting for the impact of British
rule on the South Asian agrarian economy, and in explaining the
backwardness of agriculture in the subcontinent. Much of the dis-
cussion is polemical, and there is disagreement on many points;
nevertheless, there is considerable convergence in viewpoint,
even between some ofthe earlier writers and the more recent. This
chapter explores briefly, in the light of the more or less classic
Indian experience, some of the major factors shaping the rural
economy of the Pakistan region before Independence: the expan-
sion of irrigation, tenancy, moneylending, and agricultural debt.
This analysis is confined almost entirely to the Punjab.
The Early Impact of British Rule
It is assumed that the Moguls and the rulers ofsuccessor politi-
cal entities, such as the Sikhs, held to a major policy aim ofmaximiz-
ing revenue from the agricultural surplus ofcultivators. A principal
means ofaccomplishing this in any given area was to take measures
to increase the total number of cultivators, a feasible approach in
view ofthe relative abundance ofcultivable land at the time. Some
writers estimate that yields were considerably higher in Mogul
times than in the recent past, because marginal land was seldom
used, and because with abundant pasturage, a much larger amount
of animal manure was used for fertilizer (Raychaudhuri 1969:
82-83; Habib 1963:53-57). Presumably there was relatively little
concern with increasing productivity. The main objective of the
rulers was to maintain sociopolitical conditions favorable to stable
or increasing numbers of cultivators, and to realize the treasury's
share of the surplus, in competition with other claimants: revenue
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officials, assignees, zamindars, and the cultivators themselves,
along with village menial clients of the latter. It has been held
generally that land was not a commodity to be bought and sold on
the market and that the system focused instead on the rights of
various claimants to the product.
British rule is credited with having provided law and order and
stable conditions for agriculture, particularly in contrast to the
tumultuous political and military atmosphere that prevailed after
the breakdown of the Mogul empire. In some areas law and order
and political stability came only after a long period of economic
decay, to which the British East India Company and its officials
made a considerable contribution. Under the British, during the
nineteenth century, an elaborate new legal basis for landownership
was erected involving more or less absolute proprietorship, along
with a system of revenue assessment and collection that was based
partly on native precedent.
By the time the British Raj was several decades old in the
Indus Plains region to the northwest ofthe Sutlej River, procedures
for dealing with periodic famine conditions had evolved, and with
the construction of roads and railways and swift interregional
movement of food supplies, effective measures for meliorating the
loss ofhuman life associated with severe famines were at hand. At
the same time, the improved transportation served distant domestic
and export markets for agricultural products, and fostered regional
specialization in crops.
Under the systems of land tenure introduced by the British,
variable as they were, proprietors generally had the right to sell or
mortgage holdings, and the new judicial system facilitated the re-
covery of money debts and protected the rights of mortgage hold-
ers. Proprietors often sought loans to pay the government revenue
assessments or arrears in their assessments, or fell into debt when,
after having sold their crops at the low price prevailing at harvest
time, they borrowed to buy them back six months later at high
prices. The market value ofland tended to increase rapidly, begin-
ning at least by the 1860s, and the alienation of land to mortgage
holders became common. A factor in this process was the increase
in population, slow until 1921 and increasingly rapid thereafter.
Given the system of partible inheritance of land under customary
law, and, perhaps even more important, the failure ofemployment
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tically the social fabric ofIndian agriculture, but to leave vir-
tually unaffected the basic process ofproduction and the level
of technology. The upper strata of this new agrarian society
benefited handsomely. The position of cultivators deterior-
ated. Capital needed for the development of agriculture was
siphoned off, and the level of total output tended toward stag-
nation. (1962:11)
In summary, British rule provided law and order and stable
political conditions for agriculture in place ofthe instability charac-
teristic of the eighteenth century in India. A new legal framework,
involving absolute proprietorship of land, superceded the native
system ofland control and provided a new basis for credit and sales
transactions. The market for agricultural products expanded, and,
ultimately, as the transportation and communications networks
grew and administration became more refined, famines were
brought under control. Population began to increase, and in the
absence of sufficient expansion of alternative employment, the ag-
ricultural sector became increasingly crowded, the price of land
increased, wages remained near subsistence level, and tenancy
became prevalent. '
The perspective provided by the foregoing analysis is mislead-
ing in at least one respect. It conveys an impression of abrupt dis-
continuity in rural social structure from precolonial to late colonial
times, as one-sided as would be an account that depicted rural
society persisting unchanged to the present. Moreover, one might
suspect that if the new order was unfavorable to the genuine de-
velopment ofthe rural economy, it might have failed also to provide
conditions favorable to the emergence of qualitatively new rural
institutions. As Geertz has suggested in his analysis of"posttradi-
tional" rural society in Java, behind the appearance of institutional
innovation there may lurk a reality of traditional structure (Geertz
1963:90).
Irrigation Development and Economic Growth
in the Punjab
The human geography of the Indus Plains today, particularly
that portion that now constitutes the heartland of Pakistan, is
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closely tied in with the development of modern irrigation works.
Before the construction of these projects, rainfall agriculture was
practiced in the submontane districts and irrigation agriculture was
supported by means of inundation canals along the rivers, but the
doabs (or areas between the rivers) were sparsely inhabited, as
were most of the desert areas to the east and west of the Indus.
Without the modern irrigation system, Michel estimates that the
population ofPakistan today would be hardly more than 20 million
(Michel 1967:12). The irrigation system and the great canal coloni-
zation projects shaped the distribution of the modern transporta-
tion network, the location of large towns and cities, and the dis-
tribution of major ethnic and religious communities as we know
them today. It also was due primarily to the irrigation and canal
colony projecfs that the Punjab shifted from a position as one ofthe
most economically backward provinces in the last century to that of
the most progressive in the early twentieth century.
The first perennial scheme, the Upper Bari Doab Canal, is said
to have been planned primarily to provide employment to Sikh
army veterans (Michel 1967:61). The wave ofprojects begun in the
1880s was designed to bring irrigation to sparsely inhabited crown
lands. It was expected that these colonization projects would in-
crease the amount of revenue and provide a surplus of grain for
famine-prone areas, while at the same time they would relieve
population pressure in the congested areas ofGurdaspur, Amritsar,
Jullundhur, and Hoshiarpur districts (Paustian 1930:68-69; Michel
1967:75-76).
The later canal colonies, with initial conditions unusually
favorable to agricultural growth, became the site of an agrarian
prosperity perhaps unparalleled in South Asia at the time. The
Lyallpur colony, opened in 1893 in the lower Chenab colony area,
is a prime example ofthis development. Land had been distributed
to colonists in grants of one or more perennially irrigated squares
(approximately twenty-five acres), and 70 percent ofthe cultivated
area was estimated to have been in owners' holdings oftwenty-five
acres or more in 1925 (Calbert 1925:14). Allotments were made
mostly to "peasant" grantees (as distinguished from "yeoman" and
"capitalist" grantees), who were selected from among the cultivat-
ing castes of Central Punjab and who were regarded as among the
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most skilled in the province. With an agricultural college at
Lyallpur and with special grants throughout the colonies for
experiments in agricultural development, the environment for
technical innovations seemed favorable. In the 1920s agricultural
prices were at record levels, cultivators' incomes were high, and
optimism was rather general. It was in reference to Lyallpur and
similar canal colonies that Malcolm Darling speculated on the pos-
sibility ofa "new agricultural civilization" emerging in the Punjab
(Darling 1947:36).
These canal colony projects resulted in a more equal distribu-
tion of population throughout the Punjab. In 1921, the density of
population in the above-named districts ranged from 401 to 583 per
square mile and was approximately the same as it had been in 188l.
On the other hand, the growth of population in the western Indus
Plains caused some anxiety about the economic future. In Multan,
population density increased over the same period from 94 to 150
per square mile; in Shahpur the increase was from 86 to 161; in
Montgomery, from 78 to 154; and in Lyallpur District from 12 to 301
per square mile (Paustian 1930:82).
During the early part of this period the total cultivated area
expanded faster than did the population, but beginning about 1920
the process reversed, and the average size of holdings shrank
throughout the Punjab, and in the canal colonies as well, where
natural increase was augmenting population growth. By 1926/27,
the average size of cultivators' holdings in the canal colonies was
only 9.8 acres (Paustian 1930:101). At this time, the large Sutlej
Valley project, intended to irrigate 5 million acres, was yet to be
completed, and in the neighboring Sind Province, irrigation poten-
tial had not yet been fully exploited, so there was no immediate
crisis. But in retrospect, the significance of the trend was clear; it
was noted in the 1920s and 1930s by observers such as Malcolm
Darling.
Increasing Rural Tenancy
Views on the problems posed by tenancy in the Punjab have
been varied. Although the cultivation ofland by tenants has been
common since at least the 1880s, the Punjabi agricultural scene has
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retained the image of an area dominated by peasant proprietors.
The Jats are by far the largest caste group in the province, and,
under Sikh rule, they gained control over a large proportion of the
cultivated tracts (van den Dungen 1968:75). Unlike the Rajput
zamindars, whose control over many tracts was broken during the
Sikh times, the Jats were by tradition cultivators, personally engag-
ing in agricultural work. Tenancy in its modern sense apparently
did not exist in pre-British times. Biradaris (lineages) would some-
times invite members of other castes to cultivate in their tract and
share the burden of heavy revenue assessments imposed by Sikhs
or other rulers. And, ofcourse, zamindari groups claimed a share of
the product or revenue. When the British made the early revenue
settlements, they usually conferred proprietorship on the biradaris
that cultivated and claimed traditional rights in the land. Con-
sequently, in the initial years of British rule the Punjab was rela-
tively free of proprietors having superior claims over the actual
cultivators, and occupancy tenants were less characteristic than in
the provinces to the east. However, in 1880/81 the proportion of
total cultivated area cultivated by tenants is given as 34.7 percent, it
rose to 46.0 percent in 1890/91, 54.0 percent in 1903/04, and was
well over 50.0 percent in 1925 (Imperial Gazetteer of India
1908:307; Calvert 1925:9).1 The tenant category was not clear-cut
in the Punjab as a large proportion of those renting in land were
themselves owners, and there was generally no sharp caste distinc-
tion between tenants and owners (Calvert 1928:11).
Before the turn of the century, holdings of 100 acres had been
given to the "yeoman" category ofcolonists, and two or three times
that much to "capitalist" grantees, in the hope that they would
have a catalytic effect in improving the agriculture of the colony
(Paustian 1930:69-70; Darling 1947:117-122). The new peasant
grantee, however, proved to be inclined toward absentee landlord-
ism rather than progressive farming, and the practice of making
such grants discontinued. By the mid-1920s the majority of cul-
tivators owned less than 7.5 acres (Darling 1947:7), and the persis-
tence of the tenancy patterns was taken for granted. It was hoped
that some of the productivity-dampening effects of tenant farming
might be meliorated when the larger landowners learned to make
improvements on the land let out on batai (on shares), and even that
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more of the large landowners might try to realize the somewhat
higher profits available from direct cultivation oftheir land (Stewart
1926:1-2, 1927).
The New Class of Agricultural Moneylenders
By the 1920s, the moneylenders as well as the larger landhold-
ers were more and more often from the cultivating castes. In the
nineteenth century the primary source of credit was the village
sahukar (professional moneylender), of Bania, Khatri, or Arora
caste. By the turn of the century there was considerable alarm over
the level of rural debt, the transfer of land to nonagriculturalists
through mortgage, and the share of the provinces' wealth appro-
priated by the moneylenders. A series oflegal measures, beginning
with the Punjab Land Alienation Act of1900, were taken to prevent
the transfer ofland from cultivators and to strengthen them against
the moneylenders in other ways. Apparently the sahukar remained
strong through the period of World War I (Darling 1947:175), but
after this his monopolist position in supplying credit was broken,
and the agriculturalist moneylender appeared on the scene. With
funds accumulated through soldiering, as traders, or as emigrants to
Australia, cultivators, particularly Jats, entered the moneylending
market on a large scale, and throughout the prosperous 1920s the
agriculturalist moneylenders increased their numbers and opera-
tions, while, it is reported, thesahukars actually began to leave the
villages (Darling 1947:192). By 1930, one-half of the total agricul-
tural debt, 70 crores, was owed to the agriculturalist moneylenders
who held almost all of the usufructuary mortgages (Darling
1947:197; see also van den Dungen 1968 on the subject of Jat
moneylenders). Darling comments that:
It has been shown that only the small minority [ofagricultur-
ists], probably not more than 26%, are free of debt. Allow-
ing for those who borrow as well as lend, the probability is that
the 70 crores are held by at most 30 per cent of the agricul-
turists of the province. If so, the inference is that while the
bulk of the peasantry have been steadily getting more in-
volved, a favored few have been growing increasingly pros-
perous.(1947:214)
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The moneylender, in spite ofhis negative image, is commonly
regarded as having provided a necessary service to the credit-
hungry peasant economy. Legislation designed to curtail the
sahukar did not abolish moneylending, but gave a competitive
edge to the agriculturist moneylender. The latter had other advan-
tages as well. The Jat, particularly when he had financial strength,
occupied a more secure position in the power structure of the
community, both in relation to members ofhis ownbiradari and to
clients ofother castes. He was normally more difficult to intimidate
than the sahukar, and could more easily recover debts and acquire
mortgaged land.
The economic heterogeneity of the localized biradari may
have, in itself, contributed to the increasing level of indebtedness.
Although the biradari has remained an important grouping in the
villages to the present, it became very heterogeneous as far as the
economic condition of members' households was concerned. The
membership of a Jat biradari within a given village might range
from poor households, dependent entirely upon cultivating small,
rented-in parcels of land, to households with income from large
landholdings, moneylending, and other business interests. During
the post-World War I period of prosperity, the cost of marriage
increased considerably throughout most of the Punjab (Darling
1947:54). The less affluent members ofa respectable biradari were
under pressure to meet the high standards ofexpenditure for cere-
monies set by the more affluent members in order to maintain izzat
(social position) or merely to succeed in arranging a marriage. For
this purpose, money would be borrowed, and, increasingly, the
source of credit was the agriculturalist moneylender.2
Evidently the agriculturalist moneylender was no more in-
clined to channel his wealth into the improvement of agriculture
than was the sahukar. In the absence ofa favorable economic envi-
ronment, such as might have been created by a radically new
agricultural technology, there was little incentive to invest in agri-
culture. From an economic point of view, where alternatives for
land-poor agricultural households were lacking, land could be
given to tenants at a cost to the renter not greater than that of
employing agricultural laborers. In this way the moneylender who
had accumulated land could save the costs and inconvenience of
farm management, including overseeing laborers.
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The agriculturalist moneylender combined his new role as
village banker with that of broker, or intermediary, between the
village and the outside, a role which had traditionally been played
by prominent members of the dominant agricultural castes. In the
early colonial period, as land entered the market, and as law courts
and official records became basic to decisions in land cases, ability
to cope with officials and outsiders became crucial to gaining posi-
tion or maintaining it in the local community. In the early 1900s, the
Punjab gained a reputation as a highly litigious province, and dis-
putes between important villagers frequently became factional
fights in which followers, or clients, were lined up as witnesses.
Villagers who lacked political skill or who were less successful in
mobilizing the resources for upward mobility were in need of the
services of a patron to protect them and represent them in dealing
with officials or powerful local men. The broker, by obliging peas-
ants with protection and representation, established a following
that was useful to him in any contest for power. The relationship
between the broker-patron and his followers was, however, an am-
biguous one. His role was not only to protect the interests of his
followers, but also required that he sometimes assist the police and
other officials in their dealings in the community, and his useful-
ness depended upon his ability to manipulate villagers. He also
used his influence both locally and with the outside to better his
own economic changes in various ways: as middleman in a milk
business or in garden produce, in mobilizing scarce agricultural
labor, and, as we have seen, in lending money (see Raulet and
Uppal 1970). The activities of the broker-patron, both in the
economic sphere and in the use ofpower, tended more to reinforce
the economic marginality ofmost ofhis followers rather than to lead
them toward economic progress.
Increasing Agricultural Debt
In revised portions of Malcolm Darling's book The Punjab
Peasant in Prosperity and Debt (1947), which were written in the
early 1930s, the optimistic views he expressed earlier about the
Punjab are less in evidence. By this time a precipitous drop in
agricultural prices had reduced the annual value ofthe agricultural
product ofthe province by almost 50 percent, and the long period of
.11 hZC.S
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prosperity had ended. But ofmore significance was the observation
that increased indebtedness of cultivators had in the past decade
gone hand in hand with prosperity. Lyallpur District, where the
colonists began unencumbered by debt, showed signs ofbecoming
the most indebted district in the province (Darling 1947:211). In
"insecure" districts, where water supply was uncertain and hold-
ings small, the debt position of the majority of cultivators was un-
favorable even in times of high prices, in accordance with classic
patterns. But the evidence that the most advantaged canal colony
districts were equally part of this system dampened any hopes that
the province might be shifting toward a more advanced form of
agriculture under British leadership.
For the entire Punjab, the agricultural debt in 1929 was esti-
mated at 135 crares; the debt's multiple ofland revenue was 25.5
percent higher than in any other province. The debt had grown by
56.0 percent from an estimated 90 crores in 1921; in the previous
two decades it had grown by only 40.0 percent (Darling 1947:16-
18). Lyallpur and similar canal colony districts such as Montgom-
ery and Shahpur were still, in 1924, considerably less indebted
than the rest of the province, but their debt was increasing rapidly
and, in the six years ending in 1930, the mortgage debt in Lyallpur
had increased by 141lakhs (Darling 1947:211,224). The growth in
indebtedness of cultivators proved especially burdensome, as it
was for farmers in other countries, when the slump in agricultural
prices occurred.
But the main problem was that the debts had been incurred
largely for "unproductive" expenditures. Part of the debt was in-
curred to meet immediate necessities ofhousehold consumption or
to deal with reverses such as loss ofdraft animals (Darling 1947:19).
A large part of the debt, labeled in surveys as "unproductive" or
"personal," and usually more than 50 percent of the total, rep-
resented borrowing for the purpose ofmeeting wedding, litigation,
and other similar expenses, and especially for the servicing of ac-
cumulated debts. The pattern evidently did not differ much among
the canal colonies (see Board of Economic Enquiry, 1932:100;
1963:72-73). Assuming an average interest rate of 12 to 13 percent
payments for debt accounted for an enormous share, some 17 to 18
percent of the total agricultural product of the province in 1929
(Darling 1947:191).
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The small landholder (less than ten acres) inevitably found it
difficult to keep out of debt even in a period of rising farm prices,
unless he displayed unusual energy, enlarged his holding by rent-
ing in land, or had a secondary occupation. As marketable surplus
was small, output was subject to periodic fluctuations, and there
was the need to replace draft animals and meet family consumption
requirements; the small holder was more likely to enter the market
as a buyer than as a seller (Darling 1947:247-248). The indebted-
ness of the larger holders and canal colonists was more difficult to
explain in purely economic terms, and was often attributed to their
"improvidence," their spendthrift habits, lack of managerial skill
and business knowledge. I have already suggested how an analysis
of rural society could help provide a more systematic explanation
for this phenomenon.
If, as the Thorners, Gadgil, and others have suggested, the
colonial rural socioeconomic system siphoned off potential capital,
it seems to have worked with impressive flexibility and efficiency.
When terms oftrade were favorable to agriculture and the value of
output increased, and in prosperous districts with high output, the
debt mechanism seemed to work automatically to maintain the
poverty of the peasants.
Summary and Conclusions
As in other parts of India, British rule in the Punjab in the
nineteenth century provided law and order and relative political
stability. With the construction ofa modern transportation network
came an expansion ofthe market and increased commercialization
of agriculture as well as population growth. At the same time the
new legal system helped create the conditions for widespread ten-
ancy, mortgaging of land, and rural indebtedness. Initially, the
settling of the canal colonies relieved population pressure and in-
creased crop output, and up until around 1920 cultivated area ex-
panded more rapidly than population in the province as a whole.
However, after 1920 this process was reversed and the average size
ofagricultural holdings began to shrink. Moreover, rural indebted-
ness had become a serious problem in the canal colonies, as
elsewhere in the province. After the turn ofthe century, prosperous
agriculturalists began to replace the profeSSional moneylenders as
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the major source of rural credit. But members of this new class of
moneylenders, who tended also to be landlords and village politi-
cians, were no more inclined than their predecessors to channel
money into agricultural development. By the end of the decade of
the 1920s, payments for debt accounted for an enormous share of
the total agricultural production of the province. Indebtedness
seems to have grown most rapidly in prosperous districts and dur-
ing periods of favorable terms of trade to agriculture; as mecha-
nisms for siphoning off potential capital, the colonial rural social
system and the credit system worked with remarkable flexibility
and efficiency. Beginning two decades before Independence, the
per capita all-crop output of greater Punjab began to decline, and
there was increasing evidence that the rural economy of the pro-
vince was subject to limitations similar to the rest ofIndia.
The administration was aware ofthe problems associated with
rural indebtedness and was concerned about it. Their principal
weapon against the moneylender, the cooperative society, proved
to be insufficient to the task. For one thing, cooperative societies
were organized in accordance with the prinCiple of unlimited lia-
bility. When prices fell, members with assets were pressed to pay
the debts of others and the cooperative movement tended to lose
favor (Michel 1967:401). Lack of flexibility, compared with private
moneylenders, and the ability ofthe more prosperous and powerful
agriculturalists to dominate available funds, are also reasons for the
limited impact ofthe cooperative movement (Mellor et aI1968:65).
"Cancellation" of debts accompanying the exodus of Sikhs and
Hindus at the time of Partition did more than previous efforts to
relieve the burden of debt in the Pakistan part of the Punjab
(Michel 1967:400).
It is true that even in the canal colonies, the measures of the
colonial administration cannot be characterized as single-minded
support for progressive agriculture. In these areas, concessions
were made to the demands of various government departments,
and allotments were made for such purposes as raising horses and
camels for the military and for supplying cantonments with dairy
products. "Capitalist" grantees were given allotments in the colo-
nies not only in an attempt to infuse a "progressive spirit" but also to
strengthen the "landed gentry" as a counterweight against the ris-
--
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opportunities outside of the agricultural sector to keep pace with
the growth of population, there was increasing competition for
available land (Thorner and Thorner 1962:77; Gadgil 1959:155).
This exerted an upward pressure on the price of land and encour-
aged the entry ofland into mortgage transactions. At the same time,
there arose the general practice of proprietors, "original," or those
who acquired land through mortgage or sale, giving their holdings
over to tenants for cultivation, sometimes for cash rents, always for a
major share of the product of the land.
There is some disagreement on the net effects ofBritish rule on
agriculture. Some writers have stated that the nineteenth century
was a period of growth in the sense ofexpanded per capita output
(Morris 1969:8; Neale 1962:141-148). If such growth occurred, it
probably was nol of great magnitude. Increased income to cul-
tivators is said to have resulted in part from the shift from grains to
high-value commercial crops during the second half of the
nineteenth century (Raychaudhuri 1969:91). In the famine decades
ofthe 1870s and 1890s there was a tendency to shift back to subsis-
tence crops along with a decline in the double-cropped area (Gad-
gil 1959:89). Blyn, in a study covering the period 1891-1947, found
that in all India the per capita production of all crops expanded
slightly faster than population until around 1921/22; after 1922
growth in output fell behind population growth (Blyn 1966:247). In
the last decades ofBritish rule (particularly in the Punjab) contribu-
tions to increased yields may have come from improved seeds
(BIyn 1966:200-202). On the other hand, the decreased availability
ofanimal manures for fertilizer and the reduced size and increasing
fragmentation of holdings are thought to have been dampening
influences on yield (Blyn 1966:195-197,211-212). There was little
change in agricultural equipment, and on the whole, the level of
technology did not advance throughout the whole period.
The evidence seems to favor those who claim that the new
socioeconomic order was decidedly unfavorable to progress in ag-
riculture. The decisive feature is the nexus ofrelations between the
cultivators and the new rural elites, the landlords and the
moneylenders, by means ofwhich the agricultural surplus was dis-
tributed. The Thorners have stated:
In retrospect, the net effect of British rule was to change dras-
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ing nationalism of urban, educated classes (Darling 1947:118).
Thus in many cases, long-term economic purposes played a smaller
part than immediate administrative and political aims of the raj.
Perhaps a major handicap to the sustained growth of agricul-
ture was the lack ofsufficient growth in the nonagricultural sector of
the economy. Compared with the rest ofIndia, the Punjab was well
endowed with occupational alternatives to agricultural employ-
ment, but in the seventy years prior to Independence, the popula-
tion ofthis province increased by about 65 percent compared with
only 50 percent for India as a whole. Population growth of this
magnitude, in an economy in which nonagricultural sectors were
not growing rapidly, and given the rural institutions I have de-
scribed, could only reinforce the stagnation of agriculture. Today,
Pakistan, particularly the areas that were embraced by the canal
colony experiment, is relatively well-situated in agricultural and
water resources to take advantage of new technologies and other
forces now favorable to agricultural growth. In part this is due to the
legacy of the progressive episodes of the past. But a legacy of the
cumulative effects of tenancy and agricultural debt may pose major
obstacles to strategies for economic development.
Harry M. Raulet, Jr., is professor of Anthropology at Michigan
State University. He received a Ph.D. in Anthropology from Co-
lumbia University in 1959 and an M.S. from the School of Public
Health, Harvard University, in 1961. From 1961 to 1964 he was
director ofSocial Studies, Medical Social Research Project, Lahore,
West Pakistan, while a faculty member ofthe Department ofSocial
Relations, Johns Hopkins University.
NOTES
1. The price ofland rose sharply from Rs. 10 per acre in 1869170 to Rs. 77
in 1900/01, and Rs. 275 in 1919/20 (Paustian 1930:105).
2. An extended discussion of the economics ofthe peasant household is
offered by Wolf (1966). He maintains that since the peasant household is a
family unit as well as an economic undertaking, its decisions about produc-
tion take into account not only economic factors such as market conditions,
but also, at the same time, family and kinship needs. Ceremonial expendi-
tures playa part in linking household members into a network of social
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relations in the community, and the provisioning of the household must
allow for a "ceremonial fund" as well as for a "subsistence fund." This is a
different perspective from that of many observers of the rural scene who
tended to regard ceremonial expenditures as primarily a sign of improvi-
dence.
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Rural Self-Government in
Pakistan: An Experiment in Political
Development through Bureaucracy
Muneer Ahmad
Outline of the History of Local Self-Government
One aspect ~frural development is political development: the
introduction and sustenance of institutions ofparticipatory democ-
racy. Sometimes it is sought as an end in itselfand sometimes as a
means to economic growth and social change. In most cases, demo-
cratic institutions do not already exist nor do they emerge spon-
taneously from traditional political cultures. They need to be de-
liberately created. A significant part of this process is the socializa-
tion of rural communities in democratic political behavior. In this
sense, political development requires the full-time and devoted
tutelage ofsympathetic institution builders. In Pakistan, as in many
other developing countries, this role has fallen on the professional
public servant. The Pakistani experiment with this model ofpoliti-
cal development has revealed inherent contradictions and has
shown how the inbuilt tendencies of bureaucracy operate to frus-
trate a major purpose it is supposed to serve, the development of
participatory democracy.
The Limited Colonial Effort toward Self-Government
A modern framework for rural self-government was introduced
in the subcontinent in the last quarter ofthe nineteenth century. It
was a deliberate cross-cultural transplantatio~Its author, Viceroy
Ripon, had stated the objective to be political education, not ad-
ministrative efficiency (Tinker 1968:44). However, the implemen-
tation of the reform was entrusted to the provincial governments
composed almost exclusively of civil servants. Contrary to his
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wishes they severely circumscribed the democratic features ofRi-
pon's model for local councils (Tinker 1968:46ff.) by retaining in-
hibiting control over the councils' initiative. For example, the
councils were not wholly elective. When elections were held the
franchise was so restricted that the electorate was minute. Further
limitations on democracy were the provisions that the offices of
presiding officer, chief executive, and controlling authority of the
local councils were all reserved for the members of the civil ser-
vice. These unfortunate decisions left such a far-reaching impact on
rural government that eighty years later when an independent
country under indigenous rulers set in motion a resolute drive to
revitalize local government, this same authoritarian model was re-
plicated with little change.
On the eve ofIndependence this circumscribed model ofrural
self-government was operating in practically all the districts of two
major provinces of Pakistan, the Punjab, and the Sind while some
headway had been made in the North-West Frontier Province
(NWFP) (Figure I). The significant exceptions were the province of
Baluchistan, all the princely states, and the tribal areas. These areas
were still considered to be too politically unripe to receive "ad-
vanced" institutions. Of the three "progressive" provinces, the
Punjab possessed by far the strongest traditions of rural local gov-
ernment. Not only was this province the first to follow the lead of
Lord Ripon's resolution in establishing rural self-governing institu-
tions at the district level, it was also the only province that had
established the grass-roots local government units known as pan-
chayats. However, even in this province over 75 percent of the
villages legally eligible for the panchayat form oflocal government
were without it.
Local SelfGovernment in the Post-Independence Period
A surge ofdemocratic spirit in the wake ofthe successful inde-
pendence movement led to increased representativeness in local
government in Pakistan. Universal adult franchise was introduced
in place ofthe extremely restricted colonial franchise. The councils
of the district governments were made fully elective and were em-
powered to elect their own chairmen from among themselves (Riz-
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Figure 1. Map of Pakistan Showing the Dates of Promulgation of Com-
prehensive Legislation for Rural Local Government in the Four Provinces.
vil 1966:57). Plans were prepared to extend panchayat-style local
government to more villages in the Punjab and in other provinces.
In addition, the relatively advanced Punjabi laws on local govern-
ment were extended to Bahawalpur and the North-West Frontier
Province (West Pakistan Yearbook 1956:113, 116). The gains sym-
bolized by most of these predominantly legal reforms were, how-
ever, undone by the failure of the government to follow them up
with positive action. The situation in the North-West Frontier Prov-
ince was particularly discouraging in this respect, for by 1951/52 all
the district local governments in this province had been suspended
(West Pakistan Yearbook 1956:113, 116; Rizvi 1966:57).
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Another impulse of self-government activity was witnessed
shortly after the integration ofWest Pakistan into one unit in 1955.
At this time the Punjabi law on panchayats was extended by ordi-
nance to the whole ofPakistan (West Pakistan Yearbook 1958:135).
Plans were prepared to make the local government laws uniform
throughout Pakistan and an election commission was appointed in
order to prepare ground for holding elections to local bodies. At the
same time a Local Government College and a journal on local gov-
ernment were started (West Pakistan Yearbook 1956:116). Sub-
sequent government action, however, was very much in the oppo-
site direction. For example, twenty-four out of thirty-four district
governments stood superseded in 1957 (Masud-ul-Hasan 1966:67).
A further complication for the development of local self-
government was involved with the operation of the new Village
Agricultural and Industrial Development Program (V-AID). For
rural development, the government created a network of new in-
stitutions under V-AID while at the same time it withdrew many
functions the local governments were already performing. The ad
hoc councils created under V-AID, however, failed to mobilize the
villagers because they lacked roots in the people. The already exist-
ing councils ofrural local government could not be utilized for this
purpose because short-sighted government policy had starved
them of initiative and a meaningful economic development role.
Masud-ul-Hasan noted that there was a good deal of hostility be-
tween the V-AID-created organizations and the already existing
local bodies with the result that "on the one hand the Panchayats
languished, and on the other the V-AID failed to take root"
(Masud-ul-Hasan 1966:76). Thus it appears that the uncertain
thesis that the economic development of rural communities could
be separated from their political development had been assumed
by government.
The second decade of independence saw the emergence of
Basic Democracies institutions. The singular distinction of the
Basic Democracies thrust was the explicit and formal recognition of
the positive role oflocal government in national development. Ac-
cordingly, uniform institutions of local government, both at the
district and grass-roots level, were established for the first time in
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every part ofPakistan. The scheme also explicitly recognized these
institutions as instruments of both political education and
economic development.
This scheme, however, repeated the folly ofplacing local gov-
ernments under the tight control of bureaucrats. Following in the
footsteps of their imperial predecessors, the Pakistani bureaucrats
again hedged in the independence oflocal councils by remaining
as presiding officers, chief executives, and as the controlling au-
thorities. At the district level the franchise was restricted by intro-
ducing indirect elections. In the first phase of Basic Democracies,
the district councils were not wholly elective as the civil service
retained the right to nominate a sizable portion ofthe membership
in the councils.
This brie(historical account of local government in Pakistan
shows that succeeding governments have felt obliged to establish
some kind oflocal government institution in order to mobilize rural
communities. All sought to achieve this goal under the leadership
of professional public servants. It is significant that none of these
attempts has succeeded in producing viable local governments.
After two decades of uninterrupted political independence,
rural self-government in Pakistan is in a weak state ofhealth. Rural
self-government has not become an instrument that would limit
bureaucratic discretionary power, nor has it become a check on
centralizing forces. It also has failed to perform a primary role of
providing second- and third-rank democratic leadership in rural
areas.
In contrast, the authoritarian institutions, particularly the
bureaucracy, have prospered. This occurred not infrequently with
corresponding loss to the decentralizing and participatory institu-
tions. Far from being a substitute or a partner, rural local govern-
ments remained adjuncts to central administration.
Reasons for the Weakness of Local Democracy
Focus is now placed on explanations for the slow development
of rural self-government. Three major sets of factors are explored:
the continued dominance ofthe civil bureaucracy, the nature ofthe
impact of public officials on rural people, and the weakness of the
socioeconomic base for the building of democratic values.
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The Continued Dominance of the Civil Bureaucracy
In analyzing the reasons for the weakness of local self-
government, a beginning observation of major importance is the
continuity from colonial times ofthe civil bureaucracy's dominance
in administration, particularly at the district level. Appearing in the
days of ascending colonialism the district administration-iden-
tified with arbitrary and authoritarian government-has survived
such cataclysmic changes as the Independence (1947), and the sub-
sequent experiments with parliamentary (1956-1958), presidential
(1962-1969), and unitary (1955-1970) constitutional frameworks.
Regardless ofits formal shape at a given time, government in Paki-
stan has continued to be authoritarian and centralizing. The district
administration, therefore, has continued to be authoritarian in form
and substance, lending the same color to whatever type of local
government was attempted. In effect the civil bureaucracy was
willing only to associate the people with the administration on its
own terms. Thus the nearest district administration has come to
democratic administration is to a kind of paternalism. The central
feature ofthis paternalistic administrative structure is that it creates
the illusion ofpopular participation in administration, yet gives the
ordinary citizens no control over the governing elite. Government
officials do not jeopardize their jobs, nor are they criticized if they
do not act to the benefit of citizens.1
Higher bureaucracy's conceptualization oflocal government is
ambivalent. Local government is simultaneously a desirable goal
and a convenient instrument for the realization of administrative
tasks. As a goal it is visualized as an ultimate substitute for the
already existing administration through the transfer ofthe functions
of planning, management, and administration of local affairs to
elected officials (Memorandum 1969:22, 26). As an instrument of
administration, local government is viewed as an extended arm of
the administration for the fulfillment of economic and administra-
tive tasks defined by the bureaucracy within the allocation of re-
sources determined by the administration. The driving force for
local government has often been not so much the love ofdemocracy
as the desire to achieve economic and other physical targets.
This ambivalent attitude toward local government gives rise to
the problem of displacement of goals. In his anxiety to achieve
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physical targets (such as the number ofmiles ofroad built during a
fiscal year), the public official tends to overlook or sacrifice political
development. The dilemma ofthe low-ranking official, working in a
face-to-face relationship with the villager, is even greater. On the
one hand, his role as extension agent demands the promotion of
general social, political, and economic development-a nonphysi-
cal goal not easily measurable. On the other hand, his role as a
career public servant requires the rapid achievement of physical
targets. As his superiors often heavily weigh his performance on the
basis of physical targets, his efforts toward those ends are under-
standable (Ansari 1962:59). The role of the public official acquires
critical significance in the evolution of local government in this
context, for in. the transitional phase between no rural self-
government and full-fledged rural self-government, a peculiar rela-
tionship is required between the appointed and the elected offi-
cials that would ensure physical achievements but at the same time
permit a change in decision-making authority from the appointed to
the elected official.
In the present period after Independence, the policy of the
government and the attitude of the higher civil servants directly
managing the local government institutions betray a lack of ap-
preciation of the need for special efforts to promote political de-
velopment. One indicator of this indifferent attitude toward the
growth of self-governing institutions is the failure of succeeding
governments to organize regular elections for the local councils. A
sample survey ofeleven district councils in West Pakistan revealed
that elections to most of these bodies were not held at the pre-
scribed interval of years. In extreme cases the average interval
between two elections ranged as high as twenty-two, twenty-one,
and sixteen years (Table 1) (Ahmad 1967). By denying the people
the opportunity to elect new councils, the administration pre-
vented them from learning the attitudes and habits ofa democratic
process. Also, by allOWing the councillors to stay in office beyond
their normal tenure, the government encouraged undemocratic
practices inside the councils and apathy and cynicism among the
people.
A second indicator of lack of appreciation of the special re-
quirements for fostering local self-government is indicated by the
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TABLE 1. Average Years between Elections
in Sample District Councils
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District Council
Mardan, NWFP a
D. I. Khan, NWFP
Rawalpindi, Punjab
Jhang, Punjab
Sialkot, Punjab
Multan, Punjab
R. Y. Khan, Punjab
Larkana, Sind
Sanghar, Sind
Years
between
Elections
21.0
22.0
10.0
9.5
7.0
11.5
16.0
6.5
5.0
SOURCE: Ahmad 1967.
NOTE: No comparable data were available for Baluchistan as district-level, local
self-government had been introduced for the first time in 1959.
a NWFP is North-West Frontier Province.
actions taken by officials in the Basic Democracies. Under the Basic
Democracies scheme these officials acted as the chief executives
and presiding officers ofthe local councils. They tended to treat the
local government little better than any another government de-
partment. In keeping with their bureaucratic training, they ex-
pected the conduct of local politics to be neat and tidy. At the
slightest pretext they would send the entire elected council
home-an act described in legal terminology as "supersession"2
-and replace it with a bureaucrat.
Under the Basic Democracies scheme, the office of the chair-
man of the local councils above the first level of government was
assigned to a public official. The filling of this position, the incum-
bent ofwhich could playa fatal role in the promotion or retardation
of local government, was treated as a matter of ordinary routine.
A third indicator of indifferent attitudes on the part ofthe civil
service toward local government is the fact that little consideration
was given to the aptitude of a civil servant for institution-building
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or to his suitability to a particular cultural area (Ahmad 1967). The
lack ofcontinuity in the office ofthe district chiefexecutive is well
known. Between 1958 and 1963, the average length of stay for a
deputy commissioner in a district was a little over twenty months
(Minhajuddin 1964:39). This factor, along with others, contributed
to the shallowness of the attempt to develop local government
among the people.
In conclusion, there is 'lomething inherently contradictory in
expecting the public official to build the institutions of local self-
government when they are intended, in due course, to take over a
great deal of his authority. The actual roles taken by government
servants entrusted with rural local government leaves an observer
with little optimism. The whole administrative structure, espe-
cially the higher bureaucracy, tends to neglect political develop-
ment as a desirable goal in its competition with other goals.
The I rnpact of Public Officials on Rural People
The inadequacy of the public official as a tutor of people for
local self-government in Pakistan is most conspicious at the lowest
level. Most government departments that have crucial roles in rural
local governments (Agriculture, Cooperatives, Health, Education,
and Animal Husbandry) have no permanent official at the village
level (Tehmasap 1964:77). A second and more serious shortcoming
is that the lower officials, working for the most part in the field, fail
to operate as extension agents. As members of the traditional
bureaucracy and as successors to a colonial administration, these
civil servants were not trained for development and institution-
building roles. Whereas rural development requires some kind of
personal involvement, their outstanding characteristics have been
impersonality and unimaginative adherence to rules and proce-
dures.
In a close examination of the contacts between the villagers
and public officials in three villages in the Punjab, Zuhra Waheed
found that government departments directly responsible for rural
development did not have sustained contact with the villagers. In
addition she observed that whenever contact was established it was
predominantly through privileged local infIuentials. Thirdly, she
found that the elected Basic Democrat was not able to improve
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substantially the contacts between the villagers and the officials.
With the exception of the Department of Agriculture, the de-
partments that had the most frequent contact with the villagers
were predominantly regulatory in function. The descending order
among departments offrequency ofcontact was Revenue, Agricul-
ture, Irrigation, and Police. The departments with relatively lim-
ited contact, contrary to their expected roles, were: Cooperatives,
Animal Husbandry, Health, and Basic Democracies (Waheed
1964:13-15, 54). The Departments in the second category are
mainly welfare-oriented (described in Pakistan as "nation-
building"). This pattern of contact leaves a negative image of gov-
ernment in the villagers' minds.
The Waheed study also found that high proportions ofrespon-
dents described the attitude ofthe officials toward people as "bad"
or "very bad." These proportions were the highest for the Irriga-
tion, Police, and Revenue departments (Table 2). The attitude of
the officials from the nation-building departments was described as
"good" or "very good" (Waheed 1964:60). In view of these reac-
tions, government could probably have improved its image by
further increasing the contacts by personnel ofnation-building de-
partments.
TABLE 2. Villagers' Opinions about Attitudes of
Officials from Different Departments (Percent)
Good or Bad or
Department Very Good Average Very Bad No Response
Agriculture 65 20 9 6
Animal Husbandry 58 20 17 5
Basic Democracies 55 25 15 5
Cooperatives 55 18 6 21
Education 55 13 23 9
Health 44 26 28 3
Irrigation 14 31 51 4
Police 20 28 50 3
Revenue 33 21 41 5
SOURCE: Waheed 1964:60. The sample included 150 respondents.
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The limited government-people contact was restricted further
to the propertied and the influential. During their visits to the vil-
lages, 48 percent ofthe officials "met the people" at the residence of
the local gentry (the union council chairman and the numberdar)
(Table 3). Only 45 percent ofthe officials chose the neutral ground
of the office of the union council as the meeting ground. Similarly,
in 53 percent ofthe cases, contact was sought with the local proper-
tied and influential persons (such as the union council members,
the council's chairman, the numberdar, and the patwari).3 Thus
the majority of the less-privileged classes were deprived of goods
and services supplied by government. Ironically, the failure of the
goods and services to reach their intended destination, the whole
village population, was not a consequence ofpublic policy but the
result of the idiosyncracies of the mediating public officials.
Some had expected that the introduction of an institutional
arrangement like the Basic Democracies would have improved the
relations between public officials and villagers. Evidence, how-
ever, falsifies this expectation. In the Waheed survey 46 percent of
the responding villagers felt that the Basic Democrats had not
helped establish closer contact between themselves and officials
(Waheed 1964:59). In a study by Chaudhri only 34.7 percent ofthe
respondents who were Basic Democrats, the chairman and ordi-
nary villagers, felt that the Basic Democrats have been able to
introduce a change in the attitudes ofofficials ofthe nation-building
departments (Chaudhri 1967:8-9). When asked to comment on
TABLE 3. Meeting Place Chosen by Officials
for Contact with Villagers
Meeting Place
Union Council Office
Chairman's House
Numberdar's House
School
Model Farm
TOTAL
SOURCE: Waheed 1964:64.
Times Chosen (%)
45
41
7
4
3
100
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whether the Basic Democrats had helped improve understanding
hetween government departments and the people, only 45.0 per-
cent of these same respondents agreed (Chaudhri 1967:12-13).
When asked to suggest measures for improving the role of the
chairmen of the union councils, 43 percent demanded "less inter-
ference by officials (Chaudhri 1967:33). The percentages ofvillag-
ers who thought the Basic Democrats had heightened political con-
sciousness or had encouraged local leadership were higher
(Table 4).
Weakness of Democratic Values in Rural Society
The most serious obstacle in the way of the development of
local government, however, remains the weakness of the
socioeconomic base as the foundation ofdemocratic values in rural
Pakistan. Left to itself Pakistani village society tends to sustain an
authoritarian or paternalistic political system. The introduction of
institutions ofdemocracy, therefore, has to be fostered deliberately
from the outside. In this situation the nonegalitarian social system
TABLE 4. Extent to Which Basic Democrats
Fulfilled Aspirations of Villagers
To Some To Great No Response
Aspirations NotatAll(%) Extent (%) Extent (%) (%)
Encouragement of
Local Leadership 4.7 44.1 51.3
Inculcation of
Self-help 2.8 38.1 58.8 0.3
Change in Attitudes
of Nation-
building
Departments 4.7 60.6 34.7
Meeting Needs
of People at
Local Level 4.1 42.5 53.4
Creation of Political
Consciousness 7.2 15.9 76.9
SOURCE: Chaudhri 1967:8-9.
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ofthe rural society tends to overwhelm nascent democratic institu-
tions and often bends them to suit its antidemocratic needs. Public
officials who are supposed to foster democracy are likely to give in
to the pressures of the feudal society of the village with the result
that the process of democratization by government becomes self-
defeating.
The interaction of democratic institutions from outside the
nondemocratic economic structure and value system ofrural socie-
ty yields unanticipated and dysfunctional consequences. Two such
negative consequences have attracted the attention of students of
democracy. One is the accentuation of factional strife as a conse-
quence ofthe introduction ofelections in a traditional society. The
other is the misuse of the office of public representative by its
incumbents.
According to one analysis in Pakistan, one faction finds satis-
faction in the humiliation, economic loss, and suffering ofanother.
In this scale of values, extinction of the enemy is most important
(Slocum et a!. 1959:30). According to another report, a major charac-
teristic ofa Pakistani faction is that a member feels obliged to sup-
port a fellow member in a quarrel regardless ofwhether the disput-
ant is right or wrong (USGPO 1965:169). The factional attitude is
obviously destructive ofcooperative effort in elected councils. Fac-
tions also view political dissent as treachery and a political oppo-
nent as the enemy (see, for example, Inayatullah 1964:269-270).
During electoral contests, therefore, appeals are made to factional
loyalties and not to the merits of the issues. Electoral defeat is
viewed as humiliating. The winners usually fail to show mag-
nanimity to the vanquished, and the losers are hesitant to cooperate
with the winners in good grace.4
A study of the backgrounds of the elected members of the
district councils ofPakistan revealed that, in 96 percent ofthe cases,
the councillor or a near relative of his was simultaneously a
member ofthe grass-roots local council also. In 45.3 percent ofthe
cases, the members were second-generation councillors (Ahmad
1967). This situation may be interpreted to indicate the excessive
hold offamily or biradari (kinship) in the rural society ofPakistan.
It appears that the rural people look upon political office as an end
in itself. The occupation ofthe political office in a particular area by
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the rival biradari or faction, or by a social inferior, is regarded as a
serious affront to the prestige of a given faction.
Dominant social values of rural society emphasize nondemo-
cratic attitudes. For example, they stress differences of status, em-
phasize obedience as opposed to individual freedom, and under-
line excessive loyalty to family (USGPO 1965:169-171). In such a
milieu the public representative or the elected official also tends to
behave in an authoritarian manner and acts more like the agent of
his family orbiradari than as an "efficient catalyst" for social change
for the whole community.5
One interpretation is that the ordinary villager needs to be
saved not only from the "indulgent" bureaucrat but also from the
rapacious local politician. If, therefore, the ordinary villager dis-
trusts the elected official as much as he does the appointed official it
is understandable. As far as he is concerned both are not amenable
to popular influence. The common voter possesses no mechanism
to compel accountability to him on the part ofthe councillor during
the period between elections. Given sporadic (rigged) elections
and the continuation of councillors in office many years beyond
their original tenure, the elected official can afford to be as indiffer-
ent to the needs of the people as is his brother bureaucrat.
It is significant that many of the reform measures suggested
under the section on local self-government in the Election Mani-
festo of the Pakistan Peoples' Party (1970) seem to be safeguards
against the unreliability of the representative after the election.
The manifesto underlines "the maximum direct participation ofall
citizens in all local self-government bodies" as the essence of re-
form. It stipulates that a majority ofthe inhabitants and not only the
elected members be consulted on important local questions. It
makes it obligatory for local bodies to render accounts of their ac-
tions to people in half-yearly public meetings. It also makes the
mandate of members revokable at any time by the electors. .
The response the professional public servant sometimes
makes to this situation is unhelpful to the growth of rural self-
government. Upon seeing these negative consequences of the
early steps in the introduction of democratic institutions, he at-
tempts to take the ordinary villager under his protection-by plac-
ing the local government under his guardianship. He justifies his
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control over the local politician with the argument that by doing so
he protects the interests of the ordinary man. Thus, over the short
term, he may afford relief from petty injustices to rural people, but
in the long run the impact ofhis conduct on political development
is damaging. In this response, contrary to the norms ofdemocracy,
the bureaucrat cultivates in the villager the habit of dependence
upon bureaucracy as well as an attitude in the local politician of
accountability to the bureaucrat instead of to the villagers. Un-
checked democracy, he is inclined to argue, would lead to domina-
tion by the wealthy. The conclusion is that the fate oflocal govern-
ment should be made or unmade by the people and not by the
public official.
The cultivation of democratic institutions requires that the
local councillor learn to be accountable to the people. This will
happen ifhe is exposed to control from below and not from above. If
the public official is really interested in safeguarding the interests
ofthe villager, he should institutionalize control from below. To do
this he needs to ensure that frequent and fair elections take place.
The elections should be direct and based on universal adult fran-
chise. The civil bureaucrat would do democracy a great service if
he were to content himself with the role of impartial umpire.6
Conclusion
All parties interested in the fate of local democracy seem to
agree that viable representative local governments are a precondi-
tion to genuine rural development. These institutions help identifY
the local leadership and through them local needs, aspirations, and
resources. The most outstanding contribution expected of local
governments is the release ofthe initiative now locked in the rural
communities. Once generated, the popular initiative has the poten-
tial to counter bureaucratic red tape as well as to make the process
of economic growth self-generating.
This analysis has explored the roles and outcomes ofthe public
bureaucrat's activities in the experiments directed toward estab-
lishing rural self-government in Pakistan and has highlighted some
major inherent contradictions ofthese roles. The professional pub-
lic servant will continue to have a significant role to play in local
democratic development and these inherent contradictions may be
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overcome. Effective use of bureaucratic power to this end will not
be accomplished by spoon-feeding local governments but by
eliminating economic and bureaucratic barriers to their free and
unfettered operation.
Muneer Ahmad received his doctorate at Munster University (West
Germany) in 1965. He is currently working as an assistant professor
in the Department of Administrative Science, Punjab University,
Lahore, Pakistan. He was Visiting Research Fellow at the Southern
Asian Institute, Columbia University, from 1971 through 1972.
NOTES
This chapter previously appeared in slightly different form in the
Journal of Rural Development and Administration 10 (July-September
1973):53-73. The permission to reprint granted by the Pakistan Academy
of Rural Development is gratefully acknowledged.
1. Compare Almond and Verba: " ... the problem of assessing the de-
gree of democracy in a nation becomes one of measuring the degree to
which ordinary citizens control those who make the significant decisions
for a society-in most cases, governmental elites" (1965:136).
2. Basic Democracies Order, 1959, Article 78 in Mahmood (1964:485).
3. See Waheed (1964:64), and also Tehmasap (1964:83) who says, for
example, "Some ofthe Nation Building Departments continue to look after
the interests of the big landlords and influential people in the area. The
needs ofpetty farmers are ignored."
4. Inayatullah and Shafi (1963:120) illustrate graphically the disruptive
role offactional politics in cooperative work in the case study ofa Pakistani
village. The "work committee" formed by the extension workers for the
purpose of digging an irrigation channel through the village required, to
begin with, an equal representation of the village's two major factions. No
chairman of the committee was elected in order to avoid "imbalance of
power." The leader of one faction avoided the committee for quite some
time on the grounds that its meetings were held at a place where he was not
prepared to go. The leaders ofthe other faction demanded the expulsion of
the former.
A curious device to counteract the factional division disrupting local
government was adopted in Andhra Pradesh in India by offering monetary
reward to a panchayat if it would elect all its members unanimously
(Seshadri 1964:214).
5. "The members, with their close involvement in village life, are not
suffiCiently different from their fellows to be efficient catalysts.... Before
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the elected officials' influence can be utilized to accelerate village de-
velopment they need to be 'reeducated' " (Cambridge University Asian
Expedition 1962:59).
6. Developing the same theme, Narain suggests that the administrative
elites should be prepared to practice a self-denying regimen in regard to
power (Narain 1966:564-578).
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Agricultural Growth
and Planning in the 1960s
Parvez Hasan
Introduction
During the decade ofthe 1960s, agricultural output in Pakistan
(formerly West Pakistan) grew at an average rate ofover 4.5 percent
,per annum (crop production rising by 5.4 percent per annum), in
sharp contrast to the agricultural growth rate of 1.3 percent per
annum during the 1950s. The impressive increases in production of
all major crops-wheat, rice, cotton, and sugarcane-have reflected
in varying degrees the impact ofnew and improved inputs, notably
fertilizers, tubewells, and miracle seeds. While it is true that the
agricultural revolution in Pakistan already was underway in the
first halfofthe 1960s, it was the second halfofthe decade that was
especially dramatic. During the period from 1965 to 1970, wheat
and rice output increased by nearly 75 percent; fertilizer use in-
creased nearly fivefold;1 the number ofprivate tubewells doubled;
and the new seeds covered nearly 75 percent ofthe irrigated areas
under wheat and rice. The following study centers upon the policy
and planning framework for agriculture as it evolved and affected
the spread of the green revolution.
Government policies should not be seen as having played a
central role in agricultural growth. Support and subsidy policies no
doubt had a major part in helping the growth ofagriculture in Paki-
stan, but whether or not they were a catalytic agent is difficult to say.
Land reform also set the stage for agricultural progress, but the
answers to what actually motivated the agricultural entrepreneurs
and radically transformed their attitudes may lie beyond
economics. Given the fact that responsiveness to change already
existed at the beginning of the Third Plan period (July 1965), the
policies affeCting the rate of subsidy and availability ofkey inputs,
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support prices ofmajor agricultural commodities, and the organiza-
tion of research and extension exerted a powerful influence on
agricultural production. These policies were, however, hardly per-
fect, and this chapter will highlight the mistakes as well as the
successes in an analysis organized under five headings: Irrigation
and Tubewell Development, Fertilizer, Price Support Policies,
Areas Needing More Agricultural Policy Analysis, and Income Dis-
tribution in Agricultural Development.
Irrigation and Tubewell Development
Pakistan has one of the finest irrigation systems in the world;
31 million of the 40 million cultivated areas are irrigated. The de-
velopment of water resources, therefore, has occupied a central
place in agricultural planning. It was fortunate that basic general
planning ofwater and power resources was taken up early through
the establishment of the West Pakistan Water and Power De-
velopment Authority (WAPDA) in 1958. The concern with prob-
lems ofsalinity led to intensive studies ofthe quality and extent of
groundwater resources. These studies were partly responsible for
the major discovery in the early 1960s of the possibility of tapping
the groundwater both to supplement irrigation and to lower the
water table in the sweet water areas. The commissioning ofthe first
public Salinity Control and Reclamation Project (SCARP I) coin-
cided with a spontaneous growth of private tubewells, which were
a key factor in agricultural growth in the Second Plan period
(1960-1965). The Third Plan (1965-1970) showed a great aware-
ness ofthe role ofaccelerated groundwater development in agricul-
tural development, and started with an ambitious program of
10,000 public tubewells. In fact, however, only 3,500 public
tubewells could be energized during the Third Plan period and the
bulk of the increase in net water availability once again was pro-
vided by private tubewells.
In planning for the big spurt in public tubewells, the govern-
ment and the World Bank Group Study headed by Dr. Pieter Lief-
tinck underestimated the organizational and financial constraints
on the program, and exaggerated the relative benefits of public
tubewells, particularly over the short and medium run (Lieftinck et
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al. 1968). The financial stringency actually experienced during the
Third Plan could not have been entirely foreseen, but even if the
money had been available, WAPDA could not have implemented
the program. The bottleneck in implementation was particularly
serious in the final stage of electrification of the tubewells. The
experience has shown also that the gestation period of the public
tubewells project was greatly underestimated at the planning
stage, partly because of administrative problems in handing over
the completed wells to an operating agency (either the Irrigation
Department or the SCARP Authority). In many cases even the
watercourses were found to be unready for utilization. This meant
that the economic returns originally calculated were overesti-
mated. Similarly, in formulating the public tubewells project, the
issue of contiiming subsidy on the sale of water was not really
faced. Even in the successful SCARP I area, the new water rate
(double the standard water rate) barely covers the maintenance
expenses oftubewells and, thus, the entire capital cost will have to
be written off. The introduction of this special water rate has en-
countered (and can be expected to encounter in other SCARP
areas) serious political difficulties, even though the availability of
water per acre, agricultural yields, and land values all have in-
creased sharply.
While the problems involved in undertaking a large public
tubewells effort were minimized, the potential ofprivate tubewells
development was not fully appreciated. A major constraint on pri-
vate tubewells development was the availability ofelectric connec-
tions, and WAPDA, by virtue ofits monopoly position in power and
vested interest in public tubewells, did not wish to orient its power
distribution program toward agricultural consumers. However, the
food self-sufficiency program adopted by the government of West
Pakistan in February 1967 gave high priority to private tubewells
development and laid down for WAPDA the target of5,000 electric
connections per annum for private tubewells (Government ofWest
Pakistan 1967). This, combined with measures to limit public
tubewell projects in areas of private tubewell concentration and
development promise, led to a remarkable growth in the number of
private tubewells. The Third Plan target of40,000 additional wells
was exceeded (Government of Pakistan 1970).
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It is interesting to note, however, that the rapid electrification
ofprivate tubewells was essentially a "second-best" solution. Dur-
ing the Second Plan (1960-1965), most of the private tubewells
installed were powered by diesel fuel because ofthe limited avail-
ability of electric connections. Even though the rate of return on
diesel tubewells was quite high, it was considerably lower than
that on electric tubewells. The difference was due mainly to a
heavy indirect tax on diesel fuel and a subsidy on the sale ofelec-
tricity to agricultural consumers. Studies by the Planning Board
showed that private tubewells based on diesel were better invest-
ments from a national viewpoint than were electric ones, adjusting
for these distortions and applying appropriate shadow prices.
However, electric tubewells were still encouraged because
maximization of the number of private tubewells, with their flexi-
bility and short gestation periods, was considered desirable. Also,
additional public investment in power for private tubewells ap-
peared to have a higher payoff than the equivalent investment in
public tubewells, especially over the time horizon (1967-1970)
with which the food self-sufficiency program was concerned. The
ideal policy course would have been to remove the heavy excise
duty on diesel fuel or to give a corresponding subsidy for the opera-
tion of diesel tubewells. But both these alternatives were found to
be impractical for administrative reasons.
Fertilizer
Increased fertilizer use combined with new seeds made a
greater impact than did increased availability of water on agricul-
tural output during the Third Plan. Surprisingly, only one new
fertilizer plant came into operation in Pakistan during this period,
and a large part of the increased domestic demand had to be met
through imports. This imposed a serious though necessary drain
on foreign exchange. The preoccupation with water development
in the early 1960s may have led to a relative neglect of fertili-
zer-production planning. There are some very real difficulties in
projecting fertilizer use trends. On the one hand, given the rela-
tionship of input and output prices, the rate of acceptance of new
technology cannot easily be predicted. On the other, it is even more
difficult to try to relate the changes in financial return resulting from
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fertilizer use to changes in demand for it. In Pakistan, returns of5: 1
or 4:1 on fertilized crops have not been uncommon, particularly for
wheat. What would happen ifthe returns drop, either from a lower-
ing of the support price or a raising of fertilizer prices through a
reduction in subsidy, to a range of2.5: 1 or 2: 1? What should be the
risk premium? What is a reasonable rate of return in agriculture?
Answers to these questions are crucial if ad hoc decisions on ag-
ricultural policy are to be avoided.
Price Support Policies
The government's decision to fix the support price ofwheat at
Rs.17/-per maund in 1967 was essentially such an ad hoc decision.
The rates ofreturns ofpractices adopted under the new technology
were determined by the support price, not vice versa. It was not
realized that a support price ofRs.15/- per maund instead ofRs.17/-
would have had only a marginal effect on the rate ofreturn (say 3.5: 1
instead of4:1) and consequently might have had little influence on
the spread of technology. On the other hand, the burden on gov-
ernment finances of a high procurement price was considerable
since wheat release prices could not be adjusted upward in the
interest ofthe urban consumer. On the total procurement ofaround
1 million tons, the government "loss" can be estimated at around
Rs.50 million (U.S. $10 million). Providing these windfall gains to
essentially prosperous farmers was totally unjustified socially, par-
ticularly because the mobilization ofa part ofthe additional income
in the form of agricultural taxation proved very difficult.
The basic idea ofa support price for wheat, however, wasquite
sound. It had the effect of stabilizing the grain market at a critical
time. Throughout the first half of the sixties, domestic trading in
wheat was thin; barely one-tenth (or about 400,000 tons) of the
wheat production was marketed at the mandi town level. With the
bumper crop of 1968, the marketable surplus of wheat jumped to
1.2 million tons, a threefold increase. Of the total marketable
surplus, over two-thirds was purchased by the government. It is
very doubtful whether commercial operations could have handled
the increased harvest without a serious fall in prices and disruption
of the market. The additional credit needs were quite large, total-
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ling nearly $100 million alone, and probably the banking system
would not have shown sufficient flexibility and speed in entering
this new field ifthe government had not intervened. A floor support
'price for wheat may remain necessary for an indefinite period be-
cause ofthe extreme seasonal character ofproduction. But it should
be possible for the private sector to handle increased wheat trading,
provided the present subsidy on the wheat release price to con-
sumers can be eliminated.
The government record in supporting rice prices and state
trading in rice has been considerably less satisfactory. Even though
the procurement and production of superior varieties of rice in-
creased sharply from 1967 to 1969, showing a very favorable re-
sponse to upward adjustment in prices, the Trading Corporation of
Pakistan, which had the monoply ofrice sales abroad, did not show
enough flexibility with regard to prices to dispose of a growing
volume. At the end of 1969, basmati rice stocks with the Pakistan
government exceeded a year's average export volume. Hesitation
about incurring a loss in rupees may have been a factor in not
reducing export prices. The fact that the exchange rate was patently
overvalued and that real value of foreign exchange was much
greater than indicated by the conversion at the official rate probably
were not taken into account. The failure to adjust the exchange rate
also hampered the growth in cotton production, at least until 1970
when raw cotton exports were also given a 10 percent bonus. Yet
another example of distortion in agriculture caused by trade and
exchange policies was the heavy protection given sugar, which
resulted in a misallocation of resources and in high sugar prices to
the consumer. Indeed, some calculations showed that in interna-
tional prices the returns on fertilized sugarcane were actually nega-
tive.
Areas Needing More Research
The shortcomings of agricultural policy in Pakistan, in what
was otherwise a period ofrecord achievement, point to the consid-
erable need for the application of agricultural economic research
and the growing need for a large number of trained agricultural
economists. The exciting period of agricultural development in
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Pakistan is far from over. In the overall context ofuncertain balance
ofpayments prospects and a tight domestic resource situation, the
need for extending productivity gains in agriculture has become
paramount. Provided realistic exchange and trade policies are fol-
lowed, there is considerable scope for the expansion ofagricultural
exports; overcoming the market constraint will become increas-
ingly important. One should be willing, however, to put up with a
deterioration in the commodity terms of trade for agriculture if
income and factor terms of trade improve.
To improve the bases upon which the major decisions relating
to agricultural policy are made, there is an urgent need to extend
our knowledge in the areas ofchanging technology, of production
functions for various crops, of the economic returns of various in-
puts and combinations of inputs, and ofthe elasticity ofthe supply
oftotal agricultural output in terms ofa package ofincentives. The
most interesting problems in Pakistani agricultural planning may
not relate to the optimal allocation of existing resources with the
given technology but to the need for improving research and exten-
sion capabilities in the context ofchanging technological relation-
ships.
Dr. Norman Borlaug, his associates, and the Ford Foundation
deserve a lot ofcredit for coordinated research and extension pro-
grams for wheat and rice. But, basically, both agricultural research
and extension remain neglected. Professional positions and pros-
pects do not attract talented people; priorities of research and ex-
tension are not linked closely with the overall policy objectives.
There is need for a massive mobilization of talent and funds for
agricultural research, including research in agricultural economics.
The Indus Basin Consultants Study, on which the Lieftinck group
based its report, cost nearly $7 million. At present, even 1 percent of
this amount is not being spent annually for a systematic updating
and improvement ofthis comprehensive intersectoral study ofwa-
ter, power, and agriculture. This is a great pity, particularly because
the key assumptions of the study about the desirable rate of
groundwater development in the public sector, the potential of
private tubewell development, and the rate of growth offertilizer
use and the resulting yields have turned out to be unrealistic.
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Income Distribution in Agricultural Development
In their preoccupation with raising output levels, policy
makers relegated the distributive aspects of their policies to the
background. There is little doubt that 10 percent of the farmers in
Pakistan, owning twenty-five acres or more and accounting for 43
percent of the farmed area, spearheaded the agricultural change
and were its main beneficiaries. Consequently, the income dis-
parities within agriculture certainly have widened. Greater social
justice in agriculture is likely to be a major issue of the 1970s.
Four distinct aspects of the social justice or distribution prob-
lem in agriculture are important. The first relates to the more vigor-
ous use of agricultural taxation to mobilize a part of the increased
income in agriculture. Much ofthe criticism ofgovernment policies
in this regard is not well founded. It is true that agricultural in-
comes are exempt from the normal income tax and that collections
from the agricultural income tax (a multiple ofthe land revenue) are
negligible. However, according to estimates, if the normal income
tax, with all its exemptions, were extended to the agricultural sec-
tor, the realization would not be much more than Rs.IOO million
annually. The basic problem is that the rate of taxation of middle
incomes in Pakistan is extremely low, though the budget proposals
of M. M. Ahmad would definitely increase these effective rates
(Ahmad 1971). Unless the average rates of taxation on incomes of
around Rs.15,000 to Rs.20,OOO per annum rise to 10 to 15 percent,
taxing agricultural incomes would not yield positive results.
The other important area of agricultural taxation is the water
rate, which has been raised several times during the last decade.
During the last three years, two successive increases of20 percent
were made. Nevertheless, there remains a large element ofsubsidy
in the sale of water, but upward adjustments can be made only
gradually.
The issue of agricultural taxation must also be viewed in rela-
tion to the large expenditure ofRs.IOO million or more on fertilizer
subsidy. Since the use of fertilizer seems to be well established, it
would be more desirable to reduce that subsidy rather than impose
additional taxation. The problem, however, becomes complicated
because ofthe likely adjustment in the exchange rate, which would
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raise sharply the prices of imported fertilizer and thus make the
removal of the subsidy difficult. An offset for this, ofcourse, would
be provided by a more favorable exchange rate for agricultural
exports. The interrelationship between various aspects of govern-
ment policy should be stressed, as well as the inadequate know-
ledge about relationships between agricultural supply functions on
the one hand and output and input prices on the other.
A second distribution issue in agriculture relates to the sharp
disparities in regional development. Almost all the gains in produc-
tion have been in the irrigated areas; the rainfed areas have suffered
definite declines in per capita production. Part of the solution
would be to improve the technology for rainfed areas. It is doubtful,
however, that agricultural investments in the rainfed areas would
return the kind Ofpayoff the irrigated areas have enjoyed. Choices
between subsidization of agriculture in these areas or the shifting
of population out of them are extremely difficult.
The third issue ofsocial justice, creation ofemployment oppor-
tunities, is also closely related. Indirect subsidies on agricultural
machinery have had an adverse effect on the growth ofemployment
in rural areas and have encouraged the displacement oflabor from
land. Some adjustments have been made by imposing an import
duty and sales tax on farm machinery imports. The increased cost of
foreign exchange would further tend to restore balance between
use of capital and labor.
The biggest single challenge in agriculture is to improve the
living standard of landless laborers and the small farmer who has
less than five acres. These people account for 45 percent ofthe farm
population. Since these small farmers account for only 10 percent of
the total farm area, quite obviously the rate ofgrowth oftotal output
is not greatly dependent upon them. To improve the average size of
holding for this group, a major land redistribution would perhaps
be necessary. Even if only 10 percent of the land area becomes
available for redistribution as a result of further land reform, the
farmers with fewer than five acres could double their holdings.
New technology is fairly divisible and, therefore, the lot of the
small farmers may not be altogether hopeless. However, some
cooperative form of organization would be necessary to give them
access to inputs, particularly of tubewell water and fertilizer.
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Parvez Hasan received his Ph.D. in 1961 from Yale University. He
was chief economist and additional secretary, Planning Depart-
ment, Government ofWest Pakistan from 1965 to 1970. Currently
he is at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
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NOTE
1. The level offertilizer use, however, is still rather low, being less than
12 kg. of nutrients per irrigated cropped acre in 1969/70.
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Relationships between Technology,
Prices, and Income Distribution
in Pakistan's Agriculture: Some
Observations on the Green Revolution
Carl H. Gotsch
Introduction
"Progress" has been defined as a process in which one set of
problems is exchanged for another. Though the observation may be
shopworn, it appears to be the most apt description ofthe profound
economic, social, and political changes currently taking place in a
number of the less-developed countries of the world associated
with the green revolution. l The story of these radical increases in
agricultural output has been widely told: how research work on
cereals, initially under Rockefeller Foundation auspices in Mexico
and subsequently under a joint Ford Foundation-Rockefeller
Foundation venture in the Philippines, produced new genetic
materials capable of utilizing much higher fertilizer dosages; how
these varieties were spread, again largely through the work of pri-
vate foundations but complemented by U.S. technical assistance, to
a large number of countries throughout the world; and how the
"miracle seeds," coupled in many areas with water development,
have resulted in an entirely different attitude toward the potential
contribution of the agricultural sector in a number of less-
developed countries.2 Although the first wave of enthusiasm re-
garding the extent to which these activities provide an answer to
the problem of feeding or employing the world's poor is now be-
ginning to wear off, there seems to be little doubt that these efforts
constitute some of the most far-reaching technical assistance pro-
grams ever undertaken.3
But the problems associated with the radical changes in the
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underlying production structure have not been long in showing
themselves. Wharton, for example, writes:
It will be no easy task to achieve the potential increased
production offered by the new technology, particularly when
it involves millions upon millions of diverse farms and far-
mers scattered over the countryside. If the increased produc-
tion is in fact obtained, this will automatically produce a
whole new set ofsecond-generation problems which must be
faced if development is to be sustained and accelerated.
Therefore, two considerations need to be borne in mind.
First, there is reason to believe that the further spread ofnew
varieties will not be as fast as early successes might suggest.
Second, new problems arising out of the spread of the new
technology, whatever its speed, need to be foreseen and acted
upon now. The probable developments in each case have the
greatest significance for economic growth and for the conduct
of international relations. (Wharton 1969)
The following study seeks to provide more quantitative evi-
dence on certain of the latter issues-particularly those dealing
with the relationship between prices, technical change, and
selected dimensions of the income distribution question. The ve-
hicle for the investigation is a case study ofa district in the Pakistan
Punjab, an area that, in addition to having a rather large body of
base data for agriculture, has experienced a green revolution of
unparalleled swiftness.
There are no general census materials that provide a basis for
ascertaining the impact of the new technology on the relative in-
comes of various social classes in the rural areas of Pakistan. Con-
sequently, the best that can be done is to build up quantitative
estimates of its likely effects by first examining its effects on indi-
vidual farms and then applying the results to a distribution of land
by farm size. The first question is discussed here in the context ofa
set of farm management models that seek to determine what hap-
pens to the allocation of resources when the input-output
coefficients in agriculture have changed significantly from their
traditional values. These results are then applied to a farm size
distribution taken from Sahiwal District, the area in which the data
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for the model were collected. A briefepilogue deals with the likely
political fallout of the calculated changes in the structure of in-
comes, with conclusions and recommendations following.
Technology, Prices, and the Optimal Allocation
of Resources
Supply Responses of a Representative Farm in the Punjab
The microanalysis ofvarious types of representative farms has
been carried out within a linear programming framework. The
basic model has been presented elsewhere and has been
supplemented for this paper with several crop activities (wheat,
rice, and 'maize), whose input-output coefficients are assumed to
reflect the new'high-yielding cereal varieties (Gotsch 1968). Data
for the advanced technologies were drawn largely from the agro-
nomic research carried out by the Department of Agriculture of
the government of West Pakistan. At some points, these results
were modified by discussions with agricultural experts assigned to
the technical assistance programs of the Ford Foundation and the
U.S. Agency for International Development.4
A number of solutions to the "basic" model are presented in
Table 1. The assumptions are that this 12.5-acre farm represents a
typical small holding in the Central Punjab, that it is owned and
operated by a cultivator and his family, that the source ofpower is a
single pair of bullocks, and that the available surface-water supply
is proportional to the land owned under a typical irrigation dis-
tributary. In addition to these fixed assets, it is assumed there are
two types of resource-augmenting activities. The farmer may hire
additional labor in peak seasons at the prevailing wage rate and he
owns a one-sixth share in a tubewell, which he uses to pump
supplementary water.
Several interesting conclusions about the effect of the new
technology emerge from these solutions. First, the increase in net
revenue under "advanced" conditions is substantia1.5 A compari-
son ofcolumns 1 and 8 in Table 1 suggests that under the assump-
tions indicated above, profit-maximizing farmers could improve
their net revenues approximately 85 percent by introducing the
new methods. Several factors are responsible. Due to better irriga-
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tion facilities, there was a sizable "acreage effect." On a farm as-
sumed to contain 12.5 acres available for cultivation, the cropped
acreage increased from 13.8 acres to 17.7 acres, or about 35 percent.
A second contribution results from the "yield effect" of the new
varieties. Farm demonstration plots suggested that wheat yields
could be expected to increase by 60 percent, rice by 100 percent,
and maize by 90 percent; these estimates were incorporated into
the "advanced" activities of the model. Lastly, for most
technologies, there were substantial "cropping-pattern effects."
This reallocation of land resources between crops was again due
primarily to the flexibility of the supplementary water originating
from the tubewell. Note, for example, that with the exception of
maize in column 9, the "without tubewell" cropping patterns are
quite similar.
The interaction of these factors in the model is significant. If
the two changes from traditional to advanced technology
(tubewells and high-yielding varieties) are taken independently,
they yield an increase in net revenue of35 and 25 percent respec-
tively. The sum oftheir individual increases (60 percent), however,
is well below the 85-percent increase produced-when both are
introduced simultaneously. This interaction is not due to physical
complementarities of which agronomists speak, but results rather
from the opportunity to increase the acreage under the profitable
high-yielding varieties (HYV) when a flexible supply of supple-
mental irrigation water is available.
The effect of variations in output prices on farm production
under different technological assumptions is also of interest. For
example, the use oftubewells tends not only to shift the predicted
supply curve of wheat to the right but also increases its elasticity
(Figure 1). This is particularly evident in comparing the with and
without tubewell case under traditional technology.
The results also show that use of supplementary water de-
creases the comparative advantage ofwheat with respect to cotton
(the two compete for land during the overlap of the summer and
winter seasons), and shifts the wheat supply curve to the left. In
addition, this possibility of altering the seasonal distribution pat-
tern of water has made for greater sensitivity to the wheat-cotton
price ratio. The result is that the two curves shown for traditional
TABLE 1. Optimal Cropping Patterns on a 12.5-Acre Farm
in the Mixed Farming Area of the Cen~ral Punjab
Advanced Wheat Advanced Wheat
Traditional Advanced Wheat Advanced Rice and Rice Rice, Maize
Technology Technology Technology Technology Technology
(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Without With Without With Without With Without With Without With
Tubewell Tubewell Tubewell Tubewell Tubewell Tubewell Tubewell Tubewell Tubewell Tubewell
NET REVENUE 2337 3180 2552 3577 2415 3231 2652 3678 2963 4320
(rupees)
Crops (acres)
Coarse Rice .28 1.08 .87 1.70 1.16 3.45
Summer Fodder .67 .67 .60 .67 .64 .67 .60 .67 .60 .67
(required)
Summer Fodder .67 .67 .60 .67 .64 .67 .60 .67 .60 .67
(optional)
Cotton 2.42 6.86 2.45 2.25 1.52 5.97 2.22
Summer Vegetables .10 .10 .10 .10 .10 .10 .10 .10 .10 .10
Wheat 4.74 1.69 5.57 6.26 5.87 1.69 5.51 7.00 5.12 6.75
Gram 1.62 1.80
Oilseeds 2.89 1.97 2.06 1.88 .23
Winter Fodder .80 .89 .80 .89 .80 .89 .80 .89 .80 .89
(required)
Winter Fodder .89 .85 .85 .65 .89
(optional)
Maize 2.75 4.45
Sugarcane .60 1.00 1.00 .80 1.00 .14 1.00 1.00 1.00
Winter Vegetables .20 .20 .20 .20 .20
Fruit .30 .30 .30 .30 .30
TOTAL CROPPED 13.77 14.57 13.16 14.49 14.10 15.34 13.15 16.23 13.82 19.02
ACREAGE
CROPPING 110 117 105 116 113 123 105 130 110 152
INTENSITY
(%)(Index)
NOTE: The following maximum constraints are operative in the model: optional summer fodder-200 maunds; optional winter
fodder-400 maunds; sugarcane-l acre; summer vegetables-.lO acres; winter vegetables-.20 acres; fruit-.30 acres.
Cropping intensity is defined as cropped acreage/cultivated acreage. Complete double cropping would produce a cropping intensity
of200 percent. Sugarcane and fruit are counted twice.
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wheat varieties cross (Figure 1). The same mechanism produces
the crossing of the curves depicting the impact ofadditional water
supplies with high-yielding varieties. Its effect is less visible, how-
ever, because the profitability of the new varieties ensures that a
major part ofthe winter acreage in irrigated areas will be planted to
wheat regardless of the availability of supplementary water.
Regional Differences in Resource Allocation Changes
From the foregoing description of the impact ofhigh-yielding
varieties and tubewells on agriculture in the Central Punjab, it is
clear that a number of changes in the cropping pattern can be an-
ticipated as new agricultural technology becomes available. Not all
areas in Pakistan hi,Jve this versatility, and a rather different picture
ofthe effect ofthe green revolution emerges from an examination of
technological change in the provinces of Sind and the North-West
Frontier.
The Sind (areas V through IX in Figure 2) comprises a number
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Figure 1. Supply Curves for Wheat on a Representative Punjab Farm.
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of different canal systems. Those designated as "non-perennial"
supply water only during the summer months when the rivers run
full from the monsoons and snow melts in the north. Most of these
areas, except for land near the river and the larger canals, are under-
lain with saline groundwater. This combination of(1) surface water
concentrated in the kharif(spring-planted) season and (2) an inabil-
ity to store water underground severely limits the cropping options
that farmers have.
Indeed, until additional fall (rabi) water becomes available
from Tarbela Dam, the traditional rice-fallow-rice or rice-dubari-
rice6 rotation is virtually the only alternative. The residual rice
moisture, which is currently used to grow a crop of vetch or
chickpeas in the rabi season, is insufficient for a crop of Maxipak
wheat.
Even in the perennial canal areas, much change in land alloca-
tion is unlikely as a result of the seed-fertilizer revolution. Yields
from the existing wheat and rice areas have increased Significantly.
But as long as the areas are constrained in their cropping intensities
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Figure 2, Agricultural Zones of the Indus Basin in Pakistan.
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by the availability of canal water, the land trade-offs that figure so
prominently in altering the supply curves for crops grown with
tubewells (Figure 1) will not be operative.
The predicament ofthe dryland areas ofthe North-West Fron-
tier Province (area I) is similar to that of the rice tracts of the Sind.
Rainfall is virtually the sole determinant of the cropping pattern
and the advent of the new varieties of wheat initially appeared
unlikely to produce significant alterations in land use patterns. For-
tunately, several recent studies suggest that, in a sizable portion of
the area, earlier pessimism can be somewhat modified regarding
the ability of high-yielding varieties to increase production and
cropping intensity under rainfed conditions (Rochin 1971a). How-
ever, the general,conclusion that the supply curve ofwheat in the
rainfed area is likely to be highly inelastic remains valid (Gotsch
and Falcon 1970; Quereshi 1963).
Technology, Prices, and the Distribution of Incomes
The previous section dealt with the impact ofnew technology
and different prices on the resource allocation decisions of rep-
resentative farms. In the following paragraphs, these results are
extended to produce several alternative estimates of the effect of
technology and prices on the distribution of income among the
small-farmer class. Each of the alternatives corresponds to an as-
sumption about the prices and availability of seed, fertilizer, and
water to various holding sizes.
Changes in the Distribution of Income in the Punjab
Estimates of the relationship between farm size and income
were obtained from the programming model by parametrically vary-
ing the land, surface water, and tubewell capacity constraints. For
example, while family labor and bullock power remained fixed, the
size ofthe "basic" farm (12.5 acres) was varied downward to 5 acres
and upward to 25 acres. The net revenues obtained were then
reduced by such fixed items as the depreciation of equipment and
buildings and the various taxes and cesses normally paid by the
cultivators (see AppendiX A). The resulting incomes by farm size
can be read from the solid lines in Figure 3.
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Where advanced technology is available to all, small farmers
benefit relatively more than do their larger neighbors, as they are
able to obtain higher yields through more intense application ofthe
other constrained resources. For example, on the five-acre farm,
income increases from Rs.350 to Rs.1250 or approximately 250 per-
cent; on the twenty-five-acre farm, the increase is from Rs.3750 to
Rs.5875 or 57 percent.
A more general impression of the effects of technology can be
gained by comparing the income distributions of the "traditional"
and "advanced" solutions. Lorenz curves show that incomes under
traditional technology tend to be less equitably distributed than
land (Figure 4 and Appendix B). The reason for such a result is not
difficult to find. Examination of the programming model indicates
that under traditional technology, net revenue, including only
operating costs, increases in proportion to the increases in land and
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Figure 3. The Effect ofAdvanced Technology and Size ofFann on Income,
Representative Punjab Farm, Pakistan.
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its associated surface water over almost the entire five- to twenty-
five-acre range. The "dual" of the model indicates that constraints
on bullocks and family labor are not binding and thus are not the
basis for diminishing returns to land. This Lorenz curve describing
net revenue by farm size under traditional technology would be
virtually identical with the Lorenz curve ofthe distribution ofland.
Subtraction of appropriate fixed costs from the net revenue of
each holding, however, generates a Lorenz curve of income that
lies below the curve representing the distribution of land.
The effect of fixed costs also is evident on the distribution of
income under advanced technology. However, due to the sig-
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Figure 4. Comparison of the Lorenz Curve Distribution of Land
and Income under Both Advanced and Traditional Technologies,
Sahiwal District, Pakistan.
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nificant increases in intensity resulting from increased water
supplies and the increased labor requirements associated with the
high-yielding varieties, bullock and human labor constraints
quickly become binding as farm size increases. As a result, the
disproportionate impact offixed costs on the small farm is offset by a
comparative advantage in high-value, labor-intensive activities.
The results shown in Figure 4 flow directly from production
theory. They are extremely important, for they illustrate virtually
the only condition short of land redistribution in which the dis-
tributive effect of the green revolution can lead to greater income
equality. The assumptions are strong: that all new inputs are
divisible, either intrinsically or through a competitive market for
hired services; and that everyone has equal access to the institu-
tional services that dispense the knowledge and credit required for
their use.
Recent research suggests these assumptions are, at least in
part, correct. Work by several authors, summarized by Rochin
(1971b), indicates there is little difference among different farm-
size groups regarding the percentage of cultivators now using im-
proved seeds. The same is true offertilizer, although here there is
some difference between large and small farmers in the level ofuse.
It seems that despite the general lack of concern regarding small
farmers that traditionally has been associated with various govern-
ment agencies, the simplicity, divisibility, and profitability ofseeds
and fertilizers have been such that the diffusion process has pene-
trated to groups of all sizes.
There is, however, one aspect ofthe research that is crucial and
provides considerable cause for concern. In a recent survey
(Naseem 1971), little difference was found between farm sizes in
the diffusion of the seed-fertilizer package, but the same was not
true for access to supplementary water. This is to be expected since
the tubewell is a "lumpy" input whose spatial immobility imposes
rather severe limitations on the emergence ofa competitive market
for water.
Imposing constraints on the availability of supplementary
water to the small farmers making up the lower portion of the
holding-size frequency curve would undoubtedly produce a
Lorenz curve of income distribution below that associated with
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traditional technology, that is, small farmers would be better off in
absolute terms but substantially less well off than their larger
neighbors in relative terms.
Thus far the analysis has dealt almost exclusively with the
distributive effects of the highly divisible technology associated
with the seed-fertilizer revolution. Ofinterest also are the distribu-
tive effects of alternative prices under conditions of changing
technology. What would the impact be, for example, ofpermitting
wheat prices to fall to approximately world market levels? The
dotted lines in Figure 5 show the results of parametrically varying
the land and water constraints in the model under an assumption
that wheat prices have been decreased by one-third. (Farm income
includes fixed costs as in the previous exercise.)
Lorenz curves were also calculated from the income estimated
by size of farm class (Appendix B) and compared with those ob-
tained when wheat was set at its prevailing domestic market value
(Figure 5).
In the case of both technologies, the decline in the price of
wheat has altered the distribution of income in favor of the larger
farmers. The familiar fixed cost or "lumpy input" phenomenon-
here represented in large part by the family and the bullocks as-
sociated with traditional agriculture-again provides the
mechanism by which this increase in the inequality of relative
income distribution occurs. Both large and small farmers would
suffer a decline in income under the circumstances postulated.
However, for those whose income was already small, a further de-
cline would only accentuate the disproportionate impact of fixed
costs. The smaller the income relative to a constant fixed cost, the
more disparate the income distribution among groups.
A reduction in the price of wheat would also tend to produce
greater inequality among the different size groups under the as-
sumption that advanced rather than traditional technology is being
used (Appendix B). An examination of the cropping patterns as-
sociated with various farm sizes quickly reveals why this is so. As
farm size increases, the additional flexibility associated with ad-
vanced technology, especially supplementary water, causes the
wheat activities to exit from the model long before they do under
traditional conditions. Consequently, the downward change in
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Figure 5. The Distributive Effects of Alternative Wheat Prices.
wheat prices have little effect on the larger farmers with farm sizes
above 12.5 acres, for they have no wheat in the cropping pattern.
Small farmers, who do not feel the pressure ofpower constraints to
the same degree, do not seek to reduce their wheat acreage. The
result is a relatively greater decline in incomes when the wheat
price falls and an increase in income disparity.
The most significant distributive effects of a fall in wheat
prices, however, would again be associated with a situation in
which the smaller farmers do not have access to the new technol-
ogy. In this situation the inelasticity of supply, particularly among
those without supplementary water, means that falling prices will
produce Significant declines in income. On the other hand, those
whose farming operations have attained a high degree offlexibility
through the use ofmodern inputs can be expected, under the same
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conditions, to shift out of wheat and into more profitable alterna-
tives. The result would tend to be a marginal decline in the incomes
of smaller farmers and, when compared with the position of those
able to alter their cropping patterns, an increase in income dis-
parity.
Regional Differen.ces in the Ability to Adjust to Change
As Tweeten has pointed out:
The theory [of stagnation] contains three basic elements
that apply to individuals, regions or groups: (a) they are con-
fronted by factors which require adjustments in resources,
products and technology, (b) they have identifiable charac-
teristics which give rise to differences in ability to adjust to
factors in (a), and finally (c) when the forces requiring adjust-
ments are large relative to the ability to adjust, a liminal level
of adjustment is reached at which the environment develops
anomie and other disfunctional syndromes inimical to rapid
change. The area environment then becomes less rather than
more conducive to satisfactory economic adjustments to
changing conditions. (Tweeten 1968, italics added)
This comment is as true ofregional development in Pakistan as
/
'janywhere else. Whether ~e is talking about the "flexibility'~n
are individual farmer, the lack of alternatives in the face of
• changing co~itions is t e essence ofincreasing~l!I'
r The characteristics that are perhaps most relevant in identifY-
ing the likely course of regional growth in agriculture have to do
with the distinction between (1) areas in which only the yield ef-
fects of new technology are available, and (2) areas in which
changes in both yields and cropping-pattern effects can be antici-
pated.
An example ofthe first case is much ofthe dryland wheat area
in the northern portion of the Indus Basin (area I in Figure 2). As
Rochin's recent work has shown, there is now reason to believe
that, at least in the higher rainfall areas (30-50 inches), some bene-
fits can be expected from the seed-fertilizer technology (Rochin
1971a). His field survey, based on a sample offarmers, shows that
average yields of nineteen maunds per acre were obtained in Haz-
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ara District using modern technology. This was an average increase
of 103 percent over the control group. Lawrence also reports sig-
nificant yield increases associated with tractor-power cultural prac-
tices (deep-plowing and fallow) similar to those practices in the
dryland areas of the United States (Lawrence 1970).
As a consequent of these findings, the extreme pessimism of
earlier years is giving way to a somewhat more optimistic view that
yield increases in some parts ofthe dryland areas will be sufficient
to make discernible improvements in the welfare of farm families
living there.
An even more optimistic picture for future progress is pre-
sented by another traditionally backward area of Pakistan: the
southern portions in the province of Sind (areas V, VI, and VII in
Figure 2). As indicated elsewhere, the new rice varieties have
shown themselves to be unusually adapted to the dry, sunny cli-
mate of the area. Although there again appears to be little possi-
bility ofcrop diversification, farm incomes can be expected to im-
prove significantly through the yield effects alone. The latest report
ofthe rice research stations at Kala Shah Kaku and Dokri indicates,
for example, that yields of sixty maunds of rice are now com-
monplace (Abbasi 1968). Severe institutional and marketing con-
straints continue to exist, but these are problems that, unlike the
basic climatic, soil, and water constraints, can in time be solved.
The real beneficiaries of the fruits of technical change, how-
ever, are farmers in the more versatile areas of the Central Punjab
(areas II and III in Figure 2). Not only are they able to take advan-
tage of the increased productivity associated with the seed-
fertilizer revolution, the water distribution is such that they can
respond in cropping-pattern terms to the increase in comparative
advantage of the new varieties of rice and wheat. Again, if the
evidence of more-developed agricultures is any guide, this basic
flexibility (here demonstrated by the ability to take the ultimate
advantage of new technology) will prove to be the central fact in
maintaining the dominance of this area in Pakistani agriculture in
the long run.
Thus far, comments on the effects ofmodernization on regional
incomes have focused on the impact of the new technology itself.
No attention has been given to the ~irecteffects produced by the
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impact of increased output on the prices of such widely grown
commodities as wheat and rice. Given the recent gluts on the world
cereal markets, it is probably unrealistic to assume that the gov-
ernment will want to maintain current price relatives in the face of
significantly increased domestic supplies. The most reasonable as-
sumption would be that some type of downward adjustment will
take place in those cereal prices that are most seriously distorted, at
least over the medium and long run.
Not surprisingly, !he vulnerability of various areas to Erice
changes is closel linked to their ability to a~p-Lnew t~diDQlog~'-.
----AS III t e case of technology alolle;1rexibility or range of choice is
the key. The dryland areas, constrained by the rigidity ofthe envi-
ronment from adopting new technology, face exactly the same set of
constraining factors as far as price response is concerned. Indeed,
the cropping-pattern effect, described earlier as an acreage re-
sponse to the changes in comparative net revenues, is the same
phenomenon regardless of whether the alteration in net revenues
results from a change in the market price ofthe output or a change
in its unit cost. One would therefore expect the severest effect on
incomes ofdeclining wheat prices to occur in these areas that have
highly inelastic supply curves for wheat. A major caveat is that this
only applies to the marketed surplus. As nearly every farmer sells
something, to that extent he is vulnerable. At best, sharp declines in
wheat prices will make it more difficult to raise living standards
above the subsistance level in these areas.
Incomes in the rice areas of the Sind also are affected almost
proportionately by declines in the price of rice. Although the sup-
ply curve has shifted out, it remains quite inelastic.
Again in the Central Punjab the ability either to profit from or
to minimize the adverse consequences ofvarious price policies is
obviously greatest. The reader will by now recognize that the
source of both the ability to respond to prices and the ability to
adopt the new technology have their origin in the availability and
seasonal flexibility of the irrigation water supply.
Technology, Prices, and Political Influence
As any student ofpublic policy is aware, government programs
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are deeply embedded in the political processes of a country. The
decisions surrounding policies regarding agricultural prices and
technology in Pakistan are no exception. Indeed, there is much
about the makeup of that society that permits some fairly convinc-
ing analogies to be drawn between the experience of developed
countries-particularly the southern portion of the United States
-and the likely course of agricultural transformation in the Indus
Basin.
The previous section's discussion ofthe economics ofthe dis-
tributive effect of technology took a very narrow, static view. Even
in terms ofits focus on farmers with less than twenty-five acres, the
dynamics ofthe distributive effects have not been examined fully.
This is perhaps the key group in the process since it comprises the
majority of the cultivators.
An additional dimension is the considerable casual evidence
.t.b1!!, among the Ip.lg~IJarrners(50-100_acres),substantial amounts
ofth~J!!ghI"~tllrnsfromn~~~ee<l-water-fertilizercombinations are
--&imgJIsed_to. modernize-.furtheLtheiLalread)'_progressiY.e__~n~!:.
prises. Thus, the compound effects ofgrowth among this group are
well unoerway.7 ------------ ---~--
At the sameITme economic change is takingRlace, howeve!i..a
political process is also underway. As subsequent paragraphs will
arg'ue, the wealth of this new class of.m:..ogressive larger farme~
partly derived from their use of technology but equally supported
by a distorted set ofcommodity prices, li,reflected in their increas-
ing political influen~.This is a matter offundamental importance,
for the history of agricultural policy in virtually every society un-
d~rscores the fact that thisgrotlp.9fbetter-e<ill.c£l..t~Q,..!!!Qre_P!..Qg~s­
sive farmers, owning most ofthe factors of producti~!1_b..!:!_tcontain-
Ingiininority of the pe·ople~~ilI;ifpermitted,· atte-mpt to speak for
~attofagfiC!1ltur~-onmatt~rs oftechJ!()J.Qgyand prices; BasedoiiThe
u.S. experience, the following pressures from this commercial sec-
tor can be anticipated:
(1) The larger farmers will be strongly opposed to any reduc-
tion in the government's current support of output prices. An
example of their waxing power was the recent reestablishment of
the wheat support price in the face ofthe almost unanimous opposi-
tion ofeconomists in the provincial and central planning agencies.
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(2) The larger farmers will be against any program ofselective
mechanization. There is already considerable literature on the
premature mechanization of agriculture in Pakistan, particularly
since the equipment is being imported at a subsidized exchange
rate and is being provided under special credit arrangements.8
Several authors have argued this subsidy should be eliminated, and
obviously such proposals should be supported. But there is some
question as to whether this will greatly retard the rapidity with
which the larger landowners will modernize their operations (Bose
and Clark 1969; Johnston and Cownie 1969). First, tractors are
likely to be produced soon in Pakistan. It is exceedingly difficult to
see how planners or concerned administrators will be able to resist
the pressure of an alliance between the industrialists (foreign and
private) and the larger farmers for such plants. Second, even if
tractors and equipment were imported at the economy's current
shadow price of capital, private costs and benefits would still di-
verge from their social values. So long as groundwater supplies are
not under public control, the 150 percent cropping intensity figure
for Pakistan cannot be regarded as an effective constraint. With
appropriate equipment and enough tubewell capacity, there is
every reason to believe that in the near future, efficient operators
will be able to doublecrop fully the land they operate. Such an
intensive use of land, only feasible if modern equipment is avail-
able, provides private rates of return that make agriculture one of
the most profitable enterprises in the economy.
(3) The larger farmer will resist public control of the water-
bearing aquifer. Currently, the water table is within the reach ofthe
centrifugal pumps that even the slightly above-average-size farmer
can install on his tubewell. In the long run, however, the water
table can be expected to drop below the reach of the pumps cur-
rently in use, to depths that require modern turbine pumps. The
latter are expensive and necessitate a capital outlay many times that
of centrifugal pumps. Obviously, as the water table continues to
fall, only those having access to capital for pumps that can tap the
deeper layers ofthe aquifer will be able to continue to expand their
operations.
(4) Lastly, the increasingly powerful political position of the
new agricultural class will make difficult the institutional reforms
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needed to capture-in a progressive fashion-some of the overall
increase in agricultural productivity for development purposes.
Pakistan's current mobilization ofdomestic resources as a percent-
age of GNP is extremely low, even by developing country stan-
dards. With a deteriorating foreign aid picture, it must rely more
heavily on internally generated resources. Yet the Fourth Plan
gives no evidence ofa willingness to deal with these hard issues; in
particular, nothing ofsignificance is proposed for appropriating the
windfall gains of farmers referred to earlier. If anything, the intro-
duction ofthe necessary institutional reforms seems as distant now
as it was a decade ago.9
The preceding description of the forces on the stage in Paki-
stan paints a not unfamiliar picture to students of U.S. agricultural
policy. Indeed, some foreign agriculturalists are actually pleased
by the prospects outlined above, since, in the short run at least, it
will undeniably lead to a continuation of the high rate of agricul-
tural growth. To others, however, the prospect of modernizing ag-
riculture "U.S. style" is distinctly unappealing. This is particularly
true when one adds to the previously indicated components of
change a 3 percent rate of population growth. As Johnston and
Cownie show, the employment problems that arise, even with op-
timistic increases in nonagricultural employment and reasonable
projections of migration, are staggering (Johnston and Cownie
1969).
Conclusions and Recommendations
It is clear the green revolution has set in motion a process that
will entail significant shifts in the allocation of Pakistan's agricul-
turaloutput eems e ually obvious that these same forces, work-
in~roughboth the econo~:an political structure ofthe society,
~e expected to exaceroate an already high degree of income
dispari!y. Given thIS diagnosis, what sort oftechnical recomme-ila-a-
tions could be made that would tend to promote efficiency and to
make possible a more humane type of structural change than that
which has prevailed in most developed societies?
(1) First, there is a need on efficiency grounds to bring domes-
tic relative prices in line with world market relatives. This is true of
cereals; it is even more important in the case ofsugarcane. Finding
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the correct absolute levels, however, will be no easy task. The
terms of trade between agricultural products and nonagricultural
products are badly distorted. Hence, without considering a radical
alteration ofthe overall foreign exchange policy (e.g., revaluation),
simply lowering prices to the absolute level ofworld prices would
be inappropriate. The least disruptive (but also perhaps least effec-
tive) tactic would be to approach world relatives from both above
and below. This would require downward adjustments for sugar-
cane, maize, and wheat, and upward adjustments for rice and cot-
ton.
(2) The..m.s.t.itutional assumptions that underlay the analysis of
income distribution by farm size were optimistic indeed. There is
little evidence t~at the current institutional structure is capable of
insuring that all farmers have access to those inputs that are, by
their nature, infinitely divisible. Moreover, the experience ofother
countries suggests that efforts to provide such a guarantee through
governmental bureaucracies is prohibitively expensive. .fjirninats
ffiibthe possibility of a "to -down" strate leaves no alternative
t tQJ1~G~pUh£..Eoliffcal risks oJ)~~.!Ilgvarious f~~~~~ass­
~~ farmer-dominatea organizations,-~hethe!.Jhey be in the
f~rm of.eooperatives--or-c~es,sm~.!Lfar!!1~l"~~I!4.Ql~}aiiCUess
have no weapon against the sys~rganization.
~akistanmusttaIreseriously t.he problem ofregional imbal-
ance. No one program or policy will suffice; what is required is an
approach that permits some people to stay on the farm by expand-
ing their holding size, others to be educated for migration to areas of
demand as industrial and agricultural labor. Where possible, efforts
at decentralization ofindustrial activity into growth centers close to
the affected regions would have a high payoff.
Such efforts at mitigating the growth of regional disparity are,
of course, standard recommendations, and some observers have
cautioned that they may be too expensive in terms of national
growth for a country at Pakistan's level of development. The ap-
propriate effort is indeed a matter for calculation. However, the
evidence from developed countries is that the downward spiral of
poverty that is so prominent a feature of backward regions is
difficult to reverse.
(4) The proposals recently made regarding the need to capture
some of the windfall gains of technological change must be im-
plemented. Even casual arithmetic shows that the income terms of
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trade have turned in agriculture's favor during recent years. Rather
than capturing some of the surplus associated with the green
revolution for the provision of nonagricultural employment, the
government has permitted it to remain in the hands ofagriculture.
(5) Lastly, what is needed most is a national policy toward
technological chnnge. By investigating further the effects of the
economics of mechanization, for example, it should be possible to
define more carefully the magnitudes of such parameters as wage
rates, interest rates, excise taxes, and subsidies that would create an
environment for structural transformation in agriculture consistent
with the ability of the nonagricultural sectors to absorb surplus
rural labor. Once these have been ascertained, the government
should not hesitate to implement a program that might result in
significant deviations from that dictated by the unregulated market.
The above technical recommendatiQ!1_s~aI:~JargeJXJ.h~.-Eroduct
~direct econorriTc- analysis. rr they are to have real credibility,
howevei;lheyshotild-aIS(fb-eacc~~£a:r~red)~yiae~!lphonof the
p~_soC1arriiechanisms~y which the)' are to)eUi~_
plemented. This means, above all else, a description of the nature
ofthe class interests that dominate the various aspects ofPakistan's
economic policy, an identification ofthe extent and potential evolu-
tion ofthe political consciousness ofthese groups, and proposals for
alliances that would move in the right direction.
Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper; however, I
would suggest that one can be anything but optimistic about the
ability ofPakistan's society to develop instruments capable ofcop-
ing with the country's growing income inequality.
Carl H. Gotsch received his ph.D. from Harvard University in
1966. He was a member ofthe Harvard Advisory Group in Pakistan
from 1964 to 1966. He is a lecturer in the Department ofEconomics
and Adviser with the Development Advisory Service of Harvard
University; he is currently on leave and working with the Ford
Foundation, Beirut, Lebanon. He continues research on rural de-
velopment in Pakistan.
NOTES
This paper is a summary and extension of work carried out under AID/
NESA Contract 403. I am grateful to Walter P. Falcon both for collaboration
on the original work and for comments on the specific contents of this
paper. I am, of course, responsible for any errors that remain.
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1. The term "green revolution" is taken to include the complex offactors
that has led to rapid growth in the agricultural sector: tubewells, seeds,
fertilizer, insecticides, etc. It explicitly does not consider the impact of
tractor mechanization, for, as yet, the latter has had no widespread effect.
2. A sample of the more recent writings might include: Barker (1970),
Brown (1970), Falcon (1970), Hardin (1969), Johnston and Cownie (1969),
and Kaneda (1969).
3. In describing the green revolution in India, Mort Grossman points
out that the increased productivity is thus far confined to a limited number
ofcrops in a limited number ofareas. The case for a cautious interpretation
of the implications of recent events in India is given empirical backing in
Minhas (1970).
4. Much of this information is contained in the Annual Reports pub-
lished by the Government of Pakistan. See, for example, Munshi et al.
(1969). .
5. Net revenue is defined as gross revenue minus variable or out-of-
pocket costs incurred during the crop year.
6. Dubari is the general name given to winter crops sown in the residual
moisture of the rice fields.
7. In another chapter of this volume, Burki argues that the political
influence of this class was the catalyst to the economic transformation
described above. Whatever the direction ofcausality, there is no disagree-
ment regarding the broadening ofthe political base ofagricultural interests
since the middle 1960s. See also Burki (1971).
8. An excellent discussion and summary ofthis whole argument is to be
found in R. S. Bose's unpublished paper dissenting from the conclusions of
the government committee set up to investigate the farm mechanization
problem. The latter report (Government ofFakistan 1970) does a disservice
to those in Pakistan committed to rational policies for structural change in
agriculture. See also Kaneda (1969).
9. For a general argument linking policies that promote income dispar-
ity with the difficulty ofcreating institutions that can mobilize resources for
saving in the public sector, see Bird (1968).
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APPENDIX A. Calculation of Farm Income
at Domestic Prices
Farm Gross Net
Size Revenue Fixed Costs (Rs.) Income
(acres) (Rs.) (Rs.)
Bullocks· Equip- Build- Tube- Total
mentb ings weW
Traditional Technology
5.0 836 250 136 100 486 350
7.5 1361 250 136 100 486 875
10.0 1864 250 136 100 486 1378
12.5 2337 250 136 100 486 1851
15.0 2787 250 136 100 486 2301
17.5 3180 250 136 100 486 2694
20.0 3543 250 136 100 486 3057
22.5 3900 250 136 100 486 3414
25.0 4240 250 136 100 486 3754
Advanced Technology
5.0 1784 250 136 100 62 548 1236
7.5 2939 250 136 100 94 580 2359
10.0 3757 250 136 100 125 611 3146
12.5 4442 250 136 100 156 642 3800
15.0 4943 250 136 100 187 673 4270
17.5 5319 250 136 100 219 705 4614
20.0 5770 250 136 100 250 736 5034
22.5 6250 250 136 100 281 767 5483
25.0 6675 250 136 100 312 798 5877
a One pair ofbullocks is assumed to cost Rs. 2000 and have a working lifetime ofeight
years.
bEquipment list and life taken from Singh, Day, and Joh11968.
cTubewell assumed to cost Rs. 10,000 and have a lifespan often years.
APPENDIX B. Effect of Advanced Technology and Alternative Wheat Prices
on Distribution of Income among Different-Size Farms
Income
Traditional Technology Advanced Technology
Rs.15/maund Rs. lO/maund Rs.15/maund Rs.1O/maund
Farm Number
Size of Units Total Rs. Total Rs. Total Rs. Total Rs.
(acres) (thousands) % (millions) % (millions) % (millions) % (millions) %
6.25 104 26.9 62.4 10.0 52.0 9.4 187.2 14.7 135.2 12.5
(26.9) (10.0) (9.4) (14.7) (12.5)
8.75 85 22.0 93.5 15.0 80.8 14.6 233.7 18.3 178.5 16.5
(48.9) (25.0) (24.0) (33.0) (29.0)
11.25 57 14.7 91.2 14.7 79.8 14.5 199.5 15.6 163.9 15.2
(63.6) (39.7) (38.5) (48.6) (44.2)
13.75 45 11.6 94.5 15.2 83.2 15.1 182.2 14.3 159.8 14.8
(75.2) (54.9) (53.6) (62.9) (59.0)
16.25 35 9.0 87.5 14.1 78.8 14.3 156.6 12.3 141.8 13.1
(84.2) (69.0) (67.9) (75.2) (72.1)
18.00 27 7.0 78.3 12.6 70.2 12.7 131.6 10.3 122.8 11.4
(91.2) (81.6) (80.6) (85.5) (83.5)
21.25 20 5.2 64.0 10.3 59.5 10.8 105.0 8.2 101.0 9.3
(96.4) (91.9) (91.4) (93.7) (92.8)
23.75 14 3.6 50.4 8.1 46.9 8.5 79.1 6.2 77.7 7.2
(100.0) (100.0) (99.9) (99.9) (100.0)
TOTAL 621.8 551.2 1274.9 1080.7
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are cumulative percentages.
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The Adoption and
Effects of High-Yielding
Wheats on Unirrigated Subsistence
Holdings in Pakistan
Refugio I. Rochin
Introduction
Dwarf wheats are high-yielding varieties, which were de-
veloped in Mexico and introduced into and multiplied in West
Pakistan. Their diffusion and widespread adoption on irrigated
land in the past five years have been instrumental in attaining food
grain self-sufficiency in Pakistan.
Contributing to this remarkable achievement has been a 25-
percent increase in wheat acreage and a 35-percent increase in
yields, resulting in a record high national average in 1969/70 of
J2.9 maunds per acre. Governmental season and crop reports show
the following changes in Pakistan wheat acreage and yields in re-
cent years (Table 1). Of the wheat acreage, 70 percent is irrigated
and 30 percent is barani, or rainfed.1
On irrigated land, the average wheat yields have increased by
as much as 70 percent in recent years. Official records show no such
change in yields ofwheat grown under barani conditions. Little is
known about the impact of the new wheat varieties in these less
favorably endowed areas of Pakistan, where water supplies are
uncertain and where farmers are subject to much more risk in ex-
perimenting with yield-changing innovations. Only a modest effort
has been given to research on wheat production on barani land and
to study of the socioeconomic characteristics of barani farming.
Aside from Sturt's study (1965), little is known about barani far-
mers' methods ofcultivation, standard ofliving, and willingness to
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TABLE 1. Wheat Acreage and Yields
in West Pakistan, 1964-1970
Yields in Maunds per Acre
Acreage Irrigated Barani
Year (in thousands) All Wheat Wheat Wheat
1964/65 13,140 9.4 11.3 5.7
1965/66 12,738 8.2 10.1 4.2
1966/67 13,205 8.8 10.9 3.9
1967/68 14,785 11.6 13.9 6.2
1968/69 15,221 11.6 14.1 4.5
1969/70 15,089 12.9 17.2 4.4
SOURCE: Government of Pakistan 1964/65-1969170.
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accept innovations. Available research often takes a negative view
of the barani farmers who live in the northern regions of Pakistan.
They are thought to be resistant to change and to maintain irrational
farm management methods (Sharif 1965).
The degree to which barani smallholders adopt dwarf wheats
is of considerable concern to policy makers. One view is that the
new varieties will provide widespread benefits in many agricul-
tural areas, including the barani regions. An alternative view,
explored by Gotsch in the preceding chapter, suggests that barani
areas are likely to benefit little from the new, high-yielding cereal
varieties and their complementary inputs. Should this be true, al-
ternative rural development policies may be required for these
areas.
A study of the adoption of dwarf wheats by barani farmers
presents an opportunity to examine the general process ofthe diffu-
sion ofa message, in this case, the idea that dwarfwheats are more
productive. Diffusion is carried out through communication steps
that usually involve four elements: a source, communication chan-
nels, the receiver or adapter, and the impact of the innovation.
Specifically, this study was undertaken to determine (a) to
what extent the dwarf wheats were being adapted by barani far-
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mers; (b) the nature of the diffusion process that influenced these
farmers; and (c) to gauge the impact of the dwarf varieties on a
barani area.
Survey Locations and Sample Characteristics
General Characteristics of Hazara District
Field surveys for this study were conducted in Hazara District
of the North-West Frontier Province. The district is characterized
by rough and mountainous terrain. Even though it comprises a total
area of 4 million acres, only about 600,000 acres are cultivated
annually. Of the cultivated acreage, 85 percent is exclusively ba-
rani.
Approximately 30 percent ofthe district's cropped area is sown
with wheat during the winter (rabi) season. Barani wheat covers 88
percent of the district's 200,000 wheat acres. About 45 percent of
the cropped area is sown with maize during the summer (kharif)
season in Hazara and 88 percent ofits 290 thousand maize acres are
rainfed.
Hazara's agricultural sector, which holds 95 percent ofthe dis-
trict's population, faces two interrelated problems of constant
urgency: intense population pressure and poverty. In 1961,
approximately 1.38 million people lived there. Since it has been
difficult to increase productivity and cultivable area in Hazara, in-
creases in population have made it difficult to raise per capita in-
comes. Those living in Hazara are generally poor. According to the
1960 agriculture census, 77 percent of the 270,000 farms are less
than five acres in size; barely 2 percent are larger than twenty-five
acres. Almost all farmers own their land, live on hillsides, and farm
multiterraced plots. Subsistence crop production of maize and
wheat is their main agricultural pursuit.2 Rough topographic condi-
tions have made it difficult for tractor mechanization and irrigation
schemes to penetrate the district.
The Study Site: Lora and Oghi Villages
The sample of respondents was chosen from villages in Oghi
and Lora thanas (counties),3 which are relatively large geographic
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areas representative ofmost ofHazara District. The two thana areas
are one hundred miles apart and hold a number of interesting con-
trasts and similarities. Oghi has rich forested land and Lora is prac-
tically deforested and subject to extensive erosion and soil deterio-
ration. Both grow primarily wheat in winter and maize in summer.
Annual rainfall for the last ten years has averaged around 45
inches in Oghi and 52 inches in Lora, with a variation of plus or
minus 5 inches in any given year for each area. Both areas experi-
ence heaviest precipitation during the months from July to Sep-
tember and February to April. However, the former monsoon
period is also the hottest, with temperatures soaring to 100°F dur-
ing the day, resulting in a high rate ofevapotranspiration that nearly
matches the rate of precipitation. The rainfall is extremely erratic
however, falling in unpredictable, explosive torrents. One field
may receive the brunt ofa thundershower and a neighboring field
may continue to suffer from drought. Many barani farmers still
adhere to the practice ofleaving land fallow each growing season to
"give the land rest and rebuild its power."
Data for the study were collected during two field surveys in
1970, which coincided with the postharvest periods for wheat and
maize: June and November, respectively. The method ofdata col-
lection involved approaching and interviewing farmers who were
in the field or on the trail in the vicinity of villages, which were
chosen at random by the interviewing team.
The first survey has 143 usable interviews with barani small-
holders. In the second survey, 98 farmers were interviewed. Due to
the particular sampling technique used, 15 farmers were inter-
viewed twice, and on a few occasions, smallholders could not an-
swer questions well. Thus, the size ofsample for certain questions
changes in the following analysis.
Salient Characteristics of Barani Smallholders
Approximately 96 percent of the sample of respondents culti-
vate less than 15 acres; 87 percent cultivate less than 10, 64 less
than 5, and 34 percent ofall the respondents cultivate less than 2.5
acres. About 82 percent of the respondents own their land, 4 per-
cent both own and rent land, and the rest are tenants. However,
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tenants usually did not pay rent since ownership oftheir land is in
dispute under land reform legislation. The average size of culti-
vated area is thus about 5 acres; barani land comprises 97 percent of
this cultivated acreage and is used primarily for wheat and maize.
What little land is irrigated is sown with rice during the summer
season.
Nearly all the farmers struggle with small and widely sepa-
rated plots of land passed on by Muslim inheritance practices.
Since each plot averages around one-quarter of an acre in size,
farmers cultivate on the average fifteen separate plots that are ter-
raced. Government efforts to consolidate holdings so far have been
futile (Rizvi et al. 1965).
Most families live in homes made of rock covered with hand-
molded mud. The average family has a few fruit and/or nut trees
around the home, a buffalo and/or goat to provide its dairy foods,
some chickens, and a pair of bullocks for plowing. Some homes
have a private well for drinking water or a nearby well shared by
village neighbors; none of the homes in the villages have indoor
plumbing.
Village homes are without electricity; the kerosene lamp is
now replacing the candle. Wood and fuel oil are used for heating
and cooking. Due to the cost and scarcity of both, however, cow
dung mixed with straw is more frequently burned. Latrines are
nonexistent. Few homes are located near an all-weather road. Most
are nestled against protective mountainsides. Provisions have to be
carried by hand or sometimes by donkey rented for a small carrying
fee.
The extended families average between ten and eleven
people, about two to three per cropped acre. Most extended
families have relatives employed outside the village area. Some
husbands work in Karachi city, a thousand miles away, and keep
their wives and children on the farm.
The heads of households interviewed in the survey averaged
forty-seven years of age. Although 45 percent said they were liter-
ate, they appear to read with considerable difficulty. More and
more of the younger males are sent to primary schools, mostly in
anticipation oftheir leaving the farms by the time they reach twenty
years ofage.
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The typical family's total income is about $235 a year.4 About
$150 is the value ofthe farm-produced crops-wheat, maize, a little
rice, with their straw and hay cut from the surrounding hills.
Another $25 is earned by the farmer at other jobs in the village. The
rest of the income, $60, comes from relatives employed away from
the village who send money orders or cash to the family on the farm.
Little of the grain produced by these farmers reaches the mar-
ket. Ifa farmer sells any, it is only when debts fall due or when cash
is needed to cover costs of medicine or wedding ceremonies. The
poorest families consume practically nothing besides the grain
they produce.
Overall, the barani smallholders of Hazara District do not ap-
pear to be likely candidates to adopt innovations. They simply
cannot afford to risk losses in crop production. Yet with limited
agricultural advances and a rapid growth in population, Hazarans
will continue to add to the mainstream of people joining urban
concentrations, a prospect the country can ill afford.
Sources ofDwarfWheats in Hazara
Dwarf wheats were brought into Hazara District by the field
staffofthe Regional Department ofAgriculture, by the Agricultural
Development Corporation (ADC), and by some farmers.s
The first shipment of 400 maunds (enough seed for about 400
acres) was distributed to different areas ofthe district in 1966/67 for
use on irrigated land and was sown by the field exterision staffon a
number ofcontrolled and carefully selected"demonstration plots."
Hazara has three tehsils (administrative units): Abbottabad,
Mansehra, and Haripur. Twelve maunds ofthe first shipment were
distributed in Mansehra (where Oghi is situated), twenty maunds
in Abbottabad (where Lora is situated), and the rest in Haripur (the
area with;nost of Hazara's irrigated farmland). At that time, each
bag of dwarf wheat cost the government Rs. 54 per maund, com-
pared to Rs. 20 per maund for the best desi (traditional) varieties.
In 1967/68, 9,000 maunds of dwarf wheat were commercially
available to the farmers through the ADC. The price per maund
dropped to Rs. 36, but this price was still far above the price ofdesi
varieties.
276 Rural Development in Pakistan
By 1968/69, dwarfwheat seed reached a significant number of
the farmers' fields. The ADC sold a smaller amount (5,500 maunds)
than the year before and at a lower price of Rs. 22 per maund.
In 1969170, the year ofthis survey, most seed was obtained by
trading from farmer to farmer and relatively little was sold by the
ADC.
Time Patterns in the Diffusion of Dwarf Wheat
and Fertilizer
The Adoption ofChemical Fertilizer and DwarfWheats
The Lora and Oghi areas showed a rapid rate of diffusion of
new dwarf wheats, particularly Mexipak-65,6 and chemical fer-
tilizer. The number of respondents who used dwarf wheats and
chemical fertilizer for the first time each year since 1966/67 is
shown in Table 2. During the first year, fewer than 1 percent ofthe
sampled barani smallholders were using dwarf wheats; a slightly
larger fraction offarmers used chemical fertilizer. By 1969170, the
majority of barani smallholders had already tried dwarf wheats
and fertilizer.
TABLE 2. Dwarf Wheat and Chemical Fertilizer Use
by Farmers in Lora and Oghi Thanas, 1966/67-1970/71
DwarfWheat (n-226) Chemical Fertilizer (n-95)
Cumula- Cumula-
No. of Cumula- tive No. of Cumula- tive
Growing First-time tive Percentage First-time tive Percentage
Period Users Number ofNumber Users Number ofNumber
1966/67 2 2 0.83 3 3 3.16
1967/68 28 30 13.26 5 8 8.42
1968/69 45 75 33.17 20 28 29.47
1969/70 75 150 66.35 30 58 61.05
1970/71a 50 200 88.47 11 69 72.63
SOURCE: Rochin 1971.
a Based on respondents' anticipated use.
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Overall, these findings clearly indicate that barani smallhold-
ers are responsive to innovations and will make rapid adjustments
in resource allocation when new profitable varieties of seed and
fertilizer become available.
DwarfWheat Acreage
In 1966/67, three-fourths of an acre was sown with dwarf
wheat by two farmers in the sample (Table 3). In following years
other farmers went through a period of experimentation and ac-
quaintance with the variety. Few, ifany, sowed 100 percent oftheir
wheat area with the new variety during the first two years. Between
the 1968/69 and 1969/70 growing periods, more farmers with smal-
ler holdings began to use dwarf wheats. But due to the increasing
proportion of smaller farms among these new users, this did not
sharply increase the percentage oftotal wheat area in dwarfwheats.
The survey results also indicate that dwarfwheat growers were
sowing more land during rabi (the winter season) and were leaving
less land fallow. In other words, they were increasing multiple
cropping.
TABLE 3. Area and Percentage of Farm Wheat Area Sown
to Dwarf Wheat on Respondents' Farms, Lora and Oghi
Thanas, 1966/67-1970/71
Growing
Period
1966/67b
1967/68
1968/69
1969170
1970/71c
Average Number
of Kanals/Farm a
3.0
6.2
11.0
11.3
13.8
Percentage of Total
Farm Wheat Area
30.00
34.02
65.04
65.90
72.10
SOURCE: Rochin 1971.
aIncludes only farms adopting. One kanal equals one-eighth ofan acre; it is made up
of twenty mer/as, the smallest land unit measured by revenue collectors.
b Unreliable figures for comparative purposes due to small number ofrespondents.
c Anticipated area, based on respondents' plans.
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Only one farmer in the sample tried dwarf wheats and sub-
sequently rejected them. The stated reason for this rejection was
the "bad taste and quality" ofthe unleavened bread (chapati) made
from the new wheat. He had a variety with a red grain, which is
considered inferior to white grain. However, the same farmer said
he saw some white-grain types (Mexipak-65) in the village and
would attempt to acquire enough seed to sow his entire wheat
acreage with it.
In the total group of respondents, only two farmers said they
had never heard of Mexipak at the time of the interview. They
represent less than 2 percent of the sample.
Methods of Diffusion
Communication is defined as the process by which messages
are transferred through channels from a source to a receiver.7 In this
study, the message is an idea that dwarfwheats give higher yields
than do desi varieties.
There are a number of communication channels through
which messages can be conveyed, including interpersonal and
mass media. Both types function in different ways and their effec-
tiveness also differs according to the way they are used.s A third
type of communication channel, the demonstration-plot channel,
has been grouped with the interpersonal channels in the following
discussion.
Both interpersonal and mass media channels were important
in creating awareness of dwarf varieties among the sample of re-
spondents (Table 4).
Mass Media Channels
Mass media channels refer to radio, television, films, news-
papers, magazines, and the like, anything with a capacity to reach
large audiences quickly over great distances. Agricultural pro-
grams are broadcast daily over the radio in Pakistan. Many are
coordinated by the Bureau ofAgricultural Information as part ofan
education extension component. In addition, the bureau publishes
a monthly calendar of radio programs for their respective areas.
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TABLE 4. Channels of Communication That First
Informed Respondents of Dwarf Wheats
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Channels
Mass Media
Magazine (Urdu)
Radio
Interpersonal
Localite a
Cosmopolite b
Demonstration Plots
Not Aware of Mexipak
TOTAL
Number First
Informed by
34
1
33
107
51
32
34
2
143
Percentage ofTotal
Respondents
23.78
0.70
23.08
74.82
35.66
22.38
16.78
lAO
100.00
SOURCE: Rochin 1971.
a Fellow villagers.
bpersons from outside the village.
Radio programs are presently beamed from Lahore, Rawalpindi,
and Peshawar. The firsttwo stations broadcast in Urdu/Punjabi and
the third in Pushto.
Sixty respondents interviewed in Lora said they frequently
heard either the Lahore or Rawalpindi agricultural programs. The
same number of Oghi said they listened to the Peshawar station.
Upon further questioning, however, only one-half in both
locales-30 each in Lora and Oghi-could give the approximate
time of the program to which they claimed to have listened. This
type of response could indicate that there is an element of status
involved in listening to the radio and that more farmers are apt to
say that they listened than actually did. On the other hand, radio
programming times do change during the year, a measure calcu-
lated to broadcast the agricultural program just after sunset, a time
when most farmers are eating dinner. For future questioning on the
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impact ofradio program offerings upon farmers, it would be impor-
tant to know which stations are broadcasting and at what hours in
order to cross-check respondents' answers.
Radio was found to be the mass media channel most often
mentioned by smallholders as their source ofinformation on dwarf
wheat performance and availability. Further questioning pointed
out that 56 respondents out of 143 (39 percent) owned radios. Ten
farmers (7 percent) who did not own radios stated that they first
learned of dwarf wheats over this medium.
Altogether, only one smallholder in the sample learned of
Mexipak from the written media: a magazine written in Urdu. No
other type of mass media was mentioned by the respondents as a
first source of information on the new wheat varieties.
Interpersonal Channels
The survey showed that essentially three types of interper-
sonal channels informed the barani smallholder of dwarf wheat
yields:
Interpersonallocalite comprising individuals who are mem-
bers of the social system of the receiver, for example, his
neighbors, village shopkeepers, and so forth.
Interpersonal cosmopolite comprising those who have their
origins outside the receiver's immediate social system, for exam-
ple, agricultural extension personnel and distributors of farm
supplies. Both Lora and Oghi have offices of the Department of
Agriculture, each headed by an agricultural assistant, usually a
man in his thirties with a bachelor's degree in agriculture from
Peshawar University. Each agricultural assistant, in tum, super-
vises three or four field assistants. These men, usually in their
late twenties, generally have matriculated in second- or third-
year division and have completed a one-year certificate course in
the Agricultural Training Institute in Peshawar. "A Field Assis-
tant is expected to be the Government's principal contact with
farmers in the area of one or two Unions, which means 10-20
villages, or 10-25,000 people" (Davy 1967:4).
Demonstration plots comprising visual field displays of ag-
ricultural innovations, which stimulate discussion among far-
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mers. Both Lora and Oghi areas had the same number of de-
monstration plots installed on farmers' fields by the field assis-
tants; six plots in each area in 1967/68 and five plots in the follow-
ingtwo years. For 1970/71, the number was reduced to one each.
Their locations were all near the market centers of Lora and
Oghi.
The interpersonallocalite channels had the largest impact on
the farmers. Exchanges between barani smallholders were the
highest carriers of the dwarf wheat message. The dwarf wheat
demonstration plots, when placed next to desi plots, strikingly
illustrated the differences between the two,9 and thus were also
effective transmitters of the high-yield message.
It should be noted that field assistants were very instrumental
in diffusing dwarf wheat varieties. Besides personally informing
farmers of dwarf wheat potential, they were responsible for the
installation of many of the demonstration plots on farmers' fields,
which, in tum, were catalysts in dwarf wheat diffusion.
Thus, both mass media and interpersonal communication
channels appear to be important in introducing innovations to ba-
rani smallholders of Pakistan. Strengthening the effectiveness of
both types ofchannels is a means ofkeeping smallholders informed
of innovations as they become available.
Reasons for Adoption
Yield appears to be the single most important reason behind
dwarf wheat adoption, although farmers mentioned a few other
important characteristics as follows:
(1) Dwarf wheats fit the cropping pattern of the farmer more
easily and mature earlier than do desi wheats. In particular,
dwarf wheats can be planted up to one month later.
(2) Dwarf wheats do not require changes from current prac-
tices and farmers can experiment with their culture. Many tasks
are still done in the same way for both desi and dwarf wheats,
including ground preparation, broadcast sowing, weeding, har-
vesting, and winnowing. Dwarfwheats are also neutral to scale,
so any size farm can use them.
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(3) Some respondents like the bearded features of dwarf
wheats, which gave some protection against birds.
(4) Other respondents stated that they like the taste of the
white variety (Mexipak-65).
One complaint was that dwarf wheat gave less fodder. How-
ever, barani smallholders were willing to sacrifice fodder for a
higher grain yield.10
The most important reason for adopting comparative yields is
that each year dwarf wheats outyielded desi wheats by a consis-
tently wide margin (Table 5).n In 1967/68 both temperature and
rainfall were within the range conducive to good yields with the
dwarf wheats.
In subsequent years, dwarf wheats were grown on more and
more acreage, which apparently included a mix offactors resulting
in reduced yields: poorer lands under dwarfs, poorer farm mana-
gers growing the new varieties, less ideal weather, and less fer-
tilizer per acre on dwarfs. Yet, in all periods, dwarf wheats con-
tinued to yield more than desi wheats.
TABLE 5. Yields ofDesi and DwarfWheat on Barani Land,
Hazara District, 1967/68-1969170
DwarfWheat Desi Wheat
Number Yield/ Number Yield/
of Acre of Acre
Year Growers (mds) a Growers (mds) a
1967/68 26 23.92 17 9.08
1968/69 60 17.52 28 10.24
1969/70 98 15.12 62 8.48
THREE YEAR AVE.
1967/68-1969/70 61 18.85 36 9.27
SOURCE: Rochin 1971.
aOne maund equals 82.29 pounds.
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It was clearly evident to the respondents that dwarfyields are
greater than desi yields. Respondents also claimed there is less risk
and more certainty in sowing dwarfs; they at least "got their seed
back:' On the other hand, farmers said that many times because of
the low fodder yield they had had to feed their desi wheat as fodder
to the animals and they "got no seed back."
The Impact of DwarfWheat
Major Direct Effects
The degree to which barani smallholders have benefited from
dwarfwheats has been ofconcern to policy makers (Government of
Pakistan 1970:262). Thus, the analysis now focuses on an assess-
ment of the effects of the new wheats in Hazara District. The
technological change embodied in the dwarfwheats, together with
the accompanying change in complementary inputs, has had a
number of Significant direct effects on the economy of Lora and
Oghi. Three are discussed below.
(1) Greater Cropping Intensity.12 Respondents in Lora and
Oghi are moving toward increased multiple cropping. Most of that
move has been made possible by the introduction ofdwarfwheats,
which mature earlier than desi varieties. The 1969/70 average
cropping intensity index for Lora was 141 and for Oghi 103. By
calculating the average acreage respondents say they will sow dur-
ing the 1970/71 rabi period and by making the safe assumption that
respondents will sow the same amount ofmaize during the follow-
ing summers, Lora's cropping intensity will increase to 148, Oghi's
to no. This significant change is expected to occur in one year's
time.
(2) Increased Output. Barani smallholders are not only ex-
panding planted acreage but they are getting higher yields, as
noted above. For every given acre ofland sown with dwarfwheats,
farmers are harvesting at least 70 percent more than before (Table
5). As less money is needed to purchase food grains, more money is
available. Some who save "enough" will be able to add further
cost-saving innovations (or conversely, yield-increasing innova-
tions) to their farm operations.
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All who adopted dwarf varieties have realized comparatively
greater output per acre than those who did not use the new va-
rieties. However, among those adopting dwarfwheats there is wide
variability in production practices. Some use fertilizers, others do
not; some get exceptional yields and others less so, and so forth.
(3) Increased Employment. Technological change in the
form ofnew high-yielding varieties is labor using in Lora and Oghi.
Analysis ofthe additional man-hours employed with dwarf wheats
as compared to desi wheat for each stage from field preparation
through storage shows. that overall labor requirements have in-
creased by about 50 percent (Table 6). In essence, there are notable
economies with increased output, which mean the average cost per
maund of proce~seddwarf wheat is less.
Wider Effects
The adoption of dwarf wheats in Hazara District appears to
have important wider and longer-term effects. They are as follows:
(1) Increased awareness ofchanges that could affect agricul-
tural production. During the many visits to Lora and Oghi, far-
mers frequently asked where they could acquire new varieties of
seed. Many could name some ofthe varieties they heard about on
TABLE 6. Labor Use in Dwarf- and Desi-Wheat Production,
143 Farmers, 1969/70 Lora and Oghi Thanas
(man-hours per acre)
Field Claraa Winnowing
Preparation and and
and Sowing Harvesting Threshing Storage Total
1. Dwarf 96.8 74.4 40.8 40.0 252.0
2. Desi 62.4 52.0 28.0 26.4 168.8
3. Added Labor
(2 from 1) 34.4 22.4 12.8 13.6 83.2
'Clara is a threshing floor prepared by driving bullock teams in circles on a particular
spot in the field until the ground is packed hard.
Adoption and Effects of High-Yielding Wheats 285
the radio. They were also acutely aware that changes can be
made in their maize production as well, a crop that had been
relatively untouched in barani areas by technological advances.
They also knew of government policy changes that affect com-
plementary inputs. A recent announcement by the Ministry of
Finance of a tax on fertilizer brought loud outcries from the
people of Lora and Oghi.
(2) Increased demands on extension workers. Barani small-
holders wanted to know what local-level extension workers do
and how they can be instructive in understanding the new
technology. They also put some pressure on field assistants, fer-
tilizer distributors, and others from the Department of Agricul-
ture and the Agriculture Development Corporation to keep up
with new information about improved seeds, types and rates of
fertilizer application, pesticides, sowing periods, and so forth.
(3) Shift to cash payments for services. Those using dwarf
wheats who got good yields preferred paying cash rather than a
proportion of their crop for the services of moeens (cobblers,
blacksmiths, tailors, potters, etc.),l3 Movement is away from bar-
ter arrangements toward a cash economy. The effect ofthis move
will be to create cash saving and more investment opportunities
for those who are able to participate in the larger money
economy.
Summary
A very high proportion of barani smallholders adopted high-
yielding varieties of wheat in a remarkably short time. Significant
in diffusing the new technology were certain types ofinterpersonal
and mass media communication channels, which informed the
farmers that dwarfwheats were higher yielding. Interpersonal con-
tacts between villagers created the most awareness. Demonstration
plots on farmers' fields made it possible for the potential adopters to
see the striking differences between desi and dwarf yields. Of the
mass media, radio was most important in Hazara.
Technical and economic factors had considerable influence on
farmers and their adoption ofdwarfwheats: (1) yields were consis-
tently better with dwarfs; (2) the technology was relatively simple
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to understand and use; and (3) no major changes were required in
the cropping pattern.
The primary effects at the farm level of the technological
change brought with dwarf wheats were: (1) to increase cropping
intensity; (2) to increase output; and (3) to increase employment.
Wider effects are becoming evident through increased social in-
teraction between farmers and extension people and a greater
move toward a money economy.
In sum, barani smallholders were highly responsive to sig-
nificantly "better" innovations, which are neutral to scale. They
were equally responsive and reachable by mass media and inter-
personal channels ofcommunication.14
Refugio I. Rochin received his Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics
from Michigan State University in 1971. He was a training associate
in Agricultural Economics with the Ford Foundation, Pakistan,
from 1969 to 1971, and is currently assistant professor of
Economics, University ofCalifornia (Davis).
NOTES
A preliminary version ofthis paper was published in the form ofRochin
(1972). The permission to reprint granted by The Agricultural Develop-
ment Council, Inc., is gratefully acknowledged. The analysis is based on
Rochin (1971).
1. Barani, literally translated from Urdu, means 'depending on rain-
fall'.
2. A village study conducted in Hazara during 1955 pointed out that
maize was the main subsistence crop and that wheat was "not so commonly
consumed by the villagers." In more recent years, though, wheat has be-
come as important as maize in terms ofproduction and consumption (Mat-
lub 1958).
3. "Thana" means 'police station' in Urdu. Such police stations are
located in the larger cities, which serve as main marketing centers. Each
thana has a certain jurisdiction over a number of villages known to the
villagers and, in tum, each villager can identifY himself with "his thana."
4. Estimated on the basis of the international exchange rate of ten
rupees per U.S. dollar.
5. General historical coverage ofdwarfwheat diffusion and adoption in
West Pakistan is found in Eckert (1970:12-36).
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6. Mexipak is only one of the commonly used dwarf varieties, but the
name is applied to all dwarf varieties by Hazara's farmers.
7. A review of the more recent literature on the process ofdiffusion is
given by Rogers and Shoemaker (1970).
8. Comparisons are discussed in Rogers and Svenning (1969:125).
9. Dwarf wheat with fertilizer gives a dark bluish-green appearance;
desi wheat is light green. Moreover, desi varieties stand taller, have thin
stems, and sway freely with the wind, while the high-tillering dwarfwheat
is short and sturdy against the wind. In addition, Mexipak, which is the
most commonly used dwarf, has beards whereas most desi varieties are
beardless and hence more likely to be consumed by birds.
10. There is some debate on this point. The usual comparison is 1.5
maunds of fodder for every maund of grain of desi wheat (1.5: 1) versus 1
maund of fodder for every maund of grain ofdwarf wheat (1:1). From this
we estimate whether the amount offodder is more or less by the amount of
grain produced. Judging from the farmers' complaints of lack of fodder,
perhaps a more realistic comparison would be 2: 1 for desi and 1: 1 for dwarf.
This, however, is subject to actual measurement on barani land.
11. All farmers in the sample know the size of their cultivated acreage
and measure grain that has been sun dried on the threshing floor with a
wadi (a wooden or metal measuring bowl). Each farmer knows how much
wheat, maize, and rice weigh in his own wadi in terms ofseers. In addition
to counting the number of wadis ofeach harvested crop, baran i smallhold-
ers seem capable ofrecalling production for at least three years. Customar-
ily, they discuss production over the Hukka (smoking pipe) in casual
gatherings. Thus, the data appear to be reliable. One seer equals 2.057Ibs.
or 11 40 ofa maund. One maund equals 82.29Ibs. One wadi holds approxi-
mately 5V2 seers of wheat grain.
A few words should be said also about the apparent discrepancy be-
tween the survey findings that wheat yields have increased in the Hazara
District and Table 1, which shows declining wheat yields in barani areas.
Hazara receives relatively higher rainfall (conducive to good yield with
dwarf wheats) than the vast barani areas of the Indus Plains, which sow
more acreage to barani wheat. As yet, the latter barani areas have not been
studied as intensively as has Hazara to determine the impact of the new
varieties ofwheat. There is also the problem that government statistics lag
in reporting major changes in the agricultural sector of the Indus Plains.
See Falcon (1961:3-9).
12. Cropping Intensity = !OO X Net area sown + Area sown more than once
Net area sown
13. It should be noted that almost all labor employed in wheat produc-
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tion is family labor; few are hired for the task. Unfortunately, no data were
collected on the amount paid by tenants to landlords, thus depriving us of
an analysis of whether or not tenants are paying proportionately more or
less of their output.
14. More recent research that comes to similar conclusions about the
participation of small farmers in the green revolution is contained in Rice
(1973). This report includes many of the research results obtained by Max
K. Lowdermilk in "Diffusion of Dwarf Wheat Production Technology in
Pakistan's Punjab," Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1972, and by
Mohammed Naseem in "Small Farmers and Agricultural Transformation
in Pakistan's Punjab," Ph.D. dissertation, University ofCalifornia (Davis)
1971.
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The Development
of Pakistan's Agriculture:
An Interdisciplinary Explanation
Shahid Javed Burki
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to reach beyond neoclassical
economics into other disciplines to provide an explanation for the
behavior ofWest Pakistan's agricultural sector.! This interdiscipli-
nary exercise was undertaken to increase our understanding ofthe
complex factors responsible for taking the agricultural sector over a
tortuous, and sometimes perilous, course. Economists' traditional
tools of analysis cannot adequately explain various important de-
velopments in the Pakistani countryside. They cannot by them-
selves identifY the factors responsible for the stagnation ofagricul-
ture in the first decade after Independence and the great recovery
in the second decade. They cannot isolate the factors that were
responsible for inaugurating Pakistan's agricultural revolution
some years before the extensive use ofthe new miracle seeds. And
they cannot single out the factors responsible for the distribution
and redistribution offactors ofproduction between the agricultural
and nonagricultural sectors.
The agricultural sector has been studied intensively by
economists; its progress over the years can be viewed through tra-
ditional economic prisms. Pakistan's progress has been studied in
the framework of a dual economy where, as W.H. Nicholls has
correctly pointed out, the process of industrialization is looked
upon as the dual ofthe "Law ofthe Declining Relative Importance
of Agriculture" (Nicholls 1954:146-147). Thus the contribution
made by agriculture to the gross provincial product of West Paki-
stan declined from 49.8 percent in 1948/49 to 41.5 percent in
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1968/69, while the contribution of large-scale manufacturing in-
creased from 1.5 percent to 15.4 percent.2 The process was not a
smooth one, as the agricultural sector stagnated in the 1949-1959
decade and prospered in the next (Table 1). In the first decade the
rate of growth of crop production per annum was officially esti-
mated to be 2.3 percent, while in the second decade it increased to
5.4 percent. Public investment in agriculture declined from 2.5
percent ofthe total national investment in 1949/50 to 2.2 percent in
1959/60. However, in the same period, the private sector's invest-
ment in agriculture increased from 2.9 percent of the total to 3.5
percent. Per capita income in the agricultural sector declined from
Rs. 214 in 1949/50 to Rs. 197 in 1959/60. These figures bring out
TABLE 1. Performance of West Pakistan's
Agricultural Sector
1949/50 1959/60 1968/69
Share in Gross Provincial 52 49 41
Product (percent)
Per Capita Income in the 214 197 278
Agricultural Sector (Rs.)
Total Agricultural 187 171 195
Output per Capita (Rs.)
Public Sector Investment 2.5 2.2 4.8
in Agriculture as a
Proportion ofTotal
Investment (percent)
Private Sector Investment 2.9 3.5
in Agriculture as a
Proportion of Total
Investment (percent)
Total Food Grains Produc- 188 151 202
tion per Capita (Kg.)
Per Annum Rate of Growth 2.3 5.4
of Crop Production
(percent)
SOURCES: Papanek 1967:317 and Government of Pakistan 1970.
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clearly the tremendous differences in the performance of the ag-
ricultural sector in the two decades following the emergence of
Pakistan as an independent country.
In order to provide an explanation for the performance ofWest
Pakistan's agriculture, a number ofeconomists have provided a set
ofclosely related hypotheses. Following Schultz, these hypotheses
are based on an interpretation oftraditional agriculture. Traditional
agriculture is viewed as in a state ofequilibrium in which "the state
ofthe arts remains constant, the state ofpreference and motives for
holding and acquiring sources of income remains constant, and
both ofthese states remain constant long enough for marginal pref-
erences and motives for acquiring agricultural factors as sources of
income to arrive alan equilibrium with the marginal productivity of
these sources viewed as an investment in permanent income
streams and with net savings approaching zero." (Schultz 1964:30).
What these three critical conditions of equilibrium in effect imply
is agricultural stagnation. This is a picture of an economic man
making an efficient use of the sources of production available to
him.
This hypothesis points to two important conclusions: (1) That
the farmer in a poor country is primitive because of the primitive-
ness of his environment. There is an element of optimism in this
assumption-optimism that takes us to the second conclusion. (2)
That agriculture in a poor country can be pulled out ofstagnation by
changing the state of the arts. The arts are "always embodied in
particular factors and, therefore, in order to introduce new technol-
ogy, it is necessary to employ a set of factors of production that
differs from the set formerly employed (Schultz 1964:30). Tradi-
tional agriculture can therefore be transformed by supplying to the
farmer improved factors ofproduction-"the conditioning factors"
(Johnston 1964:92)-at prices that would make their adoption pos-
sible by the risk-averting but profit-maximizing farmer. This
hypothesis is the basis ofa number ofexplanations that have been
provided for the performance ofPakistan's agricultural sector dur-
ing the sixties.
However, Pakistan's agricultural sector began to lift itself out
of a state of stagnation a few years before Schultz produced his
work. In fact the regime ofAyub Khan instituted most ofthe impor-
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tant refonns aimed at the agricultural sector in the early 1960s at a
time when a number ofeconomists and social scientists were taking
a pessimistic view of poor agrarian economies. For instance, the
economists Grunwald (1961) and Khatkhate (1962) and sociologists
such as Kusum Nair (1961) appeared to believe that fanners do not
respond to economic incentives. Students ofPakistan's agricultural
sector assert that the regime ofAyub Khan stumbled accidentally
on the idea ofinducing change in the agricultural sector by altering
the qualitative and quantitative combinations ofthe factors ofpro-
duction.
The bulk ofthe evidence in support of this explanation comes
from the important work of Ghulam Mohammad, a Pakistani
economist who did an intensive survey offactor availability to pro-
ducers in West Pakistan's agricultural sector. In his field surveys
Mohammad concentrated on the availability ofirrigation water and
its impact on cropping patterns. According to him, "one ofthe most
significant phenomena in agricultural development in Pakistan has
been the installation of private tubewells by the fanners of West
Pakistan at an exceedingly fast rate during the second plan period"
(Mohammad 1970:49). One factor that led to this very important
development was the provision of electricity to the rural areas of
West Pakistan at a highly subsidized rate (Mohammad 1970:92).
However, the subsidy to the rural consumer never was provided
specifically for the purpose of promoting the development of
tubewells. In fact the village electrification program followed by
the government was aimed at lighting up the villages rather than
providing power for tubewells. Some other researchers extended
the argumentto cover a wider spectrum ofincentives. For instance,
Gustav Papanek, in his study ofPakistan's economic development,
argued that the speed-up in tubewell drilling in the early 1960s
"seems to have been the result ofhigher and more stable prices for
cash crops and wheat, improved supplies of imported equipment,
more widespread electric connections, drilling facilities and credit,
and the gradual spread of technical knowledge and information
(Papanek 1967:179).
Once Ghulam Mohammad had provided evidence that some of
the important developments in agriculture could be attributed to
government programs that were designed to achieve totally differ-
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ent objectives, it became easier to formulate a hypothesis for exp-
laining the behavior of the Pakistani farmer. Before outlining that
hypothesis, let us briefly consider the wheat policy changes intro-
duced by the military regime. .
Among the measures adopted by Ayub Khan was a price policy
that turned the terms of trade in favor of the agricultural sector.
Before Ayub Khan's coup d'etat of 1958, there existed a cumber-
some system ofbureaucratic controls on agriculture. Many ofthese
controls, such as the restrictive zoning of surplus areas and the
compulsory sale of surplus food grains to the government at less
than market prices, had been introduced as war-time measures by
the British government in the 1940s. In April 1960 the military
regime, despite many dire predictions, abolished direct controls on
wheat movement and wheat prices in West Pakistan. Under the
new system, the administration guaranteed farmers a minimum
price ofRs. 13.50 per maund (82.3 pounds) of wheat. Sales to the
government were voluntary, and the Food Department entered
usual market channels only when prices dipped below the statu-
tory minimum (Stern and Falcon 1970:39). The net result of these
changes was an increase in the price the farmers could expect to get
for their surplus wheat.
With this background, focus is now placed on explanations of
agricultural growth based on neoclassical economics. This is fol-
lowed by an attempt to provide a broader interdisciplinary explana-
tion of the causes of agricultural growth in Pakistan in the 1960s.
Economic Explanations of Pakistan's
Agricultural Growth
Falcon's research on Pakistan has provided a number of in-
sights on farmer response to changes in price in a near-subsistence
economy. The results suggest "that it is possible to shift the com-
position of agricultural output by changing the relative prices
within agriculture. They also emphasize that, unless there is a
thoroughgOing reform in the services and facilities made available
to farmers (e.g., transportation, credit, fertilizer, technical knowl-
edge, etc.), higher prices alone can have little effect on increasing
yield per acre. On the other hand, the average evidence suggests
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that farmers ofthe area will respond to economic incentives ifgiven
the opportunity to do so" (Falcon 1964:590).
Based on this picture of responsiveness to incentives, Falcon
and Gotsch developed an elaborate explanatory-cum-predictive
model of the performance of agriculture in both East and West
Pakistan. In this model the nearly 5 percent per annum rate of
growth in West Pakistan's crop production during the Second Plan
(1960-1965) was explained in terms ofincreased inputs. More than
half of the increased output was accounted for by greater avail-
ability of water for irrigation, nearly one-third by other improved
inputs, such as seeds, chemical fertilizer, and insecticides, and the
remaining one-sixth to improved farming practices and increase in
labor productivity (Table 2). Accordingly, they considered the ag-
ricultural policy aspects of Pakistan's Second Plan to be a bright
spot in the government's economic development program. These
policy changes, which were designed to stimulate output by pro-
viding incentives for the use of improved inputs, proved to be a
tremendous success (Falcon and Gotsch 1968:312).
Some of these conclusions were counter to actual develop-
ments. In particular, considering the significance attached to the
general incentives to agricultural development, a geographically
diffused pattern of growth should be expected. This was by no
TABLE 2. Sources ofIncreased Crop Output, West Pakistan
Percent per year
Private Tubewells
Public Tubewells
Surface Water
Fertilizer
Plant Protection
Seeds
Improved Practices, Labor,
Intensity, etc.
TOTAL GROWTH
SOURCE: Falcon and Gotsch 1968.
1.4
0.6
0.7
1.0
0.4
0.2
0.6
4.9
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means the case. Recognizing this factor, Gotsch in a later paper
calculated the growth in the value of major crops for sixteen dis-
tricts of the Punjab. The growth rate in crop production in the
period 1960-1965 in these districts ranged between -2.4 percent
for Jhelum to 9.6 percent for the district ofLyallpur (Table 3). Itwas'
clear from this exercise "that what has been hailed rather widely as
'agricultural growth in West Pakistan' is really a rather remarkable
rate of growth in a relatively few districts. For example, Lyallpur,
Multan, and Montgomery, 3 out of 16 districts in the Punjab, aver-
aged an increase of approximately 8.9 percent per annum for the
period 1959-60 to 1964-65" (Gotsch 1968: 190).
Appreciating the fact that changes in general economic incen-
tives were weak in accounting for the uneven growth ofWest Paki-
stan's agriculture, Gotsch undertook further analysis based upon a
model used by B. A. Minhas and A. Vardayanathan (1964). This
model identifies four elements as contributing to the value ofcrop
output-the acreage effect, the yield effect, the effect ofthe changes
in cropping pattern, and the effect of the interaction between
changes in yields and changes in the cropping pattern. Based on the
results obtained from this model, Gotsch grouped the districts in
which the bulk of the increase in output could be explained in
terms ofthe changes in yield and the districts in which the growth
was due to both changes in yield and increases in acreage devoted
to the cultivation of crops. The remaining districts were lumped
together as having stagnated (Table 3).
Let us turn to a more formal farmer behavior model in order to
consider some of the sophistications that have been added. In the
naIve model, acreage response is directly related to price. How-
ever, the work ofS. Mushtaq Hussain has shown that in the case of
cash crops, the farmer response to price, as reflected by the elasti-
city of acreage, is higher than that for food crops (Hussain 1968,
1969). He also discovered that the price elasticity ofarea varies over
crops, regions, and time periods, and that they decline for cash
crops.
Additionally, Azizur Rahman Khan and A. H. M. Nuruddin
Chowdhury (1970:275) found that the amount of surplus food
grains marketed by the West Pakistani farmers was directly related
to their total output. This means that as "output of food increases
TABLE 3. Growth in Crop Output
in the 16 Districts of the Pakistan Punjab, 1960-1965
Districts
Annual Major Crops
Growth Acreage Yield Cropping Inter- Involved (in
Rate Effect Effect Pattern action Order of
(percent) -----------(percent)a Imporlance)
Group I. Stagnating Districts
Jehlum -2.4
Gujrat 2.2
Sialkot -1.2
Rawalpindi 1.0
Campbellpur -2.2
Mianwali 3.2
Sargodha 2.6
Group II. Growth Due Primarily to Yield Effects
Lyallpur 9.6 9.0 71.5 10.0 9.5 Sugarcane,
Wheat
Montgomery 8.4 15.7 61.3 16.3 6.2 Cotton,
Wheat
Multan 8.2 23.8 6.8 6.8 4.2 Cotton,
Wheat
Group III. Growth Due Primarily to Acreage and
Cropping-Pattern Effects
Lahore 4.9 48.5 34.8 9.1 7.6 Wheat,
Rice
Sheikhupura '7.9 47.2 44.4 7.0 1.4 Rice,
Wheat
Guhrawala 6.2 47.0 45.9 5.1 2.0 Rice,
Wheat
Jhang 8.1 39.1 51.3 6.9 2.7 Sugarcane,
Wheat
SOURCE: Gotsch 1968:190.
aThe sum ofthe four effects, acreage, yield, cropping pattern, and interaction equals
100 percent.
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the consumption of food will probably rise, but the incremental
consumption of food will probably rise, but the incremental con-
sumption ration is likely to be less than one. Thus, the marketable
surplus is likely to increase as a result ofan increase in the output of
food crops."
Although none of the works cited above deal with the de-
velopments in Pakistan's agricultural sector during the first post-
Independence decade, they contain clues that can be used to for-
mulate some kind ofan explanation for stagnation in the fifties. The
emphasis on prices as a major determinant of acreage devoted to
producing a particular crop provides an explanation for the fall in
per capita production offood grains at a time when the government
was deliberately keeping down the price of wheat and rice. The
farmer, therefOre, produced food grains either for his own con-
sumption or because his land was not good for another crop. While
the gross output offood grains remained more or less unchanged in
the rainfed areas, it actually declined in the irrigated areas where
the farmer could switch to cash crops. Since the principal deter-
minant ofmarketable surplus is the gross output of food crops, the
quantity of food grains marketed stagnated in this period.
In conclusion, public policy plays an important role in all the
economic models that we discussed. Public policy has received
accolades for the good performance ofPakistan's agricultural sector
during the 1960s. Once we recognize this common element in the
hypotheses advanced by economists to explain the development of
the agricultural sector, we also become aware of one very major
shortcoming shared by them. This pertains to the dynamics of
decision-making in Pakistan's political economy. Two questions
must be asked in any analysis in which policy plays an important
role. First, why is a certain decision made by the policymakers;
second, What happens after a certain policy has been formulated?
In the economic explanations of the growth of West Pakistan's ag-
ricultural sector, the first question has received no attention what-
soever. Economists generally have addressed themselves to
answering the second question. In what follows I shall attempt to
fill this analytical gap. This means crossing disciplinary bound-
aries, from economics into the political and social sciences.
1
The Development of Pakistan's Agriculture 299
Class Structure Changes Accelerate
Agricultural Growth in the 1960s
The History of the Landed Aristocracy
To develop the analysis along general social science lines, we
have to go back 150 years, into the history of British India, to the
time when India's new conqueror transformed herself from a com-
mercial exploiter to a founder and guardian3 of a new kind of
economic and political order in the subcontinent. The introduction
ofa new system ofland administration, known to students of!ndian
affairs as "settlements," was the starting point of a long process of
rural change. These settlements formed "the basis ofa political and
economic system in which the foreigner, the landlord, and the
moneylender took the economic surplus away from the peasantry"
(Moore 1966:344). In subsequent developments, the Land Aliena-
tion Act of 1901 removed the moneylender from the areas that now
constitute Pakistan and the Indian Independence Act of 1947 re-
moved the foreigner from the subcontinent. The political organiza-
tion that moved in to fill the vacuum left by the departure of the
British had been dominated all along by the landed aristocracy.
The Muslim League was founded in 1906 by a group oflarge land-
lords. In the 1940s, even after Mohammad Ali Jinnah had turned
the league into a mass organization, the landed aristocracy ac-
counted for 163 of the 503 members of the party's central council
(Sayeed 1966:207). However, Jinnah succeeded in diluting the
power wielded by the landlords within the Muslim League organi-
zation. As the president ofthe league, he concentrated a great deal
of political power in his hands and by recruiting a large number of
urban professonals (lawyers, teachers, doctors, etc.), he was able to
create a social group that could effectively challenge the landed
aristocracy. Since Muslims living in the Hindu minority areas were
more urbanized (Hazelhurst 1966:11-15), the bulk ofthe challenge
to the power ofthe landlords came from the areas that went to India
after the partition ofthe subcontinent. In spite ofthe fact that a very
large number of Muslim urban professionals migrated to Pakistan,
they were not able to create political constituencies for themselves
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in the new country. When Jinnah died in 1948 he left the leader-
ship ofthe Muslim League to Liaquat Ali Khan, who was the scion
ofa landed family. Thus, a year after the emergence of Pakistan as
an independent state, the landed aristocracy found itselfnot only in
full control ofthe economic surplus generated by the peasantry, but
also in charge of the country's political apparatus.
Why is it, then, that the agricultural sector of West Pakistan
began to stagnate at a time when the big landlords dominated? In
order to answer this question we have to disaggregate rural society
into a number of strata and then construct different welfare func-
tions for each of the strata.
At the apex of rural society was the landed aristocracy. This
class had been,created by the British in the image of their own
squirearchy. By the time the British reached the Punjab they had no
doubt abandoned the principles ofpolitical administration that had
led them to introduce the Permanent Settlement in Bengal. How-
ever, the Mahalwari system adopted by them for the Punjab also
resulted in the creation of a class of zamindars. The system pro-
vided sufficient incentive for the zamindar to remain on the land. In
return for economic rewards and official patronage, the zamindars
functioned as agents of the state in their villages. They collected
the government revenue from their fellow villagers and in return
received panchotra, or 5 percent of the total amount due to the
government. Moreover, their sons and relations were easily ab-
sorbed into government service. Therefore, under the British Raj,
the power and prestige of the big landlords expanded rapidly. By
virtue ofwh~,' !.,qwell and Kaplan (1960:57-58) have called the
woc~~< "'6glutinati:~ tJ-~ landlords were able to add to
,', <'-, '" t lrr;l
By icIruving _...d·:mders, the Land Alienation
Act of1901 lent a further helping hand. Peasants now had to tum to
their landlords for their cash requirements and often found that the
land mortgaged by them could not be redeemed. According to J. D.
Anderson, a British civil servant who was in charge of the settle-
ment operations in a southwestern district of the Punjab, "The big
Mohammadan landlords speak of the act as their economic salva-
tion, and probably it has to some extent protected them from the
result of their extravagance and made it easier to swallow up their
neighbors" (1929:9).
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Some ofWest Pakistan's landed aristocracy owes its existence
to the help rendered somewhat more directly by the British Raj. In
the first quarter of the present century, the government, with the
help ofa vast irrigation program, converted large tracts ofwasteland
in the Punjab and Sind into rich agricultural land. While designing
the layout of the canals and settling agriculturalists on the new
land, the administration was not unmindful ofthe loyalty that some
of the chieftains had shown toward their rulers. Within a couple of
decades the government's program of land development placed
vast productive resources in the hands of a score of families, par-
ticularly in the southern districts of the Punjab and the central
districts of the Sind.4
The Increasing Power of the Landed Aristocracy in the
1950s
In the 1950s, following the Land Reforms Commission, the
landed aristocracy were defined as landlords who owned more
than 500 acres. In the Punjab in 1949, the landed aristocracy con-
sisted of 1,000 persons who together owned 10.3 percent of the
agricultural land in the province (Table 4). In the North-West
Frontier Province the members ofthis class owned 12.5 percent of
the total cultivated area. It was in the Sind that this stratum of the
rural society possessed the greatest economic, social, and political
TABLE 4. Area Owned, including Uncultivated Area,
by Size of Holdings in the Former Punjab, 1949
Size of Holdings Acres No. ofOwners
(Thousands) (Percent) (Thousands) (Percent)
Less than 10 acres 7,092 31.8 1,809 78.7
10 to 99 acres 10,428 46.7 476 20.7
100 to 499 acres 2,502 11.2 12 0.5
500 acres and above 2,295 10.3 1 0.1
TOTAL 22,317 100.0 2,298 100.0
SOURCE: Government ofWest Pakistan 1959.
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power. In that province, the landed aristocracy possessed 30 per-
cent of the total occupied land (Government of West Pakistan
1959:13). It is therefore understandable why W. H. Morris-Jones
felt that "the key to Pakistan's politics is to be found in a little
official publication for restricted circulation by the government of
India, entitled The Landed Families of the Punjab" (1958:225).
The landed aristocracy made its presence felt when the people
went to the polls for the first time after the birth ofPakistan. In the
1951 elections to the legislative assembly of the Punjab, the big
landowning families captured 80 percent of the seats. In the Sind
elections of 1953, 90 percent of the assembly members were large
landowners. The landlord group was also in a majority in the legis-
lature elected 1;>y the voters of the North-West Frontier Province
(Maniruzzaman 1966:86).
Out ofthe 902 members ofthe landed aristocracy who surren-
dered land under Martial Law Regulation No. 64 (Government of
Pakistan 1964:33), 108 or 12 percent held ministerial appointments
in the central government or the provincial governments of the
Punjab, Sind, and North-West Frontier Province. According to the
returns filed by these landlords with West Pakistan's Board of
Revenue, the total area owned by them amounted to 1.218 million
acres, giving an average of 11,280 acres per person. None of them
owned less than 850 acres of irrigated land.s These statistics can
provide some measure ofthe power wielded by the big landlords in
the countryside.
As an average-sized village in the Punjab has 600 acres ofcul'-
tivable land, landlords who were politically active in the pre-Ayub
era were able to control completely at least twenty Punjabi villages.
However, a landlord did not have all the land in a village under 1)is
control. His land more often than not was scattered over scores
(sometimes hundreds) of villages. In each of them, he was the
headman, the lambardar, the moneylender, the most prominent
person. Therefore, the political and economic constituency of the
big landlord was not the 11,280 acres that he owned, but the 50 to
100,000 acres ofcultivable land in the villages in which he was the
paramount power.
In such a situation rationality demanded that landlords should
behave not only as economic but also as political and social
maximizers. Once the members of the landed aristocracy are re-
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garded not only as economic men, but also as political and social
men, the stagnation ofWest Pakistan's agricultural sector at a time
when the big landlords wielded great power no longer seems
paradoxical. As an economic man, the landlord had to maximize his
returns within the constraints imposed by the availability of re-
sources and the state ofthe technology. For the big landlord, water,
not land, was the real constraint. Therefore, his typical response
was "to extend the acreage which he crops each season by reducing
the fallow on the land which in the past he left totally unused,
rather than to increase the water applied to the acreage he was
already cultivating" (Lieftinck et al. 1968:23).
This tendency was reinforced by the behavior of the landlord
as a political maximizer. In this capacity, his emphasis was on ex-
tensive rather than intensive cultivation. The more land that he
could bring under his control, the larger was his constituency and
the greater his political power. The big landlord used the political
power at his disposal to make available to his class the resource
over which the government had the greatest control, that is, irriga-
tion water.
One evidence ofthis is to be found from an examination ofthe
charges brought by the military regime against a number of politi-
cians who held public office before Ayub Khan took over the ad-
ministration ofthe country. The Elective Bodies (Disqualification)
Order (EBDO) was issued in August 1959, and was applied to any
person who had held any public office or position, including mem-
bership ofany elective body in the country, and was found guilty of
misconduct while holding that office. "The exact number of per-
sons ... does not seem to have been published.... [However], it
seems that about 6,000 persons labored under the EBDO disquali-
fication" (Feldman 1967:81). My own investigations reveal that out
of 108 members of the landed aristocracy, at least forty-two or 38.9
percent were charged under the EBDO. Of those so charged,
thirty-three or 78.6 percent were found to have used their official
powers for either "diverting to their lands a higher proportion than
allowed by law and custom ofthe available irrigation water," or "for
changing the scope and extent ofgovernment-sponsored irrigation
schemes in such a way that a higher proportion than that planned
originally of new irrigation water was made available for use on
their lands."6
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This near-monopolistic control ofa scarce resource for produc-
tion increased the wealth of the landlords as well as the produc-
tivity ofthe lands owned by them. Therefore, while the agricultural
sector stagnated as a whole, the landed aristocracy prospered. Evi-
dence of the difference between the returns obtained by the big
landlords and other types ofIandholders can be obtained from rent
data (Table 5). The time series of rents received by landlords of
various categories between 1948/49 and 1968/69 is based on rec-
ords maintained by patwaris in twenty-seven villages in thePunjab.
In 1948/49, the landlords who leased out holdings of more than
250 acres received 2 to 21 percent higher rents than smaller land-
holders.7 The lowest rent was received for holdings ofless than ten
acres in size. In the ten-year period between 1948/49 and 1958/59,
the rents fetched by the large holdings increased by 39.4 percent,
whereas the rents of small holdings (less than twenty-five acres in
size) increased between 19.5 and 25.6 percent. The differential
between the rents received by the very small and the very large
holdings increased considerably, from 21 percent in 1948/49 to 48
percent in 1958/59.
The Effect of the Ayub Khan Land Reforms of1958
Ayub Khan introduced his land reforms in 1958. While it can-
not be said that the reforms resulted in large transfers ofIand, "the
political implications were weighty and, although by no means
extinguished as a class, the great landed magnates no longer rep-
resented the same vast and sometimes inert agglomeration of
power" (Feldman 1967:60). We turn to the rent data for evidence of
this decline in the power ofthe landed aristocracy. The rent series
for holdings between 250 and 500 acres stopped increasing after
1959, and in the following ten years fluctuated around a mean of
139. Rents for holdings ofless than 10 acres also did not show any
appreciable increase after 1959, but fluctuated around a mean of97.
The largest increase in the value of rent after 1959 was registered
by the holdings of25 to 50 acres in size. For these, the rent per acre
increased by 33.6 percent in the ten-year period between 1958/59
and 1968/69. For holdings of50 to 100 acres and 100 to 200 acres in
size, the rent per acre increased by 19.3 and 11.3 percent respec-
tively.
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TABLE 5. Rents Received by Landlords,
Separated by Size of Holding, in the Punjab, 1948-1969
(rupees per acre)
Year Size of the Rented Holding (acres)
Less
than 10 10-25 26-50 51-100 101-250 251-500
1948/49 82 87 91 92 102 104
1949/50 85 92 93 94 104 110
1950/51 85 94 94 96 108 111
1951/52 79 92 95 96 107 108
1952/53 76 93 95 95 105 108
1953/54 94 105 108 121 120 122
1954/55 89 101 110 120 125 128
1955/56 91 107 116 125 130 132
1956/57 88 107 118 130 132 128
1957/58 90 111 122 138 136 137
1958/59 98 117 128 140 142 145
1959/60 96 117 126 140 145 141
1960/61 94 118 135 139 144 139
1961/62 92 118 140 139 142 137
1962/63 97 121 145 142 140 140
1963/64 97 125 148 144 140 141
1964/65 104 128 157 150 142 145
1965/66 92 124 155 146 142 135
1966/67 94 128 160 152 148 132
1967/68 98 130 165 160 151 139
1968/69 102 135 171 167 158 143
SOURCE: Survey by Shahid Javed Burki with the assistance of the deputy commis-
sioners and students of Government College, Lahore. The data are from twenty-
seven villages in the Punjab. One village was chosen from Lahore District, two
villages from Sahiwal District, and three villages from each ofthe following districts:
Jhang, Gujranwala, Gujrat, Sahiwal, Multan, Dera Ghazi Khan, LyaIIput, and
Bahawalnager.
These data indicate a new trend, a change in the pattern of
development in the agricultural sector. If used as a surrogate for
land productivity, these rents show that, except for holdings under
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twenty-five acres, increases in output per acre were inversely re-
lated to the size of the holding. In other words, in holdings above
twenty-five acres the rate of increase ofproductivity was the high-
est for the smallest holdings. These data suggest that during the
Ayub Khan era, a new type ofagricultural entrepreneur emerged in
the Pakistani countryside.
We have already noted that the economists' explanation for the
performance of the agricultural sector in the sixties was not totally
satisfactory. One reason was that economists failed to study the
response to the change in technology by different categories of
landowners. Some sociologists, applying the concept developed in
diffusion research, sought to fill this gap. "Diffusion research re-
gards the di~semination of information as the basic sociological
process leading to increased agricultural productivity through the
adoption of innovations. A traditional farmer can become modem,
that is accept change, if he has the necessary knowledge and is
willing to implement new practices. Research into the acceptance
of change, based on such a theory, naturally starts with a study of
how information reaches farmers and what kinds offarmers actively
seek and use it" (Galjart 1971:35). Using this approach, Chaudhari,
Erickson, and Bajwa (1968:97), three sociologists who studied the
process ofchange in Punjabi villages, found that in two villages in
the district of Sialkot, more than 90 percent of the landlords with
holdings larger than twenty-five acres showed medium or high
levels of adoption of four improved agricultural practices. The in-
novation capacity of these farmers was considerably greater than
that ofthe landholders with less than twenty-five acres (Chaudhari
et al. 1968:101).
Chaudhari and his colleagues arrived at a conclusion quite the
opposite ofthe one reached on the basis of the data ofTable 5, for
the simple reason that they used the generalized diffusion model
within the usual sociological framework of traditional and modem
farmers. Like the economists, they also became victims oftoo much
aggregation. Thus the small farmers, defined as those who owned
less than twenty-five acres, followed the traditional pattern. The
big landlords, or those who owned more than twenty-five acres,
followed the culture pattern ofthe modem farmer. The latter, being
modem, were not only prepared to adopt agricultural innovations,
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but also proved to have changed in many other ways. They made
more use of media of communication than did the traditional far-
mers, participated more often in community affairs, possessed more
new equipment, and visited towns more frequently.s
By breaking up the ownership of land into six categories, the
modern-traditional dichotomy does not work. In fact, as was
pointed out above, the direct relationship that Chaudhari et al.
discovered between size and innovation reverses itself ifwe break
up "bigness" into four categories.
Diffusion research, like the economists' analysis, casts the
farmer in a somewhat passive role. The economists' explanation
begins when a qualitative or quantitative change takes place in the
availability of inputs. They then go on to study the farmer's re-
sponse to this change in his environment. Similarly, the
sociologists' concern starts when new information becomes avail-
able for diffusion and adoption. The question as to why new inputs
became available at a certain time is not answered satisfactorily by
either. It is the answer to this question that supplies the clue
needed to understand the growth of West Pakistan's agricultural
sector after the 1958 takeover by the military of the country's ad-
ministration.
The Rise of the Middle-Class Farmers in the 1960s
The system of Basic Democracies, launched by Ayub Khan in
October 1959, was designed to transfer some ofthe political, social,
and economic power wielded by the landed aristocracy to the rural
middle class, defined as landholders who own between 50 and 100
acres. With the help ofthis system the new regime tried to activate
politically this group of middle-class landlords who had hitherto
taken very little interest in politics. Ayub Khan's approach was
based on sound comprehension of the game of political
arithmetic-after all the rural middle class was far more numerous
than the landed aristocracy and commanded far greater economic
resources. The elections of1959 to the local councils created under
the system ofBasic Democracies brought a large number ofmiddle
landholders into the political arena (Burki 1971:178-179). Once
they were there, they exerted their influence on the civil bureauc-
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racy. The civil bureaucracy, in tum, consolidated its position by
aligning itself more closely with this new social group (Burki
1969:250-251).
The rural middle class constituted a social stratum different
from that ofthe landed aristocracy-its economic, social, and politi-
cal goals, and the nature of the constraints facing it, were not the
same as those of the big landlords. Thus the middle-class farmer
responded to his economic, political, and social environment in a
different way. An analysis concerned with understanding the de-
velopment ofthe agricultural sector would not be complete without
an emphasis on the nature ofthis response. This new response was
possible for two reasons. First, the middle-class farmer, for the first
time in the his.tory ofWest Pakistan, could operate free of the con-
trol ofthe landed aristocracy. Second, the middle-class farmers had
access to a large percentage of the cultivated land.
Dimensions ofthis response were seen in data collected from
the survey of twenty-seven villages in the Punjab. Analysis shows
that the middle-class farmers increased their crop production most
rapidly. A positive and significant correlation was found between
the percentage ofland in farm ownership sizes of25 to 50 and 50 to
100 acres and the ratio of growth of crop production (Table 6).
Twenty-seven percent ofthe variance in the rate ofgrowth ofcrop
production is explained by using the percentage of land owned by
farmers in the 25 to 50-acre category. By using the percentage of
land in the 50 to 100-acre ownership category as the independent
variable, the explanatory power ofthe equation increases from 27 to
59 percent. More than 88 percent ofthe variance is explained when
we introduce the percentage of land owned by the middle-class
farmers as the independent variable.
The conclusion we can draw is clear: the middle-class farmers,
owning between 50 and 100 acres of land in the Punjab, produced
the revolution in West Pakistan's agriculture. They did this first by
going in for intensive use of water, and then by quickly adopting
the technology made available to them as a result ofa breakthrough
in the development of high-yielding seed varit!ties. Thus West
Pakistan's agricultural revolution began with water in the early
1960s, more than half a decade before the green revolution-
coinciding with the emergence of the rural middle class as a new
l
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TABLE 6. Ratio of Growth in Agricultural Production
in 27 Villages of the Punjab, 1959-1969
Dependent Independent Coefficient of
Variable Constant Variables r Determination
1. ROG = 9.455 - .1122 APOL -0.70 0.49
(0.642) (.0231)
2. ROG= 7.257 - 0.0329 BPOL - 0.16 0.03
(0.949) (.0399)
3. ROG= 2.990 + .1751 CPOL + 0.52 0.27
(1.19) (.0580)
4. ROG= 3.880 + 0.1359 DPOL + 0.77 0.59
(0.477) (.0225)
5. ROG = 6.502 + .0014 EPOL + 0.Ql 0.00
(0.583)
6. ROG = 0.555 + 0.1505 CDOL + 0.94 0.88
(0.456) (0.0112)
SOURCE: Shahid Javed Burki, Twenty-seven Village Study. See source note to
Table 5, this chapter.
ROG = Average per annum rate of growth, 1959-1969.
APOL = Percentage of cultivated area owned by farmers having holdings of 0-10
acres in size.
BPOL = Percentage of area in holdings of 11-25 acres.
CPOL = Percentage of area in holdings of 26-50 acres.
DPOL = Percentage of area in holdings of 51-100 acres.
EPOL = Percentage of area in holdings of 101-500 acres.
CDOL = Percentage of area in holdings of 25-100 acres.
(The figures in parentheses are standard errors.)
powerful and independent factor in the political system introduced
by Ayub Khan.
Of particular interest is the fact that the rural middle class,
released from the political and social control ofthe landed aristoc-
racy as a result of the introduction of the system of Basic Democ-
racies, responded with an economic attitude that was close to that of
the traditional profit maximizer. The middle-class landlords, unlike
the members ofthe landed aristocracy, had to treat land as a scarce
resource. They did not have access to the vast tracts of wasteland
that were available for cultivation a decade earlier by the big land-
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lords. Accordingly, they concentrated their attention on expanding
their output by increasing land productivity (Gotsch's yield factor
in the model outlined above.) This they did by installing tubewells
and thereby increasing substantially the supply ofirriga!ion water.
The new regime, mindful of the economic interests of the
group it had helped to politically emancipate, was prepared to lend
a helping hand. Public policy was geared toward providing this
class of landowners with all the inputs they desired at subsidized
prices. Tubewell parts were imported at favorable terms of ex-
change, energy for the tubewells was made available by the state-
run Water and Power Development Authority at subsidized rates,
and new inputs like fertilizer and insecticides were provided at
generous rates of subsidy. According to a study sponsored by the
World Bank, the political and economic program ofthe new regime
"was a factor in changing the attitudes of large landowners, and
awakening a more active interest in improving the productivity of
their lands through increased investments, including tubewells
and mechanization of farm operations" (Lieftinck et al. 1968:66).
However, the trail was blazed by the middle-sized landowner.
If the middle-class landlord has contributed to agricultural
growth to the extent indicated by the above analysis, then it is
obvious that he is also its main beneficiary. A good proportion ofthe
increased income from land must have gone to this class of farmer.
This is supported by the twenty-seven village survey data, which
indicate that of the total land held by the farmers in the 50- and
lOa-acre range, as much as 19.2 percent was acquired through
purchases in the ten-year period between 1959 and 1969. The
proportion of land so acquired is far greater for this category of
landholder than for any other. Owners of holdings of less than 10
acres and between 10 and 25 acres held respectively 12.2 percent
and 6.9 percent less land in 1969 than they did a decade earlier. The
big landlords, with holdings of more than 100 acres, also lost 15.7
percent of the land in the same period.
The rise ofmiddle-class farmers has its positive and negative
aspects. It was no doubt healthy for the economy that the middle-
class landlord emerged as a dominant entrepreneurial influence in
the rural sector, prepared and able to make use of the additions to
his income in increasing the productive assets at his disposal. In
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this respect, he displayed a totally different attitude than that exhib-
ited by the landed aristocracy. The latter was a political rather than
an economic maximizer in the decade following independence.
The negative aspect of this development was that the middle-
class landlord, in his drive to acquire more productive capital, did
not hesitate to eliminate those who could not compete with him.
Consequently, the rapid strides made by agriculture in several
Punjabi districts during the decade of the 1960s caused the dis-
placement ofa large number ofsmaller landholders. Italso resulted
in the landed aristocracy surrendering to the acquisitive pressure of
the middle-class landlord some of their holdings. This paring of
their landed possessions helped preempt the political pressure for
reducing the size of the maximum holdings permitted under law.
While the landed aristocracy were hard on their tenants, the
middle-class landlord was hard on his competitors. The small land-
holders, when deprived oftheir holdings, often took to urban areas.
Conclusions
From the preceding analysis, it is possible to draw the follow-
ing three major conclusions. First, the principal determinants of
recent change in the agricultural sector of West Pakistan were a
new group of middle-class agricultural entrepreneurs who were
able to exercise influence over the formulation of public policy.
This influence was exercised not only because the policy makers
became aware of the potential power of this new group, but also
because in a number of cases the policy makers themselves were
the members ofthis class. To a very large extent, the policies favor-
ing the middle-class farmer were formulated because the civil
bureaucracy, in charge ofthe function ofpolicy formulation, saw in
this rural group a potentially strong ally. But of equal importance,
the very large presence ofthe members ofthe rural middle class in
the officer corps of the army added strength to the middle-class
influence on political and economic affairs.
Second, the Pakistani political and economic system proved
elastic enough to accommodate this new middle class. This expan-
sion ofthe system was described as a revolution by the admirers of
the regime ofAyub Khan (Feldman 1967).
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Third, it is likely that the new class of agricultural entre-
preneurs that Ayub Khan brought into being will also turn itself
into a group ofpolitical as well as economic maximizers.9 In doing
so the middle-class farmers will be following the model provided
by the political culture of the old landed aristocracy. This de-
velopment could produce two consequences: it could produce elite
conflict when this new group tries to increase power at the com-
manding heights of the state apparatus, and it could manipulate
what remains ofthe small-fanner class in a manner consistent with
the political style of the landed aristocracy.
We can therefore expect an increased rate ofconflict as a result
ofthe emergence ofthe middle-class farmer. What will this conflict
do to the politicaJ and economic system? This is a serious question
and can be answered in one of two ways. My preference would be
to take the line that the system, having adjusted to accommodate
conflict before, would do so once again. There is a good possibility
that the strain caused by the major change in the agricultural sector
will not tear apart the political, social, and economic fabric.
Shahid]aved Burki holds a degree in Economics from Oxford Uni-
versity. He is a member ofthe civil service ofPakistan. His numer-
ous government assignments have included: deputy secretary,
West Pakistan Department of Basic Democracies; director, West
Pakistan Rural Works Program; deputy secretary, West Pakistan
Planning and Development Department. He was also a research
fellow with the Center for International Affairs, Harvard Univer-
sity, 1970-1971. Currently he holds the position of deputy secre-
tary, Exports, Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan,
Rawalpindi.
NOTES
The hypothesis presented in this paper developed in many discussions
that I have had over the past four years with Carl H. Gotsch. I therefore owe
him a special debt. I am also grateful to Peter Bertocci and Samuel Popkin
for their helpful comments on an earlier draft ofthis paper. None of them,
however, is responsible for the conclusions that I have drawn in this
analysis. The twenty-seven village survey, results ofwhich have been used
here, was sponsored by the Center for International Affairs, Harvard Uni-
versity.
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1. For a good discussion of the importance of the interdisciplinary ap-
proach in studying developing economies, see Lipton (1970).
2. See Papanek (1967:317) for the data for 1948/49 and Government of
Pakistan (1970) for data for 1968/69.
3. Philip Wordruff(1954) in his history of the Indian civil service uses
"founders" and "guardians" as subtitles to indicate the nature of the role
played by the British in the subcontinent.
4. For an interesting study of the development of irrigation by the
British in what is now Pakistan, see Michel (1967).
5. This data was obtained by the author from the Board of Revenue,
Government of West Pakistan.
6. These two charges frequently reoccurred in the cases brought by the
state under the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order of 1959.
7. The data presented in this table include rents received in cash as welI
as in kind. The value ofthe rent received was computed from the average
price for the year of the commodity given to the landlord by the tenant or
the person to whom the land was leased.
8. Some ofthese authors developed this model in greater detail in a later
work (Chaudhari et aI. 1970).
9. I am indebted to Peter Bertocci for his contribution to these conclu-
sions: he pointed out that the middle-class farmer could also adopt the
model ofa political maximizer.
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The Rural Elite
and Agricultural
Development in Pakistan
HarnzaAlavi
Introduction
An extraordinary air ofoptimism pervades most discussions of
the green revolution in Pakistan.! It is a kind of optimism that
perhaps obscures some fundamental questions that might be raised
about its characteristics, consequences, and alternatives. Scholarly
debate has been focused on explanations for the breakthrough in
application ofnew agricultural technology and upon the reasons for
the earlier stagnation (see chapter 15), and research has been fo-
cused on the incidental difficulties that must be resolved to allow
the green revolution to continue its course.2 There is, however, a
growing uneasiness about some of the implications of the current
pattern of development (see chapters 13 and 17).
The essentially optimistic view of the green revolution in the
economic sphere is translated into political and social spheres by
Burki in chapter 15. He argues that "middle-class farmers owning
between 50 and 100 acres ofland in the Punjab [have] produced the
revolution in West Pakistan's agriculture" and are its main bene-
ficiaries. Furthermore, a new political equation was established
between the political regime in Pakistan and this class, with its
new-found economic power and local influence, which the regime
has "helped to emancipate politically." The rise ofthe rural middle
class, Burki argues, has eroded the political and economic power of
the "landed aristocracy." My analysis does not support such a con-
clusion.
Changes in the agrarian economy, referred to as the green
revolution, are the cumulative result of a number of independent
developments, events, and responses of large landholders to the
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opportunities that arose. There is no all-embracing scheme that
could be described as a "strategy" of agricultural development.
However, the term is not altogether inappropriate, in the sense that
an underlying logic gave some coherel'lCe to the separate and inde-
pendent decisions of the various authorities and farmers. That
logic, it may be argued, was derived from the demands and pres-
sures ofthe big landholders whose operations are at the heart ofthe
dynamic of agricultural development that was set in motion. For
the authorities, it turned out to be a "policy," ex post facto. It was an
elite farmer strategy because it rested on the economic power of
large landholders who were its principal beneficiaries.
My analysis shows not only a tendency toward increasing dis-
parities of income and wealth between different strata of the rural
population, but also a tendency toward widening regional dis-
parities. Such disparities are the outcome of the class basis of the
dynamic of agricultural development, in the context that there are
structural differences in the agrarian economy in the different re-
gions. However, these differences cannot be explained wholly by
reference to ecological imperatives or by suggestions of interre-
gional discrimination. Ifthat were true, a resolution ofthe problem
of regional disparities could not be resolved independently of a
shift from the present class basis of agricultural development.
A crucial aspect of the green revolution, little researched as
yet, consists of its "secondary effects," which are not apparent if
attention is focused exclusively on the agrarian economy. Such
effects arise through changes in the patterns of expenditures as-
sociated with the changes in incomes. The resultant expansion in
demand for manufactured consumer goods and imported com-
modities has generated inflationary pressures ofan unprecedented
scale. This has brought about an erosion in the real incomes ofthose
farmers who have not directly benefited from the green revolution,
as well as in those ofwage and salary earners in the towns. There-
fore, although the green revolution has increased the prosperity of
some, it has impoverished many.
If such complex secondary effects of the green revolution are
taken into account, it is not surprising that, in 1968, when the
largest harvests ever had been reaped, the entire countryside
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erupted with popular discontent on an unprecedented scale. The
regional distribution of gains and burdens of the green revolution
also has greatly exacerbated interregional tensions. It would be
naive to assume that these issues will be readily perceived by the
authorities and that a totally new approach will be introduced into
the sphere of agrarian development, because the class which has
profited most from the present pattern of development holds a
powerful position in Pakistan's political system. It would be safer to
assume under the political realities that the strains being generated
will not disappear. Far from having established a new political
equilibrium, the green revolution has generated forces that have
been at the center of the successive crises Pakistan has experi-
enced.
The Regional Pattern of the Agrarian Economy
Interregional differences in the structure ofPakistan's agrarian
economy originate from ecological differences and consequences
of differences in patterns of historical development. However, in
past discussions, interregional comparisons have focused almost
wholly on natural differences and have tended to obscure the un-
derlying differences in the economic and social structures. The
Food and Agriculture Commission, for example, distinguished be-
tween the following regions of West Pakistan: Canal Irrigated
Plains of West Pakistan, Submontane Regions of West Pakistan,
Range Lands of West Pakistan, and Hill Catchment Area of West
Pakistan (GOP 1960). This is a simple ecological classification. The
commission does not consider other criteria that might be relevant
to a further elaboration of the regional pattern, in order to identifY
issues ofpublic policy. Because such an approach emphasizes"gi-
ven" natural conditions, the problems ofeach region appear to be
specific to each region. We have no framework in which the prob-
lems of the different regions could be interrelated.
A Pakistani geographer, Maryam Elahi, was among the first to
pursue systematically the question of regional differences in ag-
ricultural productivity (Elahi: 1963,1965). She focuses her analysis
on physical factors, although at the outset she does recognize that
"efficiency of agriculture reflects the influence of varied physical,
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economic, social and historical factors." She ranks the regions of
Pakistan in their relative efficiency in agricultural production, tak-
ing into account the yield of each crop and the cropping pattern.
The weakness in her analysis seems to lie in the fact that, in ranking
productive efficiency, she allocates an equal weight for every crop
and does not take into account the relative weights of particular
crops in the national economy or in the economy of a particular
region. Her study does bring focus upon the disparities between
regions but it relates them mainly to physical differences.
In another recent study, Gotsch (1968) computed differences
in the rates of growth for the various districts of the Punjab. He
provides valuable insight into various "sources of growth" which
he breaks down into "acreage effects," "yield effects," and "crop-
ping-pattern effe·cts," and he examines the extent to which one or
the other effect has been prominent in the growth of agricultural
production in different regions ofthe Punjab. He then examines the
factors that have contributed to the predominance ofsuch effects in
the growth ofagricultural production in those regions. The critical
variable in his analysis is the provision of water.
An important additional variable that should be considered in
examining the regional impact ofthe green revolution is farm size.
The structure of the agrarian economy of each region, as deter-
mined by the distribution of landownership and farm size, vitally
affects the prospects and problems of development (Alavi 1968).
There are, however, wide variations in the structure ofthe agrarian
economy within and between Pakistan's provinces. It is conve-
nient for the purposes of this analysis to focus attention on the
province of Punjab and thus limit the range of data we need to
examine.
Furthermore, it has the advantage ofshowing that explanations
of regional disparity lie primarily in the structure of the agrarian
economy and cannot be explained purely by reference to provincial
political influence. Punjab is the largest and richest of the pro-
vinces of Pakistan and politically the most influ~ntial. !!}1-'l~L60. ,
P!!S~nt of the ~populationoEEakistan.. fAN'"'J',j,. + &",<l '" r-.L l' ¥P~.,.J
-- Regional differences in the structure of the agrarian economy A>-f.,
are derived from the historical development of the regions, con-
ditioned by their respective physical environments. For the pur-
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poses ofthis analysis, four regions ofthe Punjab, which have quite
distinct characteristics, were specified.
1. the PoorOld Settled Districts ofthebarani (rainfed) region
2. the Rich Old Settled Districts, which have good irrigation
as well as good rainfall
3. the Canal Colony Districts
4. the arid and relatively sparsely populated Western Districts
of Mianwali, Muzaffargarh, and Dera Ghazi Khan
Recent irrigation projects are changing the characteristics of the
Western Districts and will not be treated as separate categories. In
the discussion which follows, I have defined the Canal Colony
Districts to include Sargodha, Multan, and Bahawalpur divisions,
excluding only Mianwali District, which I have classified together
with the Rawalpindi Division as constituting the region ofthe Poor
Old Settled Districts. The districts of Lahore Division constitute
the region of the Rich Old Settled Districts. I have chosen these
somewhat awkward labels for the respective regions to emphasize
the historical conditions of their development, which have deter-
mined their present state.
The demarcation ofthe regions owes much to the natural con-
ditions ofthe regions. To begin with, a primary distinction is estab-
lished by the alignment of the isoprecipitation lines that differen-
tiate the northern region of the Punjab, consisting of Rawalpindi
and Lahore divisions, which receive a sufficiency ofrainfall to per-
mit barani cultivation. South of that region, until the advent of
canal irrigation, the land was by and large an empty waste, peopled
mainly in the riverains by seminomadic tribes who practiced a
rather perfunctory agriculture on strips of land irrigated by the
annual riverain floods. In some parts of this arid region, around
wells, there were also a few scattered agricultural settlements.
In the barani area, namely Rawalpindi and Lahore divisions,
sufficiency ofrainfall fostered a settled agricultural population from
very early times. Therefore, I have referred to these two regions as
the Old Settled Districts. The long history ofa settled agriculture in
these districts is relevant because, as a consequence, land in these
populous districts has been subdivided from generation to genera-
tion, and the average size of farms in these two regions is now very
small compared to those in the Canal Colony Districts.
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The barani region (the Old Settled Districts) can be sub-
divided into two distinct regions: the Rich Old Settled Districts of
Lahore Division, and the Poor Old Settled Districts ofRawalpindi
Division. The former region not only has a good rainfall but addi-
tional water available from canal 6r well irrigation. The southern
half of that region (Lahore and Sheikhupura districts, as well as
much as Gujranwala District) has the benefit ofcanal irrigation. In
the northern half(Sialkot District and parts ofGujranwala District),
where topography does not favor the extension ofcanal irrigation,
groundwater supplies are easily accessible and agriculture has
been supplemented traditionally by wells operated by Persian
wheels and now by tubewells. As a result, the region is highly
productive. Rawalpindi Division, on the other hand, with the ex-
ception only ofa lJart ofGujrat District, is almost wholly dependent
upon rainfall for agriculture. There groundwater is not easily acces-
sible and canal irrigation is limited because ofits topography. With
the population crowded into small farms, it is a very poor region.
Before the advent ofcanal irrigation, the dry zone south ofthe
Old Settled Districts, large tracts ofland that had little value, was
appropriated by big landowners. The introduction of irrigation at
the tum ofthe century transformed the agrarian economy ofmost of
the dry zone. Colonists were brought from all parts of the Punjab
and sizable allotments ofland were made. The average size offarms
in this region is, therefore, relatively large. Too few generations
have passed to fragment these large holdings into the extremely
small sizes typically found in the Old Settled Districts.
However, one factor has served to introduce a substantial
number of small landholders and landless people into the Canal
Colonies. Before 1947 a large proportion, although a minority, of
the population ofthe Canal Colony Districts in West Pakistan con-
sisted of Hindus and Sikhs who, at the time of the Partition (of
India), were driven outofthe country. The "evacuee land" they left
behind was allotted provisionally to families of incoming refugees
on the basis ofone acre per head for evey member ofa family. But in
1954, the evacuee land was reallotted among refugees on the basis
of claimed holdings in India. This was land reform in reverse.
Those who could establish large claims acquired large landhold-
ings; others who could not do so lost what they already had. This
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great upheaval in landholdings, which included the eviction of i
those who could not establish a claim, has been ignored by those
who have written about agriculture in West Pakistan. But that mea-
sure has had a far-reaching effect on the agrarian economy of the
Canal Colony Districts. One of its consequences was a large in-
crease in the proportion of the agricultural population that had to )
look to sharecropping or laboring as a principal means of liveli-
hood.
The size-pattern of farms in the three, prinCipally agrarian re-
gions of the Punjab described above is presented in Table 1. One
representative district for each region is presented for purposes of
illustration.
TABLE 1. The Size-Pattern of Farms in the Three
Principal Agrarian Regions of the Punjab
Poor Old Rich Old Canal
Settled Settled Colony
District: District: District:
Rawalpindi Gujranwala Multan
Size of Farms (%)
Small Farms
(below 5 acres) 74 48 38
Medium Farms
(5 to 25 acres) 24 46 51
Large Farms
(over 25 acres) _ 2_ _6_ _11_
100 100 100
Size ofCultivated Area (%)
Small Farms 31 11 7
Medium Farms 58 64 54
Large Farms _11_ JL ~
100 100 100
Average Cultivated Farm Area (acres)
Small Farms 1.3 1.7 1.8
Medium Farms 7.3 10.6 10.7
Large Farms 13.0 32.4 37.2
Source: Government ofPakistan (1963).
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Two parameters are of special importance when considering
the structural implications of farm size. One is technology, which
determines the upper limits ofthe farm area that can be cultivated
with a pair ofbullocks and two m~n. The other is the minimum farm
size for family subsistence. Conventionally, 12th acres is taken by
farmers and landowners in Canal Colony Districts to be the
maximum that can be cultivated by one pair of bullocks and their
complement ofhuman labor. Some place it at 10 acres. The actual
figure varies according to the quality of soil, the conditions of ag-
riculture (irrigated or otherwise), the quality ofthe animals, and so
on. The conventional maximum of 12th acres is significant as a
yardstick, since the farmers themselves use it as a basis for judg-
ments. No landlord gives more than about this quantity ofland to a
tenant who has o~lyone pair ofbullocks. Ifa large tenant family has
two pairs of bullocks, he may give them double that area of land,
and so forth. Similarly, with regard to self-cultivation, it is rare to
find an owner-cultivated farm of more than twenty-five acres that
relies on bullock power. Owners oflarger holdings have tradition-
ally let out portions of their lands for sharecropping. Tractors, on
the other hand, call for much larger farms, and one ofthe inevitable
consequences of their introduction has been the eviction of share-
croppers by landowners in order to resume sufficient land for trac-
tor cultivation. One tractor is estimated to displace a dozen (or
more) bullock-drawn plows. The amount of land available for
sharecropping depends, therefore, on the degree ofconcentration
oflandownership and the method ofcultivation employed. In both
respects, conditions vary among the regions. In the Old Settled
Districts, the amount ofland available for sharecropping is limited
because farms are small. But the factor inhibits the spread of
mechanization. In the Canal Colony Districts there has been much
land available for sharecropping, but the large holdings encourage
mechanization, which is rapidly diminishing the amount of land
available for sharecropping.
The second parameter relevant to the set of problems we are
examining is the size of farm required to yield a "surplus" over
subsistence needs, that is a farm size that would provide resources
for investment and development as well as raise consumption
324
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above a minimum. Empirically, there are obvious difficulties in
determining the level of subsistence that can be considered a
"necessary" or "tolerable" minimum level. Even ifa minimum per
capita requirement for subsistence is established (arbitrarily), it
would be impossible to express it in terms ofdefinite size required
for subsistence. Needed size would vary with the number offamily
members that must be sustained as well as with differences in farm
productivity. Nevertheless, a crude "average" figure for an "aver-
age" family is not without practical value in dealing with the prob-
lem. An International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank) Survey in 1966 estimated the farm necessary to pro-
vide a minimum subsistence for an average family in a canal colony
district at five acres. Using five acres as a yardstick, we have some
idea of the order of magnitude of a subsistence-farm size. A farm
substantially above it would be likely to yield a surplus.
Those whose farm holdings are too small for subsistence must
look for alternative or supplementary means oflivelihood. Because
large holdings in the Canal Colony Districts could not be cultivated
directly by the big landowners themselves, a substantial amount of
land has been given out for sharecropping. The farm economy in
the Canal Colony Districts could absorb the available manpower
because the number ofsmall holders and landless persons in those
districts was comparatively smaller. In the Old Settled Districts,
there was a very large number ofpersons with diminutive holdings
and the number of those with large landholdings was relatively
smaller. The surplus manpower in these districts had to be ab-
sorbed in employment outside the farm economy. Consequently
we find two different patterns ofemployment in the two regions. In
the Old Settled Districts of Rawalpindi Division there has been a
considerable incentive for emigration to towns or the army. Those
who found work outside the villages have generally remitted
money to dependents left at home. The deficit farm economy has
depended heavily upon funds remitted from outside. In the Canal
Colonies, such a symbiotic relationship with outside employment
does not exist on a significant scale.
These differences in the economic configuration of the two
areas stem from ecological differences and the historical pattern of
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their respective development. But these differences are reflected
also in the social and cultural patterns of behavior in the two re-
gions. A most significant difference is in the attitudes toward edu-
cation and in the actual progress of education in the two regions.
Surprisingly, educational progress is much higher in the Poor Old
Settled Districts ofRawalpindi Division than in the richer regions.
The census data probably even underestimate the greater range of
educated residents of the Old Settled Districts, because many of
them emigrate from the village for outside employment and are
counted as residents of other districts. But their links with their
village homes usually remain close, and economically they play an
important role in sustaining the economy of the village.
TABLE 2. Level of Literacy and
Higher Education in the Punjab
(educated persons as percentage of total population)
Literates Educated up to
with Fonnal Matriculation
Education or Higher
Region Men Women Men Women
Multan Division 14.6 2.6 1.8 0.20
Bahawalpur Division 15.3 2.8 1.9 0.17
Sargodha Division 22.1 4.5 2.8 0.26
Lahore Division 24.6 9.4 4.3 1.00
Rawalpindi Division 33.2 8.3 4.0 0.56
Gujranwala District 25.5 7.7 2.8 0.40
Sialkot District 22.7 7.2 2.8 0.40
SOURCE: Compiled from GOP (1961), Table 3.
The data in Table 2 show the considerable higher level of
education in Rawalpindi Division. The general level of literacy
there is higher than in Lahore Division, despite the fact that the
high figure for the latter includes the concentration of educated
people in the city of Lahore, a major city of Pakistan. For a more
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appropriate interregional comparison, data are offered for the two
districts of Lahore Division, Gujranwala District and Sialkot Dis-
trict, which exclude Lahore city.
The regional differences in the levels of education may be
explained by studying the role education plays in the lives of the
rural people. Until recently the principal significance ofeducation
in the rural areas was that it was regarded as a passport for employ-
ment outside the village-in the government, armed forces, or
urban employment. By contrast, in the prosperous Canal Colony
Districts, sons were needed to work the farms. Education was not
looked upon with favor because it carried the threat of alienation;
educated sons were likely to leave their villages and family farms,
attracted to jobs in town.
Attitudes toward education have begun to change in recent
years in the Canal Colony Districts, especially among the prosper-
ous big farmers. The revolution in mechanical and chemical
technology now employed in agriculture is making new demands
upon the capabilities of farmers. They are becoming increasingly
aware of the value of education in terms of their own situations,
namely for better farming and coping with the new technologies.
However, the new purpose education must now serve also raises
questions about the relationship between education and develop-
ment. We have found that progress in agricultural technology did
not make great strides in the region that had the highest level of
education. On the contrary, it was in areas ofmuch lower levels of
education (where the economic and ecological conditions were
conducive for introduction of new technology) that progress has
been the greatest. But the latter has created a new demand for
education, and a demand for a new kind of education.3
Innovation is a function ofeconomic feasibility and not simply
that of education and attitudes toward modernization. The differ-
ences in the structure of the agrarian economy of regions of the
Punjab, as well as those ofother provinces ofPakistan, are reflected
in the degree to which they have shared in agricultural prosperity.
In the Punjab, the Poor Old Settled Districts, which have high
education but a predominance ofsmall farms, progressed least. An .
index of the uneven distribution of agricultural wealth among the
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different regions of the Punjab, and among different provinces of
Pakistan, is provided by data on"the regional shares ofcrop produc-
tion (Table 3).
Wide disparities in the agricultural prosperity of the various
regions can be seen by comparing the share in the production ofthe
principal crops with the proportion ofthe rural population for each
region. The prosperity of the Punjab is in marked contrast to the
poverty of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province
(NWFP). In the poorer regions, more ofcoarse cereals are produced
relative to wheat and cash crops such as cotton and rice. But the
NWFP's very large share of the production of maize must be
viewed in the light ofthe fact that total acreage under maize in the
whole of Pakistan was only 3 percent of the cropped area as com-
pared with 33 percent ofthe cropped area under wheat. Punjab and
Sind together, which have 76 percent of the rural population of
Pakistan, accounted for no less than 91 percent ofwheat, the staple
food crop, all ofcotton, the principal cash crop, and over 98 percent
of rice. But in the Punjab, there are marked differences among
regions. The production ofwheat per capita in the Poor Old Settled
Districts was about the same as that in the Rich Old Settled Dis-
tricts in 1964/65. But the latter had a substantial lead in the produc-
tion of other commodities, especially rice. The Canal Colonies
have a dominating lead in the production of wheat and cotton, as
well as in other crops, over the other regions.
In 1964/65 there were already very marked differences in the
agricultural wealth ofthe different regions ofPakistan. However, as
a consequence of the pattern of subsequent development, these
differences have been accentuated. For example, the relative posi-
tion of the Poor Old Settled Districts worsened in the period be-
tween 1964/65 and 1967/68 (Table 3). The relative positions of
Baluchistan and NWFP have also deteriorated. The position of
Sind improved marginally in the production of wheat; there was
also a change in its cropping pattern since it gained in cotton pro-
duction but lost ground in rice, a major crop for that province.
Tubewells and the New Technology
The green revolution was the cumulative result of a series of
independent developments. The most important of those is the
TABLE 3. Regional Share of Population and
Crop Production in West Pakistan
Rural
Population
Wheat Cotton1961 (%) Rice Gram Bajra Jowar Maize
Share of Cropped Area of West Pakistan 1964165 (%)
West
Pakistan 100.0 33.0 9.3 8.5 7.6 5.9 3.6 3.0
Share ofWest Pakistan Production iii 1964165 (%)
Baluchistan 2.8 1.7 0.2 0.2 4.5 0.37
NWFP 20.5 7.0 0.1 1.1 7.4 4.6 6.9 51.0
Sind 16.2 12.5 21.0 48.5 17.2 36.0 42.8 1.3
Punjab 60.4 78.6 49.8 49.8 75.0 59.0 45.5 47.3
of which in Punjab
Poor Old
Settled
Districts 11.5 11.4 1.4 3.3 24.9 21.6 12.0 10.3
Rich Old
Settled
Districts 12.8 12.8 3.5 35.2 5.9 8.0 1.3 8.1
Canal
Colony
Districts 36.2 54.1 73.9 11.4 42.7 29.0 32.0 28.4
Share ofWest Pakistan Production in 1967/68 (%)
Baluchistan 1.6 0.2
NWFP 6.2 0.1 2.5
Sind 13.6 25.5 45.0
Punjab 78.7 74.6 52.2
of which in Punjab
Poor Old
Settled
Districts 9.5 1.1 3.3
Rich Old
Settled
Districts 12.5 2.9 36.0
Canal
Colony
Districts 56.6 70.6 12.9
SOURCES: Compiled from district-wide data in:1) Government of West Pakistan
(n.d.) and 2) Government of West Pakistan 1968 for 1967/68.
NOTE: The regions ofthe Punjab have been demarcated as follows: Poor Old Settled
Districts comprise Rawalpindi Division and Mianwali District; Rich Old Settled
Districts comprise Lahore Division; Canal Colony Districts comprise Multan Divi-
sion, Bahawalpur Division, and Sargodha Division, exclusing Mianwali District.
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extensive installation of private tubewells, which began in the
middle fifties and gathered momentum in the sixties.4 It is notewor-
thy that this crucial factor did not find a place in the priorities
{
recommended by the Food and Agriculture Commission in 1960;
. the well-known "Five FIrsts" were provision of better seed, fer-~ tilizer, plant protection capabilities, better cultivation techniques,D' '\ and short- and medium-term credit (GOP1960:64). The commis-
sion pOinted out that these prescriptions were not new, that the
chief problem was to find "a way for their effective implementa-
tion." Private tubewell development proved to be the catalyst. By
the mid-sixties, the number of private tubewells installed in the
country had· grown very large and its effects became manifest
(Mohammad 1964). In 1965 a noted agricultural economist wrote,
"One of the most significant phenomena in agricultural develop-
ment in Pakistan has been the installation of private tubewells by
farmers of West Pakistan at an exceedingly fast rate... [Con-
sequently] West Pakistan is likely to attain a rate of increase in
agricultural production which will be unparalleled in the history of
agriculture" (Mohammad 1965).
Private tubewells not only made available a greatly increased
quantity ofwater for irrigation but also its timely availability. That
made pOSSible substantial increases in the application ofchemical
fertilizers, which facilitated the introduction ofhigh-yielding dwarf
varieties of wheat and rice. An estimate of the contribution of
various factors to the increase in agricultural production between
1960 and 1965 was included in the Third Five-Year Plan
(GOP1965:462). The estimate shows an overall increase in crop
production of 26 percent, which was attributed to various factors
(Table 4). This estimate is based on limited data and may not claim
precision, but it indicates the probable order of importance of the
various factors. Increased availability of water, either through
tubewells or canals, was estimated to account for half the total
increase in output. Furthermore, the availability oftubewell water
was the crucial precondition for increase in other inputs also,
because adequate timely watering is needed for profitable increase
in application of chemical fertilizer. These two inputs are neces-
sary conditions for profitable cultivation of the high-yielding va-
rieties of seed, which also benefits most from plant protection
measures. Private tubewell development would thus appear to be
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TABLE 4. Sources of Increased Output during
Second Plan Period, 1960-1965
percent
331
Groundwater Development
Additional Surface Water
Fertilizer
Plant Protection
New Seed
Other Factors
TOTAL INCREASE IN OUTPUT
SOURCE: GOP 1965.
9
4
5
4
3
1
26
the most important single factor contributing to the green revolu-
tion in this period. The importance of tubewells can be seen by a
comparison of the water situation in the Poor Old Settled Districts
ofRawalpindi Division with other regions. In that region, tubewell
development has not gone very far and canal irrigation is absent. In
unirrigated areas it is only in the most northern districts, for exam-
ple, Hazara District, which receive relatively greater and more
dependable rainfall, that some progress has been made with new
seed and fertilizer, as shown in Rochin's study included in this
volume (chapter 14). The relatively meager progress made in these
areas, however, is reflected in the data of regional shares of crop
production (Table 3).
J In the period 1960-1965, private tubewells accounted for no
~ less than 63 percent of the increase in water supply (Table 5).5 The
TABLE 5. Sources ofIrrigation Water in the Indus Plain
Year Canals Private Public Persian
Tubewells Tubewells Wheels
------- (million acre feet)
Total
1960
1965
1968
55
58
0.3
5.3
13.0
2.0
2.7
1.7
1.7
59
68
--
SOURCE: Developed by the author from anumber of major studies.
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pace of installation in the subsequent five-year period was much
higher.
A Report on the Farm Mechanization Survey 1968 estimated
that the number of prh.;ate tubewells in Pakistan increased from
31,600 at the end of 1964 to 75,700 in 1968, or by 2Y2 times (GOP
1969:67).6 Its relative importance as a source of irrigation water is
increasing.
Tubewell development in Pakistan, however, is highly con-
centrated in the Rich Old Settled Districts and in the Canal Colony
Districts of the Punjab. The Farm Mechanization survey showed
the Punjab, of which only 3 percent were in the Old Settled Dis-
tricts ofRa,,;alpindi Division. These latter districts, however, had
10.9 percent of the public tubewells in West Pakistan (GOP
1969:55).
It is sometimes argued that the relatively small number of
tubewells in the Poor Old Settled Districts is due to the absence of
adequate groundwater supplies. B'ut there is physical evidence of
considerable potential for tubewell development in many parts of
this region. Relative costs would be greater than in other areas
because the water table is lower and the groundwater more difficult
to mine. In addition to higher costs, the preponderance of small
farms in the area would appear to be a major obstacle to the expan-
sion of private tubewells. Our hypothesis is that the backwardness
of the Poor Old Settled Districts cannot, therefore, be attributed
wholly to natural factors. It is rooted also in the fragmented struc-
ture of its agrarian economy. Under these circumstances, a public
tubewell development program might be very successful. But the
lack ofpolitical influence to effect the allocation ofresources for this
purpose is another obstacle in the way of development in this
region. Evidence supporting this comes from the Basic Democracy
Institute at Lala Musa. In 1967/68, the institute had worked out a
viable scheme for tubewell development in Kharian Tehsil, which
was vetted and approved by experts and given formal approval at
the district level. But the scheme never got off the ground because
those who were committed to its implementation lacked the neces-
sary "political resources" to influence the powers that be. 7 It is vital
for the development of the barani region that the potentialities for
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identifYing such possibilities be explored in every part of the re-
gion and then pursued with determination.
Outside the Punjab there is very little tubewell development.
It is limited to Peshawar Division, which had 2.7 percent of the
private tubewells, and Khairpur Division, which had 1.7 percent
(GOP 1969:55). The prospects of tubewell development in the
NWFP and Sind are partly limited by a shortage of accessible
groundwater and a high degree of salinity in the groundwater.
The pattern of concentration of tubewell ownership has not
only an interregional aspect, but, within each region, it has also a
stratification aspect. There is a high degree of concentration of
tubewells on farms over twenty-five acres. For example, a Pakistan
Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) survey conducted in
1965 indicates a concentration of tubewells on large farms, as
shown in Table 6.
Because private tubewell development is closely related to
concentration of land in large farms, the green revolution has
tended not only to intensifY already large disparities in wealth, but
it has also widened disparities between different regions.
The available data show a high concentration ofnew inputs on
large farms, although they are insufficient for detailed and precise
judgments.s Some benefits have percolated to smaller farmers, at
which level there has been extensive tubewell development, in-
sofar as big farmers sell surplus tubewell water to neighbors. The
latter, however, are at a considerable disadvantage not only be-
cause of the relatively higher cost of water, but also because they
cannot always have it at a time of their own choosing. This intro-
duces a factor ofuncertainty, which increases their risk and inhibits
TABLE 6. Installation of Private Tubewells, 1963-1965
Tubewells on Percentage of r
Total Number Large Farms Tubewells on
District of Tubewells (above 25 acres) Large Farms
Gujranwala 3,776 3,289 87
Multan 3,076 2,639 86
SOURCE: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (n.d.).
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innovation. Big landowners, very often, are only too eager to buy
the land of poorer neighbors. During a year's stay in Punjabi vil-
lages in the course ofmy research, I came across several landlords
who refused to sell water to their smaller neighbors at critical times
although previously they had sold it regularly. They then pressed
them to sell their land. Diffusion of benefits through purchased
tubewell water is limited and is fraught with uncertainty.
The Rural Elite
There is a high degree of concentration of landownership in
Pakistan, a fact reflected in persistent demands for land reform and
repeated promises of successive governments to introduce land
reform measures. Despite interest in the subject, reliable data are
noticeably absent. Even the Land Reforms Commission for West
Pakistan decided to make do with makeshift data in its published
report, in spite of the rich source of information maintained by the
Revenue Department in the form ofdetailed records ofland rights.
Admitting that "reliable statistics for West Pakistan [were] not avail-
able," the commission's 1959 report used 1946/47 data for Sind,
1952/53 data for Bahawalpur, and 1954/55 for Punjab. It was unable
to specifY dates for the data on NWFP, Baluchistan, and Khairpur
(Government of West Pakistan 1959, Appendix I). A factor that
modified that picture in later years, especially in Sind and the Pun-
jab, was the reallotment of refugee land in the mid-fifties. The
resettlement had the effect ofdispossessing very large numbers of
small landholders and transferring land to large landholders. Ayub
Khan later called it "a perfectly ridiculous formula: it meant that ifa
person could produce two witnesses who deposed that he owned
half of India, then the Government of Pakistan would have to ac-
cept this!" (Khan 1967:94). Ayub Khan characterized the Refugee
Rehabilitation Policy as creating "a new class of Nawabs." How-
ever, Ayub Khan's land reform in 1959 did not succeed in altering
the picture very much. To assess its impact we might compare the
"cultivated land" in West Pakistan (Le., "net sown area" and "cur-
rent fallows") with the cultivated land actually surrendered under
the land reform: The total area of "cultivated" land in West Paki-
stan, as reported by the Land Reforms Commission, was 31 million
acres. The cultivated area surrendered under the land reform was
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871,000 or about 2.4 percent of the total (Government of West
Pakistan 1959:10,1969:100). In the light ofthe high degree ofcon-
centration of land, the situation remained, for the most part, un-
changed.
We examined the data provided by the 1960 Pakistan Census
ofAgriculture to estimate the degree ofconcentration ofland own-
ership in West Pakistan. The data relate to farms as operational
units, whether cultivated by owners or by tenants. The census does
not provide information about size of holdings by ownership.
However, a careful examination of the data allows us to arrive at
reasonable estimates, which show the relative magnitudes in-
volved, although they cannot provide precise figures for the various
categories of the rural population.
TABLE 7. Proportion of Farms and Farm Area in Size
and Tenure Categories, 1960 (in %)
Owner-cum-
Farm Size Owner Farms Tenant Farms Tenant Farms All Farms
number area number area number area number area
Small Farms 25.0 4.2 5.7 1.4 19.2 3.7 49.9 9.3
(under5acres)
Medium 13.5 14.6 9.5 10.8 19.8 22.0 42.8 47.4
Farms
(5 to 25 acres)
Large Farms 2.8 19.4 2.0 10.0 3.1 13.0 7.9 42.4
(over 25 acres)
TOTAL 41.3 38.2 17.2 22.2 42.1 38.7 100.6 99.1
SOURCE: GOP (1963), Table 5.
The size interval used by the census to classify "small farms,"
namely those below 5 acres in size, identifies units below the sub-
sistence level in the case ofowner-operated farms. One-quarter of
all owner-operated holdings were below the subsistence level (Ta-
ble 7). The corresponding dividing line that defines subsistence
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level of tenant fanus is 10 acres, assuming an equal division of
produce between landlords and sharecroppers. The census does
not use that size interval. Data for fanus between 5 and 7% acres are
available. If we add the number of tenant farms and owner-cum-
tenant-operated fanus ofbelow 5 acres size to that offarms between
5 and 7% acres size, we arrive at a figure of 33 percent ofall fanus
that are tenant and owner-cum-tenant fanus below subsistence
level. That would be an underestimate, since the figure does not
include tenant fanus between 7% and 10 acres, which, too, are
below subsistence level. The categorization of owner-cum-tenant
fanus would depend On the relative proportion of owned and
tenanted areas, and the middle point between 5 and 10 acres might
be appropriate in their case to define subsistence level. We con-
clude, therefore, that more than 58 percent of all farms in West
Pakistan are below subsistence level. The total number of rural
households below the subsistence line might be greater, not only
because many farms are jointly cultivated by more than one house-
hold, but also because we must include in that category landless
laborers who constituted about 11 percent ofthe civilian labor force
in agriculture in 1961 (GOP 1964:v=28, Statement 6.15).9
At the other extreme, 70 percent ofthe farm area was owned by
noncultivating landowners and owner-cultivators of large farms.
Nineteen percent ofthe farm area was accounted for by large farms,
which numbered 2.8 percent ofall farms. A further 49 percent ofthe
farm area in West Pakistan was tenant operated, of which 88 per-
cent was cultivated by sharecroppers (GOPI963:Table 9). To esti-
mate the number of households who control that land, we might
consider data provided by the population census. The 1951 census
estimated the number ofnoncultivating landowners in West Paki-
stan at less than 4 percent ofall "landowners" (GOPI955:110-111,
Table 15). The number ofhouseholds indicated by that figure must
be considerably less, since individual households have several
persons enumerated by the census in that category. The 1961 popu-
lation census does not show the number of noncultivating land-
owners. In view ofthe substantial reallotment ofland that took place
in the fifties, we cannot assume their number will have remained
unchanged. But in view of the very small number of households
indicated by the 1951 figure, it is unlikely that the overall order of
I
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magnitude will have changed sufficiently to alter the broad picture,
namely, that about 5 percent ofall the rural households in Pakistan
(including "absentee" landowners) possess about 70 percent ofthe
land.10
Although the rural elite controls 70 percent of the land, nearly
half the total farm area was in the hands of sharecroppers in 1960.
That pattern of land use is, however, changing rapidly due to the
spread of farm mechanization. Landowners are taking over share-
cropped land for mechanized "self-cultivation." Because of the
progressive reduction in land available for sharecropping, the des-
paration ofevicted sharecroppers to secure land and the additional
demand from smaller landowners for rented land with which to
build holdings for economical use of a tractor have resulted in an
adverse change in sharecropping rates. Although in 1968 the crop
was still being divided equally between landowner and sharecrop-
per, sharing was subject to prior deductions by the landowner on a
variety ofcounts. As a result, the effective rate ofsharing had been
reduced to about one-third or less for the sharecropper. The de-
terioration ofrates affects sharecroppers ofall landowners, not only
those directly affected by farm mechanization. For both these
reasons, the rural elite, as a result offarm mechanization, appears to
be appropriating a progressively larger share of agricultural pro-
duction.
Feudal and Capitalist Agriculture
We now examine the compositi~_n-9fth~_!"~l"~~_~_li!~tg~~~if it
constitutes a single class or if it is differentiatecl)Etoseparate..clas-
se~_with c~IIlpetiI~g_<?!-<:ijiiJn~I[riKllit~-!~_~:.-rheterms "feudal,"
"semifeudal," or "landed aristocracy" often are used rather loosely
to describe an arrangement by which a small class of landowners
appropriates one-half or more of the produce grown by sharecrop-
pers. We do not propose to determine whether the term "feudal" is
appropriate in this context, but will use that term limiting its conno-
tation to the arrangement stated above. It is argued that the feudal
structure is giving away to a "capitalist" structure as a result of
self-cultivation of land by middle-class landowners ,!,ho employ
hired labor and invest in modern technology.
-_ .._-----
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In popular usage, the terms "feudal landowners" or "landed
aristocracy" connote very large landholdings ofseveral hundred or
thousands ofacres. Burki has attempted in chapter 15 to give some
precision to the term by defining the landed aristocracy thus: "Fol-
lowing the Land Refomls Commission, I define landed aristocracy
as landlords who owned holdings ofmore than 500 acres each." But
no reasons for this definition are offered. The Land Reforms Com-
mission did not attempt to define the term. The commission merely
stated its view that its proposed ceiling on land ownership would
"eradicate the feudalistic elements from the existing tenure struc-
ture" (Government of West Pakistan 1959:30). The ceiling level
was subject to some controversy, even among the members of the
commission. A pragmatic decision was reached to place it at 36,000
produce index units, which, it was indicated, would place it at
about 500 acres of the best irrigated land and about 1,000 acres of
unirrigated land. But the figure was a compromise involving a vari-
ety of conflicting considerations. The validity of Burki's definition
of landed aristocracy rests on the strength of his analysis. He at-
'71tempted to demonstrate that the landed aristocracy are political)~) maximizers rather than economic maximizers. In opposition to
them he defines a rural middle class, the owners of50 to 100 acres,
who cultivate their land intensively and invest substantially in the
new agricultural technology; they are economic maximizers. This
class, he argues, has promoted the green revolution and is its main
benefiCiary.
\
In considering class formation in rural Pakistan, it would be
misleading to make a sharp distinction between feudal landlords
and capitalist farmers, because of the complex combination of the
two modes of production. Nor in the absence of analytical criteria
I
can we justify isolating a landed aristocracy as families who own
hundreds of acres or even by some arbitrary standard such as 500
acres. Distinction between very rich and very poor farmers is not
without significance, but, for a scientific analysis, such a prior dis-
tinction without specification ofthe relevant criteria would obscure
rather than clarify the issues.
Until mechanized farming was introduced, all landowners
who owned more than 20 or 25 acres employed sharecroppers.
Owner-cultivators were those who had just enough land that could
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be cultivated by one or at most two pairs of bullocks and family
labor. Conventionally, 12¥2 acres (haIfa "square") ofland is taken to
be the maximum area that can be cultivated by two men and a pair
ofbullocks. A large family might employ two pairs ofbullocks, but
rarely more. The feudal mode of production, therefore, is to be
found not only on lands of those who own hundreds of acres but
also on the lands oflarge numbers oflandowners who own as little
as 20 or 25 acres. A landholding of25 acres might appear small, but
it is five times as large as a subsistence holding for an owner-
cultivator (estimated to be 5 acres). The 1960 Pakistan Census of
Agriculture classifies farms above 25 acres as "large farms::~r
landowI1erLs-hare\Vith_own~rs_Q[YeryJl!rgetracts. not only a
privilege~tposition in the_rural economy, but a!~~.PllIticip·ationin
the poli~ical power structure. Thus .~ig~.Ilcl.small landowners are)
differentsegments of<lsi!1gle~()~tinuu~!on which they are placed
according.to-differencesin their wealth a.n<is!l~r~i!1..£Qliticalpow-
er, without anY.StrUcturlllc:~i~e_riondifferentiating theiri~ts for
setting them aparUnto_sep~at~ll.~~S.
. Although in recent years there has been a tendency to resume]
land from tenants for self-cultivation by mechanized methods,
mechanization has not created a middle class or capitalist farmers.
Rather, it is the big landowners who have made the greatest prog-
ress in the direction of farm mechanization (Table 3).
Only pm:tQf..the t()tal!~d owned by persons who have tractors
is under_IllecJ:!<l!1i~_e_d_(~.l!ltivatioii;·Ia:fi:d-notcultivated by them is in
the hal!.d~Q.(shar~c:r~pp~hoempI6ybullocks.However, there
is a close in_t~I:~Iependerice.:betWeen.lll~chanized.C:.llltivaJion and
sharecropping on largelandholdings. It is convenient to use the
term "mechanized farm sector" here in reference to the total area of
land affected by mechanization as contrasted with the area culti-
vated by tractors.
Owners of holdings of 50 to 100 acres numbered only 27 per-
cent of the landowners in the mechanized farm sector, and they
accounted for no more than 10 percent of the cultivated area of
landholdings in that sector in 1968. However, they owned 25 per-
cent of the tractors, which suggests that the degree of mechaniza-
tion, or the proportion ofland cultivated by tractors, was greater.
Landlords with holdings above 100 acres owned 86.5 percent
9.
340 Rural Development in Pakistan
TABLE 8. Classification ofLandholdings ofTractor Owners
Cultivated Area
Total A?reage per Holding
Size of Cultivated
Size of Proportion Average Proportion Average Area per
Holdings of Total Holding ofTotal Holding Tractor
(acres) Acres (%) (acres) Acres (%) (acres) (acres)
500 & over 52.3 1,317 43.0 1,231 714
200-499 25.4 342 26.0 334 270
100-199 11.9 156 17.5 155 145
50-99 6.9 81 10.0 82 79
25-49 2.5 43 2.8 44 42
under 25 0.4 0.1 21
SOURCE: GOP 1969: Tables 3, 4.
of the land in the mechanized farm sector and 55 percent of the
tractors. Two conclusions follow from these figures. Firstly, it is
probable that middle-class landholders, as defined by Burki, who
own 50 to 100 acres, probably cultivate their land more intensively;
the relatively higher investment of capital in terms of the tractor/
land ratio may be reflected in the case of other inputs also. In-
sufficient investigation has been made of farm management on dif-
ferent size holdings in Pakistan. l1 It would not, however, be sur-
prising ifsuch studies showed a greater intensity ofcultivation and
higher productivity on farms in that category. A second conclusion
is that the bigger landlords control vastly greater resources. The
total amount of land and capital controlled by middle-class land-
owners is not ofsuch an order that they can be said to dominate the
rural economy. Quite the contrary is true.
However, we may question the significance of drawing a dis-
tinction between these groups oflandowners. We cannot accept the
implication that they constitute separate classes, since their in-
terests do not conflict. Their goals on all essential issues of publicl
policy are identical, whether they be questions ofprices ofagricul- ~
tural commodities, taxation ofagricultural incomes, or provision of;
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facilities and services and subsidized inputs to landowners.~- I'
larly, th.ey .sh...ar~n id~~t_~~.~p~.~i~!?_n ~_~_i~~~e~f cla.ss_r~}ati~n. - .l &r
ships infue-::ruEaI society vis-~-vis sliarecropperinind Tandless :::::. __ _
laborers-ana on questions of public policy and legislatIon. -
There is; however, one significant difference between the ef-
fects of farm mechanization on large landholdings and on smaller
holdings of less than 100 acres. The capacity of a medium-size
tractor ofthe type in general use in Pakistan is reckoned to be "over
100 acres" (GOP 1967: 10; Rafi 1967).1:Qwners oijl.-9Jcling§Q~I()~
100 acreswho.buya tractor tendto. eyi~t.l!IUl1~jr.te!1ants(share-
croppers) to resume. su!ficient land for mechanized farI!1ing'-- Be-
causesuchlanaowners account for-lessthan--15 percent of the
mechanized farm sector, only a small proportion of sharecroppers
are deprived of all their land and evicted. In the case ofowners of
large holdings, sharecroppers are not evicted from the land when \
tractors are introduced. Instead, the big landowners take away a )
proportion of the sharecropped land to resume sufficient land for
tractor cultivation. Hence, each of the remaining sharecroppers is
left with a reduced holding. Whereas before mechanization an av-
erage sharecropper's holding of eight to ten acres was just about
enough to provide a bare subsistence, hiu~c!!!~~c.!.J:1()!<l!Ilg!~_!10t
sufficitmtJorJhatpurpostlc.The sharecropper must find alternative
ways to supplement his diminished income such as undertaking
seasonal labor for the laIldQ"Yner. Because ofthe growing shortage
of slUlr"ecropping land, the landowner's bargaining position with
his sharecroppers is very strong, and he has a prior claim to the
lattel~_s_er:\'i~es.The sharecroppers constitute a tied, assured, and
cheap sourc~_()fsuppleIl1el!!a.rylabor. Because of increasing labor
requireIJl~nts,.the availabilitY: of such. tied labor is of vital impor-
tance,~.specIally Jor the. bigger landowners who cannot find
sufficient.~e~J:l!Jorto meet their large requirements. Although the
eviction ofsharecroppers of smaller landowners has increased the
number oflandless laborers, there is a shortage oflabor to cope with
seasonal peak requirements because of the rise in production.
The fact that big landowners keep a sufficient number of
sharecroppers to meet their labor requirements explains what
might be a puzzling feature ofthe data quoted in Table 8. The data
show average holdings of270 acres per tractor in the case of hold-
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ings of20D-499 acres, and higher in the larger category oflandhold-
ings. Land in excess ofabout 100 to 150 acres (per tractor) on such
holdings is cultivated by sharecroppers. The problem of meeting
labor requirements inhibits a higher degree of mechanization on
very large holdings. It'would be a mistake to attribute it purely to
attitudinal differences between big and small landowners.
Because of the functional role of sharecropping on large
mechanized farms, a question arises about the characterization of
such a mode of production. For the bulk_oLt4e_J~!1_9_~jf~_~t~(tby
mechanizations, nameIYJ~§:.§.p~!"£ent,J!.o.t.....hmod~~gLpro.<l.u<::tjon,
the feud~__~'<>~~_QL~har_~!.2PP~Ilg_aIliLili~_~~p~~list_~od~ __of
mechanized~l!.1!!Y:l.tion_py_hir:e_d_lilQQr._l!~{)jIl.terJ'YiIl~_(t~~<;iltl_S_eof
th~!~b(;ir~gl!!r~l1.!..~!ltof the mechanized farming operations, the
capitflljs_t_<?l??}Jlon_~_!lt.()f~h~~ept~ipIis~3i~<?Iil:llf~s~ffi~_i~ntandvia-
ble without the feudal component. The latter, on theotherhand,
withdlmrnislie<!]i.o)cfi~g~~ofthesha~ecroppers-,~fs-~otYiable~ith­
out Hie seasonal~~1?J2Y.!!1SJ!!Lq[{)~~Q_Qy.th~ .capi~list ~9mi:>onent,
~Whicnen~~!eS-~ll~~~r.~pp~rs tQ. s~Y_()Il_~ll_e_i.r _diminishedhol~ings.The feuaal and the capitalist relations of production constitute asingle, multiplex mode of production, which has its own complexand specific characteristics. It is tempting to describe it as transi-tional, on the assumption that, following the eventual, inevitable
mechanization of harvesting and threshing operations, the big
landowners' need for a supply of seasonal labor would disappear
and they would no longer be held back from introducing more
tractors and evicting all their sharecroppers. But one would hesi-
tate to use the term transitional. Such a term is less precise than a
concept of a multiplex mode of production, and the term transi-
tional suggests a process ofcumulative and necessary change from
the one mode to another. But it is by no means certain that the
present course of development will continue on a linear path and
result in a fully capitalist farm economy. The consequences of a
large-scale eviction ofsharecroppers, with no alternative sources of
livelihood in rural or urban employment, are incalculable. We can-
not, therefore, rule out a critical point when change will cease to be
progressive and quantitative and will set in motion a total, qualita-
tive transformation.
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Rural Bases of Political Power
We might consider Burki's thesis that the political power ofa
landed aristocracy has been displaced by a rural middle class. This
is parallel with the widely believed idea put forward by the Land
Reforms Commission in 1959 that its proposals would eradicate
feudalistic elements in the agrarian economy, an idea that the sys-
tem of Basic Democracies, introduced by President Ayub Khan,
had displaced the landed aristocracy from a position of political
dominance and that it had br~ught about a_~hift i!!~h!=l_JQGJILOf
politicaLp.9werjnto_the_hands_o(a1ural mig,gle_.class. This claim
was put forward by the Ayub regime for the newJ>oliticat£§l~!J1jt
in§aiiced~J1ii{l~1iQ\Ve-ver,that.the .predominance_of the .big
landowners inthe agrarianeconom)'has by no means ended, nor
has t!iiioccilrred in_th~PClliticalarena.What was altered by the
systemoCSasTcDemocracies, now defunct, was not a shift in the
locus of power, but rather",a chang~.Jhe_mQde.o£artiQ.l!1i'ltio~.o! 1
power at the. villa.g~ level iilfOThe nattQ,.Il~Lpolitical.system. To
understand the-significance of the change, we examine theway in
which power has been articulated between the local and the na-
tional levels to determine who wields power in the rural society
and how the demands of the rural elite are transmitted to the na-
tional political system.
At the vi!~ge level,economic power is a Illaj()rf;;lctor inthe
establishment of po-Htic-iI-Ieadership positions.-Burki's suggestion
that "landlords in the pre-Ayub era were able to control at least
twenty Punjabi villages" is a reference to the exceptional case
rather than the rule. Few villages were (or are) owned by a single
family. In the typical Village ofabout 1,200 acres,13 there ~eusually
a few big landowners (some ofwhom may own more land in adjoin-
ing mauzas-or villages), plu~a large nu_mber of small peasant pro-
prietors,_~~~~ll.it~Il1~II1bersof other classes. Given such a rural
populati()~,i~wouldbesimplisticto explain political power in the
rurali()<::jety Il1erely by references to exceptional cases oflandlords
wQCl 0~!1 whole villages. That w()~ld leave unexplained political
po\\,erin--.the-Yas_tmajority ofvmages. Political power in such mixed
villages is typically organized by factions. The faction leader, typi-
- ..- .- -- .-._--'-~ ---------------~-
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cally a big lando'Y}}~J,_organiz~uPP<:H1jJy_a variety of means.
Su~~__hmdow!l~t:Ln~ly-on_.a_cJ)re of supp~!I~r~-:-~·!lamelY their
economically dependent sharecropp_~r~,-\YhQ.h~y~JLt!!~()pti()nbut
to f6U6w-theJLmaster. The core of the faction would probablY in-
clude.their close r~!~ti5'~~,.i·hOmight ai~2-b;;lJlilliljfo:rasin the
nei~~!?o!hoQ~<Ui:~Y!I!Irth~iroF.!L~GQ.nQmi~_dep~_nde.nts..The faction
leader enters into alliances with fellow landlords, who bring their
economic dependents. E~9_Il~J!lic P5~_~er,~y_t.~.t!Q.k~IlL~Lilie
aggr~$Cl!~~.E..0.wer_g£JE~~_e..r:s_~f~laEcl<.?'\'Il.i_ng.~J[ls~..in.close al~
liance with ea~b olher,mtbeLthaI1thepQF~LQfa.~ingLeindividual
. or a family'. Be~ml.s~_~conomic-dependents-are.tiedJoJandlords in
~Yffi. - factiQnaLpolitics...a5. they_al'~UiedJo.Jht:)Il1jn_the_economicfield,~ p()Ji~i.Qa.I. cl~<l.}'.<lg~.. s_N.e_.Q.Q.l.h._.. _Qr.._.i..zon.talalongclass linesbut.verticalacross class lin~$~ Th~!t:ansfQnuationn£theJactionalmodeo£poli-ti~~E~_~.a.!'~p_ol!.ti~~i.~j.!lstQ.~g!!l!ling!g.manifestjt~~JfiJIlstances
of it_a!:~ fe~9Jar,_
With the power ofhis core behind him, the faction leader sets
out to recruit a following from among other sections of the rural
society, principally the independent, small, peasant proprietors.
Individually, the latter are weak, but often they are organized
under the authority of their biraderi panchayat (lineage council)
(Alavi 1972). Action leaders enter into alliances with biraderi's, for
which they use a variety ofmeans of persuasion. A powerful factor
is the ability ofa faction leader to bestow favors and patronage. For
this, the faction leader's relationship with the administration and
his access to official favors is ofspecial importance. Another way to
secure support is by threat or coercion. Big landowners who have
influence at high levels are protectors (rassagirs) of small bandits
(goondas) through whom they operate (Alavi 1971).
Rival local factions are integrated with similar factions in other
villages and form larger factions at successively higher levels.
Leaders of local factions participate in the dealings of the higher
level factions. Individuals and political parties with ambitions in
district, provincial, or national politics, seek grass-roots support
with the local faction leaders. Participation of faction leaders in
party political competition institutionalizes alliances of factions
into political parties. Because, structurally, rival factions replicate
each other in their class composition, factional conflict is n()J~ss
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conflict.. However, because factions-3l"e- based..Du_the.power of the
landowning~fass.'l.t alll~~els()f theiLorganizati()!!,.~11 factions stand
forcoiTImon goals of social and economic p<.>li~y tllafembody-tlle
interests ofthe rural elite. Att.!!.-e level ofnational policy~making;it
is sucha leadership that particip~~.£inlegislative institutions, and
the members ofth-elanaow-ning class prolife~te in the bureaucra-
ticestabIisE.!!!.ent. 1Juspattern of political alignment is sublect16
pressures generated by the green revolution because of disaffec-
tion ofvarious strata ofthe rural population whose interests are not
articulated through the existing political structure. But such disaf-
fected groups are not the rural middle class, who are well en-
trenched in the existing factional structure, in alliance with rather
than in opposition to big landlords. The disgruntled groups, rather,
are the very small, peasant landholders and sharecroppers who are
deprived oftheir livelihood as a result ofthe green revolution. This
is a compressed outline of a complex pattern of organization of a
political power in the rural areas of Pakistan. But ~t is essential to )J,.-......t
grasp this pattern in order t~_g()J2~YQndasiInplifiedpicture.Q{the / '7_
loc~oasrsOTIneponn::-carand_eC~!:1QII1iC_po~~_<>.f~iglandowners.
. Under British colonial rule, articulation ofpower between the
village and the colonial regime was achieved by appointment of
locally powerful men to the hereditary office of lambardar. Simi-
larly, appointments were made to higher offices such as zaildar.
The lambardar held a crucial position in the system. Formally, his
function was to collect land revenue for which he was allowed to
retain a commission called pachotra. But that was the least impor-
tant ofhis functions. He was not a servant ofthe state, but the holder
of a quasi-political office. He represented the village before the
administration and the administration before the village. To be
effective, it was essential that he be a powerholder in the village.
The appointment was, therefore, always from the leading landlord
family of the village, or the head of a biraderi (lineage) ofpeasant
proprietors where such a biraderi was large. By virtue ofhis role as
a mediator between the people of the village and the administra-
tion, the lambardar was in a position to bestow favors and patron-
age, which further reinforced his power. Because the power at the
village was assimilated into the political system of the colonial
regime, through the administration, the lambardari system con-
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solidated the power of the administration against political chal-
lenge, especially, as posed by national politicians.
With the progressive devolution of power and induction of
political leaders into office, following the Government ofIndia Act,
1919, political parties attracted local factional leaders, who estab-
lished ties with aspiring leaders. With politicians installed in office,
a new channel of articulation of power between local and national
levels was established. Because the articulation of power was no
longer exclusively through administrative channels, a certain ten-
sion existed between the political leadership and the administra-
tive hierarchy. The dominance ofa bureaucratic-military oligarchy
in the Pakistani political system and challenges from political lead-
ership have punctuated the political history of Pakistan with a
series of crises. .
The main significance of the system of Basic Democracies in-
troduced by President Ayub Khan must be seen in light of the
tension between the bureaucratic-military oligarchy and the politi-
cal leadership. Its effect was to restore the mode of articulation of
power that existed under the new colonial regime, namely, through
the administration. However, the new system was different in im-
portant ways insofar as it did not rely on nominated and hereditary
officeholders, the lambardars, who did not always hold de facto
power locally. Instead, by introdUCing the elective principle at the
local level, a relationship was established with those who demon-
strably held local power. In the capacity ofchairmen ofunion coun-
cils, the local powerholders were brought into a regular and in-
stitutionalized relationship with the administration by their ex-
officio membership in the tehsil councils, which were preSided
over bytehsildars or subdivisional magistrates. When political par-
ties were reestablished, great political skill was demonstrated by
an effective deployment ofinfluence through administrative chan-
nels in a manner that rival factions were accommodated and mem-
bers of one faction were prevented from dislodging all the mem-
bers of a rival faction. Thus the local powerholders could not be
enticed away by opposition politicians, whose strength in the past
had depended on their ability to recruit and to hold the allegiance
oflocal factional leaders. One aspect ofthe struggle for democracy
in Pakistan was the disaffection of political leaders who were iso-
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lated from the bases of their power. But, by that token, we cannot
infer that it was the landed aristocracy that was dislodged from
power. That class was represented at every level in the structure of
power of the new regime, symbolized best by the nawab of
Kalabagh, the powerful governor of Pakistan.
Indirect Effects of the Green Revolution
Finally there is one further aspect ofthe green revolution that
merits attention, for it poses some central issues of policy. That
aspect is the indirect consequences that follow from the changes in
rural incomes. '\he gross provincial product from ag!icultllre in
West Pakistan almost doubleain the decade ofThe sixties. But the
uheq{i-aldi~tribution-oftlieincome·from·agricultU-re·ha~.brought
aboufa:manifQL(nIJ:~reas-e-iiithe- incomes of the ruralelite;-mainly
in thl:l_~~n_alGolonyDistricts and theHich Old Settled Districts of
the I'tll!iab and in Sind. ()n theother haIld,the incomes of small
famiers i;}these<Hsti-icts and, especially, oija!J!le.!§Jnother poorer
regi~~=-I!~~~Jaile(noirripiove-orha~~~notimproved in the same
measJlr~--,_Iheiicii!~ci~:2!!§.~gu~n~es()fth~greenrevolution-for the
la!terJQllow frol!!th~i!llP'!~t2.(!h~'!<1clitionalpurchasing po'\'.er in
th~_ha_n.ds <Ji the f0fI!l:eroIlth~d~Jl1and for ~l1dthe prices ()fmanu-
factured consumer goods·. The main thrust of inflationary pre-ssure
defivespn~-:irl1ffiomtlitq~ie:itly·lncrea~~d. incomes of the rural
elite, Jor t~_~~gfuQ:ragriculturanncomes-ln--tlie-total .national
incom~1>ae_~_o_ll'ltsJsv_ery]~rge:lii·1961168 l(was-42 percent ofthe
gross provincial product in West Pakistan as compared with in-
comes from manufacturing, which were only 16 percent ofthe total.
The great increase in the incomes and consequently the ex-
penditures of the rural elite have tended to make heavy demands
on the available flow ofdomestic manufactured goods and imports.
Economists who emphasize adverse changes in terms of trade for
agriculture in relation to industry, to suggest a worsening plight of
farmers in general, focus narrowly on price effects and do not take
into account income effects in the economy and the implications of
changes in income distribution for the different sections ofboth the
rural and urban societies. Despite the adverse changes in the terms
oftrade, the rural elite enjoy considerably enhanced real incomes,
as indeed do the urban entrepreneurs whose profits multiply as a
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Intended changes in some other districts were not implemented.
The Land revenue rates in the 1960s varied from Rs. 9.13 per acre
in Lyallpur District to Rs. 1.04 per acre in Hazara District, inclusive
of cesses on land revenue. The overall effect of land revenue on
agricultural incomes has been negligible, for it amounted to no
more than Rs. 182 million as compared with the gross provincial
product from agriculture in West Pakistan in 1968/69 or Rs. 14,797
million, that is, about 1.2 percent. The rural elite has, however,
fairly successfully resisted proposals to tax agricultural incomes, to
reduce subsidies, or to lower the high support prices for certain
agricultural commodities.
To conclude, a small rural elit~,lessJhan5 E-ercent of the nual
population ofPakistan, controls an overwhelmingproport~fthe
land. It has profited most from-the greeTl_!-~o1iition:-Within the
rur~l elite, the biggest landowners continue to m-alntairi-a-dbI11inant
po~tion iii-the'contfol-Ofeconomicresources, a~~lJas-ofp~litical
PQW'«;L,-1JLcr~_IirrttleevI:(lenGeI~2~1f~:Ylew_th~ttli~e_'are~any
es~entialcot1fliCtsof1nterestor structural differences that might
jusYfY.~~~~gorizing-sectionsoftheiuralelite into separate cl~~~ei.
As' a whole, theyhave successftillYdereiiaed~ili~iQ!i~~e_S!S:Jiitheir
inf!u~nc~~n-£~onc'poHcy:-Thepresentcourse ofthegreen revolu-
tion, however, appearsfohavebrougliLaQ~~-a~cLet.e!r<:lraHoiliI1.the
con.ditioniQfIi£e_:ora::majority-o·rthe..poplllg!.~on,ancl[tl!!!.ler prog-
re...ss._().[fa!m meGJHmi~<ltion..l~reati.!!!L'!..~ituation in which a very
larg~_~!!!I!l:>~Lo..fJh~.....I.1l.!:.aLp~plllatiQI1_.wjlCb~j~.c~~~fhtli~P(Qs­
pe'cts of having no viable m~Q.fJiyelih9_Q9....:..F~!J!oIl1_.h<lying
est~.blisliea-a-ne~E~li~al.~uilibrium,-th~g~ee~~voluti0.E..has
set ~.!1rn.o.tiQI1:,HIYJlam.ict4aJ.mak~~!.hee~~~!!p'gp().si~.i~Ii~~fcfn_able.
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consequence. But other sections ofthe community, both urban and
rural, have suffered as a consequence of the inflation in prices due
partly to the changed rural income distribution.
The additional income that has passed into the hands of the
rural elite has not only increased the total ofconsumption expendi-
ture, it has also been accompanied by a structural change in the
pattern ofthe consumption expenditure. The demand for manufac-
tured consumer goods has expanded at a relatively faster rate, and,
because of the multiplication of the incomes of those who were
already well to do, the overall increase in consumption expenditure
has been accompanied by a relatively greater expansion in the
demand for luxury goods, particularly those which are imported or
which have a hiEh import content. This "Engel's Effect" can be
readily observed in West Pakistan villages and is attested to by
traders who have prospered in this boom. This change appears to
have contributed not only to the inflation ofthe prices ofconsumer
goods in general, but also, in particular, to the pressure on foreign
exchange because of the higher import content of the additional
consumption expenditure. Even in the case of investment in the
farms, the preference for mechanization has added to greater pres-
sure on foreign exchange resources.
An example of these secondary effects is that the incidence of
agricultural taxation and subsidies has served to accentuate dis-
parities between different strata of farmers and different regions.
This is because land revenue is levied on the basis ofa flat rate per
acre and is borne equally by all classes of farmers, whereas the
benefits from agricultural subsidies are distributed in proportion to
the use of the subsidized inputs. The rich farmers who have pros-
pered most have also had the lion's share of the subsidies. Land
revenue rates do vary from district to district. But that variation does
not reflect any rational basis for the differentiation; it is only the
accidental result ofhistory. The rates originally were established at
different times in different districts, on the basis of productivity of
the land in the respective areas. The result is little uniformity, and
many decades have passed since the current rates were estab-
lished. Land revenue rates were to be raised slightly in 1962 on an
ad hoc basis, and some token changes were made in a few districts.
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NOTES
This paper is part of a study of rural social structure and economic de-
velopment in Pakistan undertaken by the author at the Institute of De-
velopment Studies at the University of Sussex, under a grant from the
United Kingdom S.S.R.C.
1. Sir Arthur Gaitskell, in a foreword to Nulty (1972), writes: "This .. ~
would certainly appear to be one of the greatest agricultural advances in
history, and it has been argued that West Pakistan would thereby be a
prototype for other countries to follow." He was referring to discussions of
the green revolution and the strategy of agricultural development in West
Pakistan (Kaneda, 1969).
2. Kaneda (1969: 112) writes: "The opportunities created by the 'Green
Revolution' present some challenging economic issues besides the
mechanization question. A rapid increase in agricultural output and the
consequent increase in the marketable surplus ofagricultural products are
expected to overwhelm the processing, warehousing, distribution and
marketing systems that exist today....Now that agriculture has experi-
enced a rapid increase in productiYity it must face an increasingly difficult
problem of expanding effective demand to match the growth of supply."
3. These remarks are based on personal observations during a year
(1968) spent in Punjabi villages for research fieldwork.
4. The initial impetus came from the implementation of the "Rasul
Tubewell Scheme," which was originally suggested by W. H. Nicholson in
1927. It was not until 1954 that implementation of the scheme got under
way. Firms that were engaged in the installation of the tubewells, and
acquired equipment and expertise for the task, promoted the subsequent
development by persuading landowners to install tubewells. For details of
the Rasul Tubewell Scheme, see Michel (1967).
5. Data taken from Bose (1969). He quotes data from the Water and
Power Development Authority (1964) and International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (n.d.). The output of tubewells in 1968 was
estimated by the author to be 2% times that in 1965.
6. The number of private tubewells increased by 45,090 between the
end of1964 and the time ofthe survey in 1968, reaching a totalof75,720.
7. A dossier about the scheme was examined by the author during a
visit to the institute in 1968.
8. A senior official of the Pakistan Planning Commission, for example,
expressed such a view (Aziz 1970).
9. The figure has been adjusted for the fact that, unlike the 1951 census,
the 1961 census classifies women under the category of "Unpaid Family
Help."
10. This conclusion is based on the assumption that Virtually all land
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operated by tenants belongs either to noncultivating landowners or to
owner-cultivators who operate farms of more than twenty-five acres.
11. The Ministry ofAgriculture, Government ofPakistan, issues a regu-
lar series of studies entitled Farm Management Studies for various dis-
tricts. But those studies are of little value for the purpose that we have
indicated here.
12. Because farmers, in practice, tend to undertake fewer operations
than those on which the above calculations are based and also because they
tend to employ tillers instead ofplows, the medium-size tractors are often
used to cultivate as much as 150 cropped acres.
13. Burki greatly underestimates the size of villages in the Punjab,
which he places at 600 acres. Typically villages are two or three times that
size. We find that the average farm area per village in certain districts for
which data are readily available is as follows: Sargodha District, 2,100
acres; Shekhupura District, 1,000 acres. In addition to the farm area, the
village area would include other categories of land for which we do not
have the data. In the densely populated Old Settled Districts, the average
farm area is a little less. The biggest landholdings, ofthe kind that Burki has
discussed, are, however, to be found in the Canal Colony Districts such as
Sargodha, Multan, and Jhang. (Source: GOP 1963 for farm area, and GOP
[n.d.] for the number of villages in the respective districts).
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The Green Revolution
and Future Developments
of Pakistan's Agriculture
Carl H. Gotsch
Introduction
Growth in. Pakistan's agricultural sector continues to be a
bright spot in an otherwise confused and uncertain development
picture. Despite considerable fluctuation- understandable in a
decade that has witnessed war, unprecedented drought, and in
recent years a high degree of political instability-increases in the
gross value ofthe major crops have continued to be on or around the
trend rate for the last decade, about 6 percent per annum. Also,
judging from the increased acreage under fodder, the past rate of
increase in livestock products of 3.5 to 4.0 per annum is being
maintained.1 This latter point is significant both for what it says
about the aggregate growth rate in the agricultural sector, as live-
stock products make up about one-third ofthe total value added in
agriculture, and for what it implies about the improvement in the
nutritional value ofWest Pakistani diets.
Statistics on the use ofmodem inputs are also impressive. The
rate ofannual growth in fertilizer offtake has slowed as one would
expect, but the incremental sales have continued to be above fifty
thousand tons per year. Although for various reasons, the public
tubewell program has lagged, the number of private tubewells in
operation far exceeds all but the most optimistic projections made
in the mid-sixties.2 By mid-1971 high-yielding varieties of wheat
were being used on nearly 90 percent of the land sown to wheat,
and it is anticipated that within the next several years the entire rice
acreage will also be under varieties with significantly improved
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genetic potential. Even pesticides-an input that is more difficult
and complicated to use-are being applied each year to a sig-
nificantly larger portion of the land under crops.
Despite the evidence that a naIve projection ofthe momentum
generated during the past few years is the best forecast for the
immediate future, there is a growing uneasiness among knowl-
edgeable people about the long-run implications of the growth
process that is so obviously underway.3 The sources ofconcern are
several. First, there is the question of the ability to sustain the
demand for increased agricultural output, especially for wheat and
rice. This has not been the immediate problem that projections
based on the experience of the harvest of 1967/68 suggested it
might be. In addition to less favorable weather conditions, the off-
take during the past several years has increased somewhat above
expectations largely as a result of the continuing food deficit in the
east wing. Moreover, the substantial increase in 1971 in the price of
cotton-which competes for land with both wheat and rice-can be
expected to hold down the acreage committed to these two crops.
Nevertheless, the current situation should probably be viewed as a
breathing spell.
Secondly, concern over the distributive effects ofgrowth in the
agricultural sector is becoming more widespread. The evidence
regarding regional disparity is mixed when measured at the pro-
vinciallevel (Table 1). District data indicate that regional aggre-
gates do not really tell the tale, as other data indicate that variation
in growth rates is much greater within provinces than between. For
example, the dryland areas of the Punjab continue to fall further
behind the central or mixed-farming areas. Likewise, the newly
colonized areas ofthe Sind are barely managing to sustain a subsis-
tence economy, let alone keep up with the rapidly increasing in-
comes in the Khaiput and Rohri areas.4
Even more disturbing are the implications oftechnical change
for the social and economic structure ofrural society. For example,
there have been Widespread reports oftenant evictions as medium
and large farmers sought to resume their lands for personal cultiva-
tion. In part, this is a result of the profitability of a combination of
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TABLE 1. Growth in the Production of Crops,
by Region, 1960-1970
Regional Percentage of
Annual Growth Rate (%) Total Crop Value
1960-65 1965-70 1964-65 1969-70
Baluchistan 6.2 8.9 0.8 0.9
NWFP 3.9 1.9 8.3 6.5
Punjab 6.2 8.8 69.8 70.4
Sind 4.9 7.7 21.1 22.2
TOTAL 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Government of Pakistan 1972.
NOTES: Figures are based on the gross value of major crops.
NWFP is North West Frontier Province.
high-yielding grain varieties, water, mechanization, and good farm
management. Without question, however, it also reflects a response
to the growing militancy of the tenant class.
As for the small owners, recent research suggests that, for the
most part, they have participated in only the simplest manifesta-
tions ofthe green revolution. For example, most farmers, regardless
of size, now use improved seeds and at least some nitrogen fer-
tilizer. Many, however, do not know what the optimal input combi-
nations are, or do not have access to the resources to take full advan-
tage of input complementarity. Perhaps of greatest importance for
small farmers is the lack ofa really widespread, competitive market
for supplementary water. The majority of the small farmers also
have little knowledge or access to the next round of improvements,
such as mixed fertilizers and the plant protection measures that
have shown themselves to be so profitable when applied to cotton,
oilseeds, com, and rice. It does not take long for productivity diffe-
rentials to be capitalized into perceived differences in land pur-
chase or rental values-differences that can form the basis for land
agglomeration even before the introduction ofequipment possess-
ing significant economies of scale.
The following pages explain at greater length the issues raised
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above. The first part will be concerned with adding greater detail
and interpretation to the previously cited growth statistics. In par-
ticular, recent performance will be contrasted with that described
in an earlier paper by Falcon and Gotsch (1969). In the second
section, I shall develop a conceptual framework to speculate about
the future. Considering the present uncertainty regarding the di-
rection ofthe political processes in the country, this is not an inap-
propriate characterization of the analysis, for while one may have
some confidence in statements about the future where interna-
tional demand based on comparative advantage is concerned, the
distributive aspects of growth are intimately linked with the out-
come of current political struggles and therefore scenarios involv-
ing structural change are highly dependent on them.
The Green Revolution in Pakistan
The scope of this paper does not permit an exhaustive exami-
nation of the recent performance of the agricultural sector in Paki-
stan. My observations are therefore selective and confined to those
elements ofthe present scene that appear to have the greatest rele-
vance for future developments.
Sources of Growth
The data on the growth of crop production in the last decade
show that calculations can be quite sensitive to the periods and end
points chosen, especially for small samples. It is well to examine
these matters carefully. Details of the provincial and commodity
rates of growth are given in the Appendix.
First, it would be quite inappropriate to date the green revolu-
tion in West Pakistan from the mid-sixties and attempt to measure
its impact from that time on (Figure 1). It is clear that the two
drought years 1965/66 and 1966/67 are Significantly below the
trend for the decade; indeed, the radical increase in output in
1967/68 (particularly of wheat) would perhaps be better seen as a
year ofrecovery than as a year ofrevolution. However, ifone were
to compare, say, 1959/60 with 1964/65 and the latter year with
1969/70, one would conclude that a Significant break in the data had
occurred that could properly be pOinted to as a fundamental discon-
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tinuity in the growth picture. As will be discussed later, there may
be grounds for such a view, but it does not emerge from any simple
before and after comparison ofthe figures on the value ofaggregate
output.
Secondly, it is instructive to examine the crop composition of
the increase in output, which has not been proportional over the
last decade (Figure 2). In the early and middle sixties, for example,
the leading edge of growth appears to have been sugarcane. The
average index of increased output for cane in 1964/65-1965/66
stood at 154 (1959/60 = 100); while, for the same period, rice stood
at 148, wheat at 116, cotton at 140, and all other crops at 112. Then
came the yearofMexipak (1967/68) when both the acreage and the
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in West Pakistan (1959/60 Prices).
yield ofwheat jumped radically. The index ofwheat production in
that year rose to 170, largely at the expense of sugarcane. In the
most recent past, increases in wheat output have slowed somewhat,
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and rice and sugarcane have regained their position as crops with
rapid growth rates. Cotton alone has remained somewhat outside
the affected commodities and has continued to grow at about the
same rate in all periods.
A third perspective on the nature of recent growth can be de-
rived by breaking down the increase into acreage effects, yield
effects, and cropping-pattern effects. Such an exercise suggests
that, while OI~e may have little confidence in treating the early
sixties and the late sixties as being differentiable on the basis of
aggregate growth statistics, there is little doubt that different
growth processes were at work (Table 2). For example, the in-
creases in production that occurred from 1959/60 to 1964/65 were
still heavily dependent upon increases in cropped acreage (35 per-
cent). In contrast, growth in the period 1964165 to 1969170 was
almost entirely a result of increases in yields and changes in the
cropping pattern. The yield effect is largely a reflection of the im-
proved varieties of wheat and rice, since neither sugarcane nor
cotton have exhibited significant improvements in yields. The
cropping-pattern effect is interesting because it shows once again
TABLE 2. Area, Yield, and Cropping Effects
of Increases in Crop Production
Change
1960 to 1965
Change
1965 to 1970
Change in the
Gross Value of
Production
Area Effect
Yield Effect
Cropping Effect
Interaction
Rs. (000)
1,319
459
705
108
47
%
100
35
53
8
4
Rs. (000)
2,363
157
1,753
465
-12
%
100
7
74
20
-1
NOTE: Another example of this "budget" approach can be found in Falcon and
Gotsch (1969).
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that West Pakistani farmers were quick to make shifts in their en-
terprise combinations when the potential for higher returns to their
farming activities showed itself.
Growth and Distribution
The distributive aspects ofgrowth, as expected, are much more
difficult to assess than the magnitude of the increase in inputs and
production. However, by taking as a point of reference the size
distribution of land and relating various aspects of the new tech-
nology to holding size, a good deal ofevidence exisJs_thgt~lJpp()J::ts
the intuitive concl~.§i.Q_I!.!h~ti.r!~~J!1~_Qisp-arityisjIl<:seasing.Thisis
not to deny, ofcourse, that nearlY~~rYQ~~~!1gaged)':l~griculture
is currently absolutely bett~J:_.Qff>-witlLthe_pr.obable_exc~ptionof
evjct~a tenants. The absence ofsevere price effects from increased
output has meant that greater production has been accompanied by
increased revenues to producers. Moreover, though there is as yet
only meager evidence to support the argument, the increases in
labor demand that have resulted from tubewell-related increases in
cropping intensity and from seed/fertilizer related increases in
yield are surely greater than the increase in supplies resulting from
the still rather limited effects of tractorization. Thus the welfare of
full- or part-time farm laborers has probably also improved in an
absolute sense.
It is the relative position ofa number ofgroups in the agricul-
tural sector that has declined. Though in the short run this may
seem to be a minor matter, in the longrun it is important, for relative
incomes provide much of the momentum for the sectoral transfor-
mation of society.
The experience of developed and less-developed countries
alike is that decisions to migrate and sell out are based on a com-
parison ofopportunities. People leave an occupation or an area not
because they have been unable to improve their circumstances at
all, but because they have not improved relative to their expecta-
tions ofthe possibilities that are apparent elsewhere. Indeed, such
mobility is an asset and is desirable in a society, provided that the
social costs are not too high. Major costs include providing the
necessary additions to the services in the cities and the social and
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political costs of crowding together of large numbers of people
newly alienated from the land. Given the likely growth ofindustrial
investment and jobs in the large cities of West Pakistan, it seems
unlikely that these costs can easily be mitigated, a point to which I
shall return in the final section.
The increasing disparity in incomes has both regional and
class dimensions. The regional dimension is highlighted by district
data, which indicate that some areas, notably those with relatively
assured water supplies, have been growing more rapidly than
others. This comes as no surprise as farm management studies
throughout South and Southeast Asia show clearly that the green
revolution, with its accent on high levels of plant nutrients, has
been successful primarily where moisture levels are also high rela-
tive to plant requirements. This does not, of course, necessarily
imply irrigation. As Rochin's chapter on Hazara District shows,
when the dwarf wheats are introduced into a dryland area whose
mean rainfall is 30 to 40 inches with good seasonal distribution,
significant yield improvements can be obtained. But these are
somewhat unusual conditions for the barani lands of Pakistan.
Much of the dryland wheat acreage that could potentially be put
under improved varieties cannot be expected to respond as
dramatically because moisture conditions are poorer.
A similar picture is presented by another traditionally back-
ward area ofPakistan, the Sind. The new rice varieties have shown
themselves to be unusually adapted to the dry, sunny climate ofthe
area. Although there appears little possibility ofcrop diversification
as in the North-West Frontier Province, farm incomes can be ex-
pected to improve significantly in areas where soil salinity is nottoo
great and ample water supplies exist. Not all parts of the Sind are
suitably endowed. In the southernmost parts, particularly in the
canal commands under the Ghulam Mohammad Barrage, the qual-
ity ofthe soil and water is such that cultivators are lucky to maintain
themselves and their animals from one year to the next.
The real beneficiaries of the fruits of technical change have
been the farmers located in the areas of the Central Punjab under-
lain by usable groundwater. Not only have they been able to take
advantage of the increased productivity associated with the seed-
fertilizer revolution, but access to supplementary irrigation water
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via tubewells has made it possible to alter cropping patterns in the
direction of higher-valued crops.
It would be worth pursuing the implications of the observed
regional growth patterns for the overall development process.
However, at this point I would merely note that many of the dis-
tricts that have shown the slowest growth, that is, made least use of
the green revolution technology, are also those in which average
holding sizes are small. In terms of country-wide Lorenz curves,
therefore, it means that a large number of small farmers will be
weighed in with traditional incomes simply on the basis of their
regional location.
The second major dimension of the increasing disparity of in-
comes involves the apportionment ofincome between various clas-
ses of farmers. A number ofempirical studies done during the past
several years make it possible to offer at least some tentative con-
clusions about the impact oftechnology to date on different classes
of farmers.s
1. There is little or no difference in the percentage offarmers
in different size categories with respect to the adoption ofimproved
seeds and fertilizer. Where data on the rate of, or speed of, adoption
is available, it appears that there is a slight lag in the subsistence-
farmer category but it is not striking.
2. Of greater concern is the evidence in several of the studies
that the level of application of fertilizer per acre was considerably
lower among subsistence farmers than among those who would fall
into a surplus category.
3. Where the question was asked. respondents in the small-
farmer category were unanimous regarding the difficulties in-
volved in securing supplementary irrigation water.
4. Few of the smaller farmers had applied or even knew any-
thing very concrete about pesticides.
The overall conclusion to be drawn from these surveys and
other empirical materials is that the distributive effects of such
simple divisible technology as an improved variety will be minor.
The effects of somewhat more complicated innovations, such as
fertilizer, are currently not due to a lag in adoption but rather in the
level of use. Thus, it may take appreciable time for the more com-
plicated but still divisible technology, such as pesticides, to filter
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down. When the technology involves considerable lumpiness as in
the case of tractors and tubewells, the adoption rate takes on an
additional dimension with which small farmers have difficulty cop-
ing. The prob!ems associated with buying water mentioned by
most respondents is a case in point.
An Anatomy of the Green Revolution
From the foregoing observations, the following scenario is a
plausible reconstruction of agricultural growth during the decade
of the sixties.
1. The beginning can be dated somewhere around the tum of
the decade. Undoubtedly aided by several good weather years, this
period nevertheless marks the use of discernible quantities of fer-
tilizer and the spread ofprivately installed tubewells. An important
growth element was increased acreage under crops and increases
in sugarcane, a crop with high water and fertility requirements,
which benefited most from these inputs and became the cutting
edge of the increased output.6
The distributive effect of this period was overwhelmingly in
favor of the larger farmers since (a) tubewells are "lumpy" inputs
requiring significant capital investments, (b) the percentage ofcash
crops on large farms unconstrained by subsistence requirements is
much larger, and (c) fertilizer stocks were short and adequate
supplies required the use of influence and bribery.
2. This initial agricultural growth impetus was interrupted by
two drought years, 1965/66 and 1966/67. Although these years saw
a Significant decrease in output as a result ofweather, the impact on
the use of inputs was less severe. Indeed, there is undoubtedly a
good deal of truth in the argument that the prolonged drought
stimulated the installation oftubewells as nothing else could have.
3. The year 1967/68 was the year ofMexipak. The government
launched an all-out campaign, sometimes bordering on coercion, to
diffuse the Mexican seeds as widely as possible. Good weather, a
record off-take of fertilizer, and the water from some 60,000
tubewells boosted wheat output from an average of3.8 million tons
obtained during the first part of the decade to 6.3 million tons, an
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increase of65 percent. Although certain other crops, notably sugar-
cane, suffered in the process, the net result was a recovery from the
slump caused by the drought, plus an increment that reestablished
the upward trend in agricultural production begun in the earlier
period.
4. The most recent period has witnessed the resurgence of
rice, sugarcane, and cotton as the leading growth crops. Due to
domestic overvaluation (200 percent above world prices), sugar-
cane has a comparative advantage over all other crops when
supplementary water supplies are available. Growth therefore con-
tinues to be the response to a disequilibrium condition that began
with the introduction oftubewells. Because ofthe lack ofimproved
sugarcane technology, it continues to be associated with large in-
creases in sugarcane acreage.
The output ofrice has also increased rapidly, particularly in the
province of Sind. However, unlike sugarcane, its comparative ad-
vantage has been tremendously enhanced by rising productivity.
Yields in the past two years have increased by 44 percent over their
1967/68 level.
The increased acreage under wheat, rice, and cotton has come
mainly at the expense of other crops. Acreage devoted to oilseeds,
gram, jowar, bajra, and so forth, has declined significantly from its
1959/60 level. In general, this reflects a movement away from a
risk-oriented, subsistence agriculture toward a higher degree of
specialization and commercialization.
The distributive effect during the latter part of the decade
tended to be somewhat less in favor of the large farmers simply
because they had already adopted many ofthe improved practices.
Small farmers improved their position relatively by "catching up"
to what had gone on before.
Future Developments in Pakistani Agriculture
The previous section consisted ofsome material on the events
and statistics of the past few years. Speculation about the future,
however, requires that these observed trends be pursued in some-
what greater detail. Such an effort need not involve a model in any
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formal sense, but there must be some clearly articulated set of
questions that probe more deeply into those underlying forces that
have shaped the past and will continue to shape the future.
An Outline of the Rural System
In the following paragraphs, a set offour factors is posed whose
total is an outline of the rural system. Each of the subelements is
itself worthy of study; maximum use of the data, however, will
require particular attention to the dynamic relationships between
them.
The nature of the current and potential agricultural technol-
ogy. This issue h.as two basic facets. First, there is the question of
technical divisibility. For example, as indicated earlier, seeds and
fertilizer are highly divisible, and can in principle be used with
equal effectiyeness on any size ofholding. Tubewells and tractors,
on the other hand, are not and will thus exhibit significant
economies of scale. Second, it is important to know something
about the extent to which the technology embodies a substitution of
capital for labor. Historically, lumpy capital inputs that have been
profitable only on large farms have also tended to make labor re-
dundant. But an excellent counterexample is the tubewell, which
requires both a Significant capital investment and yet drastically
increases the demand for labor. Indeed, even the tractor, in the use
of which the timely application of additional power makes a sig-
nificant increase in cropping intensity possible, may add to labor
requirements. The lesson is obvious; no prognosis of the future
structure of agriculture can proceed that is not thoroughly
grounded in a detailed analysis of technical production relation-
ships.
With respect to the question of economies of scale, recent
farm-management studies in West Pakistan suggest that the opti-
mal size of a farm (1) located in an irrigated area of the Punjab, (2)
possessing a single pair of bullocks for power, and (3) using im-
proved seeds andfertilizer would lie in the fifteen- to eighteen-acre
range. This is somewhat higher than conventional wisdom has in-
dicated and is made possible by slight shifts in the normal cropping
pattern to permit bullocks to be used more intensively.
With respect to tubewell water, economic analyses of model
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farms, corroborated by field surveys, indicate that the full utiliza-
tion of a l-cusec tubewell requires between 60 and 100 acres, de-
pending on the area, the crops grown, and the availability ofsurface
water. Farmers installing tubewells on less land must either sell
part oftheir water or accept higher costs ofwater per acre. This does
not imply, ofcourse, that wells on holdings ofeven 25 acres are not
profitable. But the margin is much less than on the larger holdings.
Where possibilities for selling water exist, investments in excess of
home farm capacity may actually be turned into a substantial return
on capital. Indeed, in some parts of the northern rice traet-
Gujranwala and Sialkat-a number of wells have been sunk by
townspeople owning no land at all.
To date, the wells that have been sunk in the private sector are
virtually all of the l-cusec, centrifugal-pump type. By being low-
ered into the ground ten to fifteen feet, they are capable of fairly
efficient deliveries where the water table is at a depth of twenty-
five to thirty-five feet. However, as the water level declines, as it
surely will during the next decade, the type oftechnology needed
to supply supplementary water will be altered significantly. In-
stead ofrelying on shallow centrifugal wells, it will be necessary to
install deep turbine pumps at a cost of five to ten times that of
existing installations. Also to capitalize on the economies of these
higher-cost pumps, the capacity ofthe tubewell will almost surely
be larger than the current l-cusec size.
It is impossible to go into further detail regarding alternatives
involved in the choice ofwater-producing technology as the water
table declines. Suffice itto say that ifthe decision is left completely
with farmers in areas where no program for the public installation
of tubewells exists, the lumpiness of this technology is likely to
have extremely adverse distributive consequences. In an arid area
such as West Pakistan, water, not land, is the scarce resource, and
control over it will be instrumental in determining the ultimate
structure of the farming community.
With respect to the other major facet of mechanical change
already available in Pakistani agriculture, namely, tractors, the evi-
dence regarding their impact in the longer run is as yet unclear.
Unlike the tubewell, which has shown itselfto be both consistently
profitable under all conditions and employment creating, tractors
and their associated implements, if valued at the higher shadow
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price ofcapital, would not be unequivocally profitable. For exam-
ple, in the areas where the aquifer is saline and supplementary
water for irrigation is not available, the ability to prepare a seedbed
for the rabi crop with a maximum delay is of marginal value. As
indicated above, water, not land, is the binding constraint, and,
without the availability of groundwater, mechanization alone is
insufficient to increase the cropping intensity. On the other hand,
in the areas that have the potential for double cropping, advanced
farming systems that incorporate improved seed varieties, fer-
tilizer, tubewells, and mechanization appear to be highly profit-
able, even where all imported materials are valued at the higher
social cost of capital.
The forces that have prompted the rapidity ofthe initial efforts
at mechanization were undoubtedly fueled by the substantial sub-
sidies associated with the importation of capital items and the
status enhancement that accompanied the ownership of the
equipment. However, as indicated previously, during the recent
past an additional force for tractorization is to be found in the form
ofsporadic tenant and labor militancy. Such activities as refusing to
pay the rent to the landlord or striking against the owner-operator
need not be Widespread to result in what amounts to an increase in
the perceived cost of labor by the larger farmers. When the ex-
pected private cost of labor exceed its social cost and the private
cost of capital is below its social costs, it is little wonder that the
demand for tractors, as measured by applications to the Agricultural
Development Bank, has beenseveral times the available supply.
Who controls the land? This question must be broken into
several parts. First, it is important to ascertain both the absolute size
and the size distribution of the holdings. The former is important
because of its direct relationship to the earlier question of input
divisibility. The latter is significant as a first approximation of the
distribution of income and political power.
In addition to the distribution of land, it is important to ascer-
tain the extent ofvarious types ofcontrol, that is, the extent to which
the land is operated by farmer-owners, by sharecroppers, and so
forth. This distinction is particularly important when the potential
for the introduction of technology with substantial economies of
scale exists. The overall impact of technical change will be sig-
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nificantly affected by the percentage of land that is operated by
sharecroppers, and also by the labor requirements of the technol-
ogy.
Unfortunately, the agricultural census of West Pakistan does
not provide the data required to ascertain exactly who controls (Le.,
owns) the land; only the distribution ofoperated units is presented.
However, since all tenants must be the tenants of someone, and
since they will undoubtedly be the tenants of large rather than
small landowners, it is possible to make some crude calculations
regarding the extent of control by holding size. As an example,
Table 3 gives the distribution of farming units by operator size for
Sahiwal District. Column 4 shows that approximately 27 percent of
the land is operated in holding sizes of 25 acres and above. How-
ever, after the land reportedly farmed by tenants and owner-cum-
tenants is distributed among the ownership categories, a conserva-
tive estimate would put approximately 54 percent or over one-half
the land in that category. This does not mean, of course, that the
land is in contiguous blocks and can readily be farmed in units of
that size, for the problem ofextensive fragmentation exists in Sahi-
wal District. However, it does indicate that much of the land is in
hands that have command over the resources necessary to utilize
modern inputs. Several other size groups offarms emerge from the
figures in Table 3. First is the group that will almost certainly re-
quire access to nonmarket institutions that can supply resources,
information, management help, and the services of otherwise
lumpy inputs if they are to participate fully in the increases in
productivity that the new technology has made possible. Although
any quantitative distinction is somewhat arbitrary, I would include
in this category most farmers with less than fifteen acres. Whether it
be defined as operator or owner units, in Sahiwal District this
would involve on the order of70 percent ofthose actively engaged
in farming.
A second group, composed of farmers having fifteen to thirty
acres, are in a position where a reasonably functioning market
mechanism would give them access to most ofthe divisible inputs
needed to increase their output substantially. At least one would
not expect that short-run production credit and access to informa-
tion would present the kind ofproblem that it poses for subsistence
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TABLE 3. Size Distribution of Holdings
in Sahiwal District, by Tenure Status, 1960
Operated Owned
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Size Number Percent Area Percent Number Percent Area Percent
(acres) (000) ofNo. (000) ofArea (000) ofNo. (000) ofArea
under 5.0 95 43 184 9 48 43 98 5
5.0-7.5 29 13 164 8 21 19 200 10
7.6-12.5 43 19 399 20 19 17 295 15
12.6-25.0 42 19 693 35 17 15 305 16
25.1-50.0 12. 5 364 19 6 5 782 40
50.1 above 2 1 149 8 1 1 273 14
TOTAL 223 100 1953 99 112 100 1953 100
SOURCE: Government of Pakistan (1964).
farmers. The only real difficulty they are likely to encounter is the
purchase of water in a situation where they are surrounded by
several larger farmers who use virtually all the water from the
tubewells they have installed for themselves.
The third group, farmers with over thirty acres, are in a size
group that has relatively little need ofnonmarket institutions other
than those that develop new fonns of technology or provide for
rural infrastructure in the fonn ofroads, marketing facilities, educa-
tional and medical facilities, and so forth.
The magnitude and the distribution of benefits from the in-
stitutions that serve farmers. Here there are several easily quan-
tifiable elements and several that are not so easily measured.7 The
most obvious in the first category are access to infonnation and
knowledge; access to capital markets; access of farmers to knowl-
edge about new agricultural technology, marketing opportunities,
and so forth; and access to the resources needed to make use of
them.
For example, there is a good deal ofevidence that the nature of
the diffusion curve is a source of income disparity even when the
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basic technology is perfectly divisible (Figure 3). AA' is the illustra-
tive diffusion curve of large fanners who learn first about new
technology and its use because of their access to the extension-
research institutions, and who are able to reach optimum factor
combinations by their access to credit. The curve BB' illustrates
fanners who are less likely to come in touch with knowledge, or
who are more prone to discount it. They start later, and don't move
as far up on the production function. An explanation ofwhy this is
so is clearly necessary if this essentially descriptive system is to
become a policy tool. The result is a basic disparity-creation
mechanism that is reinforced by the subsequent dynamics of the
system.
Unfortunately, even a casual field trip and some conversations
with officials in various government agencies indicate that in Paki-
stan there is a pervasive bias against the small fanner in almost
every institution he confronts. Part ofthis is due to the ability ofthe
larger farmers to bring their influence to bear on the local officials.
However, the handicaps under which government representatives
labor are equally important. For example, the Department of Ag-
riculture's extension staff is vastly understaffed and inadequately
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equipped. Since there is no way for the field agents to see every-
body, it is only natural that they visit those who have the resources
necessary to make the recommended changes, and who can pro-
vide amenitie.s such as transportation, travel, and so forth. In return,
influential farmers receive not only information but services in the
form of government-subsidized plant protection.
The biases in the size distribution of institutional credit are
equally evident. The Agricultural Development Bank (ADB),
which until 1968/69 distributed 30-40 percent ofthe credit (Table
4), has the responsibility for granting medium-term loans, that is,
credits for the purchase of tractors and tubewells. Although there
have been several collateral modifications during this period, when
coupled with a.corruption problem that has not yet been brought
under control, the result has invariably been the placement of this
subsidized capital on farms of twenty-five acres and larger.
Cooperative loans, although ostensibly designed to provide
production credit to poor and subsistence farmers, also have been
misused. Again, part of the problem can be traced to the overt
actions oflarger farmers as they used various methods ofexplOiting
the organization for their own benefit. However, equally important
has been the natural tendency ofloan officers to look carefully to the
repayment rates on all of their lending activities. Through bitter
experience, the Cooperatives Department has learned that defaults
on a substantial scale can mean harsh administrative reprimand. As
one would expect, the result of this "banker's mentality," when
coupled with inadequate staffing to investigate the circumstances
ofa large number ofsmall farmers, is to produce policies that insure
that money will be lent only to those who will obviously have the
capacity to repay it. Translated into concrete terms, it means that
farmers who fall roughly into the subsistence category are passed
over when limited loan funds are allocated among a large number
of applicants.
The whole problem of the distribution of institutional re-
sources and knowledge was put eloquently by former President
Ayub Khan's Study Group on Agricultural Policy (Government of
Pakistan 1970). The relevant passages deserve to be quoted at some
length:
One of the major elements to be taken into consideration
TABLE 4. Loans Provided to Agriculturalists through Various
Institutional Credit Agencies (millions of rupees)
Percent Percent Percent Total Index of
Year Taccavi ofTotal Coops ofTotal ADB ofTotal Loans Total
1960/61 11.04 7.4 107.28 71.6 31.51 21.0 149.83 100.0
1961/62 10.69 7.2 90.23 61.1 46.91 31.7 147.83 98.7
1962/63 10.34 7.2 92.48 64.4 40.67 28.4 143.49 95.8
1963/64 12.37 7.4 108.83 64.8 46.65 27.8 167.85 112.0
1964/65 21.07 16.3 67.97 52.5 40.47 31.2 129.51 86.4
1965/66 10.74 7.1 71.63 47.7 67.97 45.2 150.34 100.3
1966/67 9.58 4.6 99.24 47.4 100.48 48.0 209.30 139.7
1967/68 12.88 5.0 137.45 53.6 106.25 41.4 256.58 171.2
1968/69 11.16 3.7 200.72 68.3 82.10 28.0 293.98 196.2
SOURCE: Government of Pakistan 1970.
NOTES: Taccavi loans are advanced by the government in situations of distress or for agricultural production.
ADB is the Agricultural Development Bank.
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in the creation ofa viable institutional structure ofrural credit
is the need to reach the very large number of small farmers
dispersed all over the countryside. In concentrating upon the
small farmer, and emphasize the need for supervised credit,
the terms of reference have got to the heart of the problem.
The big farmer is in little need offurther support on the credit
side as in addition to his own resources, a large volume of
non-institutional credit is available to him and he also has full
access to the present credit system. The really important
category of farmers upon whom efforts must be concentrated
is that with economic, subsistence and below subsistence
holdings, that is to say, the medium and small farmer.
Further on:
It is necessary, therefore, that any real effort for provision
of credit in the agricultural sector should consist ofmajor in-
stitutional changes so that all loans for the smaller farmer are
in the form ofsupervised credit. As we have discussed in the
introductory chapter, the major factor in such institutional re-
organization is the fact that urban-based bureaucratic institu-
tions cannot reach out to the individual farmers with small
holdings scattered throughout the country. It is only if there
are viable organizations of farmers themselves that this in-
stitutional problem can be solved. Cooperation is the only
possible method of organization by which individual owner-
ship can be combined with the benefits ofcommon manage-
ment and institutions created which are in a position to take
advantage at the appropriate level from the various private
and public sector organizations serving agricultural needs. A
reform and re-direction ofthe Cooperative Movement in both
wings of the country is, therefore, the fundamental require-
ment in developing a viable institutional framework for un-
dertaking supervised credit.
However, further on:
... we anticipate [subsequent] conclusions here by saying
that in East Pakistan the problem [oforganizing cooperatives]
seems to be comparatively less formidable, after the success
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of the Comilla experiment and its adaptations in Rangunia
and other areas. For West Pakistan, we are not recommending
large-scale introduction of cooperatives on a similar pattern
until successful models can be developed.... For West
Pakistan, therefore, we do not see any short term solution to
the problem of supervised credit.
How is the social and political life of the village organ-
ized? To a certain extent, of course, the distribution of power
will reflect the distribution of land and/or wealth. In traditional
societies where the technology was the same across farms, the two
were more or less synonymous. One ofthe significant effects ofthe
green revolution has been to create a mechanism under which, by
the intensive application of technology, wealth can be more equi-
tably distributed than land presently is. One would expect that this
in turn would produce a redistribution of political power.
But not all power is obtained, at least in the short run, by
control over property; there is also the power of status and role. In
Western societies, this tends to be minimized, but in traditional
communities where the extended family, the kinship lineage, the
caste, or the tribe are still basic units of social relationship, this
aspect of power must be accounted for as explicitly as possible. In
many cases, it is the key to the successful organization ofactivities
at the grass-roots level.
As Hamza Alavi (1971) has pointed out, politics in the Punjab
has a distinctly factional flavor; that is, individuals in the village
do not form groups or allegiances because they have a common goal
that their cooperation would serve, but because they are "recruit-
ed" by one or another ofthe local political leaders who offers some
sort of transactional relationship. "Recruitment" takes two forms:
among those who have a choice in the matter and among those who
do not. The latter are epitomized by the sharecroppers and landless
laborers whose dependence upon the favor ofthe landlord for their
livelihood predetermines their allegiance.
For others, namely the small and medium landowners, there
are certain choices to be made. It is around this group that intense
political competition between rival faction leaders takes place. No
holds are barred in this struggle: cattle are stolen, buildings are
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demolished, and so forth. The use ofgoondas or hoodlums as "en-
forcers" is widespread. Frequently, when two equally powerful
individuals are competing for the allegiance ofa particular kinship
lineage (biraderi), composed largely ofsmall landholders, a virtual
state ofsiege may ensue. In some cases, the pressures are such that
the kinship group, which is the basic unit of social interaction in
Punjabi Muslim villages, may have to divide against itself politi-
cally in order to acquire the "protection" of competing leaders.
J Obviously, the vertical alignment of factions is in directconflict with the horizontal alignment ofclasses. Where economicdependence is the rule, as in the case ofsharecroppers and landless
\
laborers, the latter alignments are virtually impossible. But from
Alavai's description, class alignments also would be extremely
difficult for small landowners. The necessary conditions would ap-
pear to be a biraderi that was composed largely of such small far-
mers, and the physical proximity ofthe group in a single village or
other contiguous area. The latter element is necessary in order that
faction members may be able to protectthemselves. Unfortunately,
such distributions of holding size and kinship characteristics are
not the normal pattern in the Punjab. The result is a domination of
village life, and the institutions that serve farmers at the local level,
by the various faction leaders.
A Scenario for the Future
)
Solon Barraclough (1971) has distinguished three basic types
of national development strategies whose assumptions provide a
useful background against which to speculate about the future of
the rural areas of Pakistan; they are modernization strategies, re-
I formist strategies, and strategies for deep-seated structural change.
I Modernization strategies assume that rural development can
\
' be achieved by adopting the technologies of the developed coun-
tries without simultaneously reforming social structures. Although
there is some acknowledgment that social changes may be required
in the future, existing power relationships, current land tenure sys-
\
terns, and class structures are accepted as the starting point for
development.
\ Reformist strategies are characterized by a significant alter-
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l ation in one particular aspect ofthe economic environment, say, the
distribution ofland. However, while the land reform may seriously
~ curtail the incomes and statuses of the agrarian elite, the basic
I structure ofwealth and power in the society remains intact.
! Strategies ofdeep-seated structural change involve profound
~ alterations, not only in the land tenure system, but in the entire
social structure. For example, in addition to controlling the land
they cultivate, farmers, through their cooperatives and political par-
ties, achieve a dominant voice in all facets of agricultural policy,
including those associated with agribusiness.
The cu!r_~~~s_itl1~tionin West J><l~}_stan_C:0I1f~t:Jllsmost c1~~~y
to the first of these three classifications. The green revolution has
noF- for tile m~_~p~rt .J!l~<?J~~~Lth~uQ~~~l~pmentor~;; indige~
nousnew-technolo~y:And, as the answers to the questions on farm
size;lu·sHfiitionaf services, and village organizations imply, the
technology is being applied in a situation where almost no attempts
to alter the existing social structure have occurred. These elements
form the basis ofa prognosis that in the short run-say, over the next
five years-the forces that have produced past trends will continue
to dominate the process of structural change. Some of these will
undoubtedly be accelerated. For example, the potentials for utiliz-
ing more advanced technology on the larger holdings will certainly
continue to produce further land agglomeration. The result, at least
in a number ofareas, will be to increase further the rate ofmigration
to the urban areas.
Undoubtedly, efforts will be made to dampen the undesirable
effects of this dynamic system. Some sort of progressive taxation
s~ for agriculture may be impleme~tedduring the next-de:-'
cade f£~_~)(~mEfe. Sucli-asip~~~iI1g~ffQL<lgriculturarprofits.for
gen_~ral developmenfpuii>ose·s would both decrease the incentives
to illvest iI1 e)(pensive labor-displacing techll·ology andll10re land,
and would increase the job potential in the urban areas.
. Agricultural prices also are likely to be adjusted and brought
more into line with world market prices; the country is too poor to
do otherwise. Should surpluses of wheat, rice, and other com-
modities build up-as they are likely to-Pakistan will have to
follow a Canadian-style solution to its surplus problem; that is, the
government will operate a storage and marketing program but the
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returns to farmers will be what the commodity brings on the world
market.
With respect to input prices, those subsidies still remaining
will be elimin!1ted within a relatively short time. The instrument in
bringing both sets of prices in line could well be a devaluation of
the rupee in the not-too-distant future.
The guestion that remains, howey:~.!>_~~whetherthese types of
marginal e_<.:onomic policies can offset dis~it~~ug~neratedby~l1.e
"!~ket E!I_enomen_a!o~th~~~te_nt_necessaryto synchronize the pace
o[~_b_ange-ill-ruraLareas-.withth~__n_e_ed~J)I!he_~_o~f~!'ffi sector:~s
Johnston and Cownie have suggested, on the whole, the-an-swer to
that question leaves little room for optimism (Johnston and Cownie
1969). Using several alternative assumptions about the rate of
mechanization, tne type of technology in the nonfarm sector, the
marginal savings rate, and so forth, they conclude that extension of
recent trends would mean 20-25 percent unemployment by 1985.
As it becomes more apparent that the ingredients of the rural
system are such that, left to itself, intolerably high rates of un-
employment in both the rural and urban areas will emerge, the
government, in the interests ofself-preservation, is likely to pursue
more vigorously attempts to create institutional answers to the dis-
tributive effects of agricultural growth. The most plausible ini-
tiatives in Pakistan will involve an attempt to improve the coopera-
tive system. This is based on the hope that the productivity-and
hence the political stability---of the small farmer class can be im-
proved.
J From the earlier discussion ofthe politics ofthe rural areas, it is
likely, in my view, that this attempt will fail. The statement made
by the Presidential Study Group indicating that there appeared to
be no short-run solution to the problem of supervised credit could
be reiterated for the long run as well. So long as income and po~er
are distributed as they are, it willbeimpossible to organize class-
b~organizations capabreormJfigaJ~Ilitl:1~~i!rnulativel:lffectsof
technical change. Indeed, injecting additionaL institutional_ re-
sO~_LjIlJ:i)_tll~U:!!!~}__~~~Lc~IC:l~!?_~~~6jinterproductiye, should
th~~~Mg~~~~_':ll1!~~f.§!J.1:lsidizedc:api~algo_inth~handsgftl:1()se
farmers alreadLacQve}yinyolved in a continuous sequence of in-
novation.
The combination of rapid increases in the labor force, labor-
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displacing agricultural growth, and inadequate urban employment
opportunities is a nexus of contradictions that the society cannot
sustain in the long run. However, it is exceedingly difficult to pro-
ceed beyond this point in terms of a scenario. There is a great
temptation to join Myrdal:
What the political repercussions will be ifnothing is done
in the reform field while the trend toward increasing under-
utilization of the labor force is permitted to work for ever
greater impoverishment of the masses-somewhat in the
perspective ofthe demographic dictum, when they see a reac-
tivation ofthe Malthusian checks ifpopulation increase is not
checked-eludes my power of analysis. (MyrdaI1971:431)
Perhaps all that one can say is that the historical conditions
under which revolutions or deep-seated structural changes have
occurred are much more stringent than those surrounding reforms.
Consequently the possibility that some significant reforms in, say,
the distribution ofland will occur in the next decades in Pakistan is
not to be ruled out.
NOTES
1. This is considerably above the official figures. For a justification, see
Gotsch and Timmer (1968).
2. The one person who correctly anticipated the potential for private
tubewell installations was the late Ghulam Mohammad of the Pakistan
Institute of Development Economics. His calculations are contained in
Mohammad (1965).
3. This "naive" assumption abstracts from the possibility ofa completely
deteriorating political situation. West Pakistan is not self-sufficient in any
of the modern agricultural inputs except perhaps seed. Severe foreign
exchange constraints would surely mean significant cutbacks in factor
availability-with obvious effects on output. The longer-run outlook is
considered later in this article.
4. District-wide production data may be found in Government of Paki-
stan (1972).
5. Work by Eckert, Hussain, the Punjab Planning and Development
Department's Survey Unit, Rochin, and Loudermilk has been summarized
in Rochin (1971). For a study that shows the impact ofproximity to urban
areas on small farmers, see Naseem (1971).
6. Burki presents the thesis in chapter 15 that there is a causal link
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between the increased use ofmodem inputs and the advent ofavenues of
political participation via the Basic Democracies. While such a hypothesis
is admittedly difficult to pin down, it deserves extensive investigation for
its implication regarding the future political behavior ofinnovative groups:
See also Burki (1971).
7. The notion of"institutions" used here corresponds to what Gintis has
called a "politically integrated decision-making mechanism," Le., a con-
scious and articulated apparatus for carrying out the plans and programs of
an individual or group ofindividuals. It is to be contrasted to the use ofthe
word "institutions" when such concepts as "the market" or "private prop-
erty" are the foci of discussion (Gintis 1970).
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rAppendix. Trend Rates of Growth by Region and Commodity, 1959/60-1969/70
North-West
Crop West Pakistan Frontier Province Punjab Baluchistan Sind
Rate Signifi- Rate Signifi- Rate Signifi- Rate Signifi- Rate Signifi-
(%) R2 cance (%) R2 cance (%) R2 cance (%) R2 cance (%) R2 cance
Total Gross 5.9 .94 * * 5.2 .76 * 6.1 .92 * * 7.9 .74 5.8 .95 * *
Value
Wheat 6.1 .73 * * 1.6 .21 * 6.2 .46 * 7.8 .62 * 7.4 .79 * *
Rice 7.9 .86 * * 15.0 .81 9.0 .84 * * 9.1 .81 * 6.4 .79 * *
Barley -3.2 .39 * -6.0 .46 2.7 .24 .4 - 7.3 .58 * *
Maize 4.7 .79 * * 4.2 .75 4.2 .56 * * 6.8 .37 14.2 .90 * *
Jowar 2.1 .45 * 3.8 .32 2.0 .25 ILl .84 1.2 .15 *
Bajra - .1 2.4 .52 .3 -.03 - .9 .01
Gram -2.0 .34 -8.9 .26 -3.0 .60 * * 3.0 .37
Tobacco
Sugarcane 7.5 .84 * * 5.8 .74 7.3 .82 * * 12.5 .68 * *
(Gur)
Cotton 6.7 .96 * * 2.6 .15 7.3 .93 * * 5.1 .66
Rapeseed - .2 5.8 .40 - .5 -.02 -Ll .02
& Mustard
SOURCE: Government of Pakistan 1972.
* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level
GLOSSARY
AMAN. The summer rice crop in Bangladesh, grown from mid-July
through December.
ARZAL. "Lowest of the low"; denotes the lowest status in the traditional
South Asian Muslim class hierarchy.
ATRAF. Low class; denotes a grouping of low status in the traditional
South Asian Muslim class hierarchy.
Aus. The spring rice crop in Bangladesh, grown from late March through
mid-August.
AWANI LEAGUE. The political party, founded in 1953, which led
Bangladesh to independence. Presently in power, with Prime Minis-
ter Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at its head.
BAJRA. Pearl millet.
BARANI. Land or crops that depend on rainfall for water-nonirrigated.
BARI. Locus (homestead) ofan extended peasant family, usually consisting
of groups of households.
BASIC DEMOCRAT. An elected union counselor in the Basic Democracies
system of government, usually representing a population of about
1,250 (see BASIC DEMOCRACIES).
BASIC DEMOCRACIES. The five-tiered (union, thana, district, division, and
province) system of government proclaimed for Pakistan by Ayub
Khan in October 1959.
BATA!. On share, as when renting land.
BIRADARI, BIRADERI. Patrilineal descent group and basic institution of
kinship in North India and the Pakistani Punjab; emphasizes horizon-
tal ties among contemporaries as well as agnatic descent and can be
thought of as a brotherhood.
BORO. The winter rice crop inBangladesh, grown in the dry season from
December through March, usually requiring irrigation.
CHAUKIDARI PANCHAYAT. A village council established in East Bengal in
1870 to finance and supervise village watchmen.
CIRCLE OFFICER. The general administrative officer ofa thana, consisting
of a circle of grouping of unions. The lowest level of central adminis-
tration in Bangladesh.
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CIVIL SERVICE OF PAKISTAN. A group of officers given major administra-
tive responsibilities in Pakistan, who are selected at a young age by
examination. Patterned after the British colonial Indian Civil Service.
CROPPING INTENSITY INDEX. Land area ofall crops grown during one year
divided by the land area used to grow those crops multiplied by 100;
for example, 2 crops on the same land would have a cropping index of
200.
CRORE. 10,000,000 punctuated thus: 1,00,00,000. One hundred lakh.
DESI. Of the country, native or traditional, as in native crops.
DISTRICT. Major governmental administrative unit in Pakistan and
Bangladesh, thirty-four in Pakistan and nineteen in Bangladesh.
DEWAN. The finance minister ofa province or territory under control ofthe
Mogul empire, responsible especially for land revenue policy.
DOAB. Area ofsparcely settled desert land between the rivers and canals in
Pakistan, especially in the Punjab.
DUBARI. The general name given winter crops sown in the residual mois-
ture of rice fields.
DWARF WHEAT. New high-yielding strains with short, strong stems, re-
cently introduced into Pakistan and initially developed in Mexico
with Rockefeller Foundation support.
DYARCHY. Dual system of government established by the Government of
India Act of 1919, which reserved certain administrative functions for
the provincial governors and transferred others to elected legislative
councils.
GRAM. 1. Any of several leguminous plants grown for their seeds. 2. Ben-
gali word for village.
IZZAT. Honor, status; refers to the perquisites of one's social standing.
JATS. Large landowning caste groups in the Punjab who personally engage
in agricultural work.
JOWAR. Any ofa number of grain sorghums or millet.
KHARIF. The summer crop season in Pakistan, extending from April/May
to October INovember.
LArrn. 100,000 punctuated thus: 1,00,000.
LAMBARDAR. An agent appOinted by the revenue administration under
British colonial rule for the collection of land revenue in a small re-
venue unit. Sometimes a hereditary office. (See also Numberdar.)
MAHALWARI SYSTEM. A land revenue system of north and northwest In-
dia, evolved in the nineteenth century; it lumped land held by pat-
rilineal kin groups into single revenue estates (mahals) and made
proprietors individually and collectively responsible for paying the
land tax.
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MANDl TOWN. Small agricultural market town.
MATABBAR. A traditional village leader in Bangladesh. (See also Sardar.)
MATRICULATE. Secondary school graduate who has completed eleven
years of education.
MAUND. A south Asian unit of weight measurement, equivalent to 82.29
pounds.
MAUZA. A village-level revenue unit under the Moguls, still in use today.
MODEL FARMER. In the Comilla cooperative system, a villager designated
by the village cooperative to receive training in improved agricultural
practices at the thana central cooperative. He has the responsibility to
pass on new knowledge to fellow cooperative members in the village.
MOFFUSIL. n. Rural areas, provinces; adj. provincial.
MONSOON. Heavy, rainy summer season resulting in much flooding in
Bangladesh.
MUKHTI BAHINI. Bengali guerillas, "freedom fighters," a term used in the
hostilities of 1971; literally 'liberation forces'.
MUSLIM. A believer in Islam, the religion of the Prophet Mohammed.
MUSLIM LEAGUE. A Muslim nationalist political party, which at Partition
in 1947 was led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah. The party of Ayub Khan.
MUSTAJIR. A revenue farmer, a collector whose rights were temporary, as
opposed to fixed, in the Mogul revenue system in Bengal.
NAWAB. A landed aristocrat, Mogul period especially.
NAZIM. Governor of a province under the Mogul empire.
NUMBERDAR. A revenue-collecting headman found in north and northwest
India, including post-1947 Pakistan. (See Also Lambardar)
PAKISTAN PEOPLES' PARTY. The political party of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
which aided his victory at the polls in December 1970, in West Paki-
stan.
PANCHAYAT. Traditional village governmental unit.
PARGANA. A Mogul unit ofland revenue that covered a number ofrevenue
villages (mauza) in Bengal.
PATWARI. Keeper of land records at the village level in Pakistan.
PERMANENT SETTLEMENT. The revenue settlement or arrangements, es-
tablished in Bengal in 1793 by Lord Cornwallis, fixing "in perpetuity"
the amount of land revenue each zamindar would be responsible for
collecting; the Permanent Settlement is associated with the estab-
lishment of zamindari landlordism in Bengal.
RABI. The winter cropping season in Pakistan and Bangladesh extending
from October/November to April/May.
RYOT. Peasant proprietor; cultivator.
RAJ. Literally, 'rule', from Indic words associated with kings, kingdoms;
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often used to denote British rule in India, that is, the "British Raj."
REAl, REYAl. A traditional social grouping of homesteads in rural Bangla-
desh.
RUPEE. Unit of currency in Pakistan. From 1959 to 1971, the official ex-
change rate- was Rs. 4.76 = $1.00 or about $0.21 = R.
SADR. Term denoting official headquarters ofa political and administrative
area in Mogul Bengal. An area often controlled by one zamindar.
SAHUKAR. Professional village moneylender in nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century Punjab, usually ofthe Barna, Khatri, or Arora castes.
SAMAJ. A multivillage political institution or council ofelders traditionally
used for the settlement of disputes.
SARDAR. A traditional village leader in Bangladesh. (See also Matabbar.)
SHARIF. High class; denotes a grouping of the highest status in the tradi-
tional South Asian Muslim class hierarchy.
SHEIKH. Generally an bId man or influential person, head ofa tribe. One of
the traditionally upper-class groups in Muslim South Asia.
SIKH. Member ofa religiOUS and social group (The Sikhs) whose existence
dates from the late fifteenth century; an offshoot of the Bhakti "devo-
tional" movement fusing elements of Hinduism and Islam. The
historical homeland of the Sikhs was the undivided Punjab, but after
the Partition of 1947, most Sikhs living in the Pakistani Punjab mi-
grated to India. Few live in Pakistan today.
SYED. A person who claims direct descent from the Prophet Mohammed,
through his daughter, Fatima.
TA'ALUQ. A subholding ofa zamindari estate, the rights ofrevenue collec-
tion dependent upon a grant of authority from the zamindar.
TA'ALUQDAR. Proprietor and revenue collector of a ta'aluq.
TACCAVI LOAN. A loan advanced by government in situations ofdistress, or
for agricultural production.
TARAFDAR. Revenue collector under the Mogul system holding revenue
recollection rights to several villages in Bengal.
TEHSIL. A subdivision of a district, smallest major administrative unit in
Pakistan (a county).
TEHSILDAR. The revenue official of a tehsil.
THANA. The governmental administrative unit next below the subdivi-
sional level in Bangladesh. The lowest level to which government
officials are usually posted. Could be compared with a county in the
United States. Literally a 'police station'.
UNION. The lowest level of government, under the thana, in the Basic
Democracies system; amalgamates a number oflocal villages.
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UNION COUNCIL. The group of elected representatives of a union.
V-AID. The village agricultural and industrial development program in the
1950s in Pakistan.
ZAILDAR. A well-to-do farmer, appointed as agent for the collection of
revenue from a zail, an area of a village or less.
ZAMINDAR. A person given rights to land revenue collection under the
Moguls. After the Permanent Settlement in Bengal in 1793, these
rights were fixed in perpetuity, which strengthened the landlord class.
More generally, landlord.
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